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Preface 
 
Energy demands due to economic growth and increasing population must be satisfied 
in a sustainable manner assuring inherent safety, efficiency and no or minimized 
environmental impact. New energy sources and systems must be inherently safe and 
environmentally benign. These considerations are among the reasons that lead to 
serious interest in deploying nuclear power as a sustainable energy source. Today’s 
nuclear reactors are safe and highly efficient energy systems that offer electricity and a 
multitude of co-generation energy products ranging from potable water to heat for 
industrial applications. At the same time, catastrophic earthquake and tsunami events 
in Japan resulted in the nuclear accident that forced us to rethink our approach to 
nuclear safety, design requirements and facilitated growing interests in advanced 
nuclear energy systems, next generation nuclear reactors, which are inherently capable 
to withstand natural disasters and avoid catastrophic consequences without any 
environmental impact. 
This book is one in a series of books on nuclear power published by InTech. Under the 
single-volume cover, we put together such topics as operation, safety, environment, 
and radiation effects. The book is not offering a comprehensive coverage of the 
material in each area. Instead, selected themes are highlighted by authors of individual 
chapters representing contemporary interests worldwide. Our book consists of three 
major sections housing sixteen chapters: 
Part 1. Operation and Safety 
1. World Experience in Nuclear Steam Reheat 
2. Integrated Approach for Actual Safety Analysis 
3. LWR Safety Analysis and Licensing and Implications for Advanced Reactors  
4. Geodetic Terrestrial Observations for the Determination of the Stability in the  
Krško Nuclear Power Plant Region 
5. Low Power and Shutdown PSA for the Nuclear Power Plants with WWER440 
Type Reactors 
6. A Study on the Actuator Efficiency Behavior of Safety-Related Motor 
Operated Gate and Globe Valves 
7. Investigation of High Energy Arcing Fault Events in Nuclear Power Plants 
8. Research on Severe Accidents in Nuclear Power Plants 
X Preface 
 
9. Imaging of Radiation Accidents and Radioactive Contamination Using 
Scintillators 
10. Simulation of Ex-Vessel Steam Explosion 
Part 2. Environmental Effects 
11. Radiological Releases and Environmental Monitoring at Commercial Nuclear 
Power Plants 
12. Radiological and Environmental Effects in Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant 
Cooling Pond – Lake Druksiai: From Plant put in Operation to Shut Down 
Period of Time 
13. Power Uprate Effect on Thermal Effluent of Nuclear Power Plants in Taiwan 
Part 3. Radiation Effects 
14. Long-Term Effects of Exposure to Low-Levels of Radioactivity: a 
Retrospective Study of 239Pu and 90Sr from Nuclear Bomb Tests on the Swiss 
Population 
15. The Biliprotein C-Phycocyanin Modulates the DNA Damage Response in 
Lymphocytes from Nuclear Power Plant Workers 
16. Effects of Gamma-Ray Irradiation on Tracking Failure of Polymer Insulating 
Materials 
Our opening section is devoted to nuclear power operation and safety. The discussion 
begins with an overview of nuclear steam supply systems that focuses on steam 
reheat. The second chapter introduces the integrated safety analysis approach. Further 
chapters introduce readers to licensing, probabilistic safety analysis, component 
operation and safety. The section closes with chapters surveying approaches and 
topics related to severe accident studies.  
The second section is dedicated to environmental effects of nuclear power. Included 
chapters address radiological release monitoring and consequences as well as thermal 
prolusion.  
The third and final section discusses radiation effects on general population, plant 
workers and materials. 
With all diversity of topics in 16 chapters, the integrated system analysis approach of 
nuclear power operation, safety and environment is the common thread. The “system-
thinking” approach allows synthesizing the entire body of provided information into a 
consistent integrated picture of the real-life complex engineering system – nuclear 
power system – where everything is working together. 
The goal of the book is to bring nuclear power to our readers as one of the promising 
energy sources that has a unique potential to meet energy demands with minimized 
environmental impact, near-zero carbon footprint, and competitive economics via 
robust potential applications. The book targets everyone as its potential readership 
 Preface XI 
 
groups - students, researchers and practitioners - who are interested to learn about 
nuclear power. The idea is to facilitate intellectual cross-fertilization between field 
experts and non-field experts taking advantage of methods and tools developed by 
both groups. The book will hopefully inspire future research and development efforts, 
innovation by stimulating ideas.  
We hope our readers will enjoy the book and will find it both interesting and useful. 
 
Pavel V. Tsvetkov 
Department of Nuclear Engineering 
Texas A&M University 
United States of America 

Part 1 
Operation and Safety 
 
1 
World Experience in Nuclear Steam Reheat 
Eugene Saltanov and Igor Pioro 
University of Ontario Institute of Technology (UOIT) 
Faculty of Energy Systems and Nuclear Science 
Canada 
1. Introduction 
Concepts of nuclear reactors cooled with water at supercritical pressures were studied as 
early as the 1950s and 1960s in the USA and Russia. After a 30-year break, the idea of 
developing nuclear reactors cooled with SuperCritical Water (SCW) became attractive again 
as the ultimate development path for water cooling. This statement is based on the known 
history of the thermal power industry, which made a “revolutionary” step forward from the 
level of subcritical pressures (15 – 16 MPa) to the level of supercritical pressures (23.5 – 35 
MPa) more than fifty years ago with the same major objective as that of SuperCritcal Water-
cooled Reactors (SCWRs) − to increase thermal efficiency of power plants by 10 – 15%. The 
main objectives of using SCW in nuclear reactors are: 1) to increase the thermal efficiency of 
modern Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) from 30 – 35% to about 45 – 50%, and 2) to decrease 
capital and operational costs and hence, decrease electrical-energy costs. 
To achieve higher thermal efficiency a nuclear steam reheat has to be introduced inside a 
reactor. Currently, all supercritical turbines at thermal power plants have a steam-reheat 
option. In the 60’s and 70’s, Russia, USA and some other countries have developed and 
implemented the nuclear steam reheat at a subcritical pressure in experimental boiling 
reactors. Therefore, it is important to summarize the experience of implementing nuclear 
steam reheat at several experimental Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) worldwide and utilize 
it in the context of development of SCWRs with the steam-reheat option. 
2. USA experience in nuclear steam reheat 
An active program for the development and demonstration of BWRs with nuclear steam 
reheat was implemented and directed by the United States Atomic Energy Commission 
(USAEC). Two general types of the reactors were demonstrated:  
1. Reactors in which steam was generated and reheated in the same core (integral 
reheating design); and 
2. Reactors, which only used reheated steam that was supplied from another source 
(separate reheating design); 
Under the USAEC program, the following reactors were constructed: BOiling Reactor 
Experiment V (BORAX–V, started operation in December of 1962), BOiling NUclear 
Superheater (BONUS, started operation in December of 1964), and Pathfinder (started 
operation in July of 1966). Main parameters of these reactors are listed in Tables 1 and 2 
(Novick et al. 1965). 
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At the design stage of these reactors a certain number of problems arising with the 
implementation of steam reheat were encountered and addressed. Among them were: 
1. Fuel-element sheath performance and corrosion resistance at high temperatures; 
2. Corrosion, erosion, and deposits on fuel-element surfaces due to ineffective steam 
separation prior to the reheating-zone inlet; 
3. Maintenance of the desired power split in the evaporating and reheating zones during 
extended reactor operation; 
4. Fission products carry-over in direct-cycle systems; And 
5. Reactivity changes as a result of inadvertent flooding of the reheating zone. 
In search of the solutions to these problems USAEC also instituted a number of programs to 
determine long-term integrity and behavior of the fuel-element sheath. Since May of 1959, 
the Superheat Advance Demonstration Experiment (SADE) and the subsequent Expanded 
SADE (ESADE) loops had been utilized to irradiate a total of 21 fuel elements in the 
Vallecitos BWR. Saturated steam at about 6.9 MPa from the Vallecitos BWR was supplied to 
the fuel-element section where it was superheated to temperatures of 418 – 480°C. The 
results of those irradiation tests combined with out-of-core corrosion tests led to the 
following conclusions (Novick et al. 1965):  
1. Commercial 18-8 stainless steel (18-8 SS) was not satisfactory for fuel-sheath material in 
the SuperHeated Steam (SHS) environment it was subjected to in the SADE and ESADE 
experiments; 
2. Materials with higher nickel-alloy content, such as Inconels and Incoloys, appeared to 
perform satisfactorily as a sheath material in the SHS environment; And 
3. Strain cycling coupled with environmental chemistry were significant in the failure rate 
of sheath materials for reactors with the steam reheat. 
Additional information on design of these reactors constructed under the USAEC program 
can be found in USAEC reports 1959, 1961, and 1962 and in Ross (1961). 
 
Parameters 
BORAX–V BONUS Pathfinder 
Zone Zone Zone 
Boiling SHS Boiling SHS Boiling SHS 
Structural 
material (core) A1(X8001) SS Zr–2 SS-248 Zr–2 SS 
Fuel type Rod Plate Rod Rod Rod Annular 
Fuel material UO2 
UO2–SS 
cermet UO2 UO2 UO2 
UO2–SS 
cermet 
Fuel enrichment, 
% 4.95 93 2.4 3.25 2.2 93 
Sheath material SS-304 SS-304L Zr–2 Inconel Zr–2 SS-316L 
Control rod 
shape 
Cruciform 
and "T" 
Cruciform 
and "T" Cruciform Slab Cruciform Round rod 
Control rod 
material Boral Boral 
1.0%wt10B 
in SS 
1.0% wt10B 
in SS 
2% wt10B in 
SS 
2% wt10B in 
SS 
Average power 
density, 
MWth/m3 
42.5 40.5 33.6 11.5 45.2 46.5 
Table 1. Main general parameters of BWR NPPs with integral reheat design (Novick et al. 
1965). 
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Parameters BORAX–V BONUS Pathfinder 
Electric power, MWel (gross) 3.5 17.5 66 
Electric power, MWel (net) 3.5 16.5 62.5 
Thermal power, MWth 20 50 200 
Reheat loop to evaporating loop power ratio 0.21 0.35 0.22 
Gross cycle thermal efficiency, % – 35 33 
Net cycle thermal efficiency, % – 33 31 
NPP steam cycle Direct Direct Direct 
Reheating-zone location Central or Peripheral Peripheral Central 
Nominal operating pressure, MPa 4.1 6.7 4.1 
Table 2. Main thermal parameters of BWR NPPs with integral reheat design (Novick et al. 
1965). 
The major conclusion, which is based on the USA experience with the nuclear steam reheat, 
is that the nuclear steam reheat is possible, and higher thermal efficiencies can be achieved, 
but this feature requires more complicated reactor-core design and better materials. 
3. Russian experience in nuclear steam reheat 
This section presents a unique compilation of materials that overviews all major aspects of 
operating experience of the first in the world industrial NPP with implemented nuclear 
steam reheat. 
3.1 General information 
Reactors with the nuclear steam reheat were also developed in the former Soviet Union. 
Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) was the first NPP in the world where the nuclear 
steam reheat was implemented. Two reactors (100 MWe and 200 MWe) were installed with 
identical steam parameters at the turbine inlet (Pin = 8.8 MPa and Tin = 500 – 510C). The first 
reactor (Unit 1) was put into operation on April 26, 1964, and the second reactor (Unit 2) − 
on December 29, 1967. Both reactors have similar dimensions and design. However, the flow 
diagram and the core arrangement were significantly simplified in Unit 2, compared to that 
of Unit 1. Schematics and simplified layouts of the BNPP Units 1 and 2 are shown in Figures 
1 and 2. 
 
Operation of BNPP has proved the feasibility of steam-reheat implementation on an 
industrial scale. Major results of the BNPP operation are listed below (Petrosyants 1969): 
1. Reactor start-up from the cold state was achieved without external heat sources. The 
reactor heat-up was carried out at 10% power until the water temperature in the 
separators reached 285 – 300C at 8.8 MPa. Levels in the separators were formed during 
heat-up. Transition from water to steam cooling in the SHS channels did not cause 
significant reactivity changes. 
2. The radial neutron flux flattening achieved was one of the best among operating 
reactors. The radial neutron flux irregularity coefficient, Kir, for both units was 1.28 – 
1.30, while the design values were: Kir = 1.46 for Unit 1 and Kir = 1.24 for Unit 2. 
3. Radioactivity in the turbine and technological equipment of the plant is an important 
indicator for NPP. Radiation rates at the high-pressure cylinders were not higher than 
10 µR/s and not higher than 8 µR/s at the low-pressure cylinders. Such low dose rates 
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were attained by implementation of fuel elements that eliminated the possibility of 
fission-fragment activity transported via the coolant loop. BNPP operation experience 
showed that radiation levels near Unit 1 equipment were significantly lower than that 
of other operating reactors, and releases of radioactive products into the atmosphere 
were 5 – 10 times lower than allowed by codes. 
 
 
(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 – Reheated steam; – Saturated steam; 
 – Water-steam mixture; – Water. 
Fig. 1. BNPP Unit 1 (a) and Unit 2 (b) general schematics of thermodynamic cycle 
(Yurmanov et al. 2009a): 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 2. Simplified layout of BNPP Unit 1 (a) and Unit 2 (b) (Petrosyants 1969): 1 – circulation 
pump; 2 – reactor; 3 – Boiling Water (BW) channels; 4 – SHS channels; 5 – steam separator; 6 
– Steam Generator (SG); 7 – economizer; 8 – bubbler; and 9 – Feed Water Pump (FWP). 
3.2 Cycle development  
Reliability, simple design, and efficiency are the main criteria when choosing the flow 
diagram for both the fossil and nuclear power plants. Special requirements for 
impermeability and water regime are specified for NPPs. Additionally, the reasonable 
development of temperature regimes for fuel channels allows safe power increase for the a 
reactor size. 
Several layouts of thermodynamic cycles for a NPP with a uranium-graphite reactor were 
considered for the BNPP (see Figure 3). In the considered layouts the coolant was either 
boiling water or superheated steam. Feasibility of the NPP designs was also taken into 
account (Dollezhal et al. 1958). 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
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(d) 
 
(e) 
 
(f) 
Fig. 3. Possible layouts of NPPs with steam reheat (Dollezhal et al. 1958): 1 – reactor; 2 – 
steam separator; 3 – SG; 4 – Main Circulation Pump (MCP); 5 – circulation pump; 6 – turbine 
with electrical generator; 7 – FWP; and 8 – intermediate-steam reheater. 
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Layout (a). A steam separator, steam generator (consisting of preheating, boiling and steam-
superheating sections), and two circulation pumps are included in the primary coolant loop. 
Water and very high-pressure steam are the primary coolants. High- and intermediate-
pressure steam is generated in the secondary loop and directed to the turbine. 
Layout (b). Direct-cycle layout. Steam from a reactor flows directly to a turbine. The turbine 
does not require an intermediate-steam reheat. 
Layout (c). Steam from a reactor flows directly to a turbine. The turbine requires the 
intermediate-steam reheat. The reactor has three types of operating fuel channels: 1) water 
preheating, 2) evaporating-boiling, and 3) steam-superheating. 
Layout (d). Direct-cycle layout. The evaporation and reheat are achieved inside a reactor. 
The turbine does not require the intermediate-steam reheat. 
Layout (e). Direct-cycle layout. One or two intermediate-steam reheats are required. 
Layout (f). Water circulates in the closed loop consisting of a reactor, steam separator, 
preheater, and circulation pump. Partial evaporation is achieved in the first group of 
channels. Steam exiting the steam separator is directed to the boiling section of the steam 
generator and condenses there. Condensate from the boiler is mixed with water from the 
separator. The cooled water is fed to a preheater and then directed to circulation pumps. 
The generated steam on the secondary side is superheated in the second group of channels 
and then directed to the turbine.  
Layouts (b–e) were not recommended due to unpredictable water-chemistry regimes at 
various locations throughout the thermodynamic cycle. Layout (a) with the secondary-
steam reheat required high pressures and temperatures in the primary loop. Circulation 
pumps with different parameters (power and pressure) were used to feed common header 
upstream of the channels of the primary group. In this respect, Layout (a) was considerably 
more complex and expensive than Layout (f). Activation of SHS, which could occur in 
Layout (f), was not considered to be posing any significant complications to the turbine 
operation, and hence remained a viable option (Dollezhal et al. 1958). 
From the considerations above, Layout (f) was chosen to be developed at the BNPP Unit 1. 
Surface-corrosion products in the secondary loop and salts in condenser coolant were 
trapped in the steam generator and removed from it during purging. Additionally, modern 
separators provided steam of high quality, which resulted in very low salt deposits in the 
turbine. 
3.3 Beloyarsk NPP reactor design  
The reactor was placed in a cylindrical concrete cavity, where a 3-m thick wall served as a 
part of the biological shield. A cooled ferro-concrete base of the reactor with six base jacks 
was implemented on the bottom of the cavity. The bottom bedplate attached to the bottom 
supporting ring was held by jacks. Cooling coils were placed on the bottom of the bedplate 
to provide its cooling. 
The cylindrical graphite stack (3 m in diameter and 4.5 m in height) of the reactor was 
installed on the bottom bedplate. The stack was made of columns, assembled of hexagonal 
blocks (0.12-m width across corners) in the center and of sectors in the periphery. The 
central part of the stack was penetrated by vertical operating channels (long graphite 
cylinders containing inner thin steel tubes with fuel elements). The reactor core (7.2-m 
diameter and 6-m height) was surrounded with a 0.8-m thick graphite reflector. An 
additional 1-m thick graphite layer and an approximately 0.5-m cast-iron layer over the 
upper reflector formed the principal part of the biological shield. A 0.6-m thick graphite 
layer serving as the lower neutron shield was located below the lower reflector. 
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The graphite stack (9.6-m overall diameter and 9.0-m height) was enclosed in a gas-tight 
cylindrical carbon-steel shell filled with nitrogen to prevent graphite deterioration. The 
outer graphite blocks were penetrated by steel uprights with horizontal lateral braces in 
several places along their height. The entire stack rested on the bottom bedplate. The 
graphite stack was covered on the top with a plate carrying standpipes with openings for 
the insertion of operating channels. The piping for feeding the coolant to the fuel bundles 
and for removing the coolant water from control rods was located between the 
standpipes. The piping of the operating channels and protective coating failure-detection 
system was also located between the standpipes. The plate rested on supports installed on 
the tank of the side water shield. The plate was connected with the graphite stack shell by 
means of a compensator, which allowed both for vertical elongations of the shell and 
horizontal elongations of the plate, which occurred during heating (Emelyanov et al. 
1982). 
As shown in Figure 4, the reactor had 1134 operating channels and contained 998 fuel 
channels, 6 automatic control rods, 78 channels for reactivity compensating rods, 16 shut-
down rods, and 36 channels for ionization chambers and counters. The fuel channels were 
represented with 730 BW channels, also referred to as evaporating channels, and 268 SHS 
channels, also referred to as steam-reheat channels.  
The main parameters of the BNPP reactors are listed in Table 3. 
3.4 Physical parameters of Beloyarsk NPP reactors 
Flattening of a power distribution was achieved at the BNPP with physical profiling: 
appropriate distribution of control rods and fuel channels of different uranium enrichment 
(for fresh load) and profiling of burn-up fuel along the reactor radius. The reactor load 
consisted of SHS channels of 2% and 3% uranium enrichments (SHS-2 and SHS-3, 
respectively) and BW channels. The BW channels were located in rings in alternate locations 
with SHS-2. SHS-3 were located along the circumference and had lower pressure losses in 
the steam circuit (Dollezhal et al. 1964). 
Neutronics calculations were made to choose optimal distribution of channels to achieve 
required power shape. Most of the calculations for the core-reactor physics were 
performed in the 2-group approximation. In accordance with the fuel-channels 
distribution the core was represented by four cylindrical regions with the radii: R1 = 175 
cm (234 fuel channels), R2 = 268 cm (324 fuel channels), R3 = 316 cm (220 fuel channels), 
and R4 = 358 cm (220 fuel channels). The previous calculations and operating experience 
of large uranium-graphite reactors with relatively small neutron leakage showed that a 
simplified schematic could be used when neutron distribution in the reactor is determined 
by the multiplication characteristics of the reactor regions. The multiplications constants 
obtained for the 4 regions (kinf,1 = 1.013, kinf,2 = 1.021, kinf,3 = 1.043, and kinf,4 = 1.045) allowed 
flattening of the neutron distribution along the reactor radius with Kir = 1.20 – 1.25. The 
increase in the multiplication constants values to the periphery of the reactor was attained 
by placing fuel channels with 3% uranium enrichment. Refuelling schemes and, therefore, 
fuel burn-up at different regions were chosen such as to allow designed power flattening 
in the end of the campaign, with corresponding values of kinf,i. Control rods insertion in 
the core maintained kinf,i values in the necessary limits during normal operation (Vikulov 
et al. 1971).  
 
World Experience in Nuclear Steam Reheat 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. BNPP Unit 1 channels layout (Pioro et al. 2010, this figure is based on the paper by 
Dollezhal et al. 1958). 
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Parameters BNPP Unit 1 (730 BWs & 268 SHSs)
BNPP Unit 2 
(732 BWs & 266 SHSs) 
Electrical power, MWel 100 200 
Number of K-100-90-type turbines 1 2 
Inlet-steam pressure, MPa 8.5 7.3 
Inlet-steam temperature, ºC 500 501 
Gross thermal efficiency, % 36.5 36.6 
Total metal content (top & bottom plates, 
vessel, biological shielding tank, etc.), t 1800 1800 
Weight of separator drums, t 94 156 
Weight of circulation loop, t 110 110 
Weight of graphite stacking, t 810 810 
Uranium load, t 67 50 
Specific load, MWth/t 4.3 11.2 
Uranium enrichment, % 1.8 3.0 
Specific electrical-energy production, 
MWeldays/t 4000 10000 
Square lattice pitch, mm 200 200 
Core dimensions, m:         Diameter 
Height 
7.2 
6 
7.2 
6 
Table 3. Main parameters of BNPP reactors (Aleshchenkov et al. 1964; Dollezhal et al. 1969, 
1971). 
One of the requirements to be met when implementing nuclear steam reheat is to maintain a 
constant specified power split (π) between SHS and BW channels during the operating 
period. The SHS channel temperature up to 520C at the BNPP was obtained by setting  = 
0.41 at the optimum parameters of the thermodynamic cycle. The number of SHS channels 
was chosen to provide a -value of 0.41 at the partial refuelling scheme where the Kir  1.25. 
The steady-state regime was characterized with small fluctuations of approximately 1% in 
the -value between the refuellings. Circular arrangement of SHS channels (Unit 1) had an 
advantage of small -sensitivity to the changes in radial neutron flux distributions, while for 
central arrangement of SHS channels (Unit 2)  values were more sensitive (see Table 4). 
 
 0.408 0.429 0.452 0.494 
Keff 1.20 1.36 1.53 1.78 
Table 4. Steam-superheating-zone power to boiling-zone power ratio () dependence on 
neutron flux Keff for BNPP Unit 2 (Vikulov et al. 1971). 
However, preference was given to the central arrangement of SHS channels, because this 
allowed attaining a higher -value (around 12% higher) with the same number of SHS 
channels. Additionally, central arrangement of SHS channels provided better multiplication 
characteristics than BW channels. SHS channels were placed in the central region to increase 
average fuel burn-up by 10%. It should be noted, that during the initial operation period the 
burn-up rates were different for BW and SHS channels of fresh load, which led to an 
unbalance of power between superheating and boiling zones. Figure 5 shows the calculated 
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dependence of -values and power variations for different types of fuel channels on the 
power generated by the reactor (Vikulov et al. 1971). 
Calculations were performed assuming Kir  1.25. A fast decrease in the superheating-zone 
power relative to that of the boiling zone in the initial period was accounted for by a lower 
power change in SHS channels due to slightly higher fuel conversion in the low enriched SHS-
2. Practically achieved values of Kir were approximately 1.4 for Unit 1 and 1.3 for Unit 2. 
One of the features of the uranium-graphite reactors cooled with water is the possibility of 
reactivity change with water-content change in the reactor. Substitution of boiling water with 
steam in the operating channels leads to the rapid change of coolant average density. Failure of 
a fuel-element sheath is another possibility of water-content change that was considered while 
designing the BNPP reactors. The chosen core lattice with respect to reactivity change turned 
out to be weakly dependent on water-content changes. It was explained by the compensation 
of effects of increased resonance neutrons captured by increased water content and an increase 
at the same time of non-productive neutrons absorption (Dollezhal et al. 1964). Normalized 
thermal-neutrons distribution along the operating channel cell was studied experimentally for 
the reactor lattice as shown in Figure 6   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Channel power ratios and power split between SHS and BW channels () 
dependences on burnup produced by BNPP Unit 2 during the first operating period 
(Vikulov et al. 1971): SHS-3 – superheated steam channel with 3% uranium enrichment and 
SHS-2 – superheated steam channel with 2% uranium enrichment. 
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The gradients in the normalized thermal-neutrons distributions along the reactor radius and 
height for both units indicated a significant disturbance in the normalized thermal-neutron 
flux near the outer edge of the reactor likely where the steam-reheat channels end affecting 
the power distribution. The results indicate a more stable distribution for the BNPP Unit 2. 
Distribution deformation near the end of operating period was explained by non-uniform 
fuel burn-up. The results proved a possibility of elementary diffusion-theory application for 
determining neutron distributions and showed the impact of the arrangement of the 
superheated-steam channels on power distribution. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Normalized thermal-neutrons-density distribution along cell of the operating channel 
(Dollezhal et al. 1958): 1 – experimental curve and 2 – design curve. 
3.5 Boiling-water channels 
Fault-free operation of BW channels was achieved with reliable crisis-free cooling of bundles 
and avoiding interchannel and subchannel pulsations of the coolant-flow rate. The 
appropriate experiments were performed during design of the BNPP. As the result of 
increased power, the inner diameter of the fuel element was increased from 8.2 mm for Unit 
1 to 10.8 mm for Unit 2. Note that an annular-fuel design is used and increasing the inner 
diameter results in thinner fuel and lower-centerline temperatures. Coolant is on the inside 
of the annular fuel and graphite is on the outside of the fuel. 
Experiments were performed at different pressures and equal heat flux, steam content and 
coolant mass fluxes and showed that wall temperature increases at the boiling crisis was 
higher when coolant pressure was lowered. At the same time, with the lowered coolant 
pressure the critical steam content increased. The experiments on hydrodynamic stability 
showed that mass-flux pulsations within the region of high steam content did not introduce 
danger for the BNPP reactors, because nominal pressure in the evaporating loop was 8.8 
MPa and steam content at the channels outlet was not higher than 35%. Wall-temperature 
oscillations were in the phase with the subchannel flow-rate pulsations. With the increased 
pressure both the amplitude of temperature oscillations and coolant flow rate decreased. 
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The same effect occurred at the decreased heat flux and increased flow rate per channel. 
Wall-temperature oscillations were within the range of 65C at 1000 kg/h flow rate and 30C 
at 1500 kg/h flow rate at constant pressure of 4.9 MPa and 0.2 MW power (Dollezhal et al. 
1964). 
Fuel elements of larger inner diameter used at Unit 2 compared to that of Unit 1 allowed to 
lower heat flux and hydraulic resistance. With the equal outer diameter (20 mm), fuel 
elements inner diameter of the BWs at Unit 1 were 9.4  0.6 mm while that of Unit 2  12  
0.6 mm. Diameter of the central tube for feeding the coolant was also increased. There were 
no other differences in the BWs construction used at BNPP Units 1 and 2. Uranium-
molybdenum alloy with magnesium filler was used as fuel in the BWs. 
3.6 Superheated-steam channels 
At the BNPP, SHS channels were operated at higher temperatures compared to those in 
the BW channels and, therefore, limited the choice of fuel composite and materials. The 
development of fuel elements for SHS channels underwent several stages. Preliminary 
tests on the manufacturing technology and performance of fuel elements of various 
designs were made. As the result, a tubular fuel element with a stainless-steel sheath and 
a uranium-dioxide fuel composite was chosen for further development (Samoylov et al. 
1976). Fuel elements in the initial modification had a tubular design formed by two 
coaxial stainless-steel sheaths (9.4  0.6 mm and 20  0.3 mm, respectively). Thus, SHS 
channels with such fuel elements did not differ significantly from BW channels (Figure 7), 
consisting of 6 fuel elements arranged in a graphite collar with a central steam feeding 
tube. Steam entered the central tube and was superheated while passing along the fuel 
bundles. 
Later, a U-shape design was developed. The central tube (9.4  0.6 mm) was replaced with 
an absorbing soft-control rod (12  0.6 mm). The decreased width of the active material 
decreased non-productive neutron absorption and allowed some power flattening. The 
steam was reheated first passing downward along three fuel bundles and then passing 
upwards along another three fuel bundles. Such construction reduced temperature 
conditions for SHS channels and allowed usage of simpler and cheaper materials. Also, 
reactor-graphite-stack temperature was lowered by 100C at a channel power of 0.36 MW. 
This was achieved with the transfer of heat released in the graphite stack to the 
downward flow fuel elements that operated at intermediate temperatures (Dollezhal et al. 
1964). 
Efforts for further improvement of heat and physical parameters were made. They led to 
another modification of channels and fuel elements. One upward flowing fuel element was 
eliminated, inner fuel-element sheath was increased to the size of 16  0.7 mm, and outer-
sheath size was increased to 23  0.3 mm. 
Physical and thermal parameters improved sharply after such a modification due to 
decreased matrix material in the fuel elements and increased flow cross-section. 6-elements 
channels were gradually replaced by 5-elements channels during refuelling of the operating 
reactor. The reduction of one of the elements increases the steam velocity in the upward 
flowing fuel elements (Samoylov et al. 1976). Stainless steel was used as the outer-sheath 
material. Uranium-dioxide dispersed in matrix alloy was used as fuel elements in SHS 
channels. Improvements in the performance of various BNPP parameters are listed in  
Table 5. 
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1 – head of boiling-water channel; 
2 – head of superheated-steam channel; 
3 – three downward-flow strings; 
4 – six upward-flow strings; 
5 – fuel bundle strings; 
6 – three upward-flow strings; 
7 – downward-flow strings; 
8 – compensators; 
9 – welded joints of tubes; 
10 – tail. 
Fig. 7. Principal design scheme of boiling-water and superheated-steam channels 
(Emelyanov et al. 1972) 
 
Parameters Before SHSs installation After SHSs installation 
Electrical power, MWel 60–70 100–105 
Steam Pin, MPa 5.9–6.3 7.8–8.3 
Steam Tin, ºC 395–405 490–505 
Exhaust steam P, kPa 9–11 3.4–4.0 
Mass flowrate of water in 1st 
loop, kg/h 1400 2300–2400 
P in separators, MPa 9.3–9.8 11.8–12.7 
Gross thermal efficiency, % 29–32 35–36 
Electrical power for internal 
needs, % 10–12 7–9 
Table 5. Average parameters of BNPP Unit 1 before and after installation of superheated-
steam channels (Dollezhal et al. 1969). 
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Parameters BNPP Unit 1 
BNPP Unit 2 
(U-shaped channel with 6 fuel elements) 
Downward-flow 
fuel elements 
Upward-flow fuel 
elements 
Max channel power, kW 368 767 
Min channel power, kW 202 548 
Steam mass-flow rate 
through max. power 
channel, kg/h 
1900 3600 
Steam mass flow rate 
through channel 
operating at minimal 
power, kg/h 
1040 2570 
Steam Pin/ Pout, MPa 10.8/9.81 12.9/12.3 12.2/10.8 
Steam Tin/ Tout, C 316/510 328/399 397/508 
Max heat flux, MW/m2 0.56 0.95 0.79 
Max steam velocity, m/s 57 76 112 
Max T, C: 
sheath 
fuel 
graphite 
 
530 
550 
725 
 
426 
482 
735 
 
531 
565 
735 
Table 6. Design parameters and operating conditions of superheated-steam channels 
(Dollezhal et al. 1964). 
3.7 Hydrodynamic stability of the Beloyarsk NPP channels during reactors start-up  
During start-up and nominal operating conditions it is necessary to provide reliable cooling 
of fuel bundles (crisis-free heat transfer and hydrodynamic stability). Experiments on set-up 
simulating Units 1 and 2 were performed for determining safe operating conditions for 
coolant flow rate with no pulsations during the start-up. 
Both SHS and BW channels of the BNPP were filled with water in the initial state. During 
reactor start-up, the water in the SHS channels was to be discharged and transfer to cooling 
by steam was to be performed. Additionally, the units were preheated and started without 
external heat sources. 
The coolant flow rate stability in the BW channels was studied for wide ranges of pressures, 
flow rates and powers (Smolin et al. 1965). Special attention was paid to determination of 
the pressure, flow rate, steam content and power. Different combinations of these 
parameters created conditions leading to pulsations. When occurred, flow rate pulsations 
took place when coolant reached saturation temperature at the outlet of the BWs. Pulsations 
were in the form of coolant flow rate periodical oscillations in peripheral tubes. Oscillations 
were phase-shifted in different tubes while the total flow rate was constant. 
Two pulsation regions were determined as the result of the experiments: small steam 
content region (x = 0 – 15 %, 3 – 6 oscillations per min) and high steam content region (x = 25 
– 80%, 15 – 20 oscillations per min). Flow rate pulsations in tubes were accompanied by wall 
 
Nuclear Power – Operation, Safety and Environment 18
tube temperature oscillations along its length with the frequency being equal to that of flow 
rate oscillations. Wall temperature oscillations in the top cross-sections of the heating zone 
within the small steam content region occurred with a shift to the smaller values in the 
surface or volumetric boiling zones and to both the smaller and higher values in the 
economizer zone. Wall temperature oscillations in the top cross-sections of the heating zone 
within the high steam content shifted only to the higher values causing boiling crisis 
(Smolin et al. 1965). 
The curves distinguishing stability zones (above the curves) from pulsation zones (below 
the curves) for the BW and SHS channels of the BNPP Unit 2 are shown in Figure 8. 
As seen in Figure 8 the range of stable operation of channels broadens with the increase in 
pressure or increase in flow rate. The stable operation range contracts with the increase in 
power. The operating conditions that provide stable flow rate and reliable cooling of the BW 
and SHS channels at the start-up and nominal operating conditions were chosen based on 
the performed research. The method of replacing water coolant by steam coolant in SHS 
channels using accumulated heat was accepted for experimental testing of start-up 
conditions on Unit 1. The method of gradual replacement of water in the SHS channels first 
by a water-steam mixture and then by steam was accepted for experimental tests of start-up 
regime on Unit 2 (Smolin et al. 1965). The experimentally obtained data are presented in 
Figures 9 – 10.  
Both methods were elaborately tested and proved to provide reliable cooling of the BW and 
SHS channels during the start-up. They were adapted for the development of the BNPP 
start-up conditions. 
 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
 
Fig. 8. Ranges of hydrodynamic stability in BW (a) and SHS (b) channels of BNPP Unit 2 at 
different channel power (regions of channels stable operation are above curves, closed 
symbols) (Smolin et al. 1965): 1 – 50 kW; 2 – 100 kW; 3 – 200 kW; 4 – 300 kW; 5 – 400 kW; and 
6 – 800 kW. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 9. Temperature variations at BNPP Unit 1 SHS channels at transitional regime (Smolin 
et al. 1965): (a) – coolant inlet (Tin) and outlet temperatures (Tout) and (b) –sheath 
temperature. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 10. Variations of pressure drop (a) and sheath temperature (b) at BNPP Unit 2 during 
high-power start-up (Smolin et al. 1965). 
3.8 Start-up of Beloyarsk NPP reactors 
The start-up testing of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactors of the BNPP are described in this 
section. During the Unit 1 start-up, both loops were filled with deaerated water, water 
circulation was established, air was removed, and the pressure was raised up to 10 MPa and 
3 MPa in the primary and secondary loops, respectively (Aleshchenkov et al. 1971). 
Equipment was heated up at 10 – 14% of reactor power. Average heat-up rate was kept at 
30C/h as measured at the separators. This value was chosen based on experience of drum 
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boilers operation, though reactor equipment allowed significantly higher heat-up rate. No 
heat removal was provided during the heat-up to the 160C coolant temperature at the 
reactor outlet. The water level was formed at 160C in the bubbler and the excess heat 
started being released to the turbine condenser. When water temperature at the outlet of the 
SHS channels reached 230C the heat-up was terminated. Total heat-up time was about 9 h. 
At the next step, water was purged from SHS channels. The transient processes took place in 
the second loop while constant pressure and boiling-free cooling of BWs were provided in 
the primary loop. Reactor power was rapidly reduced to ~2% of its nominal level and 
feedwater flow rate was reduced to provide water level in the SGs to purge SHS channels. 
Water-steam mixture from evaporators and steam from the steam loop were directed to the 
bubbler and then to the deaerator and the turbine condenser. 
The purging of SHS channels started after the level in the SGs had been formed. The 
purging regime was monitored by the pressure drop between the reactor inlet and outlet 
steam headers and the coolant temperature at the outlet of each SHS channel. Additional 
steam discharge by increased pressure drop rate was achieved and thus the purging was 
accelerated by opening gate valves in front of the bubbler for 1 – 2 min. The pressure drop 
rate was chosen based upon the allowed temperature condition and was set to ~0.15 
MPa/min. Overall time for the level formation in the evaporators was ~8 – 10 min, the time 
of purging ~6 – 10 min. The gate valves in front of bubblers were closed and reactor power 
was increased after the purging had finished. Thus, the pressure and the temperature in 
SHS channels were increase. After 2 hours the SHS channels purging had been finished and 
the reactor achieved a stable operation at 10% power level. The heating of steam pipes and 
the turbine was initiated and the turbine connection to the power line was prepared. Further 
power increase was made once the turbine had been connected to the power line. 
The first loop was transferred to the boiling flow regime and the separators levels were 
formed at 35% reactor power and ~6 MPa pressure. During the transient to the boiling 
regime, the operating conditions of the MCPs were continuously monitored. Water 
temperature was maintained 5 − 6C below the boiling margin for intake pipes of the main 
circulation pumps. Level formation in the separators was accompanied by smooth pressure 
change. It took about 3 h for the water to reach controlled level in the separators, the time 
being dependent only on the separator bleed lines throughput. 
The specific features of a single-circuit flow diagram made the sequence of the BNPP Unit 2 
start-up operations somewhat different. SHS channels purging and transition to boiling 
regime in the BW channels took place simultaneously. Filling of the circuits and equipment 
heat-up were the same as in Unit 1. The terminal heat-up parameters were higher (P  9.3 
MPa and T  290°C). Two main circulation pumps were used to drive coolant circulation in 
the evaporating loop. After heat-up the reactor power was reduced to 2 – 3% of nominal 
level. SHS channels purging, and transition to boiling regime in the BW channels took place 
after the heat-up. The feedwater flow rate was considerably reduced, water was purged out 
of the separators, and the flow rate to the bubblers was increased to form levels in the 
separators. As a result, the water in the fuel channels and separators boiled causing the 
purging of water and water-steam mixture from SHS channels. The monitoring of the 
purging process was the same as at the Unit 1. After SHS channels purging had been 
completed, the reactor power was increased and steam flow into the bubbler was reduced at 
the reheated steam temperature rise rate of about 1°C/min with the pressure drop between 
the steam headers at least ~50 – 60 kPa. The automatic level control system was put into 
operation as soon as the water in the separators reached the rated level. The subsequent 
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reactor power increase, turbine preparation, and connection of the turbine to the power line 
were the same as for Unit 1 (Aleshchenkov et al. 1971).  
3.9 Pumps 
All pumps at the BNPP were high-speed type (3000 rpm). Serial high-power feeding pumps 
were used. Other pumps were special canned type, in which the motor spindle and pump 
spindle were revolved in a pumped medium and were separated from the motor stator by a 
thin hermetic nichrome plate. Bearing pairs of the pumps were lubricated and cooled by 
pumped water. The revolving details of bearings were made of advanced hard alloys and 
bearing bushes were made of special plastics. Some minor failures were observed in 
operation of MCP (Emelyanov et al. 1972). Those were due to cracks in nichrome jacket, to 
malfunctioning of fan of the stator front parts, to pilot-valve distribution system 
imperfections, and to failures of the fasteners in the pump interior. Modernizations of some 
individual elements of the MCP and reconstruction of independent pump cooling loops 
improved optimal on-stream time between maintenance and repairing (16,000 h). As a 
result, the failure probability of the MCP was reduced to minimum. Operating experience of 
the MCP showed that serial pumps could be used instead of specially designed canned 
pumps under no fragment activity in the loops conditions that were achieved at BNPP. 
3.10 Water chemistry 
The experiments on effectiveness of water and steam radiolysis suppression by hydrogen in 
BW and SHS channels respectively were performed after 16 months of Unit 1 operation. 
Water and steam samples were taken at the drum-separator, MCPs, inlet and outlet of SHS 
channels. Ammonia dosing was terminated before the test for determination of the required 
amount of hydrogen that was necessary to suppress water and steam radiolysis that was 
partially caused by ammonia decomposition (Yurmanov et al. 2009b). Hydrogen 
concentration in saturated steam at the separator was found to be 45 – 88 nml/kg and  in 
circulation water at the main circulation pump was found to be 2.75 – 12.8 nml/kg. Despite 
some hydrogen excess, oxygen concentration decreased from 2.28 mg/dm3 to 0.1 mg/dm3. 
Dissolved oxygen concentration in the circulating water at the main circulation pump did 
not exceed 0.01 – 0.03 mg/dm3. At the next stage of experiments, steam radiolysis in SHS 
channels and the possibility of suppressing it by hydrogen concentration levels were 
studied. Hydrogen concentration was set to 1.2 – 6.2 nml/kg in steam and 1.2 – 1.8 nml/kg 
in circulating water. Oxygen concentration was below 0.15 mg/kg in steam and about 0.02 
mg/dm3 in the circulating water. The obtained results demonstrated effective suppression 
of water radiolysis.  
Additional research was carried out at 60% reactor power. The results showed that the 
oxygen concentration was decreased to 0.03 mg/kg at the SHS channels outlet only at 45 
nml/kg hydrogen concentration. The water-steam mixture at the turbine ejector consisted of 
hydrogen (62 – 65%) and oxygen (8 – 10%) at a hydrogen concentration of 40 – 45 nml/kg. 
The water-steam mixture was needed to be diluted with air to a non-explosive state, i.e., 
hydrogen volume fraction was to be decreased below 2 – 3% (Shitzman 1983). 
The equipment for Unit 2 was made from the following constructional materials: stainless 
steel (5500 m2, 900 m2 of which were used for the core); carbon steel (5600 m2); brass and 
cupronickel (14,000 m2); stellite (4.8 m2). The studies showed that radiolytic gases 
production rate was approximately 5 times lower than that of a BWR of the same power. 
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Water radiolysis at the BW channels of the BNPP Unit 1 was suppressed by ammonia 
dosing. This kept radiolityc oxygen content in water at several hundredths of a milligram 
per liter. Ammonia dosing wasn't used at Unit 2 due to the danger of corrosion of the 
condenser tubes and low-pressure heaters. Radiolytic fixation of oxygen in the steam that 
was bled to high-pressure heaters was achieved by hydrazine hydrate dosing. The operation 
norms and the actual quality of coolant at the BNPP Unit 2 are listed in the Table 7. 
Additional information on water flow regime may be found in paper by Konovalova et al. 
(1971). 
All the indicators of coolant quality were in the range set by the water regime regulations 
during normal operating period. 
 
Parameters Feed water 
Reactor 
circulating 
water 
Reactor 
bleed 
water 
Saturated / Reheated 
steam 
Turbine 
condensate 
SiO2-3, μg/kg – – 100–300 5–15 / 5–15 – 
Chlorides, μg/kg 25 25 25 – / – – 
Iron oxides, μg/kg 20–60 20–60 30–60 20–30 / 20 –30 0 
Copper, μg/kg – – 7–30 0.4 / – 0.8 
Specific activity, Ci/l – – 10–5 – / 10–7 – 
Oxygen, μg/kg 10–15 30 30 (5–6)·103 / (5–6)·103 40–50 
Ammonia, mg/kg 1–25 0.6–1.4 0.6–1.4 0.8–2 / 0.8–2 1–2 
pH 9.2–9.5 8–9 9–9.5 9–9.5 / 9–9.5 9–9.5 
Table 7. Actual parameters of BNPP Unit 2 coolant quality during period of normal 
operation (Konovalova et al. 1971). 
In August 1972 (after 4.5 years of operation) neutral no-correction water was implemented 
at Unit 2 (Dollezhal et al. 1974). Operation in the new conditions revealed the following 
advantages over the ammonia treated state: 
1. The cease of feedwater ammonia treatment led to the zero nitrate content in the reactor 
circulation water. This allowed an increase of the pH from 4.8 to the neutral level at the 
300°C operating temperature. 
2. Balance of the corrosion products content in the circulation water and chemical flushing 
of the BW channels showed that the rate of metallic oxide deposits formation on the 
fuel-bundles surfaces in the evaporating zone of the reactor was three times lower using 
no-correction water. 
3. The Co-60 deposition rate outside the core was 7 – 10 times lower using no-correction 
water. 
4. Condensate purification experience using no-correction water allowed an increasing 
filter service cycle by 6 times. 
3.11 Section-unit reactor with steam-reheat 
The BNPP became the first in the world industrial NPP with a uranium-graphite power 
reactor. Examination of the main characteristics of the BNPP reactors (for example, see Table 
3) shows that that performance of such type of reactors could be improved. BNPP used 
slightly enriched uranium and the calculations showed that increasing enrichment to 5% 
would increase fuel burn-up 4 − 10 times (up to 40,000 MWdays/t). 
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All channel reactors were constructed with traditional cylindrical shape of core. Therefore, 
power increase in such a reactor could be attained by increasing the number of working 
channels in the core and a proportional increase in diameter size. However, increase in 
power per reactor would then be limited by the maximum size of the reactor upper plate 
that could be built and withstand a high load. A way out of this situation was found in 
section-unit design of the channel reactor with a rectangular core. Such a shape would allow 
separating not only the core, but also reactor as a whole, into equal geometry sections. Then 
the reactor of a specified capacity can be constructed of the required number of sections. 
Each section would stay the same for reactors of different power outputs, and, consequently, 
core width and maximum size of the upper metalwork would stay the same too. Therefore, 
the power of a section-unit reactor power would not be limited by the size of the upper plate 
(Emelyanov et al. 1982). 
Section-unit type reactors with coolant at supercritical fluid conditions (see Figure 11) was 
developed at Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering (RDIPE, Moscow, 
Russia) as an improvement to the existing RBMK (Russian acronym for Channel Reactor of 
High-Power).  
 
 
Fig. 11. Schematic of RDIPE SCW NPP (Aleshchenkov et al. 1971): 1 – reactor; 4 – preheating 
channel; 5 – first SHS; 6 – second SHS; 11 – Condensate Extraction Pump (CEP); 14 – 
deaerator; 15 – turbo-generator; 17 – condenser; 18 – condenser purifier; 19 – mixer; 20 – 
start-up separator; 21 – intermediate steam reheater; 22 – low-pressure regenerative 
preheater; 23 – high-pressure regenerative preheater; 24 – feed turbo-pump; and 25 – 
booster pump. 
Rod fuel bundles were inserted into Zirconium SHS (SHS-Z) channels (see Figure 12) on the 
core level. UO2 fuel elements with steel sheath were designed. Fuel bundles were covered by 
a sheath to hold SHS-Z channel wall below 360C (Grigoryants et al. 1979). Therefore, 
saturated steam entering the channel was split into two streams. About 25% of the steam 
flowed through the annular gap cooling the SHS-Z channel wall. Both streams mixed at the 
core exit. Steam mixture was at about 455C. Tests with SHS-Z channels were performed in 
BNPP Unit 1 to check design decisions. SHS-Z channels were tested in 23 – 24 start-ups – 
shutdowns, including 11 emergency shutdowns of the reactor when the steam temperature 
change rate was 20 – 40C/min during the first 3 minutes of an automatic control system 
operation, and 5C/min after that. SHS-Z channel wall temperature reached 400 – 700C 
and that of the fuel bundles sheath reached 650 – 740C during start-up operation at a steam 
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pressure of 2.45 – 4.9 MPa. Channels were operated about 140 h at high temperature 
conditions. Studies showed that fuel element seal failures were mainly due to short-duration 
overheating (Mikhan et al. 1988). 
 
1 – suspension rod; 
2 – thermal screen; 
3,4  – outer and inner tubes of bearing body; 
5 – inner tube reducer; 
6 – upper reducer of outer tube; 
7 – fuel bundle; 
8 – graphite sleeves; 
9 – thermal screen and inner tube seal; 
10  – lower reducer of outer tube; and 
11 – reactor. 
Fig. 12. Principal scheme of SHS-Z (Mikhan et al. 1988) 
Additional information on SHS-Z-channel tests in BNPP Unit 1 may be found in the papers 
by Grigoryants et al. (1979) and by Mikhan et al. (1988). 
4. Conclusions 
The operating experience of the reactors with nuclear steam reheat worldwide provides vital 
information on physical and engineering challenges associated with implementation of 
steam reheat in conceptual SuperCritical Water-cooled Reactors (SCWRs). Major 
advancements in implementation of steam reheat inside the reactor core were made in the 
USA and Russia in 1960s – 1970s. Three experimental reactors were designed and tested in 
the 1960s – 1970s  in the USA. In the former Soviet Union, nuclear steam reheat was 
implemented at two units at the Beloyarsk NPP. Operating experience of the units showed a 
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possibility of reliable and safe industrial application of nuclear steam reheat right up to 
outlet temperatures of 510 − 540°C after over a decade of operation. Thermal efficiency of 
the Beloyarsk NPP units was increased by 5% as the result of implementing nuclear steam 
reheat. The introduction of nuclear steam reheat was economically justified in cases where 
the steam was superheated up to 500°C and higher with the use of stainless-steel-sheath fuel 
elements. 
The experiments and operating experience obtained to date also indicate that further 
improvements in SHS channel design and in reactor design are possible. 
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6. Nomenclature 
Keff effective multiplication constant 
Kir neutron flux irregularity coefficient 
P pressure, MPa 
R radius, m 
T temperature, °C 
x steam quality 
Greek letters 
 power split between superheated-steam and boiling-water and channels 
Subscripts 
el electrical 
in inlet 
out outlet 
th thermal 
Abbreviations and Acronyms 
AECL Atomic Energy of Canada Limited 
BNPP Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant 
BONUS BOiling NUclear Superheater 
BORAX BOiling Reactor Experiment 
BW Boling-Water (channel) 
BWR Boiling Water Reactor 
CEP Condenser-Extraction Pump 
ESADE Superheat Advance Demonstration Experiment 
FWP FeedWater Pump 
MCP Main Circulation Pump 
NSERC Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (Canada) 
NPP Nuclear Power Plant 
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NRCan Natural Resources of Canada 
RBMK Russian Acronym for Channel Reactor of High-Power 
RDIPE Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering (Moscow, Russia) 
SADE Superheat Advance Demonstration Experiment 
SCW Supercritical Water 
SCWR SuperCritical Water-cooled Reactor 
SG Steam Generator 
SHS SuperHeated Steam (channel)  
SS Stainless Steel 
USAEC United States Atomic Energy Commission 
Z Zirconium 
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1. Introduction  
Actual trend in reactor safety deterministic analysis are evolving toward best estimate 
approach. Best estimate analyses imply use of best estimate codes and input data. The best 
estimate concept is not limited to thermal-hydraulics rather in general terms it covers many 
fields, likewise three dimensional neutron kinetics, structural analysis and containment 
performance evaluation.  
The general frame is to put efforts in avoiding conservative assumptions performing 
analysis adopting the best tool available for each specific topic, all contributing to give an 
integrated evaluation of the plant response.  
The needs to adopt an integrated approach in performing safety analysis come from the 
inherent complexity of a Nuclear Power Plant and from the tight interactions among the 
subsystems constituting the plant itself. These interactions directly involve the necessity to 
consider a broad spectrum of disciplines typically coming into play in different not 
interacting analyses.  
An example of the integral approach is given in the present document. The integral 
approach has been pursued for the safety analyses of the ‘post-Chernobyl modernized’ 
Reactor Bolshoy Moshchnosty Kipyashiy (RBMK) specifically for Smolensk 3. These 
analyses were performed at the University of Pisa within the framework of a European 
Commission sponsored activity.  
The mentioned analyses deal with events occurring in the primary circuit, as well as  
excluding those events originated from plant status different from the nominal operating 
conditions. Following the evaluation of the current state of the art in the safety analysis area, 
targets for the analysis were established together with suitable chains of computational 
tools. The availability of computational tools, including codes, nodalisations and boundary 
and initial conditions for the Smolensk 3 Nuclear Power Plant, brought to their application 
to the prediction of the selected transient evolutions that, however, are not classified as 
licensing studies.  
The integrated approach for safety analysis yields to the evaluation of complex scenarios not 
predictable adopting just a single computational tool. Example is given considering the 
Multiple Pressure Tube Rupture (MPTR) event which constitute one of the main concern of 
this kind of plant.  
The content of this document includes an introduction to the critical issues to be accounted 
for in the frame of an integral safety analysis approach; the selection of suitable 
computational tools to proper deal with the scenario subject of the investigation; an 
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approach on how to link (coupling issues) the selected tools; the use of intermediate code 
outcomes and interpretation of the global predicted plant behaviour. All the aspects 
presented in general terms are applied in the case study of a Multiple Pressure Tube 
Rupture having as reference plant the Smolensk 3 Nuclear Power Plant. The selected event 
may occur as a consequence of a fuel channel blockage which (if not detected) brought to the 
rupture of the affected pressure tube. The dynamic loads generated by its breach may lead 
to the rupture of the surrounding pressure tubes. Direct consequence of the pressure tube 
rupture is the pressurization of the reactor cavity which envelopes all the core. In the case of 
Multiple Pressure Tube Rupture event, involving a large number of pressure tubes, the 
lifting of the reactor cavity top may occur, putting in direct connection the core with the 
environment. The present example is a kind of analysis that cannot be performed if an 
integrated approach is not adopted.  
2. Framework 
The best estimate approach is the actual trend of the NPP deterministic analysis 
(International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], 2008). The concept of best estimate is 
generally applied to the software codes used in the analysis. However the best estimate 
approach concept has a broader meaning. It applies to the general framework of the 
analysis, and it involves not only the codes, but the kind of analyses to be performed, the 
approach to realize the models to be realized for the analyses, the input data including 
boundary and initial conditions also. The best estimate approach is not only connected with 
a calculation performed with a best estimate code. The result of the analysis is a best 
estimate evaluation, if all the aspects of the analysis (input data, systems models, results) are 
best estimate, in addition to the codes. As a consequence the use of a best estimate code, 
assuming not best estimate data or systems model cannot be considered a best estimate 
analysis. 
A calculation of a complex system like a NPP, poses a lot of issues to perform a best estimate 
analysis. The main relevant aspect is constituted by the many areas involved in the analysis 
of a NPP. Knowledge in many technical areas are necessary. The solution can be obtained by 
“linking” in a single instrument of investigation the different tools developed for 
investigation in each of the different areas.  
2.1 Complexity of the approach 
The scope is the safety of nuclear power plants,  is demonstration of the capability to keep 
the radiation exposure of personal and population within specified limits. It is ensured by 
maintaining the integrity of safety barriers, which are part of the plant defence in depth 
concept. 
A series of barriers prevents the release of radioactive fission products from their source 
beyond the reactor containment and into the environment. In analyzing the NPP safety, it is 
essential to assess the integrity of these barriers and to decide to what degree the response of 
the whole NPP and its systems to a certain initiating event is acceptable from the viewpoint of 
the plant safety. The integrity of the safety barriers is related to certain threshold values, which 
are referred to as acceptance criteria. Design limits are adopted with a conservative margin so 
that the safety barrier integrity is guaranteed as long as the parameters do not exceed the 
relevant criteria. In the case of not efficacy of the barriers a radioactive release occurs and an 
evaluation of the dose to the workers and population is done (IAEA, 1996 and IAEA, 2000). 
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The complexity of the analysis is due to the involvement of a number of different 
technological areas requests a detailed identification of topics and targets together with a 
suitable connection with adopted codes and activities. 
The nuclear technology sectors or computational areas relevant for NPP safety and design 
include the following areas: the system thermal-hydraulics, the computational fluid-
dynamics, the structural mechanics, the neutron kinetics with the cross section generation 
and the fission product release and transport. 
The interconnections among individual Technological Areas identify a chains of codes. 
Figure 1 gives an idea of the complexity of the activities and related technological areas 
necessary for a such analysis. 
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Fig. 1. Technological areas for the integrated an analysis  
The effort to perform a such analysis is aimed to establish a connection with the regulatory 
or licensing environment. This connection must take into account the evolution of safety 
concepts following improvements of the technical knowledge, including the availability of 
powerful computational tools and of experimental evidences. 
The framework constitutes by the development & qualification of computational tools is 
also related to relevant points like “physical phenomena understanding”,  and “analysis of 
complex scenarios expected during accident conditions” considering the current licensing 
practices. 
The strategic objective is the set-up of a suitable chain of codes to deal with accident 
scenarios. The motivation for the selection of individual accidents is given by expecting 
challenging phenomena for the concerned safety barrier. The concerned phenomena shall 
also be connected with the existing code typologies and capabilities. These codes are 
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supposed to be qualified for the prediction of individual accidents whose relevant and 
detailed boundary and initial conditions  have been defined. 
The list of phenomena, which are taking place during progression of an accident shall be 
analyzed, discussed and selected. Relevant information can be taken from international 
literature (e.g. IAEA, 2002) or from experimental tests. The operative objective is to 
demonstrate the capability of computational tools to reproduce relevant transient 
phenomena and to show that the same tools can be linked together.  
Generally speaking, best estimate is associated to the TH SYS codes. About this kind of 
codes is clear the meaning of best estimate approach. Descriptions of this concept are largely 
diffused in international literature. The concept of best estimate is less clear about the codes 
related to the other technological areas. The general concept of best estimate approach is in 
avoiding any intentional conservatism. This concept is applied in all the aspects of the 
calculation: input data, conditions of the calculation, model of the systems and of course the 
code. From this point of view the aspects to be considered for each individual codes are: 
 The physical modelling. 
 The approximations that are made and their limitations. 
 The used correlations. 
 An assessment of uncertainties due to the physical models. 
 The practice of application associated to these codes 
 and their level of validation and/or certification. 
 the associated impact on the drawing of safety analyses. 
In such a complex analysis, requiring different codes, the data used as input for a code are 
derived from the result of another previous code calculation. So a relevant role is also 
played by the evaluation and selection (as input data in next calculations) of the results 
obtained by code application. The figure. 2 gives an idea of the links between the different 
technical areas. 
Referring to the figure 2, some links are hereafter exemplified. 
 Path a) the TH codes results are used to supply boundary data to the code for fuel 
evaluation. 
 Path b) the TH codes supply the thermal hydraulic boundary conditions to the NK 
codes. The results of the NK codes are supplied to the TH code core component. 
 Path c) the TH codes supply the thermal hydraulic boundary conditions to the CFD 
codes. The results of the CFD codes are supplied to the TH for evaluation of specific 
areas of the systems. 
 Path d) the CFD codes supply the boundary conditions to the Structural code for 
evaluation of mechanical resistance of systems components. 
 Path e) the results from the Containment code are supplied to the TH codes for 
calculation of the evolution of the accident in the reactor coolant system and 
containment. 
 Path f) the results of the Structural code about the integrity of the systems (e.g. 
containment systems) are supplied to the containment codes. 
 Path g) the results of the Containment code about possible failure and source terms are 
supplied to the codes for dispersion and dove evaluation. 
 Path h) the results of the Fuel code about source terms are supplied to the codes for 
dispersion and dove evaluation. 
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Fig. 2. Links between the different technical areas 
2.2 Qualification and uncertainty 
A relevant aspect in best estimate application is the qualification of the process of code 
application: 
The following specific topics must be covered: 
 Development process of generic codes and their capabilities; 
 Developmental Assessment; 
 Structure of specific codes  
 Numerical methods; 
 Description of input decks; 
 Description of fundamental analytical problems; 
 Analysis of fundamental problems; 
 International Standard Problem Activity and benchmarks; 
 Example of code results from applications to ITF;  
 Plant accident and transient analyses  application; 
 Modalities for developing the nodalization; 
 Description and use of nodalization qualification criteria; 
 Qualitative and quantitative accuracy evaluation; 
 Use of thresholds for the acceptability of results for the reference case; 
 Description of the available uncertainty methodologies; 
 Coupling methodologies. 
A specific aspect of best estimate application is constitute by uncertainty evaluation (Wickett 
et al., 1998). For the TH codes specific methodologies were developed and applied. 
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International literature offers a spread documentation about this uncertainty methodologies 
for TH codes. 
Concerning the codes not connected with the TH area the following items must be evalauted 
to derive the evaluation of the uncertainty. 
 Description of the numerical methods. Generally the codes are validated versus some 
reference calculations and the related uncertainty is also given.  
 International Standard Problem Activity and benchmarks. From the comparison with 
the result of other qualified codes can be estimated the uncertainty of the code.   
 Code application to experimental tests.   
 Code application to experimental tests in Plant accident and transient analyses. 
Additional and relevant aspects to be also considered are: 
 Procedure for developing the nodalization developed by the user or in the code manual. 
 Description and use of nodalization qualification criteria. 
 User experience 
2.3 Computational tools needed in the analysis 
The computational tools include: 
 the best estimate computer codes; 
 the nodalization including the procedures for the development and the qualification; 
 the uncertainty methodology including the procedure for the qualification; 
 the computational platforms for coupling and interfacing inputs and outputs from the 
concerned codes and nodalization. 
An outline of the codes listed in the table below is provided in the table 1. 
 
No Field of application Example of applications 
1. System Thermal-Hydraulics All transients 
2. I&C Modelling 
All transients (where I & C, i.e. 
control, limitation and protection 
systems, play a role). 
3. Computation Fluid Dynamics Special detailed analyses of specific components and/or systems 
4. Structural Mechanics PTS and structural mechanics integrity of the vessel wall. 
5. Fuel (mechanics) All transients in relation to which the number of failed rods is calculated 
6. Neutron Physics (and supporting) 
Transients analyzed by 3D coupled 
neutron kinetics - thermal-hydraulics: 
spatial or local neutron flux effects 
are relevant – transient conditions. 
 Confinement Severe accident 
7. Radiological Consequences (and supporting) 
Environment diffusion and dose tot 
the population 
Table 1. Outline of the codes needed in the analysis 
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All considered codes should be well established within the international community and 
some referenced document per each code should be provided that gives access to the 
peculiarities of the code. 
Key issues for the application of the codes are represented by: 
a. the demonstration of the code qualification level; 
b. the demonstration of the current user capabilities in the use of the codes. 
The quality demonstration of individual codes, item a), can be derived by several hundred 
worldwide available documents. In addition to such documents, per each code there are 
specific-additional qualification documents issued. The reference document provided per 
each code, gives one access to international qualification documents. 
Connected with the above item a), the quality of the code application results is increased by 
a systematic and comprehensive application of independent codes for deriving the same 
result. All the codes should be applied by the users, item b), having experience (years) in the 
code application and results analysis. Code qualification cases shall be considered in order 
to prove the user capabilities in the application of the codes. 
2.3.1 System Thermal-Hydraulics 
The quantitative characterization of a system transient scenario constitutes the main role for 
the System Thermal-hydraulic (SYS-TH) code, consistently with the main objective for its 
development. The SYS-TH code gives the results connected with the thermal hydraulic 
parameters evolution of the NPP during a transient. The application of the SYS-TH code, 
because of the capability to represent all the systems in a quit compact and fast calculations, 
is typically also used to derive the initial conditions for the application of other more specific 
codes/tools. 
These kinds of codes generally have embedded some additional capabilities: 
 The multi-dimensional component in SYS-TH code developed to allow the user to more 
accurately model the multi-dimensional flow behaviour that can be exhibited in any 
component or region of a system. 
 Neutron kinetic modules: the NK module can have from zero to three dimensions 
representation capabilities. 
 Severe accident module: a limited capability can be included in simulating core damage 
occurrence and fission fragment distribution in the systems. 
2.3.2 I&C modeling 
The aim is to simulate the performance of the control, the limitation and the protection 
systems of the NPP. The simplified representation of the protection system only could be 
not sufficient for a detailed analysis. The Instrumentation and Control (I&C) can be 
modelled in the SYS-TH code. But the complexity of the control (also including limitation) 
systems request a more capable end flexible tool. Some applications have been done just 
realizing software (e.g. Fortran based software) coupled with the SYS-TH code. 
In the I&C software the equations are solved to simulate the transient behaviour of the 
various transducers, actuators and logic of operation of each individual component that 
constitutes the control, the limitation and the protection systems of the NPP. The code 
receives the system information at each time step from the SYS-TH code related to any 
requested thermal-hydraulic variable (e.g. pressure, level, pressure drop, fluid temperature). 
The related information is processed, e.g. considering the inertia of the transducer or the 
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delay of the signal transmission, and commands for components (typically pumps, valves, 
control rods, heaters, etc.) modelled in SYS-TH are generated. With the new system 
configuration a new time step is calculated and the above process starts again. 
2.3.3 Computational Fluid Dynamics 
The main role of CFD is to support and validate the application of the SYS-TH in relation to 
the mixing phenomena and in calculating pressure drop coefficients at geometric 
discontinuities where information from experimental data is not adequate. The latter role is 
also relevant to the PTS study. 
CFD features the following modelling capabilities: 
 Steady-state and transient flows. 
 Laminar and turbulent flows. 
 Subsonic, transonic and supersonic flows. 
 Heat transfer and thermal radiation. 
 Buoyancy. 
 Non-Newtonian flows. 
 Transport of non-reacting scalar components. 
 Multiphase flows. 
 Combustion. 
 Flows in multiple frames of reference. 
 Particle tracking. 
2.3.4 Structural mechanics 
The structural mechanics code is used to calculate stress and strains in components other 
than the fuel rods. Two main uses are exemplified in order to summarize the role of the 
code: 
a. demonstration that dynamic loads, following transient scenarios, do not cause 
rupture/collapse of or the substantial deformation of the relevant component 
potentially affecting the coolability of the core; 
b. calculation of stresses in the components relevant to prevent radioactive releases. 
Typical application is constituted by PTS analysis. 
These tools are adopted to perform static and dynamic analyses of linear and non-linear 
problems (due to materials properties, geometry, contact between surface, etc.) in many 
fields of application (structural, thermal, electromagnetic, fluid-dynamic, etc.). It is possible 
to solve coupled problems as well as fluid–structure interaction, thermal–mechanical 
calculation. In addition several special purpose features are available, namely: fracture 
mechanics, composites, fatigue, beam analyses. 
2.3.5 Fuel mechanics 
The key goal for the use of the code is the evaluation of the integrity of the fuel claddings. 
The number of nuclear fuel rod claddings that are damaged following each transient 
constitutes the typical output from the code. The code is a computer program for the 
thermal and mechanical analysis of fuel rods in nuclear reactors. The code was specifically 
designed for the analysis of a whole rod. Code incorporates physical models of thermal and 
radiation densification of the fuel, models of fuel swelling, fuel cracking and relocation, a 
model of generation of fission gases, a model of redistribution of oxygen and plutonium, 
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and some other physical models. The code has the capabilities of analysis of all fuel rod 
types under normal, off-normal and accident conditions (deterministic and probabilistic). 
2.3.6 Neutron physics 
The transient (time dependent) three-dimensional calculation of the neutron flux following 
global or local perturbations constitutes the main goal fro the use of the code. The neutron 
kinetics subroutines require as input the neutron cross-sections in the computational nodes 
of the kinetics mesh. A neutron cross-section model has been implemented that allows the 
neutron cross-sections to be parameterized as functions of SYS-TH code heat structure 
temperatures, fluid void fraction or fluid density, poison concentration, and fluid 
temperatures. Additional codes are necessary to (not exhaustive list): 
 to derive macroscopic cross sections thus supporting the application of the Nestle code;  
 to support and to validate calculation results (fluxes and several reaction rates in each 
point of the calculation domain and to perform criticality analyses); 
 to calculate fuel cell calculation versus burn-up; 
 to calculate the build up, decay, and processing of radioactive materials; 
 to convert evaluated nuclear data file in continuous-energy or multi-group microscopic 
cross sections libraries. 
2.3.7 Radiological consequences 
The purpose is to simulate the impact of severe accidents at nuclear power plants on the 
surrounding environment. The principal phenomena considered are atmospheric transport, 
mitigation actions based on dose projections, dose accumulation by a number of pathways 
including food and water ingestion, early and latent health effects, and economic costs. 
Several aspects must considered: 
 Calculation of the radioactivity inventory in the fuel elements. 
 Tracking the transport of radioactivity products inside the primary system and the 
containment.  
 Calculating the offsite radioactivity dispersion and the dose to the population. 
 Calculating the onsite dispersion and the dose to the control room personnel 
2.3.8 Nodalizations 
The nodalizations are the result of a brainstorming process by the code-users, which connect 
each code with the physical system to be simulated. The process for developing a 
nodalization especially for a best estimate code does not necessarily require less effort than 
the process of development of the code itself. The same is true in relation to the 
qualification. Expert users develop the nodalization for an assigned purpose, provided that 
Best Practice Guidelines are followed whenever available. Sensitivity tests can be performed 
to demonstrate the nodalization quality and the achievement of mesh-independence of the 
results, which means that varying the node density (or the number of nodes) does not make 
the results change to a large extent. All nodalizations shall be developed according to 
suitable quality assurance procedures and criteria. The procedures are linked with the code 
characteristics and with the expertise of the users. 
All nodalizations developed to apply the BE codes must be qualified according to current 
standards that are specific for each code. Plant nodalization should be developed according 
to predefined qualitative and quantitative acceptance criteria. 
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Three major steps in the process must be distinguished each one characterized by a number 
of sub-steps, by procedures and by acceptability thresholds: 
1. Nodalization development: the nodalization must be characterized by ‘geometric 
fidelity’ with the modelled physical systems that are part of the NPP. 
2. Acceptance of steady state. 
3. The transient capability: the capability of the code-nodalization in simulating the 
phenomena of interest must be demonstrated 
Qualitative and quantitative acceptability thresholds and criteria are adopted at step 1). 
Quantitative acceptability thresholds are adopted at step 2). Qualitative and quantitative 
accuracy evaluation is performed for step 3) with quantitative thresholds. 
A simplified scheme of a procedure for the qualification of the nodalization is depicted in 
the figure 3. It is assumed that the code has fulfilled the validation and qualification process 
and a “frozen” version of the code has been made available to the final user. The steps of the 
diagram are described below.  
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Fig. 3. Simplified scheme for nodalization qualification 
Step “a”:this step is related to the information available by the user manual and by the 
guidelines for the use of the code. 
Step “b”: user experience and developers recommendations are listed and considered. 
Step “c”: the nodalization must reproduce all the relevant parts of the reference plant; this 
includes geometrical and materials fidelity and consideration of components and logics. 
Step “d”: different checks are performed under this step mostly geometry related (does not 
require running the code-nodalization). 
Step “e”: different checks are performed under this step. 
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Step “f”: this is the step where the adopted acceptability criteria are applied to evaluate the 
comparison between hardware and implemented geometrical values in the nodalization and 
between the experimental and calculated steady-state parameters. 
Step “g”: if one of the criteria in the step “f” are not fulfilled, a review of the nodalization 
(step “c”) must be performed. The path “g” must be repeated till all acceptability criteria are 
satisfied.  
Step “h”: this step constitutes the “On Transient” level qualification and allows the 
verification of selected data that are relevant only during transient. 
Step “i”: in this step the thermal-hydraulic parameters that are at the basis of the qualitative 
or quantitative accuracy evaluations are characterized. 
Step “j”: checks are performed to evaluate the acceptability of the calculation, e.g. of the ‘Kv-
scaled’ calculation both from qualitative and from quantitative points of view.  
Step “k”: this path is actuated if any of the checks (qualitative and quantitative) is not fulfilled.  
Step “l”: the obtained nodalization is used for the selected transient and the selected facility 
or plant. Any subsequent modification of the nodalization requires a new qualification 
process both at “steady state” and at “on transient” level. 
3. Example of application: introduction to the analysis of the MPTR 
The RBMK core is constituted by more than one-thousand pressurized channels housed into 
stacked graphite blocks and connected at the bottom and at the top by small diameter (D) 
and long length (L) pipes (less than 0.01 and more than 10 m, respectively) that end up into 
headers and drum separators. Control valves are installed in the bottom lines. Due to the 
large L/D value and to the presence of valves and other geometric discontinuities along the 
lines connecting with the pressure channels, the Fuel Channel Blockage (FCB) event is 
possible and already occurred in two documented NPP events. Previous investigations, 
have shown the relevance of these events for the safety technology, and the availability of 
proper computational technique for the analysis (NIKIET, 1983 and 1992). 
The occurrence of the FCB event remains undetected for a few tens of seconds because of the 
lack of full monitoring for the individual channels. Therefore, fission power continues to be 
produced in the absence of cooling. This brings in subsequent times to fuel rod overheating, 
pressure tube failure, damage of the neighbouring graphite brick and ejection of damaged 
fuel. Following the pressure tube rupture, reactor cavity pressurization, radioactivity release 
into the same area and change of fluid properties occur that allow the detection of the event 
and cause the reactor scram at a time of a few tens of seconds depending upon the channel 
working conditions and the severity of the blockage. 
Notwithstanding the scram and the full capability of the reactor designed safety features to 
keep cooled the core, the multiple pressure tube rupture (MPTR) issue is raised. The 
question to be answered is whether the ‘explosion’ of the blocked pressure tube damages 
not only the neighbour graphite bricks but propagates to other channels causing the 
potential for several channel failure. 
In order to address the MPTR issue fuel channel thermal-hydraulics and three-dimensional 
(3D) neutron kinetics analyses have been performed, as well structural mechanics 
calculations for the graphite bricks and rings (graphite rings surround the pressure tube to 
accommodate for thermal and radiation induced expansions). 
 
Nuclear Power – Operation, Safety and Environment 
 
40
The bases for the analysis and the results of the study are presented. The conclusion, not 
reported within a licensing based format, is that the MPTR consequences are not expected to 
be relevant for the safety of the RBMK installations. 
3.1 Execution of the analysis 
The detailed knowledge of the RBMK system configuration was not spread in the Western 
world till the 1986 event. Afterwards, “information batches” of RBMK technology became 
available and were unavoidably evaluated in the light of the Chernobyl event. The results of 
recently completed project sponsored by European Commission (EC), with the participation 
of RBMK designers in Russia and the supervision of the national utility and the regulatory 
authority, allow to give an idea of RBMK current safety characteristics. The project has been 
made possible owing to the availability of sophisticate computational tools developed and 
qualified in the last decade. These include powerful computers, advanced numerical 
solution methods, techniques for developing input decks and for proving the qualification 
level. Following the identification and the characterization of bounding scenarios assuming 
to envelope all accident conditions relevant to RBMK safety technology, two main chains of 
codes have been set-up and utilized to perform safety analyses.  
3.2 The computational tools 
The computational tools include the numerical codes, the nodalizations and the relevant 
boundary and initial conditions related to the Smolensk 3 NPP in the present case. The 
application of computational tools requires systematic demonstration of quality and suitable 
documentation detail. However, within the scope of the performed activity, there is the ‘as-
far-as-possible’ demonstration of quality for codes, the development of nodalizations, the 
implementation of boundary and initial conditions as available and the achievement of 
results from computer calculations. Furthermore, terms like ‘capable code’ and ‘suitable 
code’ have been introduced. A code is ‘capable’ when it is able to simulate the phenomena 
and the physical scenarios expected during the assigned NPP accident. A code is ‘suitable’ 
when a user can run the code addressing (or calculating) the expected phenomena within a 
reasonable time with reasonable resources. It should be noted that the term ‘capable’ is less 
binding for a code than the term ‘qualified’ and a quantification is provided for the items 
‘reasonable resources’ and ‘reasonable time’. 
3.3 The numerical codes 
The numerical codes adopted are those listed in the third column of Table 2.  
 
Identification Codes adopted Reasons for the selection 
No. ACRONYM explanation     
A1 LOCA-PH-FIGDH: LOCA in 
Pressure Header with failure 
to isolate GDH 
Relap5 Largest primary system break 
with single failure. Challenging 
core cooling and the ECCS 
design   
A2 LOCA-SL: LOCA originated 
by a break in Steam Line 
  Highest depressurization rate. 
Challenging core cooling and the 
ECCS design 
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Identification Codes adopted Reasons for the selection 
A3 LOOP-ATWS: Loss of on Site 
Power with the ATWS 
condition 
  Challenging core cooling and the 
neutron kinetics model of the 
thermal-hydraulic system codes 
A4 GDH-BLOCKAGE: Full 
blockage of the GDH 
  Check of the capability of the 
'ECCS bypass' to cool the core 
B1 GDH-BLOCKAGE-SA: Full 
blockage of the GDH with the 
'Severe Accident' assumption 
of no bypass line available 
Cocosys and 
Relap5 
Challenging the venting 
capability of the reactor cavity 
(part of the confinement) 
B2 LOCA-PH-FIGDH: See A1 Contain and 
Relap5 
Challenging the ALS (part of the 
confinement) structural 
resistance (same as A1) 
B3 LOCA-SL: See A2 Contain Challenging the reactor building 
(part of the confinement) venting 
capability (same as A2) 
C1 FC-BLOCKAGE: Full 
blockage of one fuel channel 
Relap5-
3D©/Nestle 
Challenging the calculation of 
the local fission power 
generation (same as D1) 
C2 GDH-BLOCKAGE: See A4   To assess and to understand the 
local core response (same as A4) 
C3 CR-G-WITHDRAWAL: 
Continued withdrawal of a 
CR bank (or group) 
Korsar-Bars Challenging RIA (Reactivity 
Initiating Event) 
C4 CPS-LOCA: Voiding (or 
LOCA) of the CPS 
Relap5-
3D©/Nestle 
  
D1 FC-BLOCKAGE: See C1 Relap5-Ansys 
Katran-U-
Stack 
Driving accident for the study. 
Challenging various areas and 
codes 
D2 FC-LOCA: Rupture of one FC Contain & 
Relap5 Fluent-
Ansys               
Korsar-Rapta 
To assess the ballooning model 
in the fuel pin mechanics area 
E1 FC-BLOCKAGE: See C1 Cocosys              
Melcor 
To assess the hydrogen and the 
fission products source term and 
transport (same as B1) 
E2 GDH-BLOCKAGE-SA: See B1   To assess the hydrogen and the 
fission products source term and 
transport in one extreme 
conditions (same as B1) 
F1 FC-BLOCKAGE: See C1 Relap5 To formulate the ICM proposal 
(same as D1) 
Table 2. Adopted numerical codes 
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The area for the application of the codes can be deduced from the second column in the 
same table and from the diagrams in figure. 4 and figure 5 that are applicable for the 
Russian and the Western codes, respectively. Topological subjects relevant to the 
deterministic safety analysis of RBMK are identified in Figs. 4 and 5 and the correspondence 
with the range of application of numerical codes is established.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Codes adopted by Russian group 
The topological subjects include:  
 Five fission product barriers: the fuel pellet, the clad, the pressure boundary of the 
primary cooling system and the confinement regions corresponding to the reactor 
cavity, the (ALS) and the reactor building.  
 The materials and components constituting the NPP hardware: the coolant, the fuel and 
the moderator are examples of ‘materials’; the control rods, the pressure tube and the 
zones of the confinement are examples of ‘components’. 
The technological areas (for deterministic safety analysis) include the system thermal-
hydraulics, the computational fluid-dynamics, the structural mechanics, the neutron kinetics 
with the cross section generation and the fission product release and transport. 
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Fig. 5. Codes adopted by western group 
3.4 The nodalizations 
Nodalizations were developed for both Western and Russian codes by modelling the 
materials and components, by making reference to the technological areas and by 
considering the features of codes  with the target of demonstrating codes capability and 
suitability, but also to assess the integrity of the fission product barriers. Nodalizations are 
typically the result of wide range brainstorming processes whose outcome depends upon 
the code features, the available computer power, the expertise of the user and the target for 
the analyses. An example of the realized nodalizations is reported in the table 3. 
3.5 The boundary and the initial conditions 
Boundary conditions for NPP accident analyses are constituted by huge amount of data 
ranging from in the present case the mass of water in the steam drum, to the individual fuel 
bundle burn-up, to the material properties of irradiated graphite, to the thickness and the 
Young module for the tank that encompasses the graphite stacks, to the free volume of the 
reactor cavity, to the net flow areas of the valves/openings connecting various zones of the 
confinement with the environment. 
The boundary conditions for the MPTR issue is the accident scenario originated by the fuel 
channel blockage (FC-BLOCKAGE making reference to boundary conditions in the 
Smolensk-3 NPP unit. 
3.6 The multidisciplinary problem associated with the FC-BLOCKAGE scenario 
The background for addressing the multidisciplinary problem arising from the FC-
BLOCKAGE and the MPTR include the presentation of following aspects: 
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Table 3. Realized nodalizations 
 study of the components and zones of the RBMK core region to make clear the 
concerned accident scenario, 
 the characterization of the steady state operation of the reference RBMK boiling channel, 
 the experience from the pressure tube (PT) rupture events in RBMK NPP, 
 the phenomenological evolution of the transient. 
An overview of the multidisciplinary problem associated with the blockage of one fuel 
channel scenario is given by the phenomenological aspects associated with the scenario 
originated by the blockage of one fuel channel in the RBMK NPP (i.e. FC-BLOCKAGE 
event). To this aim, phenomena are identified that characterize the progression of the event, 
the failure map for RBMK pressure tubes and the probable position for break elevation 
following FCBLOCKAGE. 
The multidisciplinary nature and the demonstration of complexity for the concerned 
scenario is shortly highlighted in the figure 6 e table 4 and can be summarized in the 
following list: 
 System Thermal-Hydraulics related to reactor coolant system 
 Fuel pin mechanics to evaluate the fuel performance parameters including rod 
deformation following the FC-BLOCKAGE event in the RBMK fuel bundle. 
 System Thermal-Hydraulics related to confinement  
 Computational fluid dynamics to calculate the hydraulic loads acting upon the fuel rods 
following the rupture of the pressure tube occurring during the FC-BLOCKAGE event. 
 Neutron kinetics for  generation of average parameters for microscopic cross-sections as 
a functions of energy 
 Neutron kinetics: 3D transient neutron flux to calculate the neutron kinetics parameters 
in the individual fuel channel and associated graphite stack following the FC-
BLOCKAGE event. 
 Structural mechanics to calculate stresses and strains in the pressure tube and in the 
graphite blocks following the rupture of the pressure tube occurring during the FC-
BLOCKAGE event. 
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 Fission products generation to calculate the source term associated with the operation 
of a fuel channel of the RBMK, i.e. the amount of radioactivity that is released during 
the progression of the FC-BLOCKAGE event. 
 Fission products transport to calculate the transport of the fission products generated as 
a consequence of the melting and the damage of a RBMK fuel bundle during the 
progression of the FC-BLOCKAGE event. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Scheme of the multidisciplinary approach 
 
Table 4. Technical areas involved in the analysis 
3.7 Results of the analysis 
The scenario puts an enormous challenge to the codes: all key technological areas relevant to 
the deterministic reactor safety are involved. About 40 phenomena have been identified as 
characterizing the scenario and related computational tools have been evaluated. 
However the possibility for the occurrence of the multiple pressure tube rupture (MPTR) 
was excluded. 
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4. Conclusions 
The best estimate concept is defined as the efforts in avoiding conservative assumptions in 
performing analysis. It implies to adopt the best suitable tool available for each specific topic 
relevant for an analysis. In the case of an analysis related to a like NPP complex system it is 
necessary to “enlarge” the investigation in many technological areas. A direct consequence 
is constituted by the adoption of an integrated approach in performing safety analysis. A 
further relevant consequence is that the best estimate concept must be applied to a broad 
spectrum of disciplines.  
This integrated best estimate approach for safety analysis means the availability of qualified 
tools an qualified users in many technical areas. The qualification has to be also applied to 
the coupling of the codes typically organized in a sort of “chain” including not only the code 
itself but also the input of the codes  and the input and output data.  
It is also relevant the availability of a suitable computational power necessary to perform the 
calculation with the different codes. The importance of this aspect is connected with the 
capability to include in the calculations all the details necessary to obtain a results to be 
considered as best estimate input for other linked codes. 
The uncertainty is another relevant aspects. Best estimate application always requests 
uncertainty evaluation. The uncertainty evaluation is rather well developed for TH SYS 
code, but requires a focused and special effort in the case of all the other technical areas. 
Summarizing, the best estimate concept applied in analysis for complex systems should be 
applied as an integrated approach in the meaning of application covering many 
technological areas and it requests a large effort in terms of technical competences, 
capability in qualified use of tools and user, and computational power.  
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1. Introduction  
Most reactors under operation nowadays are light water reactors (LWR). The licensing and 
safety basis for them has been mainly deterministic. This approach has been under use since 
the beginning of commercial nuclear power in the 1950s. The purpose of this chapter is to 
discuss what this deterministic basis is, and how it has been used with emphasis on the US 
and German experience. This emphasis is because the first Brazilian reactor is of 
Westinghouse design, while the second one is of KWU (Kraftwerk Union)/Siemens/Areva 
design. Both designs are pressurized water reactors (PWR). 
This chapter starts with the discussion of safety criteria, consideration of the defense in 
depth approach and deterministic criteria (safety margins), and the discussion of design 
basis accidents, including plant safety systems for meeting safety design criteria (IAEA, 
2009a), Ahn et al (2010). 
The approaches used thus far for safety analyses of LWRs have been essentially deterministic, 
where engineering judgment and conservatism have been used to face uncertainties. An 
example of this approach is the consideration of design basis accidents (such as large loss of 
coolant accidents – LOCA). They have been defined by arbitrarily combining initiating events 
with single failures (for example, loss of an injection pump), Kim et al (2010). 
The inception of risk-informed decision making was in the 1970s, with the publication of the 
Reactor Safety Study NRC (1975), although it was initially named probabilistic risk 
assessment in the US. Since then, many improvements have been achieved but risk criteria 
have not as yet been established. 
The risk-informed approach has been adopted by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) as an aid in the licensing and safety basis of US nuclear power plants. This means 
that the formal licensing process is to be approached by deterministic and probabilistic 
methods. The risk-informed approach may represent the formal presentation of a level 3 
probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), so that plant risk curves are available. However, 
regulators do not as yet have risk criteria for this purpose, so that PSAs are recommended 
but their results are not compared to any criteria. Instead, there is a criterion concerning 
level 1 PSAs (in this case, the reactor core degradation frequency is estimated), and this is 
the central feature of risk-informed decision making nowadays, NRC (2002). 
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The risk-informed approach will be discussed in the light of US plants experience. 
Approaches in other countries will also be presented and the gained experience will be 
commented, Kadak & Matsuo (2007).  
2. Basic definitions 
Safety analysis is the study, examination and description of a nuclear installation expected 
behavior throughout its life, under normal and transient conditions, and also under 
postulated events, in order to determine: a) safety margins provided in normal operation 
and in transient regimes; b) the adequacy of items to prevent the consequences of accidents 
that may occur. 
Safety assessment is the systematic and independent evaluation carried out by the regulator 
on the submitted safety analysis. It is used to support and subsidize the licensing decision 
on the plant acceptability, once the risk associated with its operation is known. 
Inspection is the core activity performed by the regulator to verify compliance with its 
regulatory requirements or expressed in terms of licenses and permits and to implement 
them through coercive actions. 
Regulatory inspection is the examination, observation, measuring, testing and verification of 
documentation executed by the regulator during any stage of the licensing process, to 
ensure compliance of materials, components, systems, structures, operational activities, 
processes, procedures and qualification of personnel with pre-established requirements or 
determined by the regulatory body. 
Figure 1 displays the general Brazilian licensing process, where the definitions discussed 
herein play an important role. 
The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) is one of the reports of the application for a 
building permit. It aims at demonstrating that the applicant is qualified to manage the 
construction application by providing design-related technical information to the regulator. 
The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) presents the final analysis and evaluation of plant 
design, as constructed, and the behavior of items in order to assess the risk to health and 
safety of the population as a whole, resulting from the installation and considering the 
information provided since the presentation of the PSAR. 
A discussion on PSA meaning will be presented in Section 7 in the context of risk-informed 
decision making. 
3. Defense in depth 
The basic philosophy of nuclear power plant design has been described as defense in depth 
expressed in terms of three safety levels (NRC). These levels cover a variety of 
considerations that often intertwine, so that the allocation of certain aspects of the project to 
one level or another is somewhat arbitrary. However, these levels are useful to indicate the 
various stages in the safety design of a nuclear power plant. NRC defines each safety level 
through ordinances or rules. The basic purpose of reactor safety is to maintain the integrity 
of multiple barriers against the release of fission products. This integrity is supported by a 
defense in depth approach on three safety levels: a) prevention; b) protection; c) mitigation. 
However, it has been more convenient to subdivide the second safety level (protection) into 
three new levels. Therefore, the implementation of the defense in depth concept is made 
through five levels whose objectives and essential means are displayed in Table 1, IAEA 
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(1996). The role of each safety level can be clearly seen in the table. One desirable effect of 
the defense in depth concept is that the plant that adopts it tends to be more resilient to 
failures. 
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   operational experience
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Fig. 1. General Brazilian licensing process  
 
Level Objective Essential means 
1 Prevention of abnormal operation 
and/or failures 
Conservative design 
High quality in construction & 
operation 
2 Control of abnormal operation and 
detection of failures (protection) 
Control systems 
Limiting systems 
Protection systems 
3 Accident control within design basis 
(protection) 
Engineered safety features 
Accident procedures 
4 Control of severe plant conditions 
(protection) 
Complementary measures 
Accident management 
5 Mitigation of radiological consequences 
of significant radioactive releases 
Off-site emergency response 
Table 1. Objectives and essential means of the defense in depth approach, IAEA (1996) 
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4. Accident analysis 
The construction and operation of nuclear power plants requires the submission of a safety 
analysis report which must contain an analysis of a wide range of conceivable abnormal 
events. The purpose is to demonstrate that the project provides a means to control these 
events or otherwise accommodate their consequences without undue risk to health and 
safety of the public. 
Analyzed conditions include: a) small transients that occur with moderate frequency and 
represent minor hazards; b) unlikely accident situations that can have serious consequences 
and therefore require different measures to protect the public. 
Safety analysis is concerned with the potential effects of every conceivable (or anticipated) 
transient that may occur as a result of: a) operational malfunctions, e.g., human errors or 
small instrumentation or other equipment failures, or b) serious mechanical failures of 
different types. 
Transients of moderate frequency can result from operational occurrences (or other), which 
create an imbalance between heat generation in the fuel and its removal: a) thermal power 
increase, caused by: a.1) decrease of coolant temperature; or a.2) removal of control material 
(burnable poisons); b) decrease in cooling efficiency. 
As to low frequency events, there can be: a) small pipe ruptures; b) loss of flow accidents 
(LOFA); and c) design basis accidents (DBA). 
Small pipe ruptures are more serious when they occur in an input line of the pressure  
vessel of a PWR primary system circuit.  The reactor is shut down by the reactor protection 
system (RPS) but there is loss of water to the containment (vapor flashing also occurs). In 
general, for breaches of equivalent diameter smaller than 0.5”, the chemical and volume 
control systems (CVCS) compensates for inventory losses of the reactor cooling system 
(RCS). 
Should a loss of off-site and on-site power occur, all pumps eventually stop and the result is 
a loss of flow accident (LOFA). However, in 10s, in general, power will be available through 
emergency diesel generators. Meanwhile, the reactor is shut down when receiving a loss of 
flow signal, and steam is removed automatically from the turbine (steam dump). As there is 
some energy production during steam withdrawal, recirculation pumps typically remain 
connected to the main generator bus for about 10 seconds. Recirculation during pump 
shutdown and some natural circulation of coolant is usually sufficient to prevent the 
condition of critical heat flux after reactor trip. 
Design basis accidents involve the postulated failure of one or more major systems and an 
analysis based on conservative assumptions (e.g., pessimistic estimates of fission product 
releases). It must be shown that the radiological consequences are within preset limits. These 
accidents serve as a basis for assessing the general acceptability of a particular reactor 
design. Design basis accidents are classified as Knief (1993): a) overcooling - heat removal 
increasing on the secondary side; b) subcooling - reduced heat removal on the secondary 
side; c) overfilling - increased inventory of reactor coolant; d) loss of flow - RCS (reactor 
coolant system) descreased flow; e) coolant loss - loss of reactor coolant inventory; f) 
Reactivity - reactivity and power distribution anomalies in reactor core; g) ATWS - 
anticipated transients without scram; h) Spent fuel and waste system - radioactivity release 
from spent fuel element or a subsystem or reactor component; i)  external events - natural or 
man-made events that can affect plant operation and safety systems. 
A major break in a steam line results in a reactivity insertion of cold water (overcooling) 
systems in several loop systems. This event causes liquid flashing in the secondary side of 
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steam generators. The secondary fluid cools by removing heat from the primary 
(overcooling), with important implications for the reactivity balance. 
In accidents related to overcooling, or others that require rapid reduction in temperature in 
support of depressurization, the pressurized thermal shock (PTS) phenomenon is a concern 
of great importance. It is a boundary condition of reactor vessel integrity. It may occur 
during a system transient that primarily causes severe overcooling of the vessel wall inner 
surface and then results in high repressurization. If there is significant degradation due to 
radiation embrittlement and if there are defects of critical sizes in the vessel wall, this may 
fail. PTS is prevented by operating within boundary curves of temperature-pressure which 
are periodically revised to reflect the vessel current condition, particularly in terms of 
radiation embrittlement. This approach tends to lead to increasing restrictions on the 
operation window for plant heating (heatup) and cooling (cooldown) as the plant ages. 
The anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) has two general characteristics: a) it starts 
through a transient whose occurrence is anticipated one or more times in reactor life; b) 
posterior reactor trip does not occur (that is, a failure occurs). This failure, especially a 
reactivity insertion (control rod removal) is solved by negative reactivity feedbacks that 
diminish the reactor power level, or at least diminish its growth. Adequate reliability of 
control rods and the reactor protection system are important to prevent such events. 
A large rupture or leak in one or more steam generator (SG) tubes of a PWR results in a 
particular loss of coolant accident (LOCA) scenario because primary coolant passes directly 
to the secondary side. In addition to being radioactive, the coolant also represents an 
irretrievable loss of inventory in the containment building. The response to this accident 
includes isolation of damaged generators and rapid cooling and depressurization, to reduce 
the coolant loss, where care must be taken to avoid other accidents (e.g., PTS). 
A loss of coolant accident (LOCA) occurs in general when there is loss of inventory in the 
primary system through a rupture of equivalent diameter larger than 0.5 "(for ruptures with 
equivalent diameter less than 0.5”, the chemical and volume control systems (CVCS) 
compensates for inventory losses. Three types of LOCA are typically considered: a) small 
LOCAs: for equivalent rupture diameters between 0.5" and 3”; b) medium LOCAs: for 
equivalent rupture diameters between 3" and 6”; c) large LOCAs; for equivalent rupture 
diameters between 6” up to the double-ended or guillotine break in a reactor coolant system 
(RCS) cold leg, being this rupture considered as one of the design basis accidents. 
The events that occur within the first 2 min following a design basis LOCA in a PWR are: a) 
blowdown: in which the reactor coolant is expelled from reactor vessel; b) refill: when 
emergency cooling water begins to fill the reactor vessel starting from the core bottom; c) 
reflood: when the water level raises enough to cool all reactor core. 
In general, the emergency core cooling system (ECCS), one of the engineered safety features, 
should be designed to fit the following criteria under a postulated design basis LOCA in a 
PWR: a) the calculated maximum cladding temperature after the accident should not exceed 
2200 oF (1204 oC); b) the calculated total cladding oxidation due to interaction of zircaloy 
with hot steam should not exceed 17% of the total cladding thickness before oxidation; c) the 
total amount of H2 generated shall not exceed 1% of the hypothetical amount generated if all 
cladding material around pellets reacted; d) calculated changes in geometry, e.g., diameter 
of fuel rods and spacing should be such that the core can still be cooled; e) the calculated 
core temperature, after successful ECCS starting, must be maintained appropriately low for 
the time necessary for the decay of long half-life fission products in reactor core. More 
details on LOCA analysis may be found in Glasstone & Sesonske (1994). 
 
Nuclear Power – Operation, Safety and Environment 
 
52
Companies that sell reactors must provide analysis tools through which one can  
establish that the proposed reactor is designed to meet the criteria for emergency core 
cooling. These tools are generally complex computer programs that use thermal hydraulic 
models for calculating fuel and cladding temperatures, and other relevant situations and 
reactor characteristics. These tools should include means for calculating: a) energy sources; 
b) hydraulic parameters; c) heat transfer mechanisms of various hypothetical accident 
stages. 
Different calculation programs have been developed and are being refined in order to 
calculate characteristic parameters, such as: a) coolant flow rates; b) enthalpy; c) coolant, 
fuel, and cladding temperatures; d) system pressure, under steady state and transient 
conditions. 
Central to the above calculations is the notion of nodalization. Real reactor circuits must be 
nodalized, that is, a set of nodal volumes and junctions are defined and inserted into 
calculation programs to perform the desired safety calculations. An example of these 
nodalization procedures may be found in Borges et al (2001) concerning Angra 2 power 
plant.  
5. Severe accidents and accident management 
Severe accidents are those which are characterized by at least an initial core damage, 
typically specified as the overcoming of regulatory fuel limits, as, for example, 1200oC in the 
fuel cladding, as discussed in Section 4. 
The need for considering severe accidents became apparent upon the issuance of the Reactor 
Safety Study (which will be briefly discussed in Section 7), NRC (1975), where a probability 
per year of the order of 1 in 20,000 reactor-years was estimated for core melt. This value was 
apparently higher than the one implicitly estimated for the reactors operating at that time 
(Petrangeli, 2009). This calculated figure meant an expected core melt each 40 years, 
although the Reactor Safety Study itself estimated that only one in about 100 core melt 
events could cause severe health consequences (up to 10 causalities). It is noteworthy that 
the Three Mile Island event reinforced and confirmed the need initially arisen for progress 
in nuclear safety by considering possible events beyond design basis. 
IAEA (2000a) defines a severe accident as a very low probability plant state beyond design 
basis accident condition (like those discussed in Section 4), which may arise due to multiple 
failures of safety systems leading to significant core degradation. These failures may 
jeopardize the integrity of many or all of the barriers to the release of radioactive material. 
IAEA (2000a) also mentions that the consideration of severe accidents shall not be 
performed as design basis accidents are, that is, by assuming conservative assumptions. 
Rather, realistic or best estimate assumptions, methods and analytical criteria should be 
employed. 
In this sense, important event sequences that may lead to severe accidents shall be identified 
using a combination of probabilistic and deterministic methods and engineering judgement. 
Next, these event sequences are to be reviewed against a set of criteria aimed at determining 
which severe accidents shall be addressed in safety analysis. 
Accident management has arisen to cope with severe accidents. IAEA (2000b) establishes 
some requirements on severe accident management and accident management in the 
operation of nuclear power plants. According to this, plant staff shall receive instructions in 
the management of accidents beyond design basis. 
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Examples of event sequences for PWRs in this context have been considered in the Reactor 
Safety Study (NRC, 1975), as a large-break LOCA with loss of all ac power and a transient-
induced accident. This latter is caused by an event that requires reactor trip combined with a 
station blackout, i.e, the loss of all power, as well as the loss of capability of the secondary 
system to remove heat from the primary circuit. 
External events might also play an important role in severe accident management since they 
are an importance source of energy for the reactor (Knief, 1992). 
IAEA (2009b) discusses severe accident management programs for nuclear power plants. 
D’Auria & Galassi (2010) discuss important features on scaling in nuclear reactors that 
might be relevant for severe accident management. As mentioned earlier, as best estimates 
are to be used in severe accident management rather than conservative estimates, 
uncertainty analysis plays a dominant role in this field. Na et al (2004) present an approach 
for the prediction of major transient scenarios for severe accidents in nuclear power plants 
by using artificial intelligence. 
6. Licensing of nuclear power plants 
6.1 Introduction 
The licensing of nuclear power reactors is a formal activity that constitutes a permanent 
process of decision making, involving the issuance of licenses, permits, amendments or their 
cancellations, covering issues involving the safety of nuclear reactors, and the radiological 
protection of operators, the general population and the environment. 
Decision making is performed based on the results of two complementary activities: a) 
safety assessment; and b) inspection. 
The decision should consider whether there is sufficient assurance that the facility operation 
will not result in undue risk to: a) population, b) operators and c) the environment. 
The licensing process of nuclear facilities is regulated by standard CNEN-NE-1.04 (CNEN, 
1984), in force since 1984. The issuance of licenses or permits shall be preceded by the 
applicant request together with information, data, plans and reports, whose content is 
described in the standard. 
6.2 Applicable standards 
There are over 40 standards in force in CNEN (Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission), and 
20 apply to nuclear power reactors. In the absence of appropriate standardization, codes and 
guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), are preferably used, where 
necessary. Table 2 displays the most important nuclear standards concerning nuclear power 
reactors issued by CNEN. These standards may be found in cnen.gov.br. 
6.3 The licensing process 
The licensing process requires the issuance by CNEN of the following acts: a) Site Approval 
(AL); b) Construction License (LC); c) Authorization for Nuclear Material Use (AuMN); d) 
Authorization for Initial Operation; e) Authorization for Permanent Operation (AOP). 
The various reports and programs per act required during the licensing process are 
presented below. 
For site approval: a) Site Report; and b) Preliminary Program of Pre-Operational 
Monitoring. 
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Number Title 
NE-1.01 Reactor Operator Licensing 
NE-1.04 Licensing of Nuclear Installations 
NN-1.12 Qualification of Technical Independent Oversight Bodies in Nuclear 
Facilities 
NE-1.14 Report of Nuclear Plants Operating 
NN-1.15 Independent Technical Supervision in Quality Assurance Activities 
NE-1.16 Quality Assurance for nuclear-power plants 
NE-1.17 Personnel Qualification and Certification for Non-Destructive Testing Items 
in Nuclear Facilities 
NE-1.22 Meteorological Programs in Support of nuclear-power plants 
NE-1.26 Safety in Operation of nuclear-power plants 
NE-2.01 Physical Protection of Nuclear Operating Units of Area 
NN-2.03 Fire Protection in nuclear-power plants  
NE-3.01 Basic Guidelines for Radiation Protection 
Table 2. Typical CNEN standards for nuclear power reactors 
For the Construction License (LC): a) Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR); b) 
Preliminary Plan of Physical Protection (PPPF); c) Quality Assurance Program (QAP); and 
d) Preliminary Plan for Personnel Training. 
The following activities do not depend on a previous license: a) site excavation; b) 
infrastructure preparation; c) buildings not intended for safety-important items; and d) 
system components manufacturing. 
Obligations during plant construction: a) report of deficiencies in the executive project, 
construction and pre-operational phase with impact on safety; b) progress report of 
activities; c) results of the programs of research and development (R & D) designed to solve 
safety problems; d) reports on equipment storage; e) audit programs on contractors; f) 
procedure for pre-operational tests, and g) submit to resident construction inspection. 
Authorization for Initial Operation (AOI): a) Final  Safety Analysis Report (FSAR); b) answers 
to LC constraints; c) authorization for nuclear material use; d) final plan for physical protection 
(FPF); e) radiation protection plan; f) fire protection plan; g) commissioning program; h) test 
procedures; i) Quality Assurance Program (PGQ); j) operating procedures manual; k) local 
emergency plan (PEL); l) operator team licensed by CNEN; m) civil responsibility insurance 
against damages; and n) submit to resident inspection. 
Authorization for Permanent Operation (AOP): a) initial report of operations; b) 
commissioning report, and c) responses to AOI requirements. 
During Operation: a) periodic reports; b) operational event reports; c) report to CNEN in 
Emergencies; d) shutdown planning; e) technical specification changing requests; f) 
technical modification requests; g) operator licenses reassessment; h) safety periodic review 
(each 10 years); i) response to CNEN requirements; j) submit to periodical inspections; and 
k) submit to resident inspection. 
For safety review and assessment activities, four basic procedures are used: a) comparison 
with other facility used as a reference; b) verification of requirement, standard, and 
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specification adherence; c) design verification through independent calculations; and d) 
incorporation of requirements arising from international experience in nuclear technology. 
The verification of compliance requirements is made through a detailed examination of 
normative and support documents, identifying clearly the criteria that support the regulator 
assessment. 
The analysis of the document or activity being evaluated is performed by comparing it with 
the regulator assessment criteria and/or previous requirements issued, following proper 
procedures for each type of task, such as: a) operational event; b) modification project; c) 
technical specification changes; d) Accident Analysis; e) periodical reports; and f) system 
and component design. 
Next, a balance of deficiencies and nonconformities is performed. 
The final product of the safety assessment is a technical advice. This document must contain 
the basis of judgement and conclude in a clear and concise way on the acceptability of the 
document or the activity under review. If there are deficiencies or nonconformities 
requirements for the implementation of corrective actions should be issued. 
The objectives of independent calculations are: a) verify the completeness and adequacy of 
the analysis performed by the designer; and b) provide the regulator technical staff with 
experience and knowledge about phenomena and modeling techniques associated with the 
facility operation in normal or accident conditions. 
Lessons learned through international operating experience and nuclear accidents are 
permanent sources of improvement of licensing requirements adopted by CNEN. 
An inspection activity is made throughout all licensing phases, through testimonies, 
inspections and audits. Inspections may be reactive or routine. Reactive inspections (advised 
or not) are dependent on the project phase or on the occurrence of a significant event that 
requires verification. For reactors in permanent operation routine checks follow a regular 
program, which is established on an annual basis. 
Regulatory Inspections are formal activities conducted by a team of inspectors which 
follows a previously prepared checklist, considering: a) inspection requirements (standards, 
license or permit terms, etc); b) examination of documents that regulate the inspected 
activity, such as: b.1) quality assurance program; b.2) operation manual; b.3) technical codes 
or standards; b.4) design specifications; b.5) FSAR applicable sections; b.6) checking of 
requirements not fulfilled in previous inspections. 
During plant construction and operation phases, CNEN keeps a team of resident inspectors, 
which makes a plant daily monitoring and issues periodical audit reports. These reports 
describe inspection activities, identify non-compliances and formulate proper requirements 
for the licensed facility to deploy appropriate corrective actions, when necessary. Figure 2 
display CNEN’s inspection approach. 
Tasks of power reactor licensing are performed through acts. These acts are related to the 
different steps during the licensing process: a) pre-licensing; b) site approval; c) construction 
issuance; d) during construction; e) AOP Issuance; f) operation monitoring. Acts related to 
pre-licensing involve: a) management contacts; b) verification of project objectives and 
preliminary schedules; and c) team meetings on licensing, quality systems and safety 
analysis. 
Acts related to site approval involve: a) site report assessment (demographics, seismology, 
hydrology, meteorology, geography, and external events); b) emergency plan viability; and 
c) interaction with the environmental licensing (through the Brazilian environmental 
agency, IBAMA). 
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Acts related to construction issuance involve: a) PSAR examination and evaluation to check 
the safety concept acceptability of the plant design (design basis accidents, philosophy, 
design approach, experimental support, safety research, reference plant, standards adopted 
in the design and fabrication, program quality assurance and development of major 
providers, training program for human resources) ; and b) assessment of the pre-operational 
environmental monitoring program. 
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Fig. 2. Brazilian nuclear regulator (CNEN)’s inspection approach 
Acts during construction: a) assessment of safety deficiencies identified during the execute 
design, construction, assembly or pre-operational tests, from non-conformities recorded in 
the context of the Quality Assurance Program, or from deviations from the criteria and 
design basis as stated in PSAR, or arising from significant damage during construction, 
assembly or testing; b) FSAR review to check whether the design final specification confirms 
safety analysis findings; c) implementation inspection of procedures established in QAP, 
facility compliance as constructed in relation to licensed design, test adequacy on structure 
and system integrity as well as functional tests of components and systems; d) monitoring of 
international experience, with emphasis on the reference installation, to identify any 
additional measures that need to be required to improve safety of the facility under 
construction. 
Acts during AOP issuance: a) assessment of compliance with all LC and AOI conditions; b) 
assessment of compliance with all CNEN safety significant requirements in earlier stages; c) 
beginning of resident inspection; d) procedure analysis and witness of integrated tests 
including loading tests; e) initial criticality; f) low power physical tests and other tests; g) 
initial operation report (ROI) evaluation to determine the adequacy of commissioning 
program to demonstrate foundations of safety analysis; h) survey of international safety 
standard and licensing evolution since the last license or permit issued. 
Acts related to operation monitoring: a) resident inspection to verify compliance with terms 
set out in the AOP, particularly in relation to technical specifications; b) safety assessment 
on requirement and restriction compliance expressed in AOP; c) conduction of periodic 
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inspection and audit program on activities that affect quality and are safety significant; d) 
assessment of operational safety by examining periodic operation reports, of consolidation 
of CNEN issued requirements and the examination of significant event reports; e) control 
and daily record of operational activities; f) assessment of technical change applications to 
be introduced in the licensed project or technical specifications changes; and g) monitoring 
of international operating nuclear reactors experience. 
6.4 PSAR and FSAR 
The minimum content of PSAR comprises: a) Description and safety analysis of the site for 
the facility; b) Facility description and analysis with special attention to design features and 
operation; c) Preliminary design of the facility, with emphasis on: c.1) the main criteria; 
c.2) the design bases and their relationship with the main criteria, and c.3) information 
related to building materials, arrangement and approximate dimensions; d) Preliminary 
analysis and evaluation of project performance and installation of items in order to assess 
the risk to health and safety of people (safety margins for normal operation and transient 
conditions and adequacy of the items designed for accident prevention); e) Description and 
justification of the choice of variables based on the analysis and preliminary assessment that 
will be subject to technical specifications, and f) description of control systems for release of 
effluents and radioactive waste. 
FSAR must include information that: a) describes the facility; b) provides the basis for the 
project; c) defines the limits of operation, and d) allows a safety analysis of the installation as 
a whole. 
FSAR should allow for a: a) perfect understanding of the system design; and b) clear display 
of the relationships between the system design and safety assessments. 
FSAR should also contain information relating to plant operation, like: a) quality assurance; 
b) program of pre-operational tests and initial operation; c) program for the conduct of 
operation, including: c.1) maintenance; c.2) periodic tests of items, and d) proposed technical 
specifications (TS). 
Table 3 displays the FSAR contents. 
Chapter 17 of FSAR is the only one written in Portuguese for Brazilian power plants, 
because all FSAR chapters except this one are prepared by the vendor. The chapter on 
quality assurance is prepared by the licensee itself. 
A chapter 19 on probabilistic safety assessment (to assess core melt frequency, the so called 
Level 1 PSA as will be discussed in Section 7) is to be added to FSAR for Brazilian power 
plants.  
6.5 Licensing of Angra 1 nuclear plant 
Angra 1 has had its license covered by CNEN NE 1.04 and has been based on the American 
model of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 
The operation time of 40 years was used in the project and considered in the safety 
assessment review for issuance of the Provisional Authorization of Operation (APO) in 1984, 
and later in the Authorization for Initial Operation (AOI) in 1987, and Authorization for 
Permanent Operation (AOP) in 1994. 
In AOP, the time of 40 years was considered as a basis for 1984 and a review of the 
authorization to ratify or amend its terms is scheduled every 10 years. This ensures a 
periodical safety assessment review, keeping the licensing bases of CNEN–NE–1.26 standard. 
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Chapter Contents 
01 Introduction and General Description 
02 Site Characteristics 
03 Design of Structures, Components, Equipments &  Systems 
04 Reactor 
05 Reactor Coolant Systems and Connected Systems 
06 Engineered Safety Features 
07 Instrumentation and Control  
08 Electric Power 
09 Auxiliary Systems 
10 Steam and Power Conversion System 
11 Radioactive Waste Management 
12 Radiation Protection 
13 Conduct of Operations 
14 Initial Test Program 
15 Accident Analysis 
16 Technical Specifications 
17 Garantia de Qualidade (Quality Assurance) 
18 Human Factors Engineering 
Table 3. FSAR contents 
General Design Criteria adopted are described in Appendix A of 10 CFR 50, and were the 
minimum requirements for Angra 1 main criteria. The establishment of a defined accident 
spectrum that has been postulated for the project, whose consequences could not exceed the 
maximum dose limits on the borders of the "exclusion area", according to 10 CFR 100, 
characterized the deterministic licensing model.  
The exclusion area is defined as the area in which an individual located at any point on its 
edge for 2 hours immediately after the release of fission products, would not receive a whole 
body radiation dose greater than 25 rem or a total thyroid radiation dose greater than 300 
rem due to iodine exposure (Lamarsh & Baratta, 2000). 
The verification of requirements established pursuant to 10 CFR 50 was driven by 
regulatory guides that consolidate the positions adopted and accepted by NRC technical 
assessment teams. FSAR standard model, as provided in standard NE-1.04, was the 
Regulatory Guide RG 1.70, Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Report for 
NPPs (1978). NUREG 0800, Standard Review Plan for Review Safety Analysis Report for 
NPP, is employed by CNEN for safety assessment. 
6.6 Licensing of Angra 2 nuclear plant 
Just as Angra 1’s, Angra 2’s licensing is subject to standards CNEN–NN-1.04 and 1.26. There 
is a direct correspondence between the American and German licensing models. To 
maintain uniformity between both Angra 1 and Angra 2 licensing, the FSAR contents, as 
provided in standard CNEN-NE-1.04 (CNEN, 1984)  is in accordance with RG-1.70 (NRC, 
1978) , as amended to incorporate the developments in NUREG 0800 (NRC, 1996). 
 
LWR Safety Analysis and Licensing and Implications for Advanced Reactors 
 
59 
As will be discussed in Sec. 6.7, a noteworthy feature of Angra 2 licensing is the inclusion of 
human factors. 
The safety criteria document presents the German Interior Ministry requirements that can be 
understood as minimum criteria in relation to the plant main design criteria. Guidelines for 
PWR reactors have recommendations for different design, divided into 25 chapters and, 
where applicable, they take into account technical standards from others, like ASME. 
6.7 Human factors and human reliability 
A point worth mentioning is the incorporation into FSAR of the so called human factors 
engineering (Chapter 18). NUREG 0711  (NRC, 2004) has been adopted as a reference for the 
safety evaluations, taking into account the technological differences between Westinghouse 
and Siemens/KWU (AREVA) designs. 
The human factors engineering approach to be presented in FSAR is composed by the 
following topics: a) Human factors engineering program management; b) Operating 
experience review; c) Functional Requirements Analysis and Function Allocations; d) Task 
Analysis; e) Personnel Qualification and Quantification; f) Human Reliability Analysis; g) 
Human – System Interface Design; h) Procedures Development; i) Development of the 
Training Programs; j) Human Factors Verification and Validation. 
Figure 3 displays the NRC human factors engineering approach that has been adopted by 
CNEN. 
6.8 Licensing in US 
The Brazilian nuclear regulation was strongly influenced by the model used in the U.S., 
particularly with regard to stages of the licensing process. The basic law to regulate nuclear 
power is the Atomic Energy Act, 1954. In 1974, through the Energy Reorganization Act, an 
exclusive agency was created to regulate the use of nuclear energy, called the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC). 
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) is the collection of US technical documents. It has 
several titles, and Title 10 refers to energy. Titles are divided into parts. NRC's regulations 
are in Title 10 (Parts 0-199). Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 sets out general design criteria (GDC) 
for nuclear power plants, which set out requirements for the design, manufacture, 
construction, testing and performance of systems and structures, NRC (1999). 
There are 45 GDCs, divided into six categories: 1 - General Requirements; 2 - Protection 
Against Multiple Barriers for Fission Product Release; 3 - System Protection and Reactivity 
Control; 4 - Systems Containing Fluids; 5 - Reactor Containment, and 6 - Control of Fuel and 
Radioactivity. 
Appendix B of 10 CFR - Part 50 presents the program requirements for quality assurance. 
The FSAR contents are established in 10 CFR-Part 50.34 (Contents of Applications; Technical 
Information). NRC publishes documents called regulatory guides, which, although not 
mandatory (but strongly recommended), describe methods, standards and acceptable ways 
to meet the requirements of 10 CFR. These documents are broken down into 10 divisions, 
where division 1 concerns power reactors. 
RG 1.70 (NRC, 1978) establishes the content and format for the FSAR. The Reg Guides 
mention standards and industry standards that NRC recognizes as safe engineering 
practices e.g., IEEE Std-323 for electrical and mechanical equipment qualification, IEEE 
(2004). Some codes and industry standards are considered mandatory and are explicitly 
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mentioned in paragraphs of 10 CFR - Part 50 (eg 10 CFR 50.55a - ASME Code for Pressure 
Vessels and boilers). See the NRC site (nrc.gov) for details on CFR 
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Fig. 3. NRC human factor engineering approach (NRC, 2004). 
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Industry standards are prepared by institutions which have began to produce special rules 
for application in the nuclear area, the main ones being: American Society for Mechanical 
Engineers (ASME), asme.org; Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 
ieee.org; American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM), astm.org; Health Physics Society 
(HPS), hps.org; American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), aiche.org; Institute of 
Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), inmm.org. 
Technical documents referred as NUREGs are used by NRC in its regulatory action. These 
reports are diverse in nature and support decision-making. They can result of technical 
studies, record of experience, training programs, etc. NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan 
for Review of Safety Analysis Reports of Nuclear Power Plants is an example. It is used by 
NRC technical staff for guidance on the assessment of safety analysis reports. Figure 4 
displays the general US licensing procedure. 
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Fig. 4. Licensing in US 
6.9 Licensing in Germany 
The Atomic Energy Act (AtG in German) of 1960 provides the legal basis for the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy in Germany. By the German constitution, states (Länder) are 
responsible for implementing AtG on behalf of the German federal government. To ensure 
uniform application of AtG, the Federal Government oversees the states. Section 7 of ATG 
refers to nuclear installations and their licensing. 
AtG provisions are supplemented by other laws and regulations of acts in the following 
areas: radiation protection; environmental impact; emissions control; and service water. 
The various acts include the following areas: radiological protection; nuclear licensing 
procedures; financial insurance; cost of the atomic act; nuclear safety authority; and 
payment of disposal. 
Safety requirements are of general characteristics, providing an environment for different 
technical solutions, but these solutions must have the same goal of protection. Licensing and 
supervision authorities have to examine whether this goal is achieved through a variety of 
safety regulations. 
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Safety regulations include: a) safety criteria for nuclear power plants, approved by the state 
committee for nuclear energy; b) BMI (former Ministry of Interior) and BMU (present-day 
Ministry of Interior and the Environment) guides for qualification of personnel for nuclear 
power plants; c) safety criteria for final storage; d) safety guidelines of the Committee on 
Reactor Safety; e) safety standards of the Nuclear Standards Committee; f) standards of the 
German Institute for Standardization. 
The licensee applies for a license to build and operate the plant to the Licensing Authority of 
the state, preparing the safety report in accordance with the legislation requirements. The 
state licensing authority examines whether the prerequisites for ensuring the permit were 
met, assisted by the Organization of Independent Inspection. At the same time, BMU is 
involved in the process. BMU is assisted by a radiation protection committee. After project 
evaluation, this committee shall present its recommendations to BMU. 
BMU evaluates the recommendations and submit its comments to licensing authorities, 
which are considered in the decision making process of the state authority. The state 
authorities, communities near the plant, other authorities and institutions whose areas of 
responsibility may be affected (nature protection, fire protection, disaster control, etc.)  take 
part in the examination process. 
Licensing authorities may request opinions from experts about nuclear safety and 
radiological protection requirements. However, experts only give technical support to the 
authorities, having no power of decision in licensing. A step in licensing are public hearings, 
which may contest the licensing authority, based on current legislation, and consequently 
taking action to an administrative court.  
7. Risk-informed decision making 
PSA is a methodology that can be applied to provide a structured analysis process to 
evaluate the frequency and consequences of accidents scenarios in nuclear power plants. 
NRC first applied PSA in the Reactor Safety Study (NRC, 1975). An important initiative 
taken by NRC in 1988 was the issuance of Generic Letter GL-88-20, which originated the 
program known as IPE (Individual Plant Examination). This is because the Reactor Safety 
Study did not consider each plant individually in the risk assessment. 
Since that time, NRC has been using risk assessment and directing the issuance of decisions 
on complex items associated with or related to safety such as: a) total loss of power (station 
blackout); b) anticipated transients without reactor shutdown (ATWS); c) pressurized 
thermal shock events (PTS); and e) Maintenance Rule. 
NRC issued the Probabilistic Safety Assessment Policy Statement (NRC, 1995), which 
incorporated risk assessment as a tool in the regulatory process. It consists of elements that 
have originated the Risk-informed Decision Making (RIDM) and the Performance Based 
Regulation (PD). 
The following PSA-based RIDM regulatory guides were issued: a) changes in the bases of 
the specific plant licensing, RG-1.174 (NRC, 2002) ; b) assessment of changes and 
implementation of technical specifications, RG-1.177 (NRC, 1998c); c) in-service inspections 
in pipes, RG-1.175 (NRC, 1998a); d) quality assurance, RG 1.176 (NRC, 1998b); e) an 
approach to determine the technical quality of APS results for RIDM, RG 1.200 (NRC, 2002). 
Many of the current regulations, based on deterministic requirements, can not be quickly 
replaced. In January 2001, Paragraph 69 of the 10 CFR 50 (see nrc.gov), which regulates 
RIDM, was issued. 
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‘Risk insights’ is used to refer to the results and decisions that are made after probabilistic 
safety assessments are performed. It is necessary to distinguish three approaches or 
treatments in the decision making process: a) Risk Based (RB); b)) Risk Informed (RI); and 
c) Performance Based (PB). 
The risk-based approach to decision making is the one where only the numerical results of a 
probabilistic safety assessment are taken into consideration. This causes a strong 
dependence on the results of risk assessment, due to uncertainties associated with PSA 
(such as completeness and use of data). NRC does not endorse the risk-based approach, 
however does not invalidate the use of probabilistic calculations to demonstrate compliance 
with some criteria. 
The risk-informed approach to the process of regulatory decision-making represents a 
philosophy according to which the outcomes and decisions arising from risk assessment are 
considered along with other factors to establish requirements that will best target on issues 
related to the design and operation that impact safety and health of the public. 
The RI approach extends and improves the deterministic treatment because it: a) allows 
explicit consideration of a wide range of changes for safety; b) provides rationale for 
prioritizing these changes based on risk, operational experience and/or engineering 
judgment; c) facilitates the consideration of a broad range of resources to support these 
changes; d) identifies and describes uncertainty sources in the analysis; and e) leads to 
proper decision making, providing a mechanism to test the results’ sensitivity to a set of 
assumptions. 
Where appropriate, a regulatory approach with information on risk can be used to reduce 
unnecessary conservatism in deterministic treatment, or can be used to identify areas with 
insufficient conservatism in deterministic analysis and provide the foundation and 
additional requirements or regulatory actions. 
The RI approach lies between the risk-based approach and the purely deterministic 
treatment. The details of the regulatory approach to be used will determine where the RI-
based decision will fall in this spectrum. The concept of defense in depth remains the 
principle of regulatory practice. The findings and decisions arising from risk assessment can 
make the elements of defense in depth clearer due to the PSA quantitative approach. 
Rules can be either prescriptive or performance based (PB). Prescriptive requirements 
specify particular aspects, activities or program elements to be included in the project or 
process, as a means of achieving the desired goal. A performance-based requirement 
depends on results (measured or calculated, i.e., performance data) to be found. It provides 
greater flexibility to the licensee to achieve these results. 
RIDM philosophy is the reconciliation of the results of PSA insights with the traditional 
deterministic analysis. Often, PSA results conflict with deterministic insights (defense in 
depth and safety margin, for example). It is noteworthy that the use of RIDM by the licensee 
is voluntary.  
As a result of policy implementation methodologies for the use of risk information, NRC 
expected the regulatory process would improve in three aspects: a) by PSA incorporation 
into regulatory decisions; b) preserving agency’s resources; and c) reducing unnecessary 
effort on licensing. 
RIDM follows principles for implementation and evaluation of changes proposed by the 
licensee, and to evaluate these changes a series of assumptions is adopted by the regulator. 
It is expected that the proposed changes meet the set of principles described below. PSA 
techniques can be used to ensure and show compliance with these principles, which are 
displayed in Table 4. 
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Principle Description 
1 Change meets the existing law and is explicitly related to the requested exception or rule change 
2 The proposed change is consistent with the philosophy of defense in depth 
3 The proposed change has sufficient margins 
4 
When the proposed change results in an increased frequency of core 
damage and/or risk, this increase should be small and consistent with the 
regulations laid down in (51FR30028, 4/8/86) 
5 The impact of the proposed change should be monitored using performance measures 
Table 4. Principles to be followed by RIDM 
The evaluation of proposals and licensing acceptance guides adopt these same five 
principles, according to the eight assumptions detailed next. 
Assumption # 1: All safety impact of the proposed change has been assessed in an 
integrated manner as part of the general approach of risk management, in which the 
licensee uses risk analysis to improve operational and engineering decisions in the 
identification of actions to reduce risks, and not to justify the elimination of licensing 
requirements perceived as undesirable. For those cases where risk increases are proposed, 
the benefits should be consistent with the increased risk proposal. The approach used to 
identify changes in requirements must also be used to identify areas where the requirements 
should be increased or reduced. 
Assumption # 2: The content (scope and quality) of engineering analysis (deterministic and 
probabilistic) performed to conduct and justify the proposed changes have been appropriate 
to the change nature and scope and should be based on the plant as built and operated, 
reflecting its operational experience. 
Assumption # 3: The plant-specific PSA that supports all licensee proposals has been subject 
to quality control and an independent evaluation or certification. 
Assumption # 4: Consideration of appropriate uncertainties has been provided and decision 
interpretations supplied, using a monitoring, feedback and corrective actions program to 
consider significant uncertainties. 
Assumption # 5: The use of core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency 
(LERF) as a basis for PSA acceptance is an acceptable approach to Principle 4. 
Assumption # 6: Variations in estimates of CDF and LERF arising from proposed changes to 
licensing bases will be limited to small increments. Cumulative effects of these changes will 
be monitored and considered in decision making. 
Assumption # 7: Proposal acceptance will be evaluated by licensee in order to ensure that 
all principles are met. 
Assumption # 8: Data, methods and evaluation criteria used to support regulatory decisions 
should be documented and available for public scrutiny. 
Figure 5 displays NRC approach for RIDM. 
Regulatory Guide 1.174 (NRC, 2002) describes the approach accepted by NRC to assess the 
nature and impact of licensing basis conditions (LBC) by considering engineering aspects 
and application of risk insights. 
Regulatory Guide 1.200 describes the approach accepted by NRC to determine that PSA 
quality, in part or in whole is sufficient to assure its results so that they can be used in 
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regulatory decision making. Figure 6 illustrate the role of the above discussed regulatory 
guides. 
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Fig. 5. NRC approach for RIDM (NRC, 2002) 
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Fig. 6. Role of NRC regulatory guides in RIDM. 
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In what concerns PSA role in decision making, the key is to provide an assessment of change 
impacts on risk. It has been necessary to develop a quantitative criterion to serve as a 
guideline and meet NRC principles. These guidelines have been created to allow 
comparisons of risk variation evaluations (including internal and external events, full load, 
low load and shutdown). This criterion uses the core damage frequency obtained from a 
Level 1 PSA and also the Large Early Release Frequency and is presented in Figure 7. 
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Fig. 7. Criteria for the results of a Level 1 PSA (NRC, 2000) 
Kadak & Matsuo (2007) present a discussion about US experience on RIDM usage, where 35 
nuclear plants have effectively implemented RIDM. By comparing INPO performance 
indices with NRC indices for these 35 plants with those of another 19 plants that have not 
implemented RIDM it is clearly seen that RIDM implementation has significantly improved 
performance indices. The performance indicators considered in the analysis were: a) Unit 
capacity factor; b) Automatic unplanned shutdowns (7,000 hr of criticality); c) Safety 
systems performance; d) Safety injection system actuation; e) Auxiliary feedwater system 
actuation; f) Power system actuation; g) Fuel element reliability; h) Collective radiation 
exposure; and i) Water chemistry performance. 
Table 5 summarizes RIDM status in different European countries (NRC, 2001). 
8. Final considerations 
It is noted that licensing is characterized by decision making in various fields and disciplines 
and its steps can influence the course of evolution of the enterprise. The relationship 
between the licensing agency and applicants for licenses and permits must be honest, 
keeping the formalism and the independence of the institutions themselves that are 
recognized with distinct responsibilities. Controversial topics should be discussed openly 
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and the decision making process formalized in writing (technical advice, inspection reports 
and minutes of meetings). 
The demonstration that the facility presents no undue risk to the public and the 
environment may require engineering activities, analytical or experimental, that may 
significantly affect the initial schedules and preliminary costs estimates. Design features 
significantly innovative or new reactor concepts require extensive research and testing of 
prototypes at all levels, such as components, systems, and small-scale facilities. 
 
Country Status 
Spain Recommends PSA use to define changes in requirements 
France 
The methodology Optimisation de la Maintenance par la Fiabilité 
(OMF – Maintenance Optimization for Reliability) has been 
developed to apply criteria for use of risk information for the 
optimization of plant maintenance including in-service inspection 
Sweden An update of rules considers in-service inspection use with risk information through qualitative and quantitative approaches 
Finland Expects to rationalize in-service inspection by a combination of deterministic and probabilistic methods under regulator initiative. 
UK 
 
Proposals for adoption of methodologies that use risk information in 
nuclear power plant management represent an evolution. 
Switzerland Expects to produce guidelines for implementation of a risk-informed in-service inspection quantitative method within a few years. 
Czech Republic Believes it is too complicated to introduce a risk-informed approach for in-service inspection, yet its interest on the matter is significant. 
Table 5. RIDM efforts in somecountries (NRC, 2000) 
The physical and mathematical models used in engineering projects are validated by 
experimental data or calculations. Realistic models of best estimate are preferable to 
conservative models, but their use requires an adequate treatment of the uncertainties 
involved, determined from extensively developed databases. 
The identification of areas of specialty where the technical staff of the regulatory body lacks 
experience must occur in a timely manner to enable this qualification or the necessary 
arrangements to hire consultants or consulting teams. 
The timing of any nuclear development should provide the time intervals prior to the 
granting of licenses and permits for the analysis and evaluation of the regulatory body. 
The licensing model in Brazil, in the aspects of safety analysis is deterministic in nature, that 
is, the plant behavior, after assuming an initiating event or malfunction, is studied with 
calculation models that describe the physical process of systems reactor. 
The objective of this type of analysis is to check whether the allowed values of key plant 
variables are exceeded. The probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) focuses on the identification 
of sequences of events that can lead to meltdown of the reactor, and studies of reliability of 
safety systems. The objective of this analysis is to indicate potential weaknesses in the 
design of systems and provide the basis for improving safety. 
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CNEN has introduced in Standard NE–1.26 (CNEN, 1997) the requirement for risk 
management, where the operating organization should develop, implement and 
continuously refine a model for managing the risk associated with various operational 
configurations. Thus, a probabilistic safety analysis complements the deterministic safety 
analysis, and it is incorporated into the licensing procedure, because during plant operation, 
the impact on total risk measured by the model for risk management should be considered. 
This encompasses decision making involving activities like: a) design modifications and 
specifications changes or exceptions; b) system configuration management; c) maintenance 
and testing planning; and d) analysis of operational events. 
The responsibility for nuclear safety in all phases of the enterprise belongs to the licensed 
organization. The licensing activity decides whether the licensee has the technical and 
organizational competence to fulfill this responsibility. 
A very important point in this context concerns the licensing of advanced reactors, like the 
AP-1000. The risk-informed approach has brought into light the conciliation of deterministic 
and probabilistic methods for safety analysis.  Accident scenarios both in the design basis 
and also beyond the design basis are being approached much more precisely and many 
advances in safety philosophy are proving to be effective in this way.  
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Geodetic Terrestrial Observations for the 
Determination of the Stability in the Krško 
Nuclear Power Plant Region 
S. Savšek, T. Ambrožič and D. Kogoj 
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Civil and Geodetic Engineering 
Slovenia  
1. Introduction 
The first research of the stability in the Krško plain was carried out in the period 1964–1969, 
when the area was chosen as the potential location for a nuclear power plant. The 
foundation stone for the Krško Nuclear Power Plant (NEK) was laid on December 1, 1974. In 
January 1984 NEK acquired the full operation permit. NEK has been in commercial 
operation for more than 20 years. Regarding the standards of nuclear safety and stability, 
NEK is today in the top 25% of operational nuclear power plants in the world. The Krško 
Nuclear Power Plant is of strategic importance for the Republic of Slovenia, producing 
electricity for users in Slovenia and Croatia. High level of security is of high importance; 
therefore, a comprehensive supervision of structures is carried out. A special attention is 
paid to the security systems, including the measurements of vertical displacements of 
benchmarks and measurements of horizontal displacements of the dam on the Sava River. 
Periodic geodetic observations are carried out on important technological structures 
comprising the nuclear island, the Sava River dam and the nuclear waste storage.  
Since local stability of the Krško nuclear power plant is very important, several research 
works were conducted to test the stability of the Krško region. Based on the Project of 
permanent observations of tectonic movements in the surroundings of the Nuclear Power 
Plant Krško and geological researches of crustral movements along the Orlica fault in Krško 
region the micro network Libna was established. The intention of the network was to 
determine the horizontal crustal movements along the Orlica fault. The points of the net 
were stabilized in 1998, when also the zero measurement was realised.  
Several epochs of measurements in both micro networks Krško and Libna were made. After 
a careful analysis and quality estimation of single epochs, the displacements were estimated 
and the accuracy of estimating the two-epoch displacements was calculated. We proposed 
original method, where simulations of an actual probability distribution function are 
determined, providing the basis for calculating the right critical value at a chosen 
significance level. In this way, statistically significant point displacements can be 
determined far more accurately. When assessing point displacements, the information on 
the actual risk of making an error when rejecting the true null hypothesis is very useful and 
the calculation of this value is advisable. Based on the assumption that the distribution 
function is established in detail, the suggested test statistic is simple and fits for day-to-day 
use as well as refers to the first estimation of the geodetic network.  
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2. Determination of point displacements in the geodetic network 
2.1 Single epoch processing 
For the identification of point displacement by geodetic observations, the reference points 
need to be chosen. Characteristic points on the object are tested for displacements. 
According to the required accuracy of point displacement determination, the observations 
must be carried out carefully with proper tools while following standard observational 
rules. The observations in the geodetic network are adjusted and the network quality 
estimated.  
Importantly, in networks for displacement identification network quality estimation is 
carried out prior to the measurements examining the accuracy, reliability and sensitivity of 
setting up a network. More details about network quality estimation can be found in 
Caspary (2000). For the identification of displacements, network reliability and sensitivity 
are of primary importance. Thus, great effort must be made in detecting the presence of 
undisclosed gross errors. In the planning and optimization phase, the sensitivity of 
observations needs to be enabled, thereby increasing the probability of detecting outliers.  
2.1.1 Free network adjustment 
In deformation analysis single epochs are usually adjusted as free networks. In this way the 
best linear unbiased estimation of the unknowns and independence of test statistic 
regarding the chosen network datum is enabled. 
Observations of each epoch measurement individually have to be adjusted as free network 
with minimum trace of the matrix of coordinate point correction factors, as it is valid for 
other procedures of deformation analysis. This means that not only the sum of the squares 
of the weighted residuals .minT iii vPv  has to be minimal, but also the sum of the squares 
of unknowns .minˆˆ T ii xx . Index i  defines the epoch measurement. Previous epoch 
measurement is carried out in time 1t , and the current in time 2t . Of course, the orientation 
unknowns have to be removed by reducing the unknowns in the observation equations. 
Also any possible unknown due to the factor of network scale has to be reduced (Van 
Mierlo, 1978). If the number of network points in epoch measurement 1t  differs from those 
in epoch measurement 2t , the coordinate unknowns of non-identical points are eliminated 
by the S-transformation (Van Mierlo, 1978). 
2.1.2 Detection and elimination of outliers 
A well projected network for displacement detection should enable a high degree of 
detection and elimination of gross errors in observations as well as minimize the effect of 
potentially undetected outliers influencing the unknowns. Testing the relation between the a 
posteriori variance 20ˆ  and the a priori reference variance 20  is called the global model 
hypothesis testing. At the same time, the presence of gross error observations in the network 
is tested, which is in turn possible only by having a reliable knowledge of the a priori 
reference variance. In case of incongruence between the observations and the model in the 
course of the global testing, the Baarda’s Data Snooping method for examination, detection 
and elimination of outliers in observations is introduced. The Pope’s Data Screening 
approach or the Danish approach is used when the a priori reference variance is not reliably 
known.  
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2.1.3 S-transformation 
In the deformation analysis based on geodetic measurements conducted in different epoch 
moments the occurring point displacements and deformations of the physical surface of the 
earth are detected and defined using methods of statistical analysis. Of course, the point 
displacements can only be detected and defined at identical points. If not all points in the 
epoch measurements are identical, the non-identical points shall be eliminated. This can be 
done by the S-transformation of an individual epoch measurement into the datum of 
identical points. The S-transformation can also be used if the transformation of the results of 
adjustment from one datum to another is required.  
In order to transform the vector of unknowns and the cofactor matrix from datum A to a 
newly selected datum B, the vector of unknowns and the cofactor matrix are calculated 
using the following equations (without derivation; for derivation see Caspary, 2000, Mierlo, 
1978): 
 ABB ˆˆ xSx    (1) 
 TBˆˆBˆˆ AB SQSQ xxxx  ,  (2) 
where: 
Axˆ , AˆˆxxQ  are the vector of unknowns and the cofactor matrix in datum A, 
Bxˆ , BˆˆxxQ  are the vector of unknowns and the cofactor matrix in datum B, 
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  is the S-transformation matrix, with the weakness that the inverse 
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appropriate to use the form B
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 kk xc  and kk yc , mk ,...,1 , (8) 
where: 
m  is the number of all points, 
BE  is the datum matrix of datum B. 
In order to transform the results of the free network adjustment to a network defined with 
the newly selected points, these networks have to be entered into the datum matrix at the 
places where the unknowns of the selected points, ones (
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transformation yields the solution (vector of unknowns), which minimizes the partial norm 
2
ˆ kx  of k  unknowns of the newly selected points. The sum of adequate k variances also 
reaches the minimum, i.e. the partial trace of the cofactor matrix of coordinate difference of 
the newly selected points 
kxx
Q ˆˆ  is minimal. 
2.2 Testing statistical significance of displacements 
The basis for displacement determination of a man-made object or any given object on the 
surface of the earth is to identify the displacements of characteristic points of an object. The 
points comprise networks, which are monitored in time intervals called epochs, set out in 
advance. The point displacements between two epochs can be inferred only from identical 
points, measured in two epochs. However the points are often damaged or they have to be 
included into the network due to changes of circumstances. Non-identical points are 
eliminated in the adjustment procedure or with S-transformation. More details about the 
procedure can be found in Mierlo (1978). After the two-epoch adjustment the point 
displacements and their standard deviations are estimated.  
2.3 Displacement estimation and displacement accuracy estimation 
In geodetic networks it is essential that both displacement and its standard deviation are 
determined. If the estimated displacements are several times the size of the displacement 
standard deviations, the most probable displacements can be inferred from the differences 
in point positions. In addition to determining the magnitude and direction of the 
displacements, the hypothesis testing for the displacement is also necessary. Consequently, 
these corresponding calculations must be performed. 
Point displacements are determined on the basis of comparing point coordinates in two 
epochs. Let us assume the point coordinates ),( xyT  in a plane and time t  and tt  . We 
assume that the coordinates in time t  are not correlated with the coordinates in time tt  .  
In order to calculate the estimation accuracy of point displacements, the covariance matrix 
of point coordinates for respective epochs must be known. ),( ttt xyT  represents the position 
of point T  in time t , tΣ  is the corresponding covariance matrix, and ),( tttttt xyT   
represents the coordinates of point T  in time tt   with the corresponding covariance 
matrix tt Σ . This can be expressed as 
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The covariance matrix of coordinates of identical points tt xy  , , tttt xy   ,  can be written as 
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The displacement of point T  may be evaluated as 
    2222 tttttt xxyyxyd   . (11) 
Further on, the displacement variance is determined by 
 TdTTdd ttt JΣJ 2 ,  (12) 
where the Jacobi matrix dJ  equals: 
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By inserting Equations (10) and (13) into Equation (12) we get the representation for 
displacement variance of point T  
       ,      2 2222222
tttttttttttt xxxyxyyyd d
x
d
x
d
y
d
yσ  



   (14) 
that is used for testing displacements by a test statistics given in Equation (15) and described 
in the next section. 
2.4 Distribution function of test statistic by simulations 
After adjusting at least two epochs it is possible to determine the displacement of point d  
according to Equation (11) and standard deviation of displacement d  according to 
Equation (14). Since these two parameters can be calculated prior to a detailed deformation 
analysis, they are rightly used in the statistical testing.  
When estimating displacements, the test statistic is often calculated as: 
 
d
dT   (15) 
and compared to the critical value according to the chosen significance level  . Point 
displacements are established with an appropriate probability only when the displacements 
are significantly larger than the estimation accuracy of displacements.  
Assuming that the errors of observations are distributed normally ),0(~ 2 N , then the 
parameters being the linear functions of the observations ),(~ˆ 2ˆˆ xxx N  are distributed 
normally as well. The point displacement is calculated with Equation (11). Since y  and x  
are calculated as the difference of two normally distributed random unknowns, y  and x  
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are distributed normally, too. This, however, is not the case for the point displacement d , 
which is a nonlinear function of y  and x . Consequently, it is difficult to analytically 
determine the form and the type of the distribution of the test statistic (15). The distribution 
function for the discussed test statistic is therefore determined by simulations, see 
Rubinstein (1981). 
The coordinate differences y  and x  are normally distributed random variables with 
variance-covariance matrix as follows: 
  2
2






xxy
xyy
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Σ . (16) 
The standard deviations of coordinate differences in two epochs are calculated as 
 2 2 2 2,   
t t t t t ty y y x x x           ,  (17) 
where 2222 ,,,
tttttt xxyy    are coordinate variances of tttttt xxyy  ,,, . The covariance is 
calculated as: 
 
tttttt xyxyxy   , (18) 
where 
ttxy  and tttt xy   are covariances of the coordinates in both epochs. 
To generate the sample of the normally distributed random variables, the Box and Müller 
approach was applied (Box & Müller, 1985; Press et al., 1992). The basic idea of generating a 
sample of dependent normally distributed random variables is to generate a sample of 
independent normally distributed random variables and then use a linear transformation to 
obtain a sample of dependent random variables. Let us assume that iu1  and niu i ,...,1  ,2   
are samples of two independent and uniformly distributed random variables 1U  and 2U , 
and n is the number of simulations. The sample of two independent normally distributed 
random variables 1Z  and 2Z  is calculated as follows: 
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To generate a sample of dependent normally distributed random variables, a linear 
transformation is needed. The variance-covariance matrix Σ  is decomposed by Cholesky 
decomposition  
 UUΣ T .  (20) 
In our case U  takes the following form 
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For the transformation of a sample of independent normally distributed random variables to 
a sample of dependent random variables the linear transformation  
 i
T
i zUy  , ni ,...,1   (22) 
is used. 
In our case the coordinate differences are generated by the following equations 
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where it is assumed that the means of y  and x  are zero ( 0  xy  ) and ni ,...,1  . 
The standard deviations of point coordinates in respective epochs vary from point to point. 
Therefore, the distribution function of the test statistic (15) takes on a different form for each 
point in each of the two epochs. By using the simulated normally distributed random 
variables (23), d  is calculated using equation (11) and d  using equation (14). 
Consequently, in n simulations this procedure allows us to determine the empirical 
cumulative probability distribution function of the test statistic (15) for individual points. 
2.4.1 Critical value critT  and actual risk T  
Critical value critT  and actual risk T  are determined from the obtained empirical 
cumulative distribution function by the following procedure  (Savšek-Safić et al., 2006): 
1. generate coordinate differences ii xy    , ; ni ,...,1 ; Equation (23) 
2. calculate displacement id ; Equation (11), its standard deviation id ; Equation (14) and 
test statistic iT ; ni ,...,1 ; Equation (15) 
3. form empirical cumulative probability distribution function *TF  by sorting iT ; n
iTF iT )(* ; 
1 ii TT  
4. determine critical value critT  from 
*
TF :  1    crit i nT T     or 
5. determine actual risk T  from *TF : n
i
T  1  for such i that TTi min . 
 
The test statistic is then tested according to the given null hypothesis and its alternative 
hypothesis: 
0  :0 dH ; the point is stable between two epochs, and 
0 :  dHa ; the point has changed its position. 
The test statistic (15) is compared to the critical value acquired from empirical cumulative 
distribution function. If the test statistic value is smaller than the critical value at a chosen 
significance level  , then the risk of rejecting the true null hypothesis is too high. 
Accordingly, it is established that the displacement is not statistically significant. If the test 
statistic value exceeds the critical value, the risk of rejecting the true null hypothesis is lower 
than the chosen significance level  . Therefore, the null hypothesis is rightly rejected and 
the statistical significance of the displacement is thereby confirmed.  
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This decision is supported by calculating the actual risk T  of rejecting the true null 
hypothesis (the probability of committing Type I Error). Two possibilities are examined: 
 critTT   i.e.  T : the null hypothesis is rejected; the point displacement is 
statistically significant and 
 critTT   i.e.  T : the null hypothesis is not rejected; the point displacement is 
statistically insignificant. 
Regarding the actual risk and the consequences of making a wrong decision, it is up to the 
user to decide upon the risk level of acceptability. As a consequence, a point is considered as 
stable or displaced.  
3. Significant displacement testing in a test network 
3.1 The network shape 
3.1.1 The Krško network  
The Sava River dam was built to ensure the minimum Sava River water level and thus enable 
the water pumping for cooling. The dam has six 15 m wide spillways. To ensure earthquake 
stability the dam is split into two large concrete frame structures. The structure height is 15.5 
m and is therefore considered as large dam according to international standards, and needs 
to be technically monitored. 7 control points have been stabilised on the dam to determine 
horizontal displacements. Along the outlet, there were 5 reference observation points 
stabilised with concrete pillars (Figure 4). 
3.1.2 The Libna network  
The Libna network is classical terrestrial trigonometric net applied for the determination of 
local horizontal stability along the Orlica fault. The network's shape is that of an irregular 
pentangle with five circumferential points, where point 6 is a linking point amplifying the 
network reliability (Figure 6). The points represent the geometrical basis for determining the 
positions of four ground points defined on the basis of geologic situation. Basically, the 
ground points are ex-centre points of four points of the net.  
The network size is described by indicating the area of the circumferential points of a 
polygon, amounting to approx. 4.27 ha. The longest length in the network is 385 m, the 
shortest length is less than 40 m. The network of the town of Libna in the vicinity of Krško 
was set up to determine point stability at the Orlica fault.  
3.2 Stabilization of the ground points 
3.2.1 The Krško network  
The reference points of the base network for the performance of measurements are stabilised 
with concrete pillars, representing the conventional stabilisation of geodetic points for 
deformation measurements. The chosen stabilisation enables forced centring of the 
instrument and the reflector – Leica Wild system.  
The stabilisation of control points on the dam also enables forced centring of the reflector – 
Leica Wild system. The control points were screwed into the concrete base, where the 
footplate can be fitted with the prism mount, which, in turn, enables horizontal alignment. 
Figure 1 shows the stabilisation and signalisation of the reference and control points.  
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Fig. 1. Stabilisation and signalisation of the reference and control points 
3.2.2 The Libna network  
The measuring points were determined by a set of two physically stabilised points. The 
measuring points, onto which the reflector was forced-centred, presented the points 
monitored for displacements. In all measurement epochs we used the same reflectors - Kern 
ME 5000. All the measurements were carried out on the points that were – according to the 
reference measuring points – set up ex-centrally. The term ex-central stand was introduced. 
The distance from the ex-centre to the centre point was 10 – 20 m (Figure 2). 
The reference points were stabilised by combining the methods described above (Figure 3). 
However, the implementation was simplified and the costs were lower. A mass-produced 
concrete tube with Φ = 0.25 m in diameter and 1 m length was used. A hole of the same 
diameter was drilled into the pillar, and a concrete tube was put into the hole. The tube was 
filled in with concrete and a device for forced-centring was built in. The cylinder top was 
covered with a mass-produced cover for full protection. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Ground stabilisation of the centre and the ex-central stand 
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Fig. 3. Signalisation of the centre and the ex-central stand 
The instrument stand was stabilised with the usual ground stabilisation by means of a 
concrete square stone with a built-in plug. Above the instrument stand, a tripod was set-up, 
centred and levelled. The centring accuracy did not influence the end results, since the co-
ordinates of the measuring point onto which the reflector was forced-centred were of crucial 
importance, not the co-ordinates of the instrument stand. However, the tripod's stability 
during the measurements was essential. 
The procedure of ensuring the appropriate network geometry and required precision for the 
determination of the horizontal coordinates of points in this way is theoretically and 
practically described in the article (Kogoj, 2004).  
3.3 History of measurements and measuring accuracy 
3.3.1 The Krško network  
Due to the changed measuring instrument, in 2004 also the method of measurements based 
on simulation of observations was changed in the combined Krško micro network. We chose 
a combination of triangulation and trilateration, which provides a larger number of 
redundant observations. Since periodic measurements of the dam are foreseen twice a year 
(in spring and in autumn), so far 14 independent measurements have been conducted. 
In the Krško micro trigonometric network the classic terrestrial surveying was chosen. The 
measurements were performed with the precision of electronic total station Leica Geosystems 
TC2003 intended for precise angle and distance measurements in precision terrestrial 
geodetic networks (Savšek-Safić et al., 2007). Measuring accuracy for angle measurements is 
DIN18723-Theo (Hz-V) = 0.5" and for distance measurements S : 1 mm; 1 ppm. Forced centring of 
the instrument, signalisation of measuring points and measurement of meteorological 
parameters were performed by tested and calibrated supplementary equipment (reflectors, 
footplate with reflector mounts, psychrometer, barometer). The first measurement in 2009 
was due to changed instrument performed by precise electronic tachymeter Leica Geosystems 
TCRP 1201. Measuring accuracy for angle measurements is DIN18723-Theo (Hz-V) = 1.0" and for 
distance measurements S : 2 mm; 2 ppm. In the same year we bought the most advanced 
electronic tachymeter by the manufacturer Leica Geosystems TS30, with which we performed 
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the last three measurements. The measuring accuracy for angle measurements is DIN18723-Theo 
(Hz-V) = 0.5" and for distance measurements S : 0,6 mm; 1 ppm. 
The measuring accuracy was determined on the basis of Ebner' s method of the a–posteriori 
weight determination (Vodopivec & Kogoj, 1997). The results included position accuracy 
and are given in Table 1.  
 
Epoch σa [''] σs [mm] 
August 2004 1.51 0.33 
December 2004 1.89 0.23 
August 2005 1.35 0.32 
November 2005 2.96 0.37 
July 2006 2.34 0.40 
November 2006 1.23 0.15 
May 2007 1.71 0.23 
October 2007 2.05 0.32 
April 2008 1.88 0.43 
September 2008 1.60 0.37 
May 2009 0.53 0.21 
September 2009 0.80 0.27 
May 2010 0.48 0.27 
October 2010 0.53 0.10 
Table 1. Measuring accuracy achieved in the Krško network 
3.3.2 The Libna network 
The Libna network was stabilised in 1998. So far, we have realised seven measurement 
epochs.  
To determine horizontal coordinates of the net points, we used the combination of angle and 
distance measurements. The measuring method was a combination of triangulation and 
trilateration. In each epoch we realised measurements on all eccetrical stands.  
We used the best instrumentation available. For the first six measuring epochs Electronic 
theodolite Kern E2 was used for angle measurements. The instrument is one of the first most 
precise electronic theodolites of the first generation. Its construction and accuracy stability is 
excellent. The measuring accuracy defined on DIN standard procedure is DIN18723-Theo (Hz-V) = 
0.5" For distance measurements we used precise distancemeter Kern Mekometer ME 5000. 
This instrument was constructed in the 1980's but it has been so far considered as the most 
precise geodetic electrooptical distance meter in series production. Measuring accuracy is 
S : 0.2 mm; 0.2 ppm.  
In last two measuring epochs electronic total station Leica Geosystems TC2003 was used. This 
instrument is designed for the most precise angle and distance measurements. With the 
selected additional accessories the highest accuracy can be achieved. The measuring 
accuracy for angle measurements is DIN18723-Theo (Hz-V) = 0.5" and for distance measurements 
S : 1 mm; 1 ppm. 
For temperature and humidity measurements we used 2 precise psyhrometers, and for air 
pressure measurements we used digital barometer Paroscientific, model 760-16B.  
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Similar as in the Krško network, the measuring accuracy was determined on the basis of 
Ebner's method of the a–posteriori weight determination (Vodopivec & Kogoj, 1997). The 
results included position accuracy and are given in Table 2.  
 
Epoch σa [''] σs [mm] 
November 1998 1.03 0.45 
December 1999 0.53 0.23 
December 2000 0.62 0.52 
November 2001 1.81 0.60 
March 2003 0.94 0.72 
April 2005 1.09 0.31 
February 2008 3.30 0.62 
Table 2. Measuring accuracy achieved in the Libna network 
3.4 Determination of point displacements 
3.4.1 The Krško network  
3.4.1.1 The adjustment 
The geodetic datum of the horizontal network was determined by two given assumingly 
stable points – reference points O1 and O5. To preserve the identical network geometry, as 
well as measurement and observation methods, the reference points were first tested for 
stability. The comparison of changes in coordinates between the last campaigns indicated 
that pillars O1 and O5 were statistically stable. In this way, the determination of the datum 
in the network enabled us to determine the statistically significant displacements of control 
points with a higher probability (Savšek-Safić et al., 2007).  
The horizontal coordinates were calculated into the existing local co-ordinate system of the 
network to the level of the lowest point (reference point O4). The observations were tested 
for the potential presence of gross error, following the Danish method. The input data for 
the horizontal adjustment were the reduced averages of three sets of angles and the slope 
distances reduced to the chosen level. The reduction of distances took into account the 
instrumental, meteorological, geometric and projection corrections (Kogoj, 2005). The zenith 
angles were observed to establish the height stability of the reference and control points. The 
observations in the horizontal network were adjusted following the method of indirect 
observations. First, the adjustment of the free network was performed, which gave us an 
unbiased estimate of observations (Figure 4). Then the S-transformation was used, where 
the geodetic datum was determined by two statistically stable reference points O1 and O5. 
The results of the horizontal adjustment are the most probable values of horizontal 
coordinates of measuring points in the local system with the corresponding accuracy 
estimates.  
3.4.1.2 The displacements 
In the area of NEK the horizontal stability of the Sava River dam was investigated based on 
fourteen consecutive epochs. In December 2003, the transition to a new way of 
measurements (measurement method, instrument, network geometry) and the 
determination of a new geodetic datum in the micro network of Krško enabled a higher 
reliability of the determination of statistically significant displacements. Based on an expert 
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geological opinion we decided that the geodetic datum in the Krško network would be 
represented by two assumingly most stable reference points O1 and O5.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Position accuracy for single epochs – Helmerts error ellipses - free net adjustment of 
the Krško network  
After the adjustment of at least two epochs, it was possible to determine the displacement of 
point d  and displacement variance 2d . The probability function for the test statistic (15) 
was determined empirically with simulations, and then compared to the critical value 
considering the chosen significance level  . Displacements could be identified as 
statistically significant according to the distribution of test statistic and chosen significance 
level  . If the test statistic was smaller than the critical value at the chosen significance level 
 , we assumed that the displacement was statistically insignificant. If the test statistic is 
higher than the critical value, the hypothesis was justifiably rejected and we could confirm 
the statistical significance of the displacement. In Figure 5 the regression coefficient defines 
the displacement velocity in meters per day with transformation S on points O1 and O5. 
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Fig. 5. The displacements of control point H3 in the directions of coordinate axes with the 
belonging standard deviations in time.  
The time line of horizontal displacements of points on the Sava River dam was represented 
with the displacements of control points and the corresponding relative displacement 
ellipsoids referring to the two-epoch displacements. The relative displacement ellipsoids are 
calculated from the point determination accuracy in a single epoch. 
3.4.2 The Libna network  
3.4.2.1 The adjustment 
For the adjustment we need mean values of six sets measured in horizontal directions. In 
each epoch a priori statistical analyses was made for the elimination of gross errors and for 
the computation of measuring accuracy.  
The horizontal coordinates of net points are determined on the local level. We considered 
meteorological, geometrical and projectional reductions of measured distances (Kogoj, 
2005). On the basis of measuring differences in both directions we also estimated the 
accuracy of the distances.  
In zero epoch measurement the local datum of the net was determined. The orientation of 
the coordinate axes is nearly parallel with the Slovenian national Gauß-Krüger coordinate 
system.  
The adjusted coordinates of ground points A, B C and D of zero epoch in 1998 are 
approximate coordinates for all other epochs. The definitive coordinates of points A, B, C 
and D for each epoch were determined on the basis of the adjustment process. We supposed 
that the accuracy of horizontal directions was the same for each instrumental standing point. 
The distances in the net were short. Based on this, we should determine the weights of the 
distances on the basis of only the constant part of the error. We always used the software 
GEM4 for simultaneous angle and distances network adjustment. The final results were the 
horizontal coordinates of the net points and the accuracy estimation (elements of error 
ellipses).  
First we adjusted the net as a free network for all epochs. Based on the results we analysed 
the measuring accuracy and the position accuracy of the net points. The reason for this is 
that free network adjustment gives the most objective results of measuring accuracy because 
there is no influence of the datum parameter. 
The following Figure 6 shows the size of the semi-major axis of the error ellipses (worst 
case), obtained in each epoch. Comparison of the absolute values of the ellipses is due to 
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high precision level questionable. The increase in value from 0.2 mm to 0.3 mm means a loss 
of numerical precision of about 50%. From geodetic point of view we know that between 
these values there are practically no differences! 
 
 
Fig. 6. Position accuracy for single epochs – Helmerts error ellipses - free net adjustment of 
the Libna network  
3.4.2.2 The displacements 
The main problem in the displacement determination process is the choice of stable points. 
The defect of the geodetic datum was 3, so we needed at least one and a half given points. 
On the basis of geological situation there were two logical possibilities. We could choose 
points A and B or C and D. 
The differences of the coordinate values of points A and B between single epochs were 
minimal. We once again adjusted each epoch on four different datums of the net. The main 
conclusions, based on the results, are:  
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 the size of proven displacements on points C and D are practical invariants on the 
datum of the net based on points A and B, 
 from the aspect of minimal influence of the accuracy of given points on the final 
parameters of displacement vectors the best choice is the determination of the datum 
based on the S-transformation. 
We used our own software Premik. The elements of the displacement vectors for all epochs 
combinations were calculated.  
In further analyses we computed the displacement velocity. The displacement velocities of 
points C and D in y and x directions with standard deviations determined on the basis of the 
S-transformation on points A and B are computed on the basis of linear regression analyses. 
We used the same procedure also for the determination of the datum on the basis of points 
C and D. In Figure 7 the regression coefficient defines the displacement velocity in meters 
per day with the S-transformation on points C and D. 
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Fig. 7. The displacements of points A and B in the directions of coordinate axes with the 
belonging standard deviations in time.  
4. Conclusion 
A contractor of geodetic works is expected to present not only data on point displacements, 
but also to provide assurance in terms of the quality of displacement estimation. In addition 
to the assumed null hypothesis 0:0 dH  and the chosen significance level  , the actual 
risk of rejecting the true null hypothesis is crucial. The participation of the commissioning 
Geodetic Terrestrial Observations 
for the Determination of the Stability in the Kr{ko Nuclear Power Plant Region 
 
87 
party in the process of evaluating the estimated displacements is highly recommended. The 
decision upon risk acceptability is then in the hands of the commissioner.  
The Sava River dam has a specific place among the NEK buildings, since it is subjected to 
the great force of the Sava River flow and to the differences in filling and emptying of the 
reservoir, i.e. the difference between high flow and low flow. Periodically larger 
displacements of the entire dam are to be expected. 
The Libna network was stabilised in such way that two points are located on one and two 
points on the other side of the fault. The purpose of several years of continuous 
measurements was to determine tectonic activities of the fault in question. 
Due to expected small displacements in both networks we were mainly focused on:  
 precise ground stabilisation (example Libna) or concrete observation pillars (example 
Krško), which allows forced centering of the instrument or reflector; 
 use of precise measuring instruments and additional measuring equipment; 
 meeting the condition of as large number of redundant observations as possible to 
assure quality measurements and results; 
 consideration of all influences on the measured quantities; 
 analysis of the precision of measurements and detection of any major errors (outliers) in 
the measurements; 
 transformation of adjusted coordinate points into geodetic datum of assumingly stable 
points, where the displacement of other points can be measured.  
As shown, test statistic (15) along with the empirical cumulative distribution function is 
appropriate tools for testing the significance of point displacements in a geodetic network. 
Since the displacement and its respective accuracy are acquired by a simple method, the 
suggested procedure is appropriate and provides good results that furnish a good first 
estimate of the situation in the discussed network. The test example illustrates that the 
estimation of displacement significance is directly dependent upon the critical value at a 
chosen significance level  . Accurate displacement estimation is achieved only if the critical 
value is determined according to the actual distribution function of the test statistic. Having 
in mind the difficulty level of the assignment and its consequences, the decision must be 
made whether there is the need for a detailed deformation analysis to be carried out using 
one of the known approaches.  
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1. Introduction  
Two nuclear power plants (NPPs) are in operation in Slovakia equipped with 
WWER440/V213 type reactors. The Jaslovske Bohunice V2 NPP has two reactors in 
operation, the Mochovce NPP has also two reactors in operation and another two reactor 
units are under construction which will be given into operation in 2013. Full power and 
shutdown level 1 and level 2 probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) as part of the plant safety 
report were performed for these plants by the RELKO PSA team. 
The role of PSA for NPPs is an estimation of the risks in absolute terms and in comparison 
with other risks of the technical and the natural world. Plant-specific PSAs are being 
prepared for the NPPs and being applied for detection of weaknesses, design improvement 
and backfitting, incident analysis, accident management, emergency preparedness, 
prioritization of Research & Development and support of regulatory activities.  
There are three levels of PSA, being performed for full power operation and shutdown 
operating modes of the plant:  
 Level 1 PSA: The dominant accident sequences leading to the core damage are 
identified and the core damage frequency is calculated. The strengths and weaknesses 
of the safety systems and procedures to prevent the core damage are also provided as 
results.  
 Level 2 PSA: The ways in which radioactive releases from the plant can occur are 
identified and the magnitudes and frequency of release are calculated. Detailed 
analyses of the containment are performed. Safety measures are proposed to minimize 
the release of radioactive materials into the environment after a severe accident.    
 Level 3 PSA: The public health and other societal risks such as contamination of land or 
food are estimated. Damage to people (number of fatalities, the number of injured, 
reduction of life expectancy) and damage to property (loss of agricultural products and 
of natural resources, destruction, the cost of relocating the population and 
decontaminating effecting areas, etc.) are identified and safety measures are proposed 
to be implemented to minimize the risk. The Nuclear Regulatory Authority does not 
require the level 3 PSA for NPPs in Slovakia, however, the performance of analyses is 
strongly recommended.  
There are two basic types of the plant outage: unplanned maintenance outages due to the 
repair of the components and planned refuelling outages. The differences are in:  
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 Safety systems availability, 
 Duration of outage, 
 Neutron and thermal-hydraulic conditions, 
 Reactor coolant system (RCS) and containment configuration. 
For the unplanned shutdowns, the operation can continue after several hours. In general, for 
these shutdown modes it is not necessary to achieve the cold shutdown state or to open the 
reactor vessel. Preparing of the action schedule is required for each shutdown of the unit, 
where the individual actions done by the personnel are indicated. 
During these outages the reactor subcriticality is achieved by the insertion of all control rods 
into the core. Operational records of the WWER440 type reactors have shown us, that there 
are several events during the year where it is necessary to decrease the power for urgent 
repairs. The unplanned unit trip also occurred.  
The outage of the reactor is planned once per year for the refuelling. These are the planned 
yearly outages for the refuelling of the reactor and the general plant maintenance. The 
reactor is cooled down to cold state and the reactor vessel is open. Only a fraction of the fuel 
is replaced by the new fuel (typically about 25% of the total number) in the short refuelling 
outage. The rest of the fuel elements remains in the reactor vessel during the outage. The 
refuelling is performed according to the approved refuelling program. These are the 
planned outages for the refuelling of the reactor and extended plant maintenance.  
Long refuelling outage is performed every fourth year, and involves in-service inspection of 
the reactor vessel. The difference between the short and the long outage is mostly in the 
scheduled inspection of the reactor vessel. However, the whole reactor core is transferred to 
the spent fuel pool.  
The risk from nuclear power plants was assumed for many years to be dominated by the 
risk during full-power operation. The deterministic licensing process, the PSA focused on 
full power. It seemed clear that shutdown was the safe condition.  
After all, the reactor is shutdown, the decay heat is low, substantial time is available for 
recovery, and many recovery options are possible. On the other hand, a growing number of 
incidents during shutdown, some of them leading to substantial loss of reactor coolant 
through draining, began to focus attention on the possibility of significant risk during 
shutdown conditions. In fact, although decay heat is low, it can still be substantial and must 
be removed.  
In addition, much equipment is unavailable due to maintenance, there may be unusual 
plant configurations, automatic safety features may be disabled, and manual response is 
required (often with little guidance from procedures and training). Also, knowledge of 
timing and success criteria is limited.  
During last few years, operational experience and performance of the low power and 
shutdown PSA highlighted the magnitude of the risk contribution from those, previously 
considered safe operating modes. This risk was found to be significant. Many studies such 
as the shutdown PSA for PWR in Western Europe (France and Switzerland) and WWER 
plants in Central Europe (Slovak, Hungary and Czech Republic) as well as latest industry 
events, such as Paks NPP shutdown fuel damage accident, demonstrated that the core 
damage frequency (CDF) from an accident occurring during shutdown or low power 
operation modes was higher (up to 100% of CDF for some plants) than the one at power. 
This risk is not related to the plant design. It is rather related to the unavailability of 
equipment due to maintenance activities undertaken during an outage, presence of 
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additional (contractor) personnel who may not be fully aware of the safety issues, presence 
of additional heavy loads and flammable materials, etc. All of these items increase the risk 
during plant outage. 
Adequate planning and preparation of activities during outages can reduce both the 
probability and the consequences of possible events. In other words, there are a lot of 
possibilities for safety improvements in those operating modes. To decide what kind of 
improvements are the best on safety and cost beneficial grounds, a variety of analytical 
approaches could be used.  
One of these is administrative control based on the experience of individuals involved in the 
outage planning. While any careful analysis will find ways to improve safety during 
outages, it is felt that this approach would not be best suited to very well handle a more 
complex interface, since critical configurations may not always be recognised. 
Another approach is a PSA-type modelling, which considers a variety of interactions and 
dependencies of important systems. Performance of PSA for shutdown and low power 
operating modes (SPSA), may support the enhancement of the safety during plant outage, 
and may contribute to reduction of the outage duration. Thus a detailed analysis of 
shutdown operation may: 
 contribute to a more economical plant operation,  
 improve plant safety and  
 decrease the consequences of incidents. 
The full power PSA is no longer representative of the actual plant risk profile during the 
operational condition when the configuration of safety and support systems has changed 
extensively. This usually happens when the reactor power is below a certain level and 
automatic actuation of safety systems is being interlocked. Therefore, contribution of the risk 
during plant outage deserves a special attention and a shutdown PSA appears to be an ideal 
tool to improve safety during plant outage. 
This chapter gives the view of level 1 and 2 SPSA modelling issues and results for the Slovak 
NPPs. The lessons learned in this area are presented and the PSA applications are described. 
The PSA models were developed in the RISK SPECTRUM PSA code. 
2. Modelling issues related to Level 1 SPSA 
The level 1 PSA study of the plant calculates the CDF and identifies the dominant initiating 
events (IE) and accident sequences that contribute to the core damage. The main modelling 
issues related to SPSA are described in this part of the chapter: 
 Plant operating modes and plant operational states, 
 Initiating events, 
 Screening analysis, 
 Modelling of accident sequences (fault trees and event trees), 
 Human reliability analysis (HRA), 
 Quantification of accident sequences and 
 Application of SPSA. 
2.1 Plant operating modes and plant operational states 
The definition of the plant operating mode varies from country to country. The Slovak plants 
have adopted the USA definitions. There are seven operating modes, numbered 1 to 7. 
These are: 
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1. Full power operation, 
2. Reactor criticality, 
3. Hot shutdown, 
4. Semi-hot shutdown, 
5. Cold shutdown – reactor vessel is closed, 
6. Cold shutdown – reactor vessel is open and 
7. Empty reactor vessel (the fuel is removed from the reactor vessel and located to the 
spent fuel pool). 
Understanding of plant operating modes and its characteristics in terms of systems available 
and the general plant conditions is essential for the development of the low power and 
shutdown PSA model. Operating modes are also highly important for defining the interface 
between power PSA and low power and shutdown PSA. For an integrated PSA model of a 
plant, it is significant to adequately define the interface between power PSA and low power 
and shutdown PSA. This interface does not necessarily coincide with the definition of the 
operating modes. Typically, the full power PSA considers 100% nominal power. 
In terms of the thermal hydraulic response to an initiating event, there is not much 
difference between 100% power and lower power levels, expect that at lower power levels 
the time available for selected corrective actions may be somewhat greater. The 100% power 
case is therefore conservatively a representative of the whole spectrum of power levels.  
When the reactor power reaches a certain power level, the automatic actuation of the safety 
systems is disabled. Depending on the reactor design, and in some cases on operating 
practice, this could be between 0-10% nominal power. This point is the natural interface 
between the full power PSA and SPSA (see Fig. 1). 
While the reactor is on low power, even without automatic actuation of safety systems, the 
power PSA models (with appropriate modifications) could be used to determine the risk 
level. This is generally true also for the hot stand-by mode. 
Once the reactor is in the shutdown mode, and especially when the decay heat is removed 
via residual heat removal system (RHR), the state of the plant is such that most of the power 
PSA models are not applicable without major modifications. 
Plant operating modes are important from the standpoint of the conduct of the plant 
operation. For a SPSA the plant operating modes do not mean much. Due to extensive 
changes in plant configuration during a shutdown period, it is necessary to define plant 
operational states (POSs) which will properly reflect the plant configuration during an 
outage evolution. 
The POS is used to define boundary conditions within which there would be no changes in 
major characteristics which are important for PSA modelling. 
The POS is defined as a period during a plant operating mode when important 
characteristics are distinctively different from another plant operating state. The important 
characteristics describing a plant operating state are: 
- RCS temperature and pressure, 
- RCS water level (inventory), 
- Decay heat removal, 
- Availability of safety and support systems, 
- Containment integrity, 
- System alignments and 
- Reactivity margins. 
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Fig. 1. Full power, low power and shutdown PSA 
Some or all characteristics indicated above should be considered in defining the plant 
operational states. It is obvious that defining the POSs for every possible plant condition 
may result in a very large number of POSs. The attempt to define all the POSs which are 
relevant for SPSA could result in several hundreds POSs. One of the initial activities related 
to defining the POSs is their grouping to reduce the number of POSs to a manageable level. 
The grouping process shall consider issues like specific success criteria, typical IEs and 
system availability. The actual practice varies among PSA practitioners, but the general 
guidance is always to distinct POS in their main characteristic. A typical number of POSs 
considered in SPSA varies from 10 to 15. Newer studies tend to have more POSs than the 
early ones. It should bee noted that the scope and objectives of a SPSA have a dominant 
effect on the selection of the POSs. 
Examples of POSs for a WWER440 type reactor are shortly described below:  
1. POS1. The reactor is sub-critical. The RCS pressure is between the nominal pressure and 
4 MPa. The RCS temperature is between nominal and 180°C. All trains of the safety 
systems are available (exceptions are allowed by the limiting conditions of operation). 
All SGs are connected to the reactor vessel. The primary to secondary side heat removal 
operates in the steam-water regime using the auxiliary feedwater system and steam 
removal via the steam dump station to the condenser initially and via the technological 
condenser at the end of POS. In this POS the containment is closed. 
2. POS2. RCS temperature is below 180°C but above 100°C. The RCS pressure is 1-4 MPa. 
All trains of the safety systems are available (exceptions are allowed by the limiting 
conditions of operation). Some ESFAS signals are disconnected when the RCS 
temperature is below 180°C. All SGs are connected to the reactor vessel. In the first part 
of this POS the secondary side heat removal is in the steam-water regime. At the end of 
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POS the RHR is working in the water-water regime, RHR pump is running and the heat 
removal is performed via the technological condenser. At the end of this POS the 
containment is open. 
3. POS3. The RCS temperature is between Tbrittle fracture and 40°C. The HPSI pumps are 
disconnected. These pumps are available in this POS for the accident mitigation only 
under the conditions defined in the limiting conditions of operation. However, 
exceptions are possible in case of the severe accidents (for example if primary bleed and 
feed is needed). One train of the safety systems is unavailable due to preventive 
maintenance. Two SGs are connected to the reactor vessel for residual heat removal in 
natural circulation, one loop is in reserve mode of operation (with one main isolation 
valve (MIV) fully closed and one MIV fully open). The RHR is working in the water-
water regime and the heat is removed via the technological condenser. 
4. POS4. The RCS temperature is 40°C. The RCS pressure is the atmospheric pressure. The 
reactor vessel is being open (drainage of vessel level is needed). One train of the safety 
systems is in the planned maintenance. Two SGs are connected to the reactor vessel; 
one SG is in the reserve mode. The RHR is working in the water-water regime and the 
heat is removed via the technological condenser. The water level is increased in the 
refuelling cavity in the end of POS. 
5. POS5S. The RCS temperature is 40°C. The RCS pressure is the atmospheric pressure. 
The reactor vessel is open and the refuelling cavity is filled to the refuelling level. One 
train of the safety systems is unavailable due to the planned maintenance. Two SGs 
are connected to the reactor vessel; one SG is in the reserve mode. The RHR is 
working in the water-water regime and the heat is removed via the technological 
condenser. 
6. POS5L. RCS temperature is 40°C. RCS pressure is the atmospheric pressure. The reactor 
vessel is open and the refuelling cavity is filled to the refuelling level. All fuel elements 
are located into the spent fuel pool. One train of the safety systems is unavailable due to 
the planned maintenance. This POS occurs only once per four years during the long 
refuelling outage. This POS contains all steps of POS5S. In addition, the reactor vessel 
inspection is being performed. 
7. POS6. The RCS temperature is 40°C. The RCS pressure is the atmospheric pressure. In 
this POS the reactor vessel is being closed (drainage of the reactor vessel level is 
needed). One train of the safety systems is in the planned maintenance. Two SGs are 
connected to the reactor vessel; one SG is in the reserve mode. The RHR is working in 
the water-water regime and the heat is removed via the technological condenser. 
8. POS7. The RCS temperature is between Tbrittle fracture and 40°C. The RCS pressure is 
between the atmospheric pressure and 2 MPa. There is a peak pressure of 3.5 MPa 
during a pressure test. The HPSI pumps are disconnected. These pumps are available 
for the accident mitigation only under the conditions defined in the limiting conditions 
of operation. Exception is possible during the severe accident (for example if primary 
bleed and feed is needed). Initially two SGs are connected to the reactor vessel; one SG 
is in the reserve mode. The RHR is working in the water-water regime and the heat is 
removed via the technological condenser. At the end of POS the RCS is heated by five 
main coolant pumps and the containment is closed.  
9. POS8. The RCS pressure test is performed at the pressure of 13.7 MPa. Also the high 
pressure dynamic test at the pressure of 17.2 MPa is being performed (once per four 
years or if new welding is performed in the RCS). The RHR is stopped. If the pressure 
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test is not successful the plant is returned to POS7. Given the test successful the plant 
goes to POS9 and the containment is closed.  
10. POS9. RCS temperature and pressure is gradually increasing to 200°C and to 12.26 MPa. 
The RCS coolant is heated by the main coolant pumps. At 180°C the interlocked ESFAS 
signals are becoming available. All trains of the safety systems are available (exceptions 
are based on the limiting conditions of operation). The primary to secondary side heat 
removal is performed in the steam-water regime by the AFW system. All SGs are 
connected to the reactor vessel. 
11. POS10. The reactor is on the power. The RCS pressure is nominal. The temperature is 
increasing from 200°C to 260°C. All trains of the safety systems are available (exceptions 
are based on the limiting conditions of operation). At the RCS temperature of 245°C 
another ESFAS signals are becoming available. At the end of POS the reactor power is 
2% of the nominal power. 
Examples of POS duration in hours per year are presented in Table 1. Power 1 and 2 is 
duration of low power operation. 
 
POS Planned refuelling outages 
Unplanned  
outages + 
Planned and 
unplanned outages 
Power 1 18.47 2.91 21.38 
POS 1 13.71 3.68 17.39 
POS 2 8.96 3.75 12.71 
POS 3 34.58 23.61 58.19 
POS 4 206.91  206.91 
POS 5S 224.66  224.66 
POS 5L 1 094.29  1 094.29 
POS 6 259.77  259.77 
POS 7 107.51 1.89 109.40 
POS 8 19.05 0.40 19.45 
POS 9 29.41 3.19 32.60 
POS 10 79.82 6.61 86.43 
Power 2 123.88 7.69 131.57 
POS 1-10 j = 984.38/1854.01* j = 43.13 j = 1027.51/1897.14* 
Power 1-2 j = 142.35 j = 10.60 j = 152.95 
+) Unplanned outages caused by component/system failures and initiated reactor shutdown to 
corresponding POS. 
*) The first number is applicable for short refuelling outage; the second number is applicable for long 
refuelling outage. 
Table 1. Duration of POS 
2.2 The initiating events 
Defining a list of initiating events is the major step, which influence the whole SPSA 
development process. While the main aim is similar to power PSA, actual initiators 
considered in a SPSA are different from those of the power PSA. The profile of initiators also 
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highly depends on the actual outage considered (lengths and type forced, refuelling, etc.). 
Three broad categories of internal initiators are typically considered in a SPSA, and they are 
as follows: 
 Loss of cooling, 
 Loss of coolant (LOCA) and 
 Reactivity events. 
LOCA represents a group of events which result in loss of heat removal from the core. When 
the core is cooled by the RHR system, its failure is the main initiator in that group.  
Loss of coolant events are a challenge to the RCS integrity in the same way as during full 
power operation. However, the profile and the causes of LOCAs are significantly different 
in the shutdown mode. In the shutdown mode breaks of pipes and reactor vessel rupture 
are still possible, but the dominant sources for LOCAs are the drain-down events, including 
inadvertent opening of valve and similar, both drain-downs to the plant rooms inside the 
containment or to another system (intersystem LOCA outside the containment) should be 
considered in a SPSA. Cold over-pressurisation events which are challenging the integrity of 
primary circuit may be broadly grouped with this category.  
Reactivity events are a specific category due to their specific issues and consequences. 
Reactivity accidents can lead to a local or a full core criticality. Examples like boron dilution, 
unintentional withdrawal of control rods or refuelling errors are considered in the SPSA. 
Experience has shown that many such events occurred at NPPs, and their frequencies are 
high, though the consequences are low (recoveries are possible in many of those events). 
Some phenomena, like unborated slug of water entering the core and its consequences, are 
still being analysed. 
Like in a full power PSA, hazards can be divided into two groups, internal hazards and 
external hazards. Internal events include fires, floods and events like drop of heavy loads. 
These events in comparison to power state are differently treated in a SPSA due to their 
specific attributes. Internal fire can have higher frequencies in comparison to the power 
operation. The possible fire locations increase during an outage due to maintenance 
activities. A fire during an outage is usually initiated by some repair work like welding, 
while fires during the power operation are usually initiated by electric circuits. Flooding has 
increased frequency due to maintenance activities where floods would be caused by 
opening isolation valves and similar activities. Drop of heavy load is an event which is 
seldom considered in the power PSA but it could have significant impact on the SPSA 
results. Numerous operations with overhead cranes has actually been analysed in several 
studies, although the results were not found to dominate the risk profile.  
In addition, the external hazards must be taken into consideration: aircraft crash, external 
meteorological conditions, seismic events and impact of the neighbouring industry. 
2.2.1 Grouping of the IE 
The initiating event grouping was performed based on the qualitative criteria. Some 
modifications in grouping are possible later when the frequency of the initiating events is 
calculated and accident sequence modelling and fault tree modelling is performed.  
The qualitative criteria applied for grouping at this stage are the following: 
 In order to take benefit from the existing event trees and fault trees, the initiating event 
groups were selected as much as possible consistently with the list of the initiating 
event groups for the full power PSA. 
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 Plant response and core cooling requirements associated with each of the LOCA 
categories are conservatively assumed to be the same as for the full power conditions. 
However, this assumption was revised within the system analysis task as one train of 
the safety systems is unavailable in some POSs. Core cooling requirements can also be 
relaxed taking into account that at the shutdown conditions the residual heat rate of the 
core is lower than at the full power conditions. 
 Frequency of the initiating events was not taken into account in the first step of 
grouping. Some of the groups can be screened out due to an extremely low frequency of 
the events (provided that they do not lead to a severe plant degradation, i.e. they are 
not expected to have a high risk impact). 
 Some of the events with different consequences (risk impact) were assigned to the same 
group when the consequences did not differ very much. In this case the group is 
defined based on the event with the highest consequences.  
 When the consequences of the events (groups) are expected to be different at least in 
one POS, such events (groups) are listed separately. However, for some POS these 
differences may be negligible and many events can be grouped together.  
 All events grouped together are not necessarily applicable to the same POS. 
Special cases of the event defined as a group representative may have a slightly different 
consequences. Bounded events have also different consequences than the event defined as a 
group representative as well as a different origin (contrary to the special cases). List of the 
events provided as examples is not necessarily exhaustive. Other events that are not 
indicated as a special cases or examples are expected to be exhaustive. 
Further grouping was possible based on the result of data quantification and system 
analysis tasks. Initiating event frequency was one of the aspects on which further grouping 
could depend. Generally, it was assumed that the initiating events or IE group could be 
conservatively included into another group with similar but worse consequences if its 
frequency was not higher than the frequency of the main event representative for the group. 
This assumption was verified and the grouping confirmed when the initiating event 
frequency was finally determined. 
Combination of the individual groups was also possible when the plant response and 
mitigation system requirements were defined more precisely. 
2.2.2 Assignment of IE to POS 
The first stage of POS assignment was done mostly on the basis of possibility of an 
occurrence. For instance, the breaks were not considered unless there was an overpressure 
in the circuit, the human errors associated with a maintenance were not considered unless 
some maintenance activities were conducted in the specific POS, etc. 
In general, the assignment of an applicable POS to the initiating event group was carried out 
by the considering each event included into the group. In many cases the applicability of 
POS was dependent on the particular scenario either through a particular plant 
configuration or through specific maintenance activities associated with a certain POS. 
In general, the frequency of IE was not taken into account in the POS assignment process. 
However, in some cases the frequency was considered in a qualitative way. 
For some POS the risk impact of the event was expected to be very low either due to a low 
frequency or small consequences or both. However, only a qualitative and subjective 
judgement could be provided to justify such observations. Therefore, the event credibility 
level is not indicated in the POS assignment results. 
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However, a credit was given to the fact that during a specific POS the conditions for IE may 
change (e.g. the pressure is decreasing to atmospheric, so the credibility of a LOCA is 
diminished). Another aspect that was addressed explicitly was the case when an event was 
applicable to a part of POS only (but not a negligible part). This aspect was also 
subsequently considered in an estimating of IE frequency. 
Since the selection of POS for IE calculation also depends on the expected frequencies and 
consequences, another stage of grouping was needed in a co-operation with other PSA 
tasks. In this stage a consideration was given to the assumptions taken during the accident 
sequence modelling and to the frequency estimation. 
For some POS to which an initiating event was applicable the consequence of this event was 
considered negligible. The accident sequence task revealed such cases and these events were 
screened out for these POS. Typical examples of such screening include: events related to 
loss of the reactor core cooling in POS5S (because of a large inventory of the water in the 
reactor refuelling pool) and in POS8 (because the system does not need any cooling and the 
RHR is switched off) or the loss of working cooling pump in any POS (because of a 
relatively low decay heat generation in the spent fuel pool (exception is POS5S).  
Initiating events were considered for the deletion if they lead to the core damage in a time 
period greater than 24 h. However, it should be noted that simply exceeding this 24 h 
window was not, by itself, considered to be sufficient reason for deleting initiating events.  
Frequency of the events during particular POS was not taken into account in the initial stage 
of the grouping and POS assignment tasks. For some assigned POS an initiating event (or 
even a whole group of events) was screened out later due to a low frequency (provided that 
it was not expected to have a very high risk impact). 
The duration of some POS is very short comparing with other POS, so an initiator or even 
the whole group can be screened out on that basis as well (see Table 1). Example for IE 
assignment to POS is provided in Table 2. 
 
IE group Event description POS number 
  1 2 3 4 5S 5L 6 7 8 9 10 
RT(RBD) Rapid boron dilution            
RT(SBD) Slow boron dilution            
RAT Uncontrolled reactivity addition            
 
 Applicable to the POS  Non-applicable to the POS 
Table 2. IE assignment to POS – reactivity events 
2.2.3 IE frequency calculation 
The basic principles for calculation the IE frequencies are the same as for the full power PSA. 
However, the determination of the IE frequencies for shutdown events is much more plant 
specific due to configuration, maintenance practices and other issues. In SPSA the frequency 
of an IE is dependent on POS, and it must be determined for every POS individually.  
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There are three basic approaches to calculate the IE frequency in a given POS: 
 calculation of frequency based on plant specific data, 
 calculation of frequency by quantifying a logical model of an initiator and 
 considering the full power PSA frequencies of IE with additional recalculation. 
Determination of the IE frequencies based on actual operating experience (plant specific 
data) could be the most accurate approach but in the same time it is the most difficult one. A 
thorough evaluation of the records on various occurrences during outages is essential in 
determining the IEs frequencies. It is very important that the evaluation of experience is 
performed together with the plant personnel who could correctly interpret the information 
contained in the historical records. The outage schedule as well as POS defined in the 
previous step should be evaluated to identify the possibility of the occurrences of each 
specific IE in every POS. 
The SPSA studies found that human interactions are a high contributor to the frequencies of 
many IEs. HRA is used for IE frequency calculation. The IE frequencies considered in the 
full power PSA may be only the starting point in defining the IE frequencies for SPSA. Many 
of the full power IEs are not directly applicable and the frequencies may be significantly 
different during an outage. 
In many SPSA studies the frequencies for LOCAs are just adopted from the full power PSA. 
Such approach causes some controversy as whether: 
 LOCAs frequencies should be modified to reflect that the systems are operating at 
much lower pressure (some analysts argue that non-pressurised primary piping will 
have the reduced pipe ruptures failure rate). 
 LOCAs frequencies should not be modified to be conservative. 
 In fact, the contribution to CDF from LOCAs caused by pipe rupture is found to be 
negligible in the SPSAs. LOCA caused by human errors is much more important. 
The following approaches were applied for initiating event frequency calculation:   
1. For the initiators that were quantified based on the plant operational history the 
applicable events are uniformly distributed across all applicable POS. For the time 
dependent events uniform distribution of the events is assumed within the applicable 
time period. The following formula is applied for the annual frequency calculation: 
fi,k = (Ni/T) x (tk/tj)  
 where 
fi,k - frequency of initiating event „i“ per reactor year per POS „k“, 
Ni - number of the applicable operating events reported during exposure time   period 
T, 
T - exposure time in reactor years, 
tk - duration of POS „k“, hours, 
tj - total duration of applicable POS, hours. 
2. For the events that were quantified based on full power data it is assumed that the 
initiating event frequency per hour of the full power operational states is the same for 
the applicable shutdown states. The following formula is applied for the annual 
frequency calculation: 
fi,k = fi,FP x tk/TFP 
 where 
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fi,k - frequency of initiating event „i“ per reactor year per POS „k“, 
fi,FP - frequency of initiating event „i“ per reactor year for full power operational states 
(generic or based on full power operational statistics), 
tk - duration of POS „k“, hours, 
TFP - exposure time for full power operation in hours per reactor year. 
3. Human reliability analysis is applied for several initiators that involve human actions 
and never occurred in the plant. These included the initiating events related to the cold 
over-pressurization, man induced LOCA and boron dilution. In the most cases there is 
the inadvertent actuation leading to the initiating events. The frequency is calculated 
based on HRA. In general, the probability of the inadvertent actuation is calculated 
from the following formula:  
PIC = PI  x PC 
where PIC is the probability of not corrected inadvertent actuation, PI is the probability 
of the inadvertent actuation and PC is the conditional probability that the error is not 
corrected. The commission error probability or probability of the inadvertent actuation 
(opening) is PI = 3.0E-3, the conditional probability that the error is not corrected PC = 
0.1. The probability of the inadvertent actuation is PIC = 3.0E-4.  
4. Bayesian approach is applied to calculate the initiating event frequency for the events 
which never occurred in the plant and the IE frequency can not be calculated using 
HRA. After updating the prior frequency by the plant specific frequency the posterior 
frequency is received. 
2.3 The screening process 
IE with available recovery times longer than 24 hours could be screened out without much 
danger of leaving out important results. IE with very short recovery times, which are those 
earlier in an outage and which involve very specific system availability, shall not be 
screened-out because of their generally high importance.  
Screening process can be performed in two phases:  
 After screening-out the clearly unimportant events, the draft event trees can be 
developed for remaining sequences.  
 The remaining sequences then could be analyses qualitatively or/and quantitatively.  
The main idea of the whole process is to select events of higher safety significance and to 
reduce the level of details in modelling work for sequences with lower safety impact. The 
final step in the screening process is re-grouping of POSs and initiators. The result of the 
whole process is a list of safety important POSs and IE groups. The SPSA requires iterative 
processing for re-defining and re-grouping POSs and IEs several times during the process. 
Development of detailed accident sequences (including supporting TH analysis, HRA, etc.) 
is the most labour intensive part of the SPSA. Its aim is to focus on essential issues only. 
Establishment of a systematic screening procedure is the best way of removing unimportant 
accident sequences. 
2.4 The accident sequences 
2.4.1 The fault trees 
The fault tree models developed for the full power PSA could be used, with exceptions, as a 
basis for SPSAs as well. Revision of the models is necessary due to the following reasons: 
- system is operational in shutdown (it is in the standby mode during power operation),    
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- system actuation is manual (it is automatic during power operation),  
- mission time is different, 
- system success criteria changes with POS, 
- redundancies are different in different POSs, 
- recovery possibilities are different and 
- system alignment is different for individual POSs. 
2.4.2 The event trees 
The accident sequence modelling is usually performed using event trees.  The event trees 
developed for full power PSA may be modified for use in SPSA. The modification will 
typically include removal of some headings (i.e. reactor trip) and relaxation of the others 
due to lower decay heat levels. Some new headings may be added to reflect operator actions 
which may not be possible during power operation. 
Shutdown state also has some specific characteristics which are not modelled in the full 
power PSA. Operation of the RHR system and related operator responses often requires  
development of new sequence models. A longer time is available to operators to recover 
from initial failures. Possibilities to establish non-conventional accident mitigation (as an 
example, supplying water into the open reactor vessel) require from the PSA analysts to 
consider options which have not been addressed in the full power PSA. 
2.5 The human reliability analysis 
Human reliability analysis is the most important issue in a SPSA. Both the plant outage and 
the start-up activities involve a large number of operator actions, functional tests and 
maintenance activities. All of those have to be correctly introduced in a SPSA. 
In a SPSA different types of human actions are considered: 
 human actions before initiating event, affecting availability of equipment,  
 human actions as an IE, 
 procedure based post-accident human interactions to terminate an IE, 
 human recovery actions to recover the failed equipment or to terminate an event. 
Compared to the full power PSA, human interaction analysis in a SPSA is much more 
complex since they require identification of actual ways the work is being done and 
consideration of interactions which are not obvious. 
The following issues needed to be addressed when evaluating the human interactions 
during outage safety analysis: 
 operating procedures,   
 supervision on maintenance activities, 
 appreciation of risk during shutdown and 
 comprehensive and appropriate training. 
The following steps are important for considering human interactions: 
 identify all possibly important human interactions during plant outage,  
 screen these human interactions and prioritise them from the risk perspective, and 
 collect information from plant experience during shutdown operating mode, and 
establish human error data base.  
During an outage, the dependencies between human errors tend to be much more complex 
than during power operation. Testing and maintenance activities during shutdown 
operation create new dependencies which need to be identified and documented. Cross-
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connections and support system status may cause hidden dependencies which need to be 
taken into account. 
2.6 Quantification of accident sequences 
Quantification of accident sequences is performed for all POSs. First, the total CDF is 
presented for an average refuelling outage, short refuelling outage and long refuelling 
outage. Then, the dominant initiating events, accident sequences, minimal cut sets and 
dominant categories of the basic events are identified. Results of the importance and 
sensitivity analyses are also summarized.  
The task is similar to quantification in the power PSA. However, the sources of data as well 
as the procedure to develop a data base may be different. Data for component unavailability 
for SPSA have significantly different emphases than for the power PSA. While in the power 
PSA the unavailability of safety components are (often) dominated by the failures in stand-
by, in SPSA they are clearly dominated by maintenance unavailability. Maintenance 
schedules and actual duration of various tests and maintenance actions are carefully 
evaluated to determine the actual equipment availability. Quantification of accident 
sequences, uncertainty and sensitivity analysis follow the same methodological approach as 
for the full power PSA. Due to various influences, it was shown that the SPSA results 
typically have higher uncertainties. 
The dominant initiating events identified for all POSs are presented in Table 3. This is 
graphically depicted in the pie chart in Fig. 2. Instantaneous CDF for each POSs is presented 
in Fig. 3. The dominant contributions to the total CDF are from POS6, POS4, POS7, POS5S, 
POS3 and POS5L. The combined contribution of these POSs is 98.1% of total CDF.  
 
 
 
No. Initiatingevent Description 
CDF 
[1/y] 
mean value 
Contribution 
to total 
CDF (%) 
1 LOSW(OP) Loss of  service water 1.14E-5 20.5 
2 LNC(GP) Loss of natural circulation - gas penetration 1.12E-5 20.3 
3 L(MI-SL) Man-induced small LOCA 9.81E-6 18.0 
4 LOP Loss of offsite power 7.77E-6 14.1 
5 LRHR Loss of residual heat removal 5.95E-6 10.8 
6 COVPR Cold over-pressurisation 1.87E-6 3.4 
7 LVBB Loss of vital 6 kV bus bar 1.43E-6 2.6 
8 LNC(OD) Loss of natural circulation - over-draining 1.32E-6 2.4 
9 LBA(B) Leakage in the spent fuel pool 1.32E-6 2.4 
10 LNVBB Loss of non-vital bus bar 1.27E-6 2.3 
 
Table 3. The dominant IE for all POSs 
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Fig. 2. The average core damage frequency with dominant IE for a WWER440 plant for all 
POSs 
 
 
Fig. 3. Instantaneous CDF for each POS 
2.7 Application of SPSA 
The following applications of SPSA model and results are considered: 
 outage planning and scheduling, 
 optimization of operating and maintenance procedures, 
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 optimization of limiting conditions of operation, 
 accident procedures, emergency planning and 
 making decision on hardware modification. 
The Equipment Out Of Service (EOOS) risk monitor is developed for the J.Bohunice V2 
plant plant in Slovakia. The monitor is used by operator and schedulers of maintenance (see 
Fig. 4, 5 and 6). 
An example for SPSA application is described for the preventive maintenance strategy of the 
safety systems in the plant: 1) the maintenance activities are performed in operating mode 5 
(reactor cavity not flooded) and 6 (the reactor cavity is flooded), 2) only a single train is 
under preventive maintenance, 3) the second safety train is available based on limiting 
condition of operation, 4) the third safety train can be or can not be available, the availability 
is not required by limiting condition of operation, 5) the systems that could be used for 
decay heat removal and accident mitigation should be available to the maximum extent 
possible but this is not the case in the plant. Recommendation for changes from SPSA: 1) 
planned maintenance activities will begin when the reactor cavity is flooded, 2) availability 
of all three safety trains will be required by limiting conditions of operations, 3)  one train 
out of three is allowed to be unavailable due to preventive maintenance. 
3. Modelling issues related to Level 2 SPSA 
3.1 The plant damage states 
The level 1 PSA sequences are terminated and the level 2 PSA sequences are started with the 
core damage. The interface between the level 1 and level 2 PSA is accomplished through the 
definition of plant damage states (PDS). The PDS defines the plant state at the beginning of 
the core damage and defines the conditions necessary for conducting severe accident 
progression analysis. PDS are developed as an initial step to a level 2 PSA. The status of 
some safety systems may not be identifiable from the level 1 PSA models. So, their 
availability during various core damage sequences must be addressed by means of an 
extension to the level 1 system models. In the level 2 PSA, post core damage recovery 
actions (using the existing system in automatic or manual mode) are also identified. 
The criteria for binning the level 1 sequences into the plant damage states are based on the 
following five characteristics of each sequence: 
 IE, 
 Time to core damage, 
 Status of high pressure and low pressure safety injection system, 
 Status of containment spray system and 
 Status of containment isolation. 
The PDS are further grouped based on POS of the plant at power operation and during 
refuelling outage. Several POS groups (G0 – G4) were introduced to facilitate the PDS 
grouping process:  
G0: Full power operation 
G1: POS1,  9  and 10, which are essentially similar to the full power operation. Both the RCS 
and the containment are normally closed. 
G2: POS2, 3, 7 and 8 in which the RCS is closed but the containment is open. 
G3: POS4, 5S and 6, in which both the RCS and containment are open. The fuel is located in 
the reactor vessel. 
G4: POS5L, which is a special case because the fuel is relocated to the spent fuel pool. 
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Fig. 4. Risk monitor for the operator (components in red colour are unavailable, CDF = 
3.39E-7/y) 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Risk monitor for planning of maintenance activities (high risk profile) 
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Fig. 6. Risk monitor for planning of maintenance activities (low risk profile) 
3.2 Accident progression analysis 
The MELCOR code is used to model all aspects of the severe accident progression, 
including:  
 reactor coolant system thermal-hydraulic response to the initiating event prior to the 
core damage,  
 core heat up, fuel degradation and material relocation within the reactor vessel, 
 possible failure of the reactor vessel pressure boundary, and subsequent release of 
molten fuel and core debris to the containment,  
 thermal and chemical interactions between the core debris and containment structures, 
such as concrete floors, and the containment atmosphere, and  
 containment behaviour (including its pressure and temperature history, hydrogen 
mixing and combustion, and the effect of the operation of containment safeguard 
systems). 
This code provides an integrated framework for the evaluating the timing of key accident 
events, thermodynamic histories of the reactor coolant system, core and containment, and 
corresponding estimates of fission product release. 
3.3 Containment performance analysis 
Deterministic calculations of severe accident progression generate pressure and temperature 
histories within the containment during the various accident sequences. To determine 
whether the containment pressure boundary will be able to withstand the loads, 
quantitative estimates of its structural performance limits must be generated.  
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Challenges to the containment integrity can take many forms. Therefore, the analysis of 
containment performance limits must address several topics. Typically, the following 
containment challenges are considered:  
 internal, rapid and slow pressurization transients greater than nominal design 
conditions,  
 high temperatures, 
 thermal-mechanical erosion of concrete and steel structures (if contact with ejected core 
debris is possible),  
 impact from internally-generated missiles and   
 localised dynamic loads, such as shock waves, hydrogen detonation, etc. 
In some instances, these challenges may exist simultaneously. For example, high 
temperatures often accompany high pressures. 
Engineering calculations of structural response to these types of challenges are performed as 
part of the level 2 PSA. Quantitative failure criteria are developed as the primary reference 
for estimating the likelihood of containment failure for a wide spectrum of accident 
sequences. These criteria are based on plant specific design and construction data and 
represent realistic material response properties. 
3.4 Construction of the containment event trees 
Probabilistic model in the form of containment event trees (CET) is constructed for the 
evaluating the containment performance. The model is displaying the alternative accident 
progressions that may evolve from a given core damage sequence or a plant damage state.  
The initiating event of the containment event tree is the PDS. During the construction of 
CET the following issues are taken into consideration: 
1. Important time phases of severe accident progression. Different phenomena may 
control the nature and intensity of challenges to the containment integrity and the 
release of radionuclides as an accident proceeds in time. The following time frames are 
identified:  
 After the core damage begins, but prior to failure of the reactor vessel lower head. 
This period is characterised by the core damage and radionuclide release from the 
fuel while core material is confined within the reactor vessel. Hydrogen detonation 
is possible. 
 Immediately following reactor vessel failure. The level 2 PSA analysis concludes 
that many of the important challenges to the containment integrity occur just 
following reactor vessel failure. They often occur as a direct consequence of the 
release of molten core materials from the reactor vessel to the reactor cavity.  
 Long term accident behaviour. In the absence of the heat removal to the 
environment, the loads may steadily increase to the point of containment failure in 
a long term. 
 It must be noted that release is possible also from the containment which remains 
intact via the normal leakage. 
2. Probabilities associated with events in the CETs are of different types: failure 
probability of safety system, probability that a human will not perform specific activity 
or probability of accident phenomena (for example hydrogen burn). Probabilities in the 
first two cases are developed in similar manner as in the level 1 PSA. The last one 
represents uncertainty in the occurrence or effects of severe accident phenomena. In this 
case, the split fraction associated with this event is not based on reliability data. Rather, 
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it is a reflection of the uncertainties in the engineering analyses required to characterise 
hydrogen generation, release, distribution and combustion. The probabilities are 
obtained using decomposition event trees. 
3. Recognition of the interdependencies of phenomena. Most severe accident phenomena 
and associated events require certain initial or boundary conditions to be relevant. For 
example, a steam explosion can only occur if molten core debris comes in contact with 
the water. Therefore, it may not be meaningful to consider ex-vessel steam explosions 
during accident scenarios in which the reactor cavity is dry at the time of vessel breach. 
Logic models for evaluating containment performance capture these and many other 
such interdependencies among severe accident events and phenomena.  
3.5 Source terms 
Estimation of the magnitude of fission product release to the environment (i.e. source terms) 
are a major product of a level 2 PSA. Plant specific source terms were evaluated for the 
Slovak plants. 
The following source terms categories are defined: 
1. STC1 - containment intact, containment spray available, no vessel failure, 
2. STC2 - containment intact, containment spray unavailable, no vessel failure, 
3. STC3 - containment intact, containment spray available, core cooling recovery after 
vessel failure, 
4. STC4 - containment intact, containment spray unavailable, core cooling recovery after 
vessel failure, 
5. STC5 - containment intact, containment spray available, no core cooling recovery after 
vessel failure, 
6. STC6 - containment intact, containment spray unavailable, no core cooling recovery 
after vessel failure, 
7. STC7 - very early containment failure before vessel failure, 
8. STC8 - release from the spent fuel pool, 
9. STC9 - early containment failure at vessel failure, no core cooling recover after vessel 
failure, 
10. STC10 - late containment failure after vessel failure, core cooling recover after vessel 
failure, 
11. STC11 - late containment failure after vessel failure, no core cooling recover after vessel 
failure, 
12. STC12 - late containment failure without vessel failure, 
13. STC13 - containment not isolated, containment spray unavailable, vessel failure  
14. STC14 – containment not isolated, containment spray unavailable, open reactor vessel, 
no vessel failure, 
15. STC15 - containment not isolated, containment spray unavailable, open reactor vessel,  
vessel failure, 
16. STC16 - containment bypassed after SGTR, 
17. STC17 - containment bypassed after interfacing LOCA. 
3.6 Large early release 
The effective doses are identified from the source term for the public. Based on the effective 
doses the countermeasures are implemented, as for example evacuation. Based on an 
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estimate of the effective dose that could be avoided by implementing a particular 
countermeasure, the lower and upper emergency reference levels are defined. Below the 
lower level, introduction of the countermeasure would not be justified because of the harm 
that it would cause. The upper level is the dose level at which every effort should be done to 
introduce the countermeasure, except in exceptional circumstances. It is set at ten times the 
dose of the lower level.  
The lower and upper levels for sheltering are a dose of 5 mSv and 50 mSv respectively. For 
evacuation, they are 50 mSv and 500 mSv. These are higher than the recommended dose 
limit for routine exposure, which is 1 mSv per year for the public. This is because the dose 
levels are not intended to represent the boundary between what is ‘safe’ and what is 
‘unsafe’, but to represent an acceptable balance between the harms and benefits of an action. 
In case of fission product release the release is large if more than 1% caesium is released to the 
environment from the core inventory. It can correspond to the dose of 50 mSv/y for the public. 
Large early release is a release to the environment before implementation of required 
countermeasure (before evacuation). For the purpose of the WWER440 units it is considered 
that the evacuation can not be performed until 10 h from the beginning of the accident. The 
release until 10 h is the early release.  
For the groups G0, G1 a G2 the Large early release frequency (LERF) is given as sum of 
frequencies of the following source term categories: STC7 + STC9 + STC13 + STC16 + STC17. 
For group G3 the LERF is given by STC14 and STC15 (the reactor vessel is open, the 
containment is open). For group G4 the LERF is given by STC8 (the spent fuel pool is 
outside the containment). 
3.7 Results 
The source term category 14 for group G3 is presented in Table 4 for illustration of the 
results. The fission product groups Xe, I and Cs are presented in table with the 
corresponding frequency. 
 
Source term 
category 
Frequency 
1/y 
Beginning of 
the release 
Xe 
[%] 
I 
[%] 
Cs 
[%] 
14 4.08E-6 Early 94.8307 86.0377 83.8331 
Table 4. The source term categories for group G3 
The risk of fission product release from the spent fuel pool is very small in operating mode 
7. The source term category frequency is 3.0E-9/y. However, the quantity of fission products 
in the source term is extremely high because the pool is located outside the containment and 
the spray system has no impact on the fission products which can be released into the 
environment. The fuel inventory is also higher in comparison with the core inventory. 
The LERF for each group G0-G4 is less than 1.0E-5/y. The requirement of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Authority is met.  
4. Conclusion  
The level 1 shutdown risk of the WWER440/V213 plants presented in the form of CDF was 
higher than the risk coming from the full power operation. Safety measure were 
implemented which significantly decreased the CDF.  After implementation of the proposed 
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changes the same level of risk is achieved for shutdown operating modes as for the full 
power operation. 
The changes in the limiting condition of operation are the most important from the 
shutdown risk reduction point of view.  In operating mode 5 and 6 only one train of safety 
system was required to be available. Now the limiting conditions of operation require the 
availability of safety system trains to the maximum extent possible. It was also 
recommended that the preventive maintenance for all three trains of safety systems should 
be done only in operating mode 6, when there is high water level in the reactor refuelling 
cavity and more than 30 h are required to core uncovery after loss of residual heat removal.  
Symptom-based emergency operating procedures (SB EOPs) for shutdown operating 
modes, developed by Westinghouse and implemented in the Slovak NPPs, also significantly 
reduce the risk. 
In addition, risk reduction factor of automatic operation of low pressure safety injection 
pumps during shutdown operating modes is also high.  
The level 2 shutdown risk in POSs with open reactor vessel and open containment was also 
higher than the full power risk. The reason was in high core damage frequency in plant 
operational state during shutdown (groups G2 and G3). The proposed safety measures 
decreased the risk arising from the high core damage frequency. So, also the level 2 risk is 
decreased. Further decrease of the level 2 risk can be achieved after planned implementation 
of Severe accident management guidelines  (SAMGs) for shutdown operating modes, being 
developed by Westinghouse.   
 The risk of fission product release from the spent fuel pool is very small in operating mode 
7. The source term category frequency is 3.0E-9/y. However, the quantity of fission products 
in the source term is extremely high because the pool is located outside the containment and 
the spray system has no impact on the fission products which can be released into the 
environment. The fuel inventory is also higher in comparison with the core inventory. 
The full power, low power and shutdown PSA models of the Slovak NPPs are periodically 
updated. Risk monitors are used to generate the risk profiles and to maintain the risk on the 
acceptable level for all operating modes. SB EOPs and SAMGs from Westinghouse 
guarantee high reliability of operators in post-accident situations. 
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1. Introduction 
A motor operated valve (MOV) consists of a motor, an actuator, and a valve. Fig. 1 shows a 
schematic diagram of an MOV. A motor that is bolted to the actuator housing drives the 
actuator. Attached to the motor shaft is the pinion gear, which drives a gear train. The gear 
train drives a worm that is splined onto the opposite end of the worm shaft. This worm 
assembly is capable of moving axially as it revolves with the worm shaft. The axial 
movement is a means of controlling the output torque of the actuator. The worm drives a 
worm gear that rotates the drive assembly. As the drive sleeve rotates, the stem nut raises or 
lowers a valve stem. When the valve is seated or obstructed, then the worm gear can no 
longer rotate, and the worm slides axially along its splined shaft compressing a spring pack. 
This axial movement operates a torque switch, causing the motor to be de-energized.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of MOV 
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An MOV with such operational principles is an essential element to control the piping flow 
in nuclear power plant or other facilities. In fact, the operational failure of a safety-related 
MOV in a nuclear power plant can have catastrophic results. Therefore, it is necessary that 
the operability of the safety-related MOVs should be integral and required in the design 
basis conditions. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Generic Letter (GL) 
89-10 regarding safety-related MOV testing and surveillance (USNRC, 1989). Subsequently, 
in South Korea, the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) required similar testing and 
verification, as follows: 
 Reviewing and documenting the design basis for the operation of each MOV 
 Establishing the correct switch settings 
 Demonstrating the MOV to be operable at the design basis differential pressure and/or 
flow 
Once the operability of each MOV was proven, the need arose to preserve the operability of 
every tested MOV to maintain the safety of nuclear power plants. The USNRC and KINS 
issued regulatory requirements, which specify periodic verification (PV) of the operability of 
MOVs. The requirements recommend utilities to develop an effective PV program of MOV 
design capability, considering the fact that aging can decrease the thrust/torque output of 
motor actuators (USNRC, 1996). To address the two types of requirements described above, 
at least in part, Korean nuclear power plants have implemented static diagnostic tests that 
can provide information on the thrust/torque output of the motor actuator, and any 
changes to the motor-actuator output as a result of aging effects. The first static test for each 
MOV had been conducted from 1999 to 2004, in order to guarantee its operability and 
design basis conditions. The second static test has been conducted from 2005, ongoing to the 
present, in order to implement PV requirements. Up until 2009, it had been assumed that the 
actuator efficiency, one of the most important factors in evaluating the motor actuator 
output, does not degrade over time. In other words, the design efficiency provided by 
manufacture had been used in the calculation of motor actuator output. In addition, in the 
event that the design efficiency had not been provided by the manufacturer, the design 
efficiency of other manufacture with similar motor speed and actuator size had been used. 
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to confirm the validation of the design efficiency by 
analyzing the efficiency behavior over time for motor operated gate and globe valves with 
rising stem, and comparing the design efficiency with the efficiency calculated from a 
method that is introduced in this chapter.  
It is presented herein that most actuators of gate and globe valves have minor variations in 
efficiency from test-to-test, but no increasing or decreasing trend over time, as well as 
demonstrating higher efficiency than the design efficiency. The efficiency variations for 
some actuators with lower motor speed, lower actuator size, and lower gear ratio also were 
not increased or decreased over time, but their design efficiency was susceptible to decrease 
below the their original value. For those actuators, the threshold efficiency was calculated 
for the purpose of replacing their design efficiency. 
From 2010, those results with two other evaluation studies over time on stem/stem nut 
friction coefficient and valve disk/seat friction coefficient have been applied for the PV 
program of safety-related MOVs in Korean nuclear power plants. The three studies 
including the contents introduced in this chapter have helped us to develop optimized PV 
program that can enhance the operability of the valves. Furthermore, they have made key 
roles in extending the maximum test frequency from 5 years to 10 years. 
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2. Calculation of actuator efficiency 
2.1 Data acquisition 
As described in Section 1, the diagnostic static tests have been conducted to ensure the 
motor actuator output of safety-related MOVs for 20 units of nuclear power plants from 
1999 to the present in Korea. For each valve, more than two tests have been conducted. The 
first test was the design basis test from 1999 to 2004, and the second was the periodic test 
from 2005 to 2009. Each test was composed of one ‘as-found’ and two ‘as-left’ tests to 
compare and analyze conditions before and after maintenance jobs, according to the field 
test procedures. The comprehensive static test data for each valve were used in this study. 
In the tests, the actuator torque and the three phases of currents and voltages were 
measured from the strain gage type sensor attached on the stem, and current and voltage 
probes installed at the power lines toward the actuator, respectively. Fig. 2 shows the 
sensors installed to measure currents and voltages at the valve. The measured values for 
gate and globe valves were used in analyzing their respective actuator efficiency behavior. 
 
 
Fig. 2. A picture of installed sensors at a valve test 
2.2 Efficiency calculation process 
The actuator efficiency is a factor transferring motor torque produced by an electric motor 
into actuator torque, necessary in rotating actuator inner gears. The typical efficiency can be 
calculated using the following expression: 
 OVRMTq
Tq
   
(1)
 
Where   is the actuator efficiency, ][ lbftTq   is the actuator torque, ][ lbftMTq  is the 
motor torque, and, OVR is the overall gear ratio provided by the manufacturer. In this 
study, the equation (1) was used to calculate the efficiency.  
2.2.1 Data preparation 
As shown in equation (1), the values of actuator torque and motor torque can be used to 
calculate the efficiency. The measured actuator torque in the static tests was applied directly 
for the equation (1). The motor torque was not measured directly in the static tests. 
Accordingly, in order to calculate actuator efficiency, a method to estimate motor torque 
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was introduced. In this chapter, the motor torque was estimated by a motor torque 
estimator, NEET (S.C. Kang et al., 2006), which can estimate the motor torque using the 
three phases of currents and voltages, and resistance values between phases measured in 
the static tests. The NEET was developed on the basis of several assumptions. First, the 
stator windings are assumed to be sinusoidally wound to couple only to the fundamental-
space-harmonic component of air-gap flux. Second, the self-inductances of the rotor are 
assumed not to vary with rotor angular position. Finally, linear magnetics are assumed.  
Under these assumptions, the air-gap torque produced by a two-phase induction motor, 
which can be transformed from the three-phase induction motor is given by 
 ( )s s s sT P i i       (2) 
Where, s  and s  are the flux linkages of the two stator phases. si   and si   are the 
currents of the two stator phases and P  is the number of pole pairs. The currents si   and 
si   can be directly measured at the stator terminals. The flux linkages can also be 
determined from terminal measurements. For a two-phase machine,  
 s s sS
s s s
i dR
i dt
  
  
 
 
                
 (3) 
Where, s  and s  are the two stator voltages and sR  is the stator phase resistance. Thus, 
the motor torque is expressed only in terms of stator variables, which can be measured in 
field test. Except for the NEET, other motor torque estimators can be used in the estimation 
of motor torque. Fig. 3 shows an example of motor torque signal estimated by NEET using 
the electrical data acquired from a field test.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3. An example of motor torque signal estimated by NEET 
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2.2.2 Efficiency calculation 
By substituting the estimated motor torque, the measured actuator torque, and the overall 
gear ratio provided by manufacturer into the equation (1) the efficiency can be calculated 
easily.  
 
 
Fig. 4. An example of efficiency calculation area 
In this study, the added algorithm into the NEET for the calculation of efficiency was used, 
and the efficiency calculation procedures from the algorithm are as follows:  
a. Read the estimated motor torque signal. 
b. Read the measured actuator torque signal. 
c. Input the overall gear ratio. 
d. Establish the area to be analyzed from the two signals above (Fig. 4): the left and right 
reference points of the area were set up based on the starting point of seating in the 
actuator torque signal, and the point in the motor torque signal where power is turned 
off, respectively. 
e. Calculate the actuator efficiency of each point within the established area, including the 
reference points by using the equation (1) (Fig. 5). 
f. Calculate the average actuator efficiency by dividing the total sum of efficiency of each 
point by the total number of points in the area. As a matter of convenience, the average 
actuator efficiency is referred to as the actuator efficiency henceforth. 
g. Calculate the two 'as-left' actuator efficiencies of the design basis test, and 'as-found' 
efficiency of the periodic test for each valve by applying the procedures from (a) to (f). 
h. Calculate the average value of the two 'as-left' actuator efficiency (avg. 'as-left' 
efficiency), the difference between avg. 'as-left' efficiency and the 'as-found' efficiency 
(efficiency), and the time interval between design basis test and periodic test needed 
to analyze the efficiency behavior over time. 
 
 
Fig. 5. An example of calculated actuator efficiency for each point 
Starting point of 
seating in actuator 
torque signal 
Point that power 
is off in the motor 
torque
Calculation area 
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2.3 Efficiency behavior analysis process 
As the known equation (1), actuator efficiency is dependent on motor torque, actuator 
torque, and the overall gear ratio. One of the important parameters in determining the 
motor torque output is motor speed. In addition, one of the important parameters in 
determining the actuator torque output is maximum motor torque rating. Accordingly, the 
motor speed, maximum motor torque rating, and overall gear ratio were selected as major 
factors in analyzing the efficiency behavior for gate and globe valves. The design 
information about these factors included in this study is described in Table 1.  
The efficiency behavior by the three factors described above was analyzed according to the 
following process: 
a. Analyze the distribution of the avg. 'as-left' and 'as-found' efficiencies based on the test-
to-test time interval in order to address the potential degradations with the passage of 
time. The time interval covers the efficiency variations over a period of several years. 
b. Compare the avg. 'as-left' and 'as-found' efficiency with the design efficiency. In this 
study, the pullout efficiency, which is the lowest efficiency among the staring, stall and 
pullout efficiencies usually provided by manufacturers, was selected as the design 
efficiency because most nuclear power plants use the efficiency in the calculation of the 
actuator output torque. 
c. Modify the design efficiency based on the analysis results of item (b), if necessary. 
 
 
 
Motor 
Manufacturer 
Motor 
Speed 
(RPM) 
Actuator 
Manufacturer 
Actuator 
Model 
Overall 
Gear Ratio 
Max. 
Torque 
Rating 
Design 
Efficiency 
Reliance 1800 Limitorque SMB-000 33.5~62.5 120 0.4 
SMB-00 23~81.1 260 0.4 
SMB-0 34.9~54.8 700 0.4 
SMB-1 
50.4~60.1 
1100 
0.4 
103.2 0.35 
SMB-2 26.4~67.4 1950 0.4 
SMB-3 
53.7~70.9 
4200 
0.4 
98.6 0.38 
3600 AMB-000 36.5 120 0.4 
SMB-00 
34.1~41 
260 
0.45 
67.5 0.4 
SMB-0 31.3~39.1 700 0.45 
SMB-1 27.2~35.9 1100 0.45 
SMB-2 46.6~82.5 1950 0.4 
SMB-3 66.1~70.9 4200 0.4 
 
Table 1. Design information of tested valves 
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3. Efficiency behavior 
Fig. 6 to 8 depict the actuator efficiency distribution for the avg. 'as-left' efficiency ( blue), 
'as-found' efficiency (□ red), and efficiency ( green) by motor speed, maximum motor 
torque rating, and overall gear ratio, respectively. In the figures, the x-axis is the time 
interval between the design basis test and the periodic test. The y-axis includes the actuator 
efficiency and efficiency (-0.2 to +0.2). The figures also include the design efficiency 
provided by manufacturer. Based on the results displayed in the figures, the efficiency 
behaviors over time were analyzed. 
3.1 Motor speed 
The efficiency distribution of the actuators with design efficiency, 0.4 was shown in Fig. 6 by 
the motor speed 1800 RPM (Fig. 6a) and 3600 RPM (Fig. 6b). In both figures, efficiency 
was distributed in the positive and negative areas evenly over time. The actuator efficiencies 
have variations in efficiency from test-to-test, but no increasing or decreasing trend over 
time. However, from the distribution of the avg. 'as-left' efficiency and 'as-found' efficiency, 
most of the actuators with 3600 RPM are observed to possess greater efficiency than the 
design efficiency, 0.4, while some actuators with 1800 RPM have lower efficiency than the 
design efficiency. From those observations, we concluded that motor speed does not affect 
the age-related or service-related degradation, while the efficiency of actuators with 1800 
RPM can be susceptible to a decrease below the design efficiency. 
3.2 Overall gear ratio 
In order to analyze if the OVR affects the potential degradation in efficiency, the various 
OVRs were grouped by 20~40, 40~60, and 60~80 (Fig. 7a, 7b, 7c). The design efficiency of the 
groups is 0.4. In the three figures, efficiency was distributed in the positive and negative 
areas evenly over time. The actuator efficiencies have variations in efficiency from test-to-
test, but no increasing or decreasing trend over time.  
However, the greater number of actuators was distributed in the area below design 
efficiency as the OVR increased. From those observations, we concluded that OVR does not 
affect the age-related or service-related degradation, while the efficiency of actuators with 
more OVR can be susceptible to a decrease below the design efficiency. 
3.3 Maximum motor torque rating 
The efficiency distribution of the various actuators was shown in Fig. 8 by the maximum 
motor torque rating (Fig. 8a to Fig. 8n). In the figures, efficiency was distributed in the 
positive and negative areas evenly over time. The actuator efficiencies have variations in 
efficiency from test-to-test, but no increasing or decreasing trend over time.  
Some valve’s efficiencies of 120 and 260 of maximum motor torque rating with an 1800 RPM 
motor (Fig. 8a, 8b) were showing up in the region below the design efficiency line. However, 
such trends appeared in the other actuators only with the 1800 RPM motor. The design 
efficiencies for those actuators were considered still available because data points showing 
such behavior are less than two at most for an actuator, and the deterioration from the 
design efficiency is small and can be explained based on the following engineering 
judgments. First, one avg. 'as-left' efficiency of 700 of maximum motor torque rating is lower 
than the design efficiency (Fig. 8c) but the behavior was considered temporary because the 
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'as-found' efficiency was recovered up to the design efficiency. The same behavior was also 
observed for 1950 of maximum motor torque rating (Fig. 8e). In the Fig. 8e, both avg. 'as-left' 
and 'as-found' efficiency were lower than the design efficiency, but the maximum deviation 
from the design efficiency was less than 11% approximately, which is an approximation of 
the sum of 8% for uncertainty of sensors for stem torque and 3% uncertainty of motor torque 
estimator based on NEET. 
From these observations, maximum motor torque rating does not affect the efficiency 
degradation over time, but lower motor torque rating could have lower efficiency than the 
design only, for 120 and 260 of maximum motor torque rating with the 1800 RPM motor. 
 
 
 
 
(a) 1800 RPM 
 
  
(b) 3600 RPM 
 
 
Fig. 6. Efficiency distribution by motor speed 
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(a) OVR 20~40 
 
(b) OVR 40~60 
 
(c) OVR 60~80 
Fig. 7. Efficiency distribution by OVR 
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(a) 120 of max. motor torque rating (1800 RPM) 
 
(b) 260 of max. motor torque rating (1800 RPM) 
 
(c) 700 of max. motor torque rating  (1800 RPM) 
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(d) 1100 of max. motor torque rating  (1800 RPM) 
 
(e) 1950 of max. motor torque rating (1800 RPM) 
 
                       (f) 4200 of max. motor torque rating (1800 RPM, 53.7~70.9 OVR) 
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(g) 4200 of max. motor torque rating (1800 RPM, 98.6 OVR) 
 
(h) 120 of max. motor torque rating (3600 RPM) 
 
(i) 260 of max. motor torque rating (3600 RPM, 34.1~41 OVR) 
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(j) 260 of max. motor torque rating (3600 RPM, 67.5 OVR) 
 
(k) 700 of max. motor torque rating (3600 RPM) 
 
 (l) 1100 of max. motor torque rating (3600 RPM) 
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(m) 1950 of max. motor torque rating (3600 RPM) 
 
(n) 4200 of max. motor torque rating (3600 RPM) 
Fig. 8. Efficiency distribution by max. motor torque rating 
4. Threshold value calculation 
As described in Section 3, the actuator efficiency of gate and globe valves have variations in 
efficiency from test-to-test, but no increasing or decreasing trend over time. Some of the 
variation is due to, for example, uncertainty in test measurements or in the estimation of 
motor torque. Some of the variation can be due to random variation in efficiency. Although 
the efficiencies of the two actuators,120 and 260 of motor torque rating with an 1800 RPM 
motor, also were not increased or decreased over time, where their values are susceptible to 
be lower than design values. The decrease can be due to the various combinations of causes 
such as lower motor speed, lower maximum motor torque rating, overall gear ratio, 
operational environment, maintenance history after installation of those valves. For those 
actuators, change of design efficiency is needed to verify proper MOV setup and to quantify 
operational margin, as well as to provide any needed information on potential actuator 
degradation. Therefore, the threshold efficiencies for the two actuators are established using 
a deterministic approach (JOG, 1994), based on engineering judgment, which bounds 95% of 
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the efficiency data. This is shown by the dashed lines in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 of the labeled 
threshold boundary. The intersection of a +45 line and a horizontal line at efficiency = 0 
creates a wedge-shaped boundary. For points on the +45 line, design efficiency + efficiency 
= 0 constant. In other words, all data points on such a line will end up at the same final 
efficiency after a change in efficiency occurs. Points to the right of the line will end up at a 
higher efficiency and points to the left of the line will end up at a lower efficiency. The 
efficiency = 0 line is also used as a discriminator because points with negative efficiency 
(below the line) are not a concern regarding potential decrease in efficiency. This threshold 
boundary can be positioned until a place is found where 5% of the data lie to the left of the +45 
line and above the efficiency = 0 line (i.e., within the 135 wedge). In this position, the 
intercept of the +45 line with the x-axis is the threshold efficiency. For 95% of the data, 
efficiency decreases will not result in a final efficiency exceeding the threshold. Using this 
approach, a threshold value that bounds 95% (1 out of the 25 data points in Fig. 9 and 1 out of 
the 26 data points in Fig. 10) of the data for maximum torque rating 120  and 260 with 1800 
RPM motor is determined as 0.332 and 0335, respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Threshold efficiency for motor torque rating, 120 with 1800 RPM 
 
 
Fig. 10. Threshold efficiency for motor torque rating, 260 with 1800 RPM 
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5. Conclusion 
The actuator efficiency has variations in efficiency from test-to-test, but no increasing or 
decreasing trend over time. In other words, there is no potential degradation in efficiency 
due only to the passage of time. Under certain conditions, however, decreases in efficiency 
to below the design efficiency were observed. Specifically, the actuators with low speed, low 
actuator size, and high gear ratio are susceptible to decrease in efficiency. However, these 
decreases tend to occur progressively down to a plateau level because those actuators have 
variations in efficiency from test-to-test, but no increasing or decreasing trend over time.  
In this chapter, the two actuators that have 120 and 160 of motor torque rating with an 1800 
RPM motor appeared to possess those behaviors. For the two actuators, change of design 
efficiency is needed to verify proper MOV setup and to quantify operational margin, as well 
as to provide any needed information on potential actuator degradation. Accordingly, the 
threshold efficiencies for the 120 and 160 of motor torque rating which bounds 95% of the 
efficiency data were determined as 0.332 and 0.335, respectively. The threshold values and 
efficiency behaviors over time can be applied only for the actuators described in the Table 1, 
because the design efficiencies and features of actuators depend on manufacturers. 
However, when it is assumed that design efficiencies are pertinent for some actuators, it can 
be possible to evaluate the potential degradation in design efficiencies only for the actuators 
with lower speed motor, lower actuator size, and higher gear ratios based on the results of 
this chapter. 
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1. Introduction 
Operating experience from different industries has shown a considerable number of 
reportable events with non-chemical explosions and rapid fires resulting from high 
energy arcing faults (HEAF) in high voltage equipment such as circuit breakers and 
switchgears.  
High energy arcing faults can occur in an electrical system or component through an arc 
path to ground or lower voltage, if sufficiently high voltage is present at a conductor with 
the capacity to release a high amount of energy in an extremely short time. High energy 
arcing faults may lead to the sudden release of electrical energy through the air.  
The significant energy released in the arcing fault of a high voltage component rapidly 
vaporizes the metal conductors involved and can destroy the equipment involved. The 
intense radiant heat produced by the arc can cause significant damage or even destructions 
of equipment and can injure people. However, this problem has been underestimated in the 
past (Owen, 2011a and 2011b). 
Arcing events are not limited to the nuclear industry. Examples for such events could be 
found, among others, in chemical plants, waste incineration plants, and in conventional as 
well as in nuclear power plants underlining that high-energetic arcing faults are one of the 
main root causes of fires in rooms with electrical equipment (HDI-Gerling, 2009).  
An evaluation of several loss incidents in different types of industrial plants has shown that 
causes for the generation of arcing faults are mainly due to (HDI-Gerling, 2009): 
 contact faults at the screw-type or clamp connections of contactors, switches and other 
components due to, e.g., material fatigue, metal flow at pressure points, faulty or soiled 
clamp connections, 
 Creeping current due to humidity, dust, oil, coalification (creeping distances, arcing 
spots), 
 Mechanical damage due to shocks, vibration stress and rodent attack, 
 Insulation faults due to ageing (brittleness), introduction of foreign matter and external 
influences.  
Investigations of HEAF events have also indicated failures of fire barriers and their elements 
as well as of fire protection features due to pressure build-up in electric cabinets, 
transformers and/or compartments, which could lead to physical explosions and fire. These 
events often occur during routine maintenance. 
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HEAF have been noted to occur from poor physical connections between the equipment and 
the bus bars, environmental conditions and failure of the internal insulation (Brown et al., 
2009). 
The interest in fire events initiated by high energy arcing faults has grown in nuclear 
industry due to more recent events having occurred at several nuclear installations.  
In the ongoing discussion on an international level it appeared necessary to find a common 
understanding about the definition of high energy arcing faults.  
Currently, high energy arcing faults are seen as high energy, energetic or explosive electrical 
equipment faults resulting in a rapid release of electrical energy in the form of heat, 
vaporized metal (e.g. copper), and pressure increase due to high current arcs created 
between energized electrical conductors or between an energized electrical conductor and 
neutral or ground.  
Components that may be affected include specific high-energy electrical devices, such as 
switchgears, load centres, bus bars/ducts, transformers, cables, etc., operating mainly on 
voltage levels of more than 380 V (OECD/NEA, 2009a). 
The energetic fault scenario consists of two distinct phases, each with its own damage 
characteristics and detection/suppression response and effectiveness: 
1. First phase: Short, rapid release of electrical energy which may result in projectiles 
(from damaged electrical components or housing) and/or fire(s) involving the electrical 
device itself, as well as any external exposed combustibles, such as overhead exposed 
cable trays or nearby panels, that may be ignited during the energetic phase. 
2. Second phase, i.e., the ensuing fire(s): this fire is treated similar to other postulated fires 
within the zone of influence.  
However, a common definition of high energy arcing faults is expected as one result of a 
comprehensive international activity of the OECD on high energy arcing faults in  the 
member states of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) (see below). 
A variety of fire protection features may be affected in case of high energy arcing faults 
events by the rapid pressure increase and/or pressure waves (e.g. fire barriers such as walls 
and ceilings and their active elements, e.g. fire doors, fire dampers, penetration seals, etc.).  
The safety significance of such events with high energy arcing faults is non-negligible. 
Furthermore, these events may have the potential of event sequences strongly affecting the 
core damage frequency calculated in the frame of a probabilistic fire risk assessment. 
2. High energy arcing faults and work safety  
Although only the technical consequences for nuclear power plants and other nuclear 
installations in case of a HEAF event are discussed in the following in detail, another 
important hazard resulting from arcing faults should not be ignored. This is the possible 
injury of workers.  
Based on previous statistics it is expected that solely in the U.S. more than 2,000 workers 
will be seriously burnt by the explosive energy released during arcing faults within one year 
(Lang, 2005). The magnitude of this problem is far reaching, and the following statistics are 
staggering (Burkhart, 2009): 
 44,363 electricity-related injuries occurred between 1992 and 2001, 
 27,262 nonfatal electrical shock injuries, 
 17,101 burn injuries, 
 
Investigation of High Energy Arcing Fault Events in Nuclear Power Plants 
 
129 
 2,000 workers admitted annually to burn centres for extended arc flash injury 
treatment. 
Three main consequences for workers result from a high energy arcing fault: blinding light, 
intense heat and thermo-acoustic effects.  
1. Blinding light:   
As the arc is first established, an extremely bright flash of light occurs. Although it 
diminishes as the arcing continues, the intensity of the light can cause immediate vision 
damage and increases the probability for future vision problems. 
2. Intense heat:  
The electrical current flowing through the ionized air creates tremendously high levels 
of heat energy. This heat is transferred to the developing plasma, which rapidly 
expands away from the source of supply. Tests have shown that heat densities at typical 
working distances can exceed 40 cal/cm². Even at much lower levels, conventional 
clothing ignites, causing severe, often fatal, burns. At typical arc fault durations a heat 
density of only 1.2 cal/cm² on exposed flash is enough to cause the onset of a second-
degree burn.  
3. Thermo-acoustic effects:   
As the conductive element that caused the arc is vaporized, the power delivered to the 
arc fault rises rapidly. Rapid heating of the arc and surrounding air corresponds to a 
rapid rise in surrounding pressure. The resultant shock wave can create impulse very 
high sound levels. Forces from the pressure wave can rupture eardrums, collapse lungs 
and cause fatal injuries. 
Most of these people will neither have been properly warned of the hazards associated with 
arc flash nor will they have been adequately trained in how to protect themselves. 
While the potential for arc flash does exist for as long as plants have been powered by 
electricity several factors have pushed arc flash prevention and protection to the forefront. 
The first is a greater understanding of arc flash hazards and the risk they pose to personnel. 
Research has started since a few years for quantifying energy and forces unleashed by arc 
flash events. This has resulted in the development of standards to better protect workers.  
Arc-flash hazard analysis is important in determining the personal protective equipment 
required to keep personnel safe when working with energized equipment. Contact with 
energized equipment is a commonly known risk; however exposure to incident energy from 
an electrical arc is sometimes overlooked.  On that background approach boundaries have 
been determined to improve the arc flash hazard protection (Lane, 2004) 
There is much discussion regarding how thorough an arc-flash hazard assessment must be. 
A complete examination of the system would require assessment at each and every possible 
work location, a task that is unrealistic to complete. Even if this task was undertaken, some 
of the accepted analysis methods pose some concerns as to whether the assessment 
considers the ΄most likely΄ fault scenarios. 
The fundamentals of arc-flash hazard analysis are discussed in (Avendt, 2008 and Lane, 
2004). The methodology used in the arc-flash hazard analysis is recommended in (IEEE, 
2002) where techniques for designers and facility operators are provided to determine the 
arc flash boundary and arc flash incident energy. How to use this IEEE standard is 
described in (Lippert et al., 2005). 
First and foremost, when considering arc-flash hazards four primary factors have to be 
mentioned which determine the hazard category: 
1. System voltage. 
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2. Bolted fault current – calculated at the location/equipment to be assessed and 
subsequently used to calculate the theoretical arcing fault current. 
3. Working distance – as measured from the personnel´s head/torso to the location of the 
arc source. 
4. Fault clearing time. 
Two of the four primary factors determining the arc-flash hazard category have a larger 
impact than the others: working distance and fault clearing time. 
In (Avendt, 2008) it is underlined that fault clearing time plays the largest role in the arc-
flash hazard category. A time-current curve is frequently used to show the relationship 
between current (amps) and response time (seconds). Most protective devices have an 
inverse characteristic: as current increase, time decreases. Examples of such curves are given 
in (Avendt, 2008).  
In order to fulfil the obligation to protect workers, several standards and guidelines are 
currently updated or under development.  
For example, the Electricity Engineers Association has developed a discussion paper on the 
issue of arc flash (EEA, 2010) that will enable the subsequent preparation of a guide which 
will provide best practice advice for employers and asset owners needing to determine the 
probability of an arc flash occurring, its severity, means of mitigation and relevant personnel 
protection equipment. 
An overview of various arc flash standards for arc flash protection and arc flash hazard 
incident energy calculations are presented in (Prasad, 2010).  
3. Systematic query of international and national databases 
In order to confirm these indications by feedback from national and world-wide operating 
experience, the national German database on reportable events occurring at nuclear power 
plants as well as international databases, such as  IRS (Incident Reporting System) and INES 
(International Nuclear Event Scale), both provided by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), or the OECD FIRE Database (cf. OECD/NEA, 2009) have been analysed 
with respect to high energy arcing faults events which resulted in a  fire and high energy 
arcing faults events with only the potential of deteriorating fire safety.  
That systematic query underlined that a non-negligible number of reportable events with 
electrically induced explosions and extremely fast fire sequences resulting from high energy 
arcing faults partly lead to significant consequences to the environment of impacted 
components exceeding typical fire effects. 
All results of the international and national databases are presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3 in 
the same manner, containing in particular the current plant operational state in case of the 
event, the information in which component the cause of the event was identified, the voltage 
level, if only the impacted component was damaged, and information if fire barriers being 
available had been deteriorated.  
3.1 International OECD HEAF activity 
Due to the high safety significance and importance to nuclear regulators OECD/NEA/CSNI 
(Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations) has initiated an international activity on 
“High Energy Arcing Faults (HEAF)” in 2009 (OECD/NEA, 2009a) to investigate these 
phenomena in nuclear power plants in more detail as an important part of better 
understanding fire risk at a nuclear power plants which is better accomplished by an 
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international group to pool international knowledge and research means. In this task it is 
stated:  
“The main objectives of this common international activity are to define in technical terms a 
HEAF event which is likely to occur on components such as breakers, transformers, etc., to 
share between experts from OECD/NEA member states HEAF events, experiences, research 
and potential mitigation strategies. In addition, the physical and chemical phenomena of a 
HEAF event shall be investigated and characterized from a fire dynamics perspective. In 
this context, a simple model and/or deterministic correlation is intended to be developed to 
reasonably and quickly predict the potential damage areas associated with a HEAF.  
Furthermore, generally acceptable input criteria and boundary conditions for CFD 
(computerized fluid dynamics) models shall be defined being likely to be accepted by 
industry and regulatory agencies. In a last step, the needs for possible experiments and 
testing to develop input data and boundary conditions for HEAF events to support the 
development of HEAF models shall be identified and the correlations and models 
developed be validated and verified.” 
The working group with members e.g. from Canada, France, Germany, Korea, and the 
United States decided during the Kick-Off Meeting at OECD/NEA in Paris in May 2009 that 
the goals of the task are to develop deterministic correlations to predict damage and 
establish a set of input data and boundary conditions for more detailed modelling which 
can be agreed to by the international community.  
The output of the OECD activity may directly support development of improved methods 
in fire probabilistic risk assessment for nuclear power plant applications. The task may also 
result in the definition of experimental needs to be addressed later in a project structure 
(OECD/NEA, 2009a). 
3.2 Information from of international databases 
First information from the international operating experience collected within the IRS 
database - for more severe reportable incidents at nuclear power plants - and INES, both 
provided by IAEA,  is given in Table 1. 
In addition, applications of the OECD FIRE Database (cf. OECD/NEA, 2009) have indicated 
that a non-negligible contribution of approx. 6 % of the in total 343 fire events collected in 
the database up to the end of 2008 (cf. Berg & Forell et al., 2009) are high energy arcing faults 
induced fire events. Details can be found in Table 2. 
At the time being, the existing data base on high energy arcing faults events in nuclear 
installations is still too small for a meaningful statistical evaluation.  
However, the first rough analysis of the available international operating experience gives 
some indications on the safety significance of this type of events, which potentially will also 
result in relevant contributions to the overall core damage frequency.  
Up to the end of 2009, thirty-eight high energy arcing faults events have been identified in 
the OECD FIRE Database. Details on these events are provided in the following paragraphs. 
The database query was started in Germany. One application of the OECD FIRE Database 
selected by the German experts was an analysis of events associated with explosions. A 
query in this database on the potential combinations of fire and explosion events (cf. Berg & 
Forell et al., 2009) indicated a significant number of explosion induced fires. Most of such 
event combinations occurred at transformers on-site, but outside of the nuclear power plant 
buildings or in compartments with electrical equipment.  
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Year of 
Occurrence 
Reactor 
Type 
Plant 
State Component 
Voltage 
Level 
Damage 
Limited to 
Component 
Barrier 
Deteriorated 
Fire / 
Explosion 
2006 PWR FP transformer busbar 20 kV yes no F 
2006 BWR FP switchgear station 400 kV yes no - 
2001 PHWR LP/SD circuit breaker cables 
not 
indicated no no F 
2001 PWR FP power switch not indicated no no E / F 
2001 PWR FP circuit breaker not indicated no yes F 
2000 PWR FP circuit breaker 6 kV yes yes F 
2000 PWR FP circuit breaker 12 kV yes no F 
1996 PWR FP power switch not indicated no yes E / F 
1996 PWR FP lightning arrester not indicated no no F 
1995 PWR FP circuit breaker 6 kV no no E / F 
1992 PWR FP switchgear room 6 kV yes no F 
1991 PWR FP control cabinet 6 kV yes no F 
1991 PWR FP busbar 0.4 kV yes no F 
1990 PWR LP/SD switchgear station 400 V yes no - 
1990 PWR FP busbar 6 kV yes no - 
1990 LGR FP busbar 6 kV no no F 
1989 PWR FP distribution 6.9 kV no no E / F 
1988 PWR FP distribution 13.8 kV yes no E / F 
1984 BWR FP main transformer not indicated no yes E / F 
1983 GCR LP/SD control panel 5.5 kV no yes E / F 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Operating experience from HEAF events reported to INES and IRS (from Berg & 
Forell et al., 2009) 
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Year of 
Occurrence 
Reactor 
Type 
Plant 
State Component 
Voltage 
Level 
Damage 
Limited to 
Component
Barrier 
Deteriorated 
Fire / 
Explosion 
2007 PWR FP high voltage transformer 
not 
indicated 
/ 345 kV 
yes no E / F 
2006 PWR FP electrically driven pump 12 kV yes no E / F 
2006 PWR FP high voltage transformer 
6 kV / 
20 kV no yes E / F 
2006 PWR LP/SD
medium and low 
voltage 
transformer - oil 
filled 
not 
indicated 
/ 400 kV 
no no E / F 
2005 BWR FP high voltage transformer 
not 
indicated yes no E / F 
2005 PHWR FP high voltage transformer 
not 
indicated 
/ 500 kV 
yes no E / F 
2003 GCR FP high voltage transformer 
6.6 kV / 
400 kV no no E / F 
2002 BWR LP/SD high voltage transformer 
not 
indicated yes no E / F 
2002 PWR FP high voltage breaker 34.5 kV yes no E / F 
2001 PWR LP/SD
high or medium 
voltage electrical 
cabinet 
6.6 kV no yes E / F 
2001 PWR 
not 
indicat
ed 
high or medium 
voltage electrical 
cabinet 
6.6 kV no no E / F 
1999 PWR FP high voltage transformer 
20 kV / 
161 kV yes no E / F 
1995 PWR FP 
medium and low 
voltage 
transformer – dry
not 
indicated 
/ 130 kV 
yes no E / F 
1994 PWR FP high voltage transformer 
not 
indicated 
/ 400 kV 
yes no E / F 
1990 PWR FP 
high or medium 
voltage electrical 
cabinet 
6.6 kV yes no E / F 
1988 PWR LP/SD high voltage transformer 
20 kV / 
400 kV yes no E / F 
1988 PWR FP high voltage transformer 
20 kV / 
400 kV yes no E / F 
1988 PWR FP high voltage transformer 
20 kV / 
400 kV yes no E / F 
 
Table 2. Operating experience from fire events with HEAF included in the OECD FIRE 
Database (from Berg & Forell et al., 2009)  
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Approximately 50 % of the fires in the database were extinguished in the early (incipient) 
fire phase before the fire had fully developed.  
As there is no specific coded field in the database to indicate explosions, the main source of 
information is provided by the event description field. The following terms were used as 
search filters: 
- search for *explo* (explosion, exploded, etc.):   26 events 
- search for *defla* (deflagration, deflagrated, etc.):  no events 
- search for *deto* (detonation, detonated, etc.):   no events 
In three of the in total 26 cases no explosion occurred according to the event description but 
the term “explo” was used in another meaning.  
In case of one event, the explosive release of ‘INERGEN’ gas from a gas cylinder occurred. 
The 22 reported explosions amount to 6.4 % of the 373 events reported up to date. Some 
details of the explosions are listed in (Berg & Forell et. al., 2009). 
Concerning the process of explosion distinction should be made between an explosion as a 
process of rapid combustion (chemical explosion) and an explosion as a physical process 
resulting from a sudden gas pressure rise by a high energy arcing fault.  
A chemical explosion was found for only three events (solvent vapour, diesel fuel, 
hydrogen). In the other 18 cases, high energy arcing faults events obviously took place at the 
same time indicating a physical explosion.  
In some of these cases the electric fault might have caused a fuel pyrolysis/spread and acted 
as an ignition source for a chemical explosion, thus a high energy arcing fault event and a 
chemical explosion may have taken place simultaneously. In one event, a fire led to the 
explosion of diesel fuel vapour while in another event a fire and an explosion occurred 
independently from each other in parallel. In all other cases explosions induced the fire. 
The buildings/locations where the events took place are also listed in (Berg et al., 2009). It 
was found that 13 (59 %) events took place outside buildings, 3 inside electrical buildings. A 
majority of 59 % of the reported explosions (again 13 events) started at transformers.  
The other nine events took place at electrical cabinets, other electrical equipment, or process 
equipment (three each representing 14 %).  
External fire brigades were needed in 4 of 22 cases (18 %). The 22 events were also evaluated 
concerning the fire duration with the following results: 
- Fire duration between 0 and less than 15 min:        11 events 
- Fire duration between 15 and less than 30 min:          3 events 
- Fire duration between 30 and 60 min:            3 events 
- Fire duration longer than 60 min:           3 events 
For the remaining two events no information on the fire duration is provided. This result is 
in good agreement with the fire durations recorded in the database for all events, where for 
approx. 55 % of the events (i.e. 128 out of 233 events with fire duration provided) afire 
duration of less than 15 min could be found. 
3.3 Information from of the German database 
The German national operating experience from reportable events at nuclear power plants is 
summarized in Table 3. As one can see from this table different components were impacted, 
in particular – as expected – switchgears. In many cases the voltage level could not be 
identified. The damage was in most cases limited to the component where the HEAF 
occurred, only in one case a barrier was deteriorated. One third of these events were 
correlated with a fire. 
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Year of 
Occurrence 
Reactor 
Type 
Plant 
State Component 
Voltage 
Level 
Damage 
Limited to 
Component
Barrier 
Deteriorated 
Fire / 
Explosion 
2007 BWR FP transformer 380 kV yes no E / F 
2007 PWR FP transformer 380 kV yes no - 
2006 BWR LP/SD auxiliary service pump 
not 
indicated yes no - 
2006 PWR FP switchgear drawer not indicated yes no - 
2006 BWR FP switchgear drawer not indicated yes no - 
2005 BWR FP Switch not indicated yes no - 
2004 PWR LP/SD emergency power feed line 
not 
indicated yes no - 
2004 BWR FP diesel generator 6 kV no no F 
2004 BWR FP cable connection not indicated yes no F 
2004 PWR LP/SD diesel generator. exciter 6 kV yes no - 
2003 BWR FP diesel generator. exciter 6 kV yes no - 
2003 PWR FP emergency power feed line 500 V yes no F 
2002 BWR FP emergency power busbar 500 V no no F 
2001 PWR FP generator transformer switch
not 
indicated yes no - 
2001 BWR FP emergency power distribution 660 V yes no - 
1999 PWR FP ventilation exhaust not indicated yes yes - 
1998 PWR FP emergency power distribution 660 V no no - 
1996 BWR FP switch drawer 500 V yes no F 
1995 BWR FP switchgear drawer not indicated yes no - 
1993 PWR FP currency converter 380 V yes no - 
1992 PWR LP/SD emergency power generator 
not 
indicated yes no F 
1991 BWR FP emergency power busbar 10 kV yes no - 
1989 PWR FP switchgear feed cell 10 kV no no F 
1989 PWR LP/SD switchgear feed area 380 V? no no F 
1988 PWR LP/SD switchgear 220 kV no no E / F 
1987 BWR FP emergency diesel generator 
not 
indicated yes no - 
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Year of 
Occurrence 
Reactor 
Type 
Plant 
State Component 
Voltage 
Level 
Damage 
Limited to 
Component
Barrier 
Deteriorated 
Fire / 
Explosion 
1987 PWR FP auxiliary service water system 
not 
indicated yes no - 
1986 PWR LP/SD busbar 380 V no no F 
1984 BWR LP/SD auxiliary power supply 
not 
indicated yes no - 
1981 PWR FP safety injection pump motor 
not 
indicated yes no - 
1979 BWR LP/SD switchgear 400 V yes no - 
1979 PWR LP/SD control rod distribution 
not 
indicated yes no F 
1978 PWR FP switchgear 220 kV yes no - 
1977 PWR LP/SD switchgear 350 V yes no - 
1977 BWR LP/SD emergency switchgear 
not 
indicated yes no - 
Table 3. Operating experience concerning reportable HEAF events from German NPP (from 
Berg & Forell et al., 2009) 
In all three tables the following abbreviations are used: 
PWR:  pressurized water reactor   BWR:  boiling water reactor 
PHWR:  pressurized heavy water reactor  GCR:  gas cooled reactor 
FP:  full power    LP/SD:  low power / shutdown 
E:  explosion    F:  fire 
4. Questionnaire to gain further insights on HEAF 
As a result of the evaluation of the above mentioned international databases IRS and INES, a 
questionnaire has been developed by German experts providing a list of questions, which 
mainly shall be answered by the licensees (see Röwekamp & Klindt, 2007 and Röwekamp et 
al., 2007).  
The answers to this questionnaire shall provide further insights on the basic phenomena 
regarding high energy arcing faults and may allow the evaluation of such events as well as 
the identification of effective preventive measures to be taken in nuclear installations in the 
future.  
This questionnaire has been discussed nationally and in an international experts group. The 
results of the international discussions as well as a first pilot completion of this 
questionnaire in a German nuclear power plant resulted in enhancing the questionnaire and 
its sub-division into two parts depending on the availability of experiences with this type of 
events in the plants under consideration.  
The questions concerning events which occurred at the nuclear power plant cover the 
operating experience in the respective plant, consequences and effects of the events, fire 
suppression measures (if needed), event causes and resulting corrective actions.  
Questions without plant-specific observations from events deal with preventive measures in 
the plant and assessment activities performed without direct observations from the events 
(Röwekamp & Berg, 2008 and Röwekamp et al., 2009). The complete list of elaborated 
questions is provided in the following.  
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Part I: Questions concerning events occurred at nuclear power plants 
 Operating experience 
1. Does the operating experience of the nuclear power plant (including grid 
connection) reveal either reportable or minor, non-reportable events interconnected 
to a high energy electric (i.e. arcing) failure of electric components and equipment 
with > 6 kV?  
2. What was the damage? What was the damage zone? Was there damage by the high 
energy release (explosion pressure wave, etc.), or by fire or by both?  
3. In which buildings / compartments / plant areas did the event occur? 
4. At what type of component was the fault initiated (e.g., switchgear, motor control 
centre, transformer (oil filled or dry ones), breakers, cables etc.)?  
5. What voltage level did the component operate at? What was the nominal current 
load available to the component? 
6. If known, what was the estimated overload current observed during the arcing 
fault? 
7. How was the HEAF observed or detected? Directly by fire detectors, visual or 
auditory detection in the location where the fault occurred or indirectly by 
faulty/spurious signals indirect fire alarms, etc.? (An as far as feasible detailed and 
exhaustive description of the event is needed.) What were the observations and 
findings? 
8. What was the arcing duration in case of arcing being the cause? How did the arcing 
stop? (Note: Due to expert judgment from international experts there may be a 
correlation between arcing duration and damage consequences/extent) 
 Consequences / Effects 
9. Which consequences/effects including secondary ones (e.g. pressure waves, impact 
by missiles, i.e. induced high frequent voltage, etc.) to adjacent/nearby 
components (including cables) and compartments / plant areas have been 
observed besides the typical fire effects? Did, as a consequence, protective 
equipment fail or become ineffective? 
10. Was the damage limited to one fire compartment and or one redundant safety train 
or were further compartments / trains affected? 
11. Which functions of fire protection features (fire barriers and their elements as well 
as active means) have been impaired by the effects of high energy arcing faults, in 
particular by pressure waves and missiles? 
 Fire suppression (if needed) 
12. Was fire extinguishing performed? 
13. If yes, which extinguishing means were applied? Which were successful? 
14. What was (rough estimate) the total fire duration? 
 Event causes 
15. Was it possible to find out the causes of the high energy impacts observed? If yes, 
what were the potential causes? 
16. Were the initial causes (root causes) man-induced (mal-operation, errors), or purely 
technical ones, administrative causes, or combinations of different causes? Have 
the root causes been found? (Please list all the root causes.) 
 Corrective actions 
17. What are the corrective actions after the event for prevention of recurrence? 
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Part II: Questions without observations from events at nuclear power plants 
 Preventive measures 
18. In which compartments / plant areas are components and equipment with the 
potential of HEAF installed? Are there safety significant / safety related 
components available in these compartments / plant areas and/or adjacent ones? If 
yes, which ones? What are the preventive (structural) measures there against such 
events? 
19. Which measures are foreseen (originally in the design as well as improved ones 
after the event) to limit the consequences of such high energy arcing faults failures? 
20. Is it possible to practically exclude by the preventive measures that safety 
significant equipment is impaired? 
21. Are further measures intended for prevention of these faults (continuous controls, 
in-service inspections, etc.), and if yes, which ones? 
 Assessment without direct observations from the events 
22. In how far are such high energy arcing fault events and their potential effects 
considered in the frame of periodic safety reviews (deterministic safety status 
analysis as well as probabilistic safety assessment)? 
This German questionnaire could be the basis for gaining plant-specific information also 
from nuclear power plants in other countries. 
5. Some examples of HEAF events in nuclear power plants 
In the following, typical examples of high energy arcing fault events which occurred in 
different nuclear power plants in the last thirty years are provided. 
5.1 HEAF in a 10 kV cable with a spontaneous short circuit 
A high energy arcing faults event from a spontaneous short circuit with a longer time 
duration took place in a German nuclear power plant.  
This event, which occurred in a 10 kV cable at a BWR type plant, has been analyzed in detail 
by the responsible expert organization on behalf of the regulator in charge (Berg & Katzer et 
al., 2009). Details on the electric circuit are provided in Figure 1.  
The affected cable was routed from the station service transformer together with various 
other cables through an underground cable channel to the switchgear building.  
Due to the conditions in the ground, cables were partly imbedded in so-called ‘cable 
cylinder blocks’ manufactured from concrete (see Figure 2). 
The short circuit with a duration of some seconds occurred in a single 10 kV cable inside one 
of the cylinder blocks. Neighboring cables were not affected. During this time period, the 
PVC insulated cable including the copper conductor evaporated completely on a length of 
approx. 1 m (see photos in Figure 3). 
The pyrolysis and/or evaporation of the PVC cable insulations caused a strong smoke 
release inside the cable channel.  
The automatic fire detectors directly gave an alarm. Due to the typically high air humidity 
inside the channel, a smoke exhaust system was installed for the cable channel, which 
removed the smoke rapidly after actuation by the fire detectors.  
The overpressure arising from the high voltage short circuit was relieved via open cable 
conduits to the transformer and leakages. 
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Fig. 1. Scheme of the electric circuit affected 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Cross section of the cable tray inside the cable cylinder blocks inside ground between 
the buildings 
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Fig. 3. Photos of the cable damage; left: location of the damaged cable, right: damage by the 
cable fire/evaporation 
 
Fig. 4. Cables with protection by intumescent coating; left: photo of the cable channel, right: 
photo of the coating 
Unfortunately, the pressure value having really occurred during the event could not been 
determined. Damage to fire doors, dampers, or fire stop seals were not observed. The high 
energy short circuit did not result in any fire propagation; the combustion was limited to the 
location where the short circuit occurred. The fire self-extinguished directly after the electric 
current had been switched off. The fire duration was only a few seconds, however, the 
smoke release was high.  
It has to be mentioned that all cables inside the cable channel were protected by intumescent 
coating (see Figure 4 above). This coating ensured the prevention of fire spreading on the 
cables. 
The detailed analysis led to the definite result that the event was mainly caused by ageing of 
the 10 kV cables. The ageing process was accelerated by the insufficient heat release inside 
the cable cylinder blocks. 
As a corrective action, all high voltage (mainly 10 kV) cables with PVC shielding being older 
than 30 years were replaced by new ones.  
Another effect of the event was the smoke propagation to an adjacent cable channels via a 
drainage sump. As a preventive measure, after the event each cable channel was supplied 
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by its own drainage system. Moreover, all the channels were separated by fire barriers with 
a resistance rating of 90 min. 
5.2 Arcing fault in an electrical cabinet of the exciter system of an emergency diesel 
generator 
This event occurred at a German nuclear power plant in 1987.  
 
  
 
Fig. 5. Photographs: a) view into the exciter cabinet, in the foreground location where the 
screw loosened and b) view into the cabinet 
 
 
Fig. 6. Photographs of the damaged fire door from outside the room 
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Performing a load test during a regular in-service inspection (usually at an interval of four 
weeks) of the emergency diesel generator, an arcing fault with a short-to-ground took place 
in the electrical cabinet of the exciter system of the emergency diesel generator (cf. Figure 5 
above).  
The ground fault is assumed to be caused by a loose screw. The ionization of air by the arc 
developed to a short circuit within approximately four seconds.  
The coupler breakers between the emergency power bus bar and the auxiliary bus bar 
opened 0.1 s after the occurrence of the short circuit, due to the signal “overload during 
parallel operation”.  
1.5 s later the diesel generator breaker opened due to the signal "voltage < min” at the 
emergency power bus bar. Another 0.5 s later the emergency power bus bar was connected 
automatically to the offsite power bus bar. 
The smouldering fire is believed to be caused by the short circuit of the emergency diesel 
generator.  
Due to the high energy electric arcing fault a sudden pressure rise occurred in the room 
(room dimensions are approximately 3.6 m x 5.5 m x 5 m) that damaged the double-winged 
fire door.  
Photographs of the damaged fire door from outside the room are shown in Figure 6 above. 
5.3 Short circuit leading to a transformer fire 
This event occurred at a German nuclear power plant in June 2007. A short circuit resulted 
in a fire in one of the two main transformers. The short circuit was recognized by the 
differential protection of the main transformer. Due to this, the circuit breaker between the 
380 kV grid connection and the affected generator transformer (AC01) as well as the 27 kV 
generator circuit breaker of the unaffected transformer (AC02) were opened.  
At the same time, de-excitation of the generator was actuated. The short circuit was thereby 
isolated. In addition, two of the four station service supply bus bars (3BC and 4BD) were 
switched to the 110 kV standby grid (VE). A simplified diagram is given in Figure 7 (Berg & 
Fritze, 2011).  
Within 0.5 s, the generator protection system (initiating 'generator distance relay' by 
remaining current during de-excitation of the generator which still feeds the shot circuit) 
caused the second circuit breaker between the 380 kV grid connection and the intact 
generator transformer (AC02) to open. Subsequently the two other station service supply 
bus bars (2BB and 1BA) were also switched to the standby grid. After approx. 1.7 s, station 
service supply was re-established by the standby grid.  
Due to the short low voltage signalization on station service supply bus bars the reactor 
protection system triggered a reactor trip. 
As soon as the switch to the standby grid had taken place , feed water pump 2 was started 
automatically. After about 4 s the pump stopped injecting into the reactor pressure vessel 
and subsequently was switched off again. This caused the coolant level in the reactor 
pressure vessel to drop so that after about 10 min the reactor protection system actuated 
steam line isolation as well as the start-up of the reactor core isolation cooling system. About 
4 min after the actuation of steam line isolation, two safety and relief valves were opened 
manually for about 4 min. This caused the pressure in the reactor to drop from 65 bar to 
approx.. 20 bar. As a result of the flow of steam into the pressure suppression pool, the 
coolant level in the reactor pressure vessel dropped further.  
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Fig. 7. Simplified diagram of the station service supply and the grid connection of the 
nuclear power plant  
After closing the safety and relief valves the level of reactor coolant decreased further 
because of the collapse of steam bubbles inside the reactor pressure vessel. Thereby the limit 
for starting the high-pressure coolant injection system with 50 % feed rate was reached and 
the system was started up by the reactor protection system. Subsequently, the coolant level 
in the reactor pressure vessel increases to 14.07 m within 6 min. The reactor core isolation 
cooling system was then automatically switched off, followed by the automatic switch-over 
of the high-pressure coolant injection system to minimum flow operation. Subsequent 
reactor pressure vessel feeding was carried out by means of the control rod flushing water 
and the seal water.  
Due to the damage caused by the fire in the transformer, the plant was shut down. The fire 
of the transformer showed the normal behaviour of a big oil-filled transformer housing, the 
fire lacks combustion air and produces a large amount of smoke (see Figure 8). 
A detailed root cause analysis regarding the different deviations from the expected event 
sequence was carried out. The cause of the fire was a short circuit in the windings of the 
generator transformer. Due to the damages to the transformer it was not possible to resolve 
the failure mechanisms in all details.  
To end the short circuit, the differential protection system of the generator transformer 
caused to open the circuit breaker between the 380 kV grid connection and the affected 
generator transformer as well as the generator circuit breaker to the unaffected 
transformer.  
The generator circuit breaker to the affected transformer did not open since the generator 
circuit breakers are not able to interrupt the currents flowing during a short circuit. The 
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opening of the circuit breaker between the second 380 kV grid connection and the 
remaining intact generator transformer is caused by the remaining current after de-
exciting the generator which initiates the distance relay of the generator protection 
system.  
The loss of the operational feed water supply was caused by the time margins in between 
the opening of the two 380 kV circuit breakers. The logical sequence in the re-starting 
program of the feed water pumps could not cope with the specific situation of the delayed 
low voltage signals during the incident. 
The further drop in the reactor pressure vessel level following the actuation of steam line 
isolation and the reactor core isolation cooling system was caused by the manual opening of 
the two safety and relief valves for 4 min. The manual opening of safety and relief valves 
was not needed in the case of this event sequence and at that point in time. The reason for 
the manual opening of two safety and relief valves will be part of a detailed human factor 
analysis which is not completed. 
As a consequence of these indications, improvements concerning the fire protection of 
transformers are intended in Germany (Berg et al., 2010). 
 
 
Fig. 8. Flame and smoke occurring at the generator transformer; the photo on the right hand 
shows the fire extinguishing activities 
5.4 Phase-to-phase electrical fault in an electrical bus duct 
A phase-to-phase electrical fault, that lasted four to eight seconds, occurred in a 12 kV 
electrical bus duct at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant in May 2000 (Brown et al., 
2009). This bus supplied the reactor coolant and water circulating pumps, thus resulting in a 
turbine trip and consequently in a  reactor trip.  
The fault in the 12 kV bus occurred below a separate 4 kV bus from the start-up transformer, 
and smoke resulting from the HEAF caused an additional failure.  
When the circuit breaker tripped, there was a loss of power to all 4 kV vital and non-vital 
buses and a 480 V power supply to a switchyard control building, which caused a loss of 
power to the charger for the switchyard batteries. After 33 hours, plant personnel were able 
to energize the 4 kV and 480 V non-vital buses.  
This event was initiated due to the centre bus overheating causing the polyvinyl chloride 
(PVC) insulation to smoke, which lead to a failure of the adjacent bus insulation. Having 
only a thin layer of silver plating on the electrodes, noticeably flaking off in areas not 
directly affected by the arc, contributed to the high-energetic arcing fault event.  
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Other factors that caused the failure were heavy bus loading and splice joint configurations, 
torque relaxation, and undetected damage from a 1995 transformer explosion. Two photos 
of this failure are shown in Figure 9. More photos are provided in (Brown et al, 2009). 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Photographs of the damages at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant (from Brown 
et al., 2009) 
5.5 Short circuit due to fall of a crane onto cable trays 
This event occurs at a Ukrainian plant which was at that time under construction when 
work on dismounting of the lifting crane was fulfilled (IAEA, 2004).  
The crane was located near the 330/6 kV emergency auxiliary transformers TP4 and TP5 
which are designed for transformation 330 kV voltage to 6 kV for power supply of the 6kV 
AC house distribution system of the unit 4 and the emergency power supply system 6 kV 
for unit 3. They are located outside at a distance 50 m from the turbine hall of the unit 4. 
There are two metal clad switchgear rooms (with 26 cabinets and 8 switchers) about four 
meters from the emergency auxiliary transformers.  
The supply of the sub-distribution buses building from the power centre rooms (see Figure 
10), was ensured by a trestle with cable trays consisting of power, control and 
instrumentation cables for the units 3 and 4.  
All trays were provided with the cut-off fire barriers. The transformer rooms were supplied 
by an automatic fire extinguishing system, which actuated when the gas and differential 
protection actuated. 
The event started when the jib of the crane fell on the trestle with the cables passed from 
330/6 kV transformer TP 4 and TP 5 to unit 4 and broke them. The cables fell on the ground. 
The diagram of the situation after the event is provided in Figure 10 (IAEA, 2004). 
Damages of all cable trays lead to loss of instrumentation cables for relay protection of the 
transformers and the trunk line 6 kV. 
As a result the earth fault of the cables 6kV could not be disconnected rapidly. The 
emergency relay protection of the transformers during earth fault 6 kV from the side 330 kV 
with the executive current from the storage buttery for open-type distribution substation 330 
kV was not designed. 
To remove this earth fault the plant was cut off from outside high-voltage transmission lines 
330 kV by electrical protection actuation and the voltage on the power supply bus was 
decreased.  
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There was a loss of normal and emergency auxiliary power supply which resulted in a 
decrease of the frequency of ´the power supply buses of the main coolant pumps. The 
emergency protection was actuated and the reactors of units 2 and 3 were scrammed. 
The long-term exposure of this earth fault (1 min and 36´sec.) caused a high earth fault 
currents which burn the cables. This lead to a fire spread to the 6 kV supply distribution 
buses and 6 kV metal clad switchgear rooms resulting inside these rooms in high 
temperature and release of the toxic substance. Also the equipment of the transformers TP 4 
and TP 5 was damaged.  
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Diagram of the situation after the event (from IAEA, 2004) 
The earth fault has to be disconnected with differential protection of the line 330 kV but it 
was actuated with the output relays of the TP 4 and TP 5 which was damaged. 
The fire was detected by the security guard, the on-site fire brigade was informed, including 
the outside agency. The automatic fire extinguishing system was activated but stopped 
working right away because of fire pump’s power supply loss. There was no water in the 
fire mains.  
Then the fire brigade laid fire-fighting hoses and provided water with a mobile pump unit. 
Then the fire brigade  waited for the permission from the shift leader.  
In compliance with a written procedure, after elimination of the short circuit and restoration 
of the house distribution power supply the fire brigades could start fire fighting and 
extinguished the fire about one hour and thirty minutes after detection. 
5.6 A triple-pole short circuit at the grounding switch caused by an electrician 
In December 1975, a safety significant fire occurred in unit 1 of a nuclear power plant in the 
former Eastern Germany (see, e.g., Röwekamp & Liemersdorf, 1993 and NEA, 2000) . At that 
time, two units were under operation. Unit 1 was a PWR of the VVER-440-V230 type. The 
reactor had 6 loops and 2 turbine generators of 220 MWe each.  
An electrician caused a triple-pole short-circuit at the grounding switch between one of the 
exits of the stand-by transformer and the 6 kV bus bar of the 6 kV back-up distribution that 
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was not required during power operation. The circuit-breaker on the 220 kV side was 
defective at that time. Therefore, a short circuit current occurred for about 7.5 minutes until 
the circuit-breaker was actuated manually. The over current heated the 6 kV cable which 
caught fire over a long stretch in the main cable duct in the turbine building. 
The reactor building is connected to the turbine building via an intermediate building, as 
typical in the VVER plants. The 6 kV distribution is located in this building and the main 
feed water and emergency feed water pumps all are located in the adjacent turbine building. 
In the main cable routes nearly all types of cables for power supply, instrumentation and 
control were located near each other without any spatial separations or fire resistant 
coatings. In the cable route that caught fire there were, e.g., control cables of the three diesel 
generators.  
Due to the fire in the 6 kV cable, most of those cables failed. The cable failures caused a trip 
of the main coolant pumps leading to a reactor scram and the unavailability of all feed water 
and emergency feed water pumps. The heat removal from the reactor was only possible via 
the secondary side by steam release. Due to the total loss of feed water, the temperature and 
pressure in the primary circuit increased until the pressuriser safety valves opened. This 
heating was slow, about 5 h, due to the large water volumes of the six steam generators, 45 
m3 in each. In this situation one of the pressuriser safety valves was stuck open. Then the 
primary pressure decreased and a medium pressure level was obtained so that it was 
possible to feed the reactor by boron injection pumps. Due to cable faults, the 
instrumentation for the primary circuit was defective (temperature, pressuriser level). Only 
one emergency diesel could be started due to the burned control cables. The primary circuit 
could be filled up again with the aid of this one emergency diesel and one of six big boron 
injection pumps. With this extraordinary method it was possible to ensure the residual heat 
removal for hours. 
The Soviet construction team personnel incidentally at the site then installed temporarily a 
cable leading to unit 2. With this cable one of the emergency feed water pumps could be 
started and it was possible to fill the steam generator secondary side to cool down the 
primary circuit to cold shutdown conditions. Fortunately, no core damages occurred. 
Regarding the weak points with respect to fire safety, first of all, the cause for the fire has to 
be mentioned. This fire could only occur because there was no selective fusing of power 
cables. 
Another very important reason for the wide fire spreading concerning all kinds of cables 
was the cable installation. Nearly all cables for the emergency power supply of the different 
redundancies as well as auxiliary cables were installed in the same cable duct, some of them 
on the same cable tray.   
All the fire barriers were not efficient because the ignition was not locally limited but there 
were several locations of fire along the cable. 
In the common turbine building for the units 1 to 4 of the Greifswald plant with its total 
length of about 1.000 m there were no fire detectors nor automatic fire fighting systems 
installed. Therefore, the stationary fire fighting system which could only be actuated 
manually was not efficient. The design as well as the capacity of the fire fighting system 
were not sufficient. 
Although there were enough well trained fire fighting people, the fire-brigade had problems 
with manual fire fighting due to the high smoke density as there were no possibilities for an 
efficient smoke removal in the turbine hall. 
 
Nuclear Power – Operation, Safety and Environment 
 
148 
5.7 Explosion in a switchgear room due to a failure of a circuit breaker 
In December 1996, in a PWR in Belgium the following event occurred. The operator starts a 
circulating pump (used for cooling of a condenser with river water). This is the first start-up 
of the pump since the unit was shut down.  
About eight seconds later, an explosion occurs in a non safety related circuit breaker room 
(located two floors below the control room), followed by a limited fire in the PVC control 
cables inside the cubicles. Due to some delay in the reaction time of the protection relays, 
normal (380 kV) and auxiliary (150 kV) power supply of train 1 are made unavailable. Safety 
related equipment of train 1 are supplied by the diesel generating set 1. Normal power 
supply of train 2 is still available. 
The internal emergency plan is activated and the internal fire brigade is constituted. The fire 
is rapidly extinguished by the internal fire brigade. 
As a direct consequence of the explosion five people were injured during the accident, one 
of them died ten days later. 
The fire door at the room entrance was open at the moment of the explosion; this door opens 
on a small hall giving access to the stairs and to other rooms (containing safety and non 
safety related supply boards) at the same level; all the fire doors of these rooms were closed 
at the moment of the explosion and were burst in by the explosion blast. Three other fire 
doors were damaged (one of these is located on the lower floor); some smoke exhaust 
dampers did not open due to the explosion (direct destruction of the dampers, bending of 
the actuating mechanism). One wall collapsed, another one was displaced. 
The explosion did not destroy the cubicle of the circulating pump circuit breaker; the supply 
board and the bus bar were not damaged, except for the effects of the small fire on the 
control cables; other supply boards located in the same room were not damaged. In the 
room situated in front of the room where the explosion occurred, the fire door felt down on 
a safety related supply board, causing slight damages to one cubicle (but this supply board 
remained available except for the voltage measurement). 
A comprehensive root cause analysis has been performed and has shown that the explosion 
occurred due to the failure of the circuit breaker. The failure occurred probably when the 
protection relay was spuriously actuated 0.12 seconds after the start up of the pump (over 
current protection) and led to an inadvertently opening of the circuit. 
Based on an investigation of the failing circuit breaker, it was concluded that two phases of a 
low oil content 6 kV circuit breaker did not open correctly and the next upstream protection 
device did not interrupt the faulting device. This has led to the formation of long duration 
high energy arcing faults inside the housing and to the production of intense heat release. 
This resulted in an overpressure with subsequent opening of the relief valve located at the 
upper part of the circuit breaker presumably introducing ionised gases and dispersed oil 
into the air of the cubicle/room. This mixture in combination with the arcs is supposed to be 
at the origin of the explosion. Indications of arcing between the three phases of the circuit 
breaker have been observed, resulting in a breach of the housing on two phases. Many 
investigations were conducted to identify the root cause of the circuit breaker failure 
(dielectric oil analyses, normal and penalising conditions tests, mechanical control 
valuations) but no clear explanation could be found. Moreover, the circuit breaker 
maintenance procedure was compared with the constructor recommendations and the 
practice in France. No significant difference was noticed. 
Although the explosion occurred in a non safety related supply boards room, the event was 
of general importance, because the same types of circuit breakers were also installed in 
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safety related areas. Therefore, this event was reported to IAEA and included in the IRS 
database. 
6. First insights 
Due to the safety significance of this type of events and the potential relevance for long-term 
operation of nuclear power stations there is a strong interest in these phenomena in various 
countries with nuclear energy. Investigations on high energy arcing faults are ongoing in 
several OECD/NEA member states.  
The licensees of German nuclear power plants are principally willing and able to answer the 
questionnaire concerning HEAF events as far as possible and information being available.  
In particular, experts from nuclear power plants in Northern Germany have already 
answered this questionnaire. The licensees intend to use the feedback from the operational 
experience provided by the answers to the survey and by conclusions and recommendations 
from the analysis for potential improvements of fire protection features in this respect in 
their nuclear power plants.  
The evaluation of the answers of the remaining licensees to the questionnaire is ongoing and 
is planned to be completed by the end of 2011. 
Due to the most recent experience from German nuclear power plants, it is necessary from 
the regulatory point of view to investigate high energy arcing fault events. Moreover, it 
might be helpful to investigate precursors to such events in more detail.  
Table 3 gives indications that more than 40 % of the reportable events in Germany related to 
high energy arcing faults have been reported since 2001. This underlines the increasing 
relevance of this type of events. 
Moreover, nearly half of those events, for which information regarding voltage level is not 
available, are among the most recent events whereas usually specific information is more 
difficult to collect for events in the far past. All these different activities and explanations of 
the current state-of-the-art should be supported by the evaluation of the answers to the 
German questionnaire. 
Concerning high energy arcing fault events, short circuit failure of high voltage cables 
(typically 10 kV) in cable rooms and cable ducts (channels, tunnels, etc.) is not assumed for 
German nuclear power plants at the time being. Moreover, a failure of high voltage 
switchgears (10 kV or more) and the resulting pressure increase are presumed to occur and 
to be controlled.  
Specific investigations with respect to such scenarios have resulted in additional measures 
for pressure relief inside switchgear buildings of German nuclear power plants. 
According to international fire testing standards (EN, 2009) fire barrier elements are 
designed predominantly against the thermal impact of fires given by the standard fire curve 
according ISO 834. The pressure build-up due to a HEAF is not considered as fire barrier 
design load. In the course of several events fire barrier elements such as fire doors were 
opened or deformed by a HEAF.  One example is described in 5.7. 
7. Concluding remarks and outlook 
7.1 Improvement of the basic knowledge on HEAF 
As soon as the questionnaire has been answered by the German nuclear power station 
licensees, the answers will be statistically examined and interpreted. In particular, potential 
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consequences of events with this failure mechanism on equipment adjacent to that where 
the high-energetic arcing faults occurred (particularly safety related equipment including 
cables, fire protection features) as well as HEAF events in plant areas exceeding the typical 
fire effects (smoke, soot, heat, etc.) shall be identified. The major goal of this task is to 
provide first, still rough estimates on the contribution of high energy arcing faults events to 
the core damage frequency.  
The results of the German survey may reveal additional findings on the event causes, 
possible measures either for event prevention or for limiting the consequences of such faults 
such that nuclear safety is not impaired. In this context, additional generic results from the 
OECD HEAF activity are expected. 
A review of secondary effects of fires in nuclear power plants (Forell & Einarsson, 2010) 
based to the OECD FIRE database showed that HEAFs did not only initiated fire event but 
were also secondary effect of a fire.  In two events included in the database, fire generated 
smoke propagated to an adjacent electrical cabinet, which was ignited by a HEAF. This can 
be interpreted as a special phenomenon of fire spread. In one case smoke from an intended 
brush fire spread between the near 230 kV lines and caused a phase-to-phase arc. 
As soon as the answers to the questionnaire have been analyzed in detail and the results 
from the operation feedback are known, a discussion between licensees, reviewers and 
regulators can be started on the general conclusions and potential back fitting measures and 
improvements inside the nuclear installations. 
Based on the international operating experience, state-of-the-art information and data on 
high energy arcing faults of electric components and equipment shall be collected and 
assessed with respect to the phenomena involved. In particular, potential consequences of 
events with this failure mechanism on adjacent equipment (particularly safety related 
equipment, fire protection features) and high energy arcing faults events in plant areas 
exceeding the typical fire effects (smoke, soot, heat, etc.) shall be identified. Based on the 
collected information and data a more comprehensive and traceable assessment can be 
performed. 
7.2 HEAF assessment 
The high energy arcing fault assessment approach developed in (USNRC, 2005) primarily 
represents an empirical model. As such, it depicts observations mainly based on a single 
event and characterizes a damaging zone affected this event. To capture variations in 
current and voltage level, insulation type and cabinet design a mechanistic model has been 
developed (Hyslop et al., 2008).  
Some recent studies have further developed the understanding of the high energy arcing 
faults phenomena through experimentation and re-evaluation of previous theories.  
Damage to cables and equipment by high energy impulses from arcing faults has been 
shown to be different from that caused by fires alone. Specific components, such as 
transformers, overhead power lines, and switchgears, have been identified as vulnerable to 
arc events. However, when looking at the dynamic nature of high energy arcing faults, there 
are still many factors being not well understood.   
Computational fluid dynamics models have also been used to measure the pressure and 
temperature increase (e.g. in switchgear rooms) and present reasonable results on arc events 
(Friberg & Pietsch, 1999). However, fires were not evaluated.  
The existing research is mainly limited in scope and has not yet addressed all factors 
important to perform a full-scope probabilistic fire risk assessment including high energy 
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arcing faults. In general, high energy arcing faults events have been minimally explored but 
improvements in the early quantitative results have been made.  In particular, fire PSA 
needs to assess the event behaviour beyond the initial arc-fault event itself (as past research 
has focussed) so as to encompass the issues related to the enduring fire. Issues that go 
beyond the initial arc fault event include the characterization of the potential for ignition of 
secondary combustibles, characterization of the fire growth and intensity following the 
enduring fire, and the effectiveness and timing of fire suppression efforts.  
In order to improve the probabilistic fire safety assessment approach, further research 
including experimental studies with respect to the arc mechanisms and phenomena as well 
as to the damage criteria of the relevant equipment affected by high energy arcing faults is 
needed. To better address the needs of probabilistic fire safety assessment, the scope of the 
testing will need to be expanded as compared to past studies. These research activities will 
be started in the U.S. in the near future (Hyslop et al., 2008), partially together with other 
countries interested in high energy arcing faults and their significance. 
7.3 Strategies for reducing arc flash hazards 
An arc flash fault typically results in an enormous and nearly instantaneous increase in light 
intensity in the vicinity of the fault. Light intensity levels often rise to several thousand 
times normal ambient lighting levels. For this reason most, if not all, arc flash detecting 
relays rely on optical sensors to detect this rapid increase in light intensity. For security 
reasons, the optical sensing logic is typically further supervised by instantaneous over 
current elements operating as a fault detector. Arc flash detection relays are capable of 
issuing a trip signal in as little as 2.5 ms after initiation of the arcing fault (Inshaw & Wilson, 
2004). 
Arc flash relaying compliments existing conventional relaying. The arc flash detection relay 
requires a rapid increase in light intensity to operate and is designed with the single 
purpose of detecting very dangerous explosive-like conditions resulting from an arc flash 
fault. It operates independently and does not need to be coordinated with existing relaying 
schemes. 
Once the arc flash fault has been detected, there are at least two design options. One option 
involves directly tripping the upstream bus breakers. Since the arc flash detection time is so 
short, overall clearing time is essentially reduced to the operating time of the upstream 
breaker. A second option involves creating an intentional three-phase bus fault by 
energizing a high speed grounding switch. This approach shunts the arcing energy through 
the high-speed grounding switch and both faults are then cleared by conventional upstream 
bus protection. Because the grounding switch typically closes faster than the upstream 
breaker opens, this approach will result in lower incident energy levels than the first 
approach. However, it also introduces a second three-phase bolted fault on the system and it 
requires that a separate high speed grounding switch be installed and operational (Inshaw 
& Wilson, 2004).  
To prevent or alleviate HEAF effects, manufacturers have been working to develop arc 
arrestors and arc detection methods and to improve composite materials in the switchgear 
interior. The experiments conducted (see e.g. Jones et al., 2000) indicated that research and 
testing are required to determine the voltage level, insulation type, and construction where 
bus insulation may help extinguish or sustain arc once established. The use of such devices 
would likely impact estimates of fire ignition frequency for such events, but no methods 
currently exist to account for the presence, or absence, of such equipment. 
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1. Introduction 
Severe accidents (SA) in nuclear power plants (NPPs) are unlikely events but with serious 
consequences, as recently shown by the accident that occurred in April 2011 in the 
Fukushima Japanese NPPs. SA research started originally in the seventies with initial risk 
assessment studies and later on with experimental programs, development of numerical 
simulation codes, and Level 2 Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSA2). A huge amount of 
research and development (R&D) was performed in the last thirty years in the international 
frame. This was pushed forward by the two core meltdown accidents that occurred: first in 
the Unit N°2 of the Three Mile Island (TMI-2) Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) near 
Harrisburg (Pennsylvania, USA) on March 28, 1979; then in the Chernobyl RBMK (Water-
cooled channel-type reactors with graphite as moderator, designed by Soviet Union) reactor 
in Ukraine. Large progress has been reached in recent years on the understanding of SA but 
several issues still need research activities to reduce uncertainties and consolidate the 
accident management plans. 
Along with the progress of understanding and the limited amount of the national budgets 
on SA R&D, the high complexity of the physical phenomena and the high cost of 
experiments made necessary to better rank the R&D needs. In 2004 the European 
Commission judged necessary to better coordinate the national efforts to optimise the use of 
the available expertise and the experimental facilities in order to resolve the remaining 
issues for enhancing the safety of existing and future NPPs. This led to launch SARNET 
(Severe Accident Research NETwork of Excellence) (Albiol et al., 2008; Micaelli et al., 2005), 
in the framework of the 6th Framework Programme (FP6) of the European Commission, 
gathering most worldwide actors on R&D SA. One of the main outcomes was the 
identification of the highest priority SA issues still to be solved. A second phase of the 
network (SARNET2 project) has started in April 2009, again supported by EC in the FP7 for 
four years, again coordinated by IRSN. 
Section 2 describes shortly what a severe accident is (most of the material described in this 
section is issued from the reference IRSN-CEA, 2007). Section 3 presents the general 
approach on SA R&D. Section 4 explains in details the approach that was adopted in 
SARNET to rank the R&D priorities. Section 5 describes the current SARNET2 FP7 project 
and the common research programmes, and finally Section 6 focuses, for the sake of 
illustration, on the important issue of coolability of a degraded core during reflooding. 
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2. Severe accidents in nuclear power plants 
2.1 Case of present nuclear power plants  
The “severe accident” refers to an event with an extremely low probability of occurrence 
(such as 10-5 per reactor per year1 for internal events), thanks to the preventive measures 
implemented by NPP operators, but causing significant damage to the reactor core, with 
more or less complete core meltdown and finally possible serious consequences in case of 
release of radioactive products into the environment.  
SAs are generally caused by a cooling failure within the reactor cooling system (RCS), which 
prevents proper evacuation of residual power from the core, and by multiple dysfunctions, 
arising from equipment and/or human error, including the failure of safety procedures. A 
series of complex phenomena then occur, according to various scenarios and depending on 
the initial conditions of the accident and on the operator actions. For the purpose of this 
document, “early releases” are those liable to occur before all the measures aiming at 
protecting the general public can be implemented. Figure 1 schematically presents the major 
physical phenomena that may occur during a SA, as well as a few safety systems involved. 
If the reactor core remains uncovered by water for an extended period of time (typically a 
few hours), nuclear fuel progressively overheats due to residual power. Steam initiates an 
exothermic oxidation of zircaloy fuel cladding, resulting in substantial production of 
hydrogen and thermal power. Additionally, chemical reactions between fuel and its 
cladding produce low-melting-point eutectics, resulting in relocation of molten materials 
(called “corium”) in the core. The fuel first releases the most volatile fission products, then 
the semi-volatile products.  
Progressively, a corium pool forms in the core and progresses towards the lower head of the 
vessel. When it reaches water remaining there, water is vaporized, corium is fragmented 
and forms a debris bed. During core degradation, standby supplies of water can be 
delivered to the RCS or the secondary cooling system. Reflooding a degraded core is a 
complex phenomenon which may enable the accident progression to be slowed down or 
halted under certain conditions. In contrast, reflooding may also increase hydrogen 
production and cause further release of fission products. 
Corium melts and debris accumulate in the vessel lower head and may cause its rupture, 
either by thermal erosion, creep or plastic failure, depending on pressure conditions in the 
RCS. After vessel rupture in case of high-pressure conditions within the vessel, part of the 
ejected corium is fragmented and may be dispersed into the containment. This may provoke a 
pressure spike, resulting in substantial heat exchange with the air, oxidation of the corium 
metallic components and, in some cases, simultaneous combustion of the hydrogen present in 
the containment building. This phenomenon is called “direct containment heating” (DCH). 
Following vessel rupture, corium slumps and accumulates in the reactor pit. A corium-
water interaction (called Fuel-Coolant Interaction or FCI) may occur if the pit contains some 
water, which may be followed by a more violent phenomenon called steam explosion. This 
explosion may create projectiles that could threaten the leak-tightness of the containment 
buildings. Without initial presence of water in the pit, corium will thermally erode the 
concrete basemat, which could cause the loss of containment: this is the Molten-Corium-
Concrete-Interaction or MCCI. During this phase, a substantial quantity of incondensable 
gas (H2, CO, CO2) is released, resulting in a progressive increase in pressure within the 
containment building. To avoid a potential break in this structure, a ventilation-filtration 
 
                                                 
1  This figure could be updated in the future, following the recent Fukushima accident. 
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Fig. 1. Main physical phenomena during a severe accident 
system has been installed in all Light Water Reactors (LWR): it can be activated in general 24 
hours after an accident begins, if the containment heat removal system fails. 
Hydrogen produced by core degradation is released into the containment, where it burns on 
contact with oxygen, provoking a pressure and temperature spike which may damage the 
containment building. This combustion can either be slow acting (slow deflagration) or 
more rapid (rapid deflagration) and, in some cases, explosive (detonation). Hydrogen 
combustion may lead to the loss of the containment barrier: a commitment to making this 
risk residual has been demonstrated by the progressive implementation of hydrogen 
Passive Autocatalytic Recombiners (PAR) in many NPPs. 
For all modes of containment rupture, the release of fission products into the environment 
depends on the conditions affecting their transfer within the reactor. The transfer of fission 
products depends primarily on their physical and chemical properties, i.e. whether they are 
gases or aerosols and their chemical form. Iodine and ruthenium behaviour requires 
particular attention, given their complexity and their significant short-term radiological 
impact. Regarding longer-term accident consequences, particular attention must be paid to 
caesium releases. 
In the event of a SA, operating personnel are called upon to follow the recommendations in 
the Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG). Actions recommended in the SAMG 
serve primarily to maintain containment, aiming to: 
- Avoid or minimise airborne radioactive releases outside the containment building, 
- Provide sufficient time before potential containment loss to allow implementation of the 
public protection measures described in emergency plans. 
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2.2 Case of future nuclear power plants  
For all new NPPs of any type under construction or planned today, named “Generation III” 
(noted Gen.III in the following), the provisions aim to significantly enhance accident 
prevention and the SAs are addressed from the design phase.  
For the EPR (European Pressurized Reactor), the technical directives specified that: 
- Core meltdown accidents, particularly under pressurised conditions, postulated to 
cause large early releases must be “practically eliminated”. While such accidents remain 
physically possible, design measures must be implemented to prevent them. For 
instance a dedicated pressurisation valve, coupled with an isolation valve, was 
integrated in the RCS, in addition to the standard safety mechanisms protecting this 
system from overpressure. PARs have also been installed in the containment. 
- Low-pressure core meltdown sequences must proceed in such a way that the maximum 
conceivable releases only require measures very limited in duration and scope to 
protect the public. Thus a system was implemented to collect corium and stabilise it on 
the long-term: this “core-catcher” is built in the containment building and linked to the 
reactor pit. Besides, the containment has a double concrete wall, with filtration, to 
increase the containment tightness with respect to radioactive release. 
In other Gen.III NPPs, different designs have been elaborated for stopping corium 
progression or limiting its consequences. Some NPPs aim at maintaining corium within the 
vessel (In-Vessel-Retention or IVR) by cooling the external surface of the vessel lower head 
through water injection into the pit. Others have designed core-catchers differently from the 
EPR one that is based on corium spreading. Advanced VVERs2 adopt a core-catcher 
underneath the vessel (like the one at Tian Wan in China or being built in Belene in 
Bulgaria): this core-catcher makes use of sacrificial materials consisting mainly of steel, iron 
oxide ceramic and alumina.  
3. Research and development on severe accidents 
3.1 General approach 
The general approach for SA R&D (Figure 2)  is based on one hand on experiments and on 
the other hand on computer codes for simulation of physical phenomena.  
The SA R&D presents some specific features that imply very high costs: 
- Complexity of the physical phenomena,  
- High number of phenomena, with the need of considering them together due to their 
mutual interactions (“coupling”),  
- Extreme conditions: very high temperatures (above 3000°C), high pressure (up to 200 
bars), irradiation effects, 
- Need of tests with real materials (importance of the “material effect”), 
- Difficulty to extrapolate to the reactor scale. 
It has involved in the past very substantial human and financial resources as well as 
collaboration between nuclear stakeholders, industry groups, research centres and safety 
authorities, at both the national and international levels. The international programmes 
concerned mainly the Framework Programmes of Research and Development of the 
European Commission (see http://cordis.europa.eu) and the projects conducted under the 
                                                 
2 VVER: water-cooled water-moderated power reactors (PWR type) that were developed in the ex-
Soviet Union. 
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auspices of the CSNI (Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations) of NEA (Nuclear 
Energy Agency) in the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development)  
(CSNI, 2000; OECD, 2007). 
The research in this area thus aims to further understand the physical phenomena and 
reduce the uncertainties on their quantification, with the ultimate goal of physical 
developing models that can be applied to reactors. These models, implemented in computer 
codes, allow predicting SA progression and consequences. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. General R&D approach 
For Gen.III NPPs, this research allowed to design specific devices for SA prevention and for 
mitigation of consequences, as described in Section 2.2. However, for existing plants (called 
Generation II and noted Gen.II in the following), SAs were not a design consideration. 
Consequently, modifications of their design are limited and the research in this area is 
primarily aimed at limiting the potential impact of SAs. Specifically, there are two 
complementary research orientations: a) characterising releases and studying modes of 
containment failure, and b) developing methods to limit the consequences of the SA scenarios. 
3.2 Experimental R&D programmes  
Different categories of experiments are usually defined: 
Knowledge 
improvement Separate effect tests 
Coupled effect tests 
Integral tests 
Models development 
Experimental programmes 
National - International 
SA codes development, validation, 
benchmarking 
Data bases development 
Knowledge 
capitalization 
Studies: deterministic (incl. source term 
studies), level 2 PSA development 
Safety analysis of nuclear installations 
Knowledge valorisation 
Emergency and post accidental situations 
preparedness 
 Experience 
feedback 
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 Separate effect tests (SET) investigate a single phenomenon and yield data for 
development of a model which describes its effect and which is to be integrated as a 
sub-routine into a computer code. The corresponding facilities are typically single-
purpose, small-scale channels, loops or vessels equipped with specialised, 
sophisticated, high-accuracy instrumentation. 
 Coupled effect tests (CET) investigate the coupling of two or more phenomena previously 
explored in SETs, and provide data for the appropriate integration of the corresponding 
models into a code. The corresponding facilities are typically of small to intermediate-
scale, using a test loop or a test vessel with comprehensive instrumentation adapted to 
the effects to be investigated. 
 Integral Experiments represent all or part of a reactor accident sequence. They examine 
the interactions of several phenomena previously studied in SETs and/or CETs. The 
data obtained are needed for confirmatory validation of a code and its application, i.e. 
adequate problem set-up by the code user, correct and complete modelling of the 
relevant phenomena and their interactions within the code. The corresponding facilities 
are typically intermediate to large-scale models of full size bundle or containment, in 
the latter case with variable infrastructure for investigating many aspects of 
containment behaviour. 
3.3 Development of computer codes for SA numerical simulation   
3.3.1 Types of codes 
Three classes of SA codes can be defined, depending on their scope of application: integral 
codes, detailed codes and dedicated codes.  
 Integral codes (also called “system” codes or, in the past “engineering-level” codes): 
these codes simulate the overall NPP response, i.e. the response of the RCS, the 
containment, and the source term to the environment, using "integrated" models for a 
self-consistent thorough analysis of the accident. They include a well-balanced 
combination of phenomenological and user-defined parametric models for the 
simulation of the relevant phenomena. They must be (relatively) fast running to enable 
sufficient number of simulations of different scenarios to be performed, accompanied 
by parameter studies to address uncertainties: the computing time should be roughly 
around the accident real time. These codes are primarily not designed to perform Best-
Estimate simulations, but rather to allow the user to bound important processes or 
phenomena by numerous user-defined parameters. Integral codes are usually used to 
support PSA2 analyses and for the development and validation of Severe Accident 
Management (SAM) programmes. In the last years, the rapid increase of the computer 
performance enabled more and more the replacement of parametric models by 
mechanistically based ones in the integral codes. The main internationally used codes 
are today ASTEC (see Section 5.6), jointly developed by IRSN and GRS (Van 
Dorsselaere et al., 2009), MAAP, developed by Fauske & Associates Inc. (USA), and 
MELCOR, developed by Sandia National Laboratories (USA). 
 Detailed codes (also called mechanistic codes): they are characterised by best-estimate 
phenomenological models, consistent with the state of the art, to enable as far as 
possible an accurate simulation of the behaviour of a NPP in case of SA. In order to 
better illustrate the differences with the approach of integral codes, in most cases, a 
numerical solution is found for integral-differential equations while in integral codes 
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some correlations may be used. Basic requirements are that the modelling uncertainties 
are comparable with the uncertainties on the experimental data used to validate the 
code and that user-defined parameters are only necessary for phenomena that are not 
understood due to insufficient experimental data (including scaling problems). Since, as 
a basic principle, these codes should have as few as possible user options, existing 
uncertainties in the simulation of the different phenomena must be specified to enable 
the definition of the uncertainties of the key results. The main advantages of these codes 
are to give a more detailed insight into the progression of a SA and to design and 
optimise mitigation measures. They can also be used for benchmarking the integral 
codes. Due to the high computation time, they simulate only a part of the plant, e.g. 
RCS or containment. Their computation time depends on the scope of the application 
but it can span over days and weeks. The main internationally used codes are today: for 
the RCS behaviour and the core degradation ATHLET-CD (GRS), SCDAP/RELAP5 
(INL in the USA), RELAP/SCDAPSIM (ISS in the USA) and ICARE/CATHARE (IRSN) 
and for containment CONTAIN (ANL in the USA) and COCOSYS (GRS). 
 Dedicated codes: these codes that deal with a few phenomena have become important in 
context with the requirements of the regulatory authorities to take into account SAs in 
the design of new NPPs and to reduce uncertainties of risk-relevant phenomena. In 
general they have to be very complex with the drawback of large calculation time. 
Typical issues for which dedicated codes are required include: steam explosion and 
melt dispersal (e.g. MC3D at IRSN), structure mechanics (e.g. CAST3M at CEA in 
France, or ABAQUS in the USA). This family of codes includes the CFD (Computational 
Fluid Dynamics) codes that solve Navier-Stokes thermal-hydraulics equations in 3D 
geometry, such as GASFLOW in KIT (Germany), TONUS in IRSN, CFX as commercial 
tool, etc…. 
3.3.2 Process of code development and validation 
The general process of code development is composed of the following steps, with possible 
iterations between them: 
- Code requirements (scope of application, computing time, etc…), 
- General specifications (structure, programming language, level of details of modelling, 
numerical schemes, etc…), 
- Detailed specifications, possibly with prototyping to check a model or a numerical 
scheme, 
- Physical model development, 
- Implementation into a computer code, 
- Code verification (tests on analytic solutions of equations, laws of conservation of mass, 
energy, and momentum, portability on diverse computers types, numerical coupling 
between models, etc..). 
The code validation process aims at providing a sufficiently accurate representation of the 
reality of the SA phenomena. But this SA field presents some very peculiar features due to 
the continuous evolution of knowledge and to the extreme conditions that occur in a SA, 
notably the geometry scale that is difficult to achieve in laboratory experiments. The VASA 
project (Allelein et al., 2001) took place in the FP4 of the European Commission to analyse 
this SA validation process in details. Two stages can be defined: 
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 Comparing the code results with results of experimental programmes, which leads to 
define a “validation matrix”. 
 Verifying the code capability to adequately simulate real SA scenarios at full-scale, 
which may be done through several types of work: 
- Benchmarking the code results of plant applications with results of other codes, 
either integral codes or detailed ones, 
- Applying the code to real plant SA scenarios, which is very scarce except for the 
TMI-2 and Chernobyl accidents (and in addition the Fukushima accident in the 
future when reliable data become available), 
- Performing uncertainty analyses in order to show the consistency and the 
reliability of code results, including the analysis of the influence of nodalisation 
and of numerical time-steps. 
The CSNI International Standard Problems (ISP) provide a particularly valuable source of 
information for code validation: they are comparative exercises in which predictions of 
different computer codes for a given physical problem are compared with each other and 
with the results of a carefully controlled and well documented experiment. Over the last 
thirty years, forty-nine ISPs have been sponsored (CSNI, 2000). 
The qualification of the code user is an important part of the code validation process. The 
user may have an impact on the quality of the SA analysis. It is considered essential that 
users have a good knowledge of the modelling inside the code and that the codes should not 
be run as “black boxes”.  
4. SARNET approach on severe accident R&D ranking 
Most of the material described in the Section 4 is issued from the SARNET reference 
(Schwinges et al., 2008). 
4.1 Objectives and work scope of the SARP group  
The EURSAFE thematic network (Magallon, 2005) yielded a list of 21 areas of needed 
research in the SA domain, which included recommendations for experimental programmes 
and code development. To further develop this list as a living document, the work package 
“Severe Accident Research Priorities” (SARP) was established in the SARNET FP6 project.  
The activities in SARP focused on the identification of areas where the knowledge has been 
considerably improved and where further experimental research and/or model 
development seemed not to be of high priority. Furthermore it had to identify research areas 
which needed reorientation and, last but not least, the needed research not yet being 
covered. The outcome of the SARP work was an up-dated ranking, giving different 
priorities to the research issues, and helping (thus linking the last sentence to the previous 
one..) decision to perform the different research programmes. 
The working scope was outlined as:  
- Agree on methodology, 
- Identify issues resulting from EURSAFE not appropriately covered and review them, 
- Analyse R&D recent progress, 
- Analyse results from PSA2 studies, 
- Reassess the ranking of research issues and reorient the priorities, 
- Review potential experimental and theoretical programmes to address these issues, 
- Make recommendations for revision of R&D programmes.  
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4.2 EURSAFE methodology and results  
The objectives of EURSAFE were to establish a large consensus on the SA issues, where 
large uncertainties still subsist, and to propose a structure to address these uncertainties by 
appropriate R&D programmes making the best use of the European resources. It 
incorporated issues related to existing plants (PWR, BWR3 and VVER), lifetime extension of 
these plants, evolutionary concepts (higher burn-up and mixed oxide –MOX- fuels), and 
safety and efficiency of future systems. Twenty partners representing R&D governmental 
institutions, regulatory bodies, nuclear industry, utilities and universities from nine 
European countries and Canada worked together in a network structure, which was 
supposed to be a starting point of SARNET.  
To achieve the objectives, sufficient convergence on issues and phenomena and on their 
importance in terms of safety and knowledge was required among all actors. The final 
objective was a consensual approach to resolve the remaining uncertainties and open issues. 
Establishing Phenomena Identification and Ranking Tables (PIRT) has been proved in other 
areas (e.g. Loss of Coolant Accidents or LOCA) to be an efficient and unbiased way to reach 
such a consensus (NUREG, 2000). In EURSAFE the PIRT integrated all the SA issues from 
core degradation up to release of fission products from the containment, taking into account 
any possible counter-measures and the evolution of fuel management.  
As a basis, a comprehensive list of 1016 SA phenomena was established. The phenomena 
were classified in five groups:  
- In-vessel (162 phenomena),  
- Ex-vessel (149 phenomena), 
- Dynamic loading of the containment (461 phenomena), 
- Long-term loading of the containment (116 phenomena), 
- Fission products (128 phenomena).  
Three safety-oriented groups of experts scrutinized these phenomena of the five lists and 
ranked them in accordance to their safety importance for primary circuit, containment and 
source term. Two evaluations were established: the safety importance ratio and the 
knowledge ratio. Starting with 1016 identified phenomena, the list was reduced to 239 items, 
important for safety, of which 106 were found with significant lack of knowledge.  
After completion of the two ranking phases, this procedure clearly emphasized the 
phenomena being simultaneously highly important for safety and significantly lacking of 
knowledge. The remaining 106 phenomena were obviously candidates for further R&D 
work:  
- 24 phenomena for In-vessel, 
- 28 phenomena for Ex-vessel,  
- 26 phenomena for Dynamic loading of the containment,  
- 10 phenomena for Long-term loading of the containment,  
- 18 phenomena for Fission products.  
As a further step, the research needs and programmes to address each selected phenomenon 
of the PIRT list were identified and established in a list. According to the similarities in 
terms of research needs and physical processes, with the scope of being able to set up a 
limited number of coherent R&D programmes, several phenomena were merged into 
research issues without further elimination or selection. A rationale for these research needs 
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was established based on safety relevance and lack of knowledge. The outcomes of this 
process are summarised in Table 1, which gives the 21 items of needed research (EURSAFE 
Research Issues or ERI) and corresponding rationales drawn from the 106 phenomena 
selected in the PIRT. 
 
ERI  EURSAFE Research Issue  Rationale for selection  
1,1  Hydrogen generation during 
reflooding or melt relocation 
into water  
Rapid generation of hydrogen which may not be 
accommodated by recombiners and the risk of 
early containment failure. Improve knowledge 
about the magnitude of hydrogen generation.  
1,2  Core coolability during re-
flooding and thermal-
hydraulics within particulate 
debris  
Termination of the accident by re-flooding of the 
core while maintaining the integrity of the RCS. 
Increase predictability of core cooling during 
reflooding.  
1,3  Corium coolability in lower 
head and external corium 
catcher device  
Improve predictability of the thermal loading on 
Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) lower head or 
corium catcher devices to maintain their integrity.  
1,4  Integrity of RPV due to 
external vessel cooling  
Improve data base for critical heat flux and 
external cooling conditions to evaluate and design 
Accident Management (AM) strategies of external 
vessel cooling for in-vessel melt retention.  
1,5  Integrity of RCS  Improve predictability of heat distribution in the 
RCS to quantify the risk of RCS failure and 
possible containment bypass.  
1,6  Corium release following 
vessel failure  
Improve predictability of mode and location of 
RPV failure to characterise the corium release 
into the containment.  
2,1  MCCI: molten pool 
configuration and concrete 
ablation  
Improve predictability of axial versus radial 
ablation up to late phase MCCI to determine 
basement material failure time and loss of 
containment integrity.  
2,2  Ex-Vessel corium coolability, 
top flooding  
Increase the knowledge of cooling mechanisms 
by top flooding the corium pool to demonstrate 
termination of accident progression and 
maintenance of containment integrity.  
2,3  Ex-Vessel corium catcher: 
corium ceramics interaction 
and properties  
Demonstrate the efficiency of specific corium 
catcher designs by improving the predictability 
of the corium interaction with corium catcher 
materials.  
2,4  Ex-Vessel corium catcher: 
coolability and water bottom 
injection  
Demonstrate the efficiency of water bottom 
injection to cool corium pool and its impact on 
containment pressurisation.  
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ERI  EURSAFE Research Issue  Rationale for selection  
3,1  Melt relocation into water and 
particulate formation  
Determine characteristics of jet fragmentation, 
debris bed formation and debris coolability 
towards maintenance of vessel and respectively 
containment integrity.  
3,2  FCI incl. steam explosion: melt 
into water, in-vessel and ex-
vessel  
Increase the knowledge of parameters affecting 
steam explosion energetic during corium 
relocation into water and determine the risk of 
vessel or containment failure.  
3,3  FCI incl. steam explosion in 
stratified situation  
Investigate the risk of weakened vessel failure 
during reflooding of a molten pool in the lower 
head.  
3,4  Containment atmosphere 
mixing and hydrogen 
combustion / detonation  
Identify the risk of early containment failure due 
to hydrogen accumulation leading to 
deflagration or detonation and to identify 
counter-measures.  
3,5  Dynamic and static behaviour 
of containment, crack 
formation and leakage at 
penetrations  
Estimate the leakage of fission products to the 
environment.  
4,1  Direct containment heating  Increase the knowledge of parameters  
affecting the pressure build-up due to  
DCH and determine the risk of  
containment failure.  
5,1  Oxidising environment impact 
on source term  
Quantify the source term, in particular for 
ruthenium, under oxidation conditions / air 
ingress for high burn-up and MOX fuels.  
5,2  RCS high temperature 
chemistry impact on source 
term  
Improve predictability of iodine species exiting 
RCS to provide the best estimate of the source 
into the containment.  
5,3  Aerosol behaviour impact on 
source term  
Quantify the source term for aerosol retention in 
the secondary side of steam generator (SG) and 
leakage through cracks in the containment wall 
as well as the source in containment due to 
revolatilization in RCS.  
5,4  Containment chemistry 
impact on source term  
Improve the predictability of iodine chemistry in 
containment to reduce the uncertainty in iodine 
source term.  
5,5  Core reflooding impact on 
source term  
Characterise and quantify the fission product 
release during core reflooding.  
 
Table 1. EURSAFE Research Issue and rationale for selection 
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4.3 Decision procedure followed in SARP  
In the SARNET FP6 project, the SARP work, lead by GRS, was performed in close 
collaboration with eight organizations, representing diverse types of organizations (IRSN, 
CEA, EDF, FZK now KIT, GRS, KTH, TUS, VTT). The collaboration between those who 
perform research and those who use its results was essential to correctly address the 
problem.  
One requirement was that all steps of the decision process must be documented to allow a 
well-funded judgement for the SARNET community and for the end-users of SARNET 
products. For this reason a template (Trambauer, 2005) was constructed and updated as a 
living document during the whole process. The template was used for the three possible 
“Decisions”:  
a.  “To be closed” meaning that the issue is closed by sufficiently improved knowledge  
b.  “Reorientation” meaning that the work should be reoriented to fulfil the objectives  
c.  “New Item” meaning that a new research item should be set up.  
The structure of the template reflected the strategy of the intended decision process, with 10 
successive “Actions” with a clear indication of responsibility and the time of execution. A 
comprehensive description of the “Rationale for the decision to be taken” was included, as 
well as a step of comments from the SARNET community and the end-users.   
4.4 SARP results 
The methodology applied in EURSAFE to establish an internationally agreed list of needed 
research items was proven as adequate. It started with a comprehensive list of phenomena 
and finished by using a bottom-up approach with 21 items of needed research areas. 
Investigations showed that a well balanced top-down approach gives very similar results. 
Therefore the EURSAFE methodology was applied in SARP too.  
In a first step seven possible new or reoriented research items were identified. The assessment 
of the following items was performed (for most of them, only a reorientation or a small 
extension of experimental and/or analytical work planned in SARNET was necessary):  
- Investigation of high burn-up cladding materials at high temperature and under 
reflooding conditions,  
- Spreading of corium into cavity nearby compartments possibly filled with water, 
- Effect of hydrogen mitigation systems (esp. PAR) on hydrogen distribution, 
- Combustion of hydrogen jets in atmosphere with different hydrogen concentrations (in 
relation to DCH), 
- Retention of aerosols in RCS, SG tubes or concrete cracks under consideration of 
mechanical resuspension, 
- Decomposition of iodides by heat-up in PARs and its impact on source term, 
- Ruthenium volatility and behaviour in containment.  
Then all ERI issues from Table 1 were reassessed in a top-down approach with respect to 
gain of knowledge and further necessary activities in SARNET. This last step resulted in the 
merging of some issues and in the following ranking:  
 Six issues were regarded to be investigated further with high priority: 
- Core coolability during reflooding and debris cooling of a not totally degraded 
core, 
- Ex-vessel melt pool configuration during MCCI, ex-vessel corium coolability, by 
top flooding,  
- Melt relocation into water, ex-vessel FCI,  
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- Hydrogen mixing and combustion in containment, 
- Oxidising impact (ruthenium oxidising conditions/air ingress for high burn-up 
and MOX fuel elements) on source term, 
- Iodine chemistry in RCS and in containment.  
 Four issues were reassessed with medium priority; these items should be investigated 
further as planned in the different research programs. The risk significance was reduced 
due to significant progress of knowledge, but some questions were still open: 
- Hydrogen generation during reflooding and during melt relocation in vessel, 
- Corium coolability in vessel lower head, 
- Integrity of reactor pressure vessel due to external vessel cooling, 
- Direct containment heating. 
 Five issues were assessed with low priority; the current knowledge was considered as 
sufficient according to the state and progress of knowledge and the risk and safety 
relevance and taking into account ongoing activities outside SARNET frame, and they 
could be closed after the end of the related activities:  
- Corium coolability in external core-catcher, 
- Corium release following vessel rupture, 
- Crack formation and leakages in concrete containment, 
- Aerosol behaviour impact on source term (SG tubes and containment cracks); 
- Core reflooding impact on source term.  
 Three issues were marked as “issue could be closed”. This means that the current issue 
knowledge was considered as sufficient assessing both the state and progress of 
knowledge and the risk and safety relevance and taking into account ongoing activities:  
- Heat distribution in RCS and RCS integrity, 
- Ex-vessel core-catcher and corium-ceramics interaction, cooling with water bottom 
injection, 
- FCI including steam explosion in weakened vessel. 
Concerning the end-users’ opinion, the utilities and vendors are mainly interested in the 
practical value of research results which can be used for developing plant-specific solutions 
for SAM measures. Risk-informed ranking seems not to be a straightforward approach for 
assessment because the results of PSA2 are plant-specific. Anyhow the aspect of risk must 
be taken into account during the assessment discussions by reflecting the risk relevance of 
each phenomenon with respect to the source term (large releases or not) as threat to the 
environment. The discussions on each issue should definitely include the applicability of the 
expected research results to possible SAM measures (planned, envisaged or under development).  
The approach adopted in the SARP group is an attempt to come within a reasonable time 
with consideration of all pertinent factors to an agreed decision considering all aspects of 
innovation and economic efficiency. The outcomes of the final SARP report already served 
as a proposal to provide the orientations for joint activities for research of common interest 
and high priority in the SARNET2 FP7 project. An important aspect has also been the total 
traceability for possible future updates. 
5. The SARNET2 project 
5.1 General description of the network 
Forty-two partners (Table 2) from Europe, Canada, Korea and the USA, participate in the 
SARNET2 FP7 project (Van Dorsselaere et al., 2011) that started in April 2009 for a period of  
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Partner Short name Country 
Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire IRSN France 
KFKI Atomic Energy Research Institute AEKI Hungary 
AREVA NP GmbH AREVA GmbH Germany 
AREVA NP SAS AREVA NP SAS  France 
Budapest University of Technology and Economics  BME Hungary 
Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique et aux Energies 
Alternatives CEA France 
ENEA – Ricerca Sul Sistema Elettrico SpA RSE Italy 
Chalmers tekniska högskola AB CHALMERS Sweden 
Centro de Investigaciones Energeticas Medio Ambientales y 
Tecnologicas CIEMAT Spain 
National Centre for Scientific Research "DEMOKRITOS" DEMOKRITOS Greece 
Electricité de France SA EDF France 
Energy Institute JSC Sofia EI Bulgaria 
Ente per le Nuove Tecnologie, l'Energia e l'Ambiente ENEA Italy 
Forschungszentrum Juelich GmbH JÜLICH Germany 
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology KIT Germany 
Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit mbH GRS Germany 
National Autonomous Company for Nuclear Activities - 
Nuclear Research Subsidiary Pitesti INR Romania 
Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy INRNE Bulgaria 
Inzinierska Vypoctova Spolocnost Trnava s.r.o. IVS Slovakia 
Jozef Stefan Institute JSI Slovenia 
Kungl Tekniska Högskolan KTH Sweden 
Lithuanian Energy Institute LEI Lithuania 
National Nuclear Laboratory NNL United Kingdom 
Nuclear Research & Consultancy Group v.o.f. NRG Netherlands 
Paul Scherrer Institut PSI Switzerland 
Ruhr-Universität Bochum RUB Germany 
Tractebel Engineering SA TRACTEBEL Belgium 
Thermodata THERMODATA France 
Technical University of Sofia TUS Bulgaria 
Urad Jadroveho Dozoru Slovenskej Republiky UJD SR Slovakia 
Ustav Jaderneho Vyzkumu Rez a.s. UJV Czech Rep. 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne UNEW United Kingdom 
Dipartimento di Ingegneria Meccanica, Nucleare e della 
Produzione - Università di Pisa UNIPI Italy 
Universität Stuttgart USTUTT Germany 
NUBIKI Nuclear Safety Research Institute NUBIKI Hungary 
VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland VTT Finland 
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Partner Short name Country 
VUJE Trnava, a.s. – Inzinierska, Projektova a Vyskumna 
Organizacia VUJE Slovakia 
Commission of the European Communities – Joint  Research 
Centres JRCs 
European 
Union 
Atomic Energy Canada Limited AECL Canada 
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute KAERI Korea 
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission USNRC USA 
Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety KINS Korea 
Table 2. List of SARNET2 partners 
four years. They represent a large majority of the European actors involved in SA research 
plus a few non-European important ones. Diverse types of organizations are represented: 
research organizations, universities, industry, utilities, safety authorities and Technical 
Safety Organisations (TSO). A new partner, BARC (India), is joining the network in October 
2011. 
The network is organised with a Steering Committee of ten members in charge of strategy 
and decisions, advised by an Advisory Committee of end-user organisations. A General 
Assembly, composed of one representative of each SARNET Consortium member, plus the 
EC representative, is called periodically for information and consultation on the progress of 
the network activities, the work orientations and the decisions taken by the Steering 
Committee. A Management Team, composed of the network coordinator and of seven 
Work-Packages (WP) leaders, is entrusted with the day-to-day management of the network. 
In the continuity of the SARNET FP6 project, the SARNET2 FP7 project has been defined in 
order to optimize the use of the available means and to constitute a sustainable consortium 
in which common research programmes and a common computer code on SA, ASTEC, are 
developed. ASTEC capitalizes the whole knowledge produced in the network through new 
or improved physical models. The Joint Programme of Activities can be divided into several 
elements: 
- Ranking periodically the priorities of the research programmes, harmonizing and re-
orienting existing ones and jointly defining new ones when necessary,  
- Performing small and large-scale experiments on the highest priority issues as defined 
in the SARNET FP6 project and jointly analysing their results in order to elaborate a 
common understanding of the concerned physical phenomena, 
- Developing physical models, integrating them into ASTEC, and validating this code 
versus experiments and through benchmarks on plant applications with other codes,  
- Storing all the experimental results in a scientific database, based on the STRESA tool, 
- Disseminating the knowledge to students or young researchers, as well to new nuclear 
emergent countries, through educational courses, textbooks, mobility of personnel 
between the network partners, and international conferences that become the major SA 
event in the world. 
On the basis of the outcomes of the SARP work, the research programmes focus on the six 
high-priority issues that were presented in Section 4.4. They are analyzed in the WP N°5 to 
8. The experimental efforts are mainly devoted to two of these issues for which real progress 
toward the closure of the issue is expected: corium/debris coolability and MCCI. For all 
these 6 issues, the same method is being adopted: review and selection of available relevant 
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experiments, contribution to the definition of test matrices, synthesis of the interpretation of 
experimental data, benchmark exercises between codes, review of models, synthesis and 
proposals of new or improved models for ASTEC. Indeed a key integration aspect is the set-
up of the technical circles, each covering a specific detailed topic. They bring experimenters 
and modellers closer together, concerning test definition, interpretation, model development 
etc... In each of the domains, additional studies are being performed in order to bring 
research results into reactor applications. Calculations of SA scenarios in reactor conditions 
are being performed using various computer codes, including ASTEC, in order to evaluate 
the importance of the involved phenomena, in particular through uncertainty studies. 
Sections 5.2 to 5.6 summarize the work that is performed in the WP5 to 8 and on the ASTEC 
code assessment. Section 5.7 summarizes all activities related to dissemination of 
knowledge. 
5.2 Activities on corium and debris coolability 
The major motivation is to reduce or possibly solve the remaining uncertainties on the 
possibility of cooling structures and materials during SA, either in the core or the vessel 
lower head or in the reactor cavity, in order to limit the progression of the accident. This 
could be achieved by water injection, either by ensuring corium retention within the vessel 
or at least slowing down corium progression and limiting the flow rates of corium release 
into the cavity. These issues are covered within SAM for current reactors, and also within 
the scope of the design and safety evaluation of future reactors. The current PSA2 studies 
still show very large uncertainties in the results of the core reflooding phase. For the issue of 
in-vessel retention in principle two different aspects have to be considered, the probability 
for reflooding systems to begin operation in due time, and the status or degree of core 
damage. If core damage occurs at high pressure, low pressure reflooding systems cannot 
inject against that pressure. But they may be available with a high degree of reliability. In 
such conditions it is crucial to evaluate if and when depressurisation of the reactor coolant 
system occurs which would lead to immediate reflooding. In the bottom of BWRs vessel 
there is a continuous injection through the control rod and pump seal flushing water. 
Depending on the reliability and capacity of these systems and the pressure in the RCS, the 
core degradation may be inhibited.  
The following three key situations and processes for the investigation of corium and debris 
coolability are considered.  
Reflooding and coolability of a degraded core 
The focus is on the accident phase after water boil-off in the core. Heating and melting may 
produce a severely damaged, partly molten core with relocated material and partly broken 
parts. Quenching of such a hot and partly degraded core is the main issue here. The specific 
case of reflooding of a debris bed is detailed in Section 6. 
The experimental database on degraded core reflooding was analysed to derive the crucial 
information about success of reflooding. The QUENCH experiments in KIT constitute the 
main part of this database. The behaviour of fuel rod bundles can be outlined in a 
“reflooding map” with respect to the reflooding mass flow rate and the core damage state to 
deduce the limits up to which final bundle cooling can be expected to be successful and 
hydrogen production may be tolerated.  
The analyses show that even at the onset of severe core degradation at temperatures up to 
app. 2200 K, the accident progression can be stopped with a sufficiently high flowrate for 
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core reflooding of ~1 g/s per rod. The reflooding map on core degradation and hydrogen 
release is still under development and is considered as a tool to summarize the existing 
knowledge and to identify blank areas for efficient future experimental work.  
Remelting of debris, melt pool formation and coolability 
If core cooling fails, a melt pool will form in the core and melt might flow down into 
remaining water in the lower head. The TMI-2 accident indicated that even though 
coolability of the core is not attained, a coolable configuration may result from break-up of 
the melt in the water of the lower head.  If cooling in the core and in the lower head is not 
possible, the development of a melt pool in the lower head has to be analysed and it has to 
be established whether a melt pool can be kept in-vessel due to external vessel cooling; if it 
is not possible, the timing and modes of vessel failure have to be considered. This is the 
general objective of the LIVE programme (KIT). These phenomena resulting from core 
melting are studied experimentally in large-scale 3D geometry and in supporting separate-
effects tests, with emphasis on the transient behaviour. One experimental result is e.g. that 
melt pouring near the vessel wall at the beginning of the test results in considerable 
asymmetric heat flux distribution even during the steady state. The time period of the 
solidification ranges from 50 minutes to several hours, depending on the cooling conditions 
and the position of the melt/crust interface.  
The external cooling conditions, which are the second important aspect for achieving in-
vessel coolability, are investigated by the CNU experimental programme (CEA) which is a 
unique experimental set-up, large scale, dedicated to the study of two-phase flow with 
steam production around a heated RPV geometry.  
If all the attempts to cool down the vessel fail, the location and size of the vessel breach are 
of concern. Up to now the following main conclusions can be drawn for large PWRs: when 
the vessel fails, the liquid corium is mainly oxidic with potentially some metal. The mass of 
corium that can be ejected into the reactor pit at vessel failure is estimated between 2 and 20 
tonnes. The breach is most probably located on the lateral surface of the vessel. Only local 
breaches are expected and not vessel unzipping.  
Ex-vessel debris formation and coolability 
A porous debris bed can be formed in a water pool of the reactor cavity due to the 
fragmentation of the molten corium jet ejected from the lower head of the vessel. The water 
pool is available through cavity flooding (e.g. SAMs in Swedish and Finnish BWRs) or water 
accumulation in the sump of a PWR due to Loss of Coolant conditions or containment 
spray. This is a similar process to the in-vessel situation, when melt relocates from the core 
to a water filled lower head. The large depth of water pools in BWRs yields additional 
effects. 
The first issue concerns the debris bed formation by break-up of melt, with the DEFOR 
(KTH) and FARO (JRC/IE-Ispra) experiments. The second issue concerns the investigations 
on coolability of debris beds, with the STYX (VTT) and DEBRIS (IKE) experiments (for the 
latter, see more details in Section 6).  
Bringing research results into reactor application 
As an example of research results for reactor applications, the IVR via external reactor vessel 
cooling (ERVC) has been recognised as a feasible and promising SAM strategy for VVER-
440/V213 reactors. The most important design features of these reactors, favourable for 
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adoption of the IVR concept, are low thermal power, RPV without penetrations in lower 
head, massive stainless steel vessel internals, large volume of residual water in lower head 
and high driving head for natural circulation in ERVC loop.  
Recent activities devoted to IVR concept via ERVC for standard VVER-440/V213 reactors 
are performed in the frame of SARNET as well as within national programmes performed in 
the countries operating this type of reactors. From the results obtained so far it follows that 
there should be sufficient gap width (~ 1 cm) between RPV wall and thermal/biological 
shield for the coolant flow in natural circulation regime alongside the outer surface of RPV 
wall. Further research should be focused on confirmation of the estimated heat flux values. 
Here the outcomes of the SARNET2 project and results of ASTEC analysis will be of high 
importance. 
In order to evaluate the ability of current advanced codes to predict in-vessel core melt 
progression and coolability of the degraded core, a benchmark is being organized in close 
collaboration with the OECD/NEA/CSNI. It addresses an alternative scenario of the TMI-2 
accident. 
5.3 Activities on MCCI 
In the postulated case of a SA with vessel melt-through, the containment is the ultimate 
barrier between the corium and the environment. The addressed situation is the reactor pit 
initially dry but with the possibility of water injection later during MCCI. The work 
programme has been designed to be complementary with the MCCI project of the 
OECD/NEA that finished in 2010.  
Recent 2D experiments like VULCANO (CEA) in prototypical materials have provided new 
results that questioned the reliability of the available models and their extrapolation to 
reactor conditions. As an example, it becomes clear that new effects have to be taken into 
account to be able to describe the ablation anisotropy observed in case of silica-rich concrete 
and the different behaviour of limestone concrete. This anisotropy was also present in the 
ablation of Chernobyl silica-rich concrete. The intention is thus to gain sufficient 
experimental data in order to determine which phenomena are responsible for the observed 
isotropy/anisotropy of the concrete ablation. 
Concerning the oxide/metal configuration, only few experimental programmes were 
conducted with stratified pools using simulant melts, for instance in KIT the large-scale 2D 
BETA test series with a large test matrix, and the series of COMET experiments, which were 
performed in alumina thermite within the LACOMERA EC project. They provided a 
valuable database on long-term MCCI for various initial and boundary conditions. The 
VULCANO experiments with oxide and metal pools have the unique characteristics of 
providing heat to the oxide layer, like in the reactor case. Several experiments were 
performed (VULCANO, MCCI-OECD, HECLA in VTT) but more data are required to 
improve knowledge in these configurations. The following question remains open: does a 
stratified configuration exist in the reality? The other need is to improve in the modelling 
the stratification criteria for onset and termination of stratification. 
The other current experiments are MOCKA (KIT) at a large-scale in simulant materials, 
COMETA (UJV) for thermochemistry tests on real corium samples, the Laser melting facility 
(JRC/ITU), and CLARA and ABI  (CEA)  SETs in simulant materials. 
Water-cooling is the main available way to terminate the concrete ablation. It was mainly 
studied within the OECD/NEA MCCI project. Recently, interest has been shown to pursue 
R&D on concepts that could be used to provide bottom-cooling in the cavity of current 
reactors.  
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5.4 Activities on containment issues 
The considered issue is the threat to the containment integrity, due to two types of highly 
energetic phenomena: steam explosion and hydrogen combustion. Steam explosion may be 
caused by ex-vessel FCI due to a RPV failure and pouring of the reactor core melt in the 
flooded reactor cavity. Hydrogen combustion (deflagration and detonation) may be caused 
by ignition of a gas mixture with high local hydrogen concentrations, which may be due to 
the imperfect mixing of the containment atmosphere. Phenomena linked to these threats are 
considered as well. Essential insights and results from this research should be applicable to 
actual NPPs.  
Ex-vessel FCI may lead to steam explosion. The corium ejected in the reactor cavity after 
vessel failure may lead to high-pressure loads on the containment or vital components in 
case of FCI. The work performed in the frame of SARNET and SERENA-1 (OECD/NEA 
project) allowed the identification of the major uncertainties that make difficult to quantify 
containment safety margins for an ex-vessel steam explosion. These uncertainties mainly 
concern the level of void in the pre-mixing phase and the role of material properties on 
explosion energetics. A new OECD/NEA project (SERENA-2) has been launched in October 
2007 to resolve these uncertainties by performing a limited number of well-designed tests 
with advanced instrumentation reflecting a large spectrum of ex-vessel melt compositions 
and conditions in the KROTOS (CEA) and TROI (KAERI) facilities, and the required 
analytical work to bring the code predictive capabilities to a sufficient level for use in reactor 
analyses. The main objective in SARNET is to further review and debate the progress made 
in the SERENA-2 programme, and to propose and perform any activity that might be 
needed to complement (and possibly have positive feedback on) the work performed in 
SERENA-2, with the help of data produced in SARNET such as MISTEE, DEFOR and DROP 
experiments in KTH. 
Phenomena that are linked to the hydrogen-in-containment issue, which is still today of 
highest priority, are addressed. This issue covers the containment thermal-hydraulics, 
including the hydrogen distribution, the different hydrogen combustion regimes, their 
impact on containment structures and measures to prevent (severe) combustion processes or 
at least to mitigate their consequences with specific devices like PARs or with accident 
management measures, like containment sprays. The involved experiments are: TOSQAN 
and ENACEFF (IRSN and CNRS/Orléans), MISTRA (CEA), HyKA and DISCO (KIT), 
CONAN (Univ. of Pisa), THAI (Becker Technologies, Germany). Benchmarks between codes 
are performed on most of these experiments.  
5.5 Activities on source term 
The overall objective is to reduce the uncertainties associated with calculating the potential 
release of radiotoxic fission products to the environment that may occur during a severe 
accident in water-cooled nuclear reactors. It concentrates on iodine and ruthenium, given 
their high radio-toxicity, noting that the release of ruthenium is enhanced in oxidising 
atmospheres, such as those that may follow air ingress into the RCS. The research treats the 
transport of these elements through the primary circuit, including consideration of the SG, 
and their behaviour in the containment. The prediction of volatile iodine and ruthenium 
species in the containment atmosphere of particular importance, because they are hard to 
remove by containment sprays or by filtration while venting the containment. For 
ruthenium, the enhanced release from the fuel in oxidising conditions is also studied.  
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Full advantage is taken of cooperation with international programmes such as Phébus FP 
(Clément et al., 2005), the International Source Term Programme (ISTP) (Clément et al., 
2005), and the projects of the OECD/NEA/CSNI, to avoid duplication of experiments, to 
help consistency of the programmes and to identify remaining needs. 
As concerns the oxidising influence on source term, the technical work concentrates in 
particular on ruthenium source term from the fuel up to its behaviour in-containment: 
 Release of fission products from fuel (FIPRED experiments in INR, RUSET ones in 
AEKI, VERCORS past RUSET and VERDON future ones in CEA, Phébus FP past 
experiments in IRSN): release from high burn-up and MOX fuels; role of fuel cladding, 
i.e. the competition between cladding oxidation, UO2 oxidation and fission products 
release; fission products release under mixed steam-air conditions, which are more 
realistic than 100% air conditions in accident situations; 
 Ruthenium transport in RCS (experiments in Chalmers University): thermodynamic 
behaviour of ruthenium oxides; reactivity with surfaces and other chemical compounds 
such as caesium; 
 Ruthenium behaviour in containment (EPICUR experiments in IRSN, VTT ones, THAI 
ones in Becker Technologies): behaviour of ruthenium oxides as aerosols, and their 
potential conversion to volatile forms; thermodynamic behaviour of ruthenium species 
in liquid phase and potential volatilization. 
As concerns the iodine chemistry in the RCS and containment, two main situations are 
addressed: 
 Iodine transport in circuits (CHIP experiments in IRSN, EXSI ones in VTT): kinetics of 
gaseous phase reactions; speciation of revaporised iodine and of other fission products; 
development of a databank from plant iodine spiking data and associated development 
of a correlation-type model covering some steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) events, 
volatile iodine mass transfers and adsorption/deposition in SG secondary side in case 
of a SGTR event; 
 Iodine behaviour in containment (EPICUR experiments, RTF ones in AECL): 
mechanisms of iodine association with painted surfaces (adsorption of iodine from 
particulate iodides deposited on “wetted” surfaces); subsequent volatile iodine 
formation from iodine-loaded paint; radiolytic destruction of gaseous iodine species to 
form nucleate particles and subsequent behaviour of these particulate iodine oxides; 
iodine binding on sump materials and in sump screen blockages; effect of PARs on 
iodine source term. 
5.6 ASTEC code assessment and improvements 
IRSN and GRS jointly develop the ASTEC code to describe the complete evolution of a SA in 
a nuclear water-cooled reactor, including the behaviour of engineered safety systems and 
procedures used in SAM (Van Dorsselaere et al., 2009). The new series of versions V2 
(Figure 3) can simulate the EPR, especially its external core-catcher, and it includes the 
advanced core degradation models of the ICARE2 IRSN mechanistic code. 
IRSN and GRS deliver the successive code versions and the corresponding documentation 
to the code users: ASTEC V2.0 in July 2009; V2.0rev1 in mid-2010 and V2.1 foreseen in 2013. 
They also assure the code maintenance and the support to the code users, notably through 
Users Club meetings that are organized about every eighteen months (the next one in spring 
2012). 
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Fig. 3. Structure of the ASTEC integral code for SA simulation 
Twenty-nine organizations collaborate on the development and assessment of the successive 
ASTEC versions. The developments will account for the model improvements proposed by 
the joint research activities of the JPA. Besides, four partners work on the model adaptations 
to simulate SA sequences in BWR and PHWR4 reactors: IKE and KTH for BWR, INR and 
AECL for PHWR. They write model specifications, and validate the code against adequate 
experiments and benchmarking with other codes. Most ASTEC models are already 
applicable to these two types of NPPs except for core degradation. The BARC Indian partner 
is developing new PHWR core degradation models and validating them against Indian 
experiments.  
The assessment activity mainly consists: 
- On one hand in validating the code against experiments of diverse types (SETs, CETs, 
and integral tests). The comparison of code results with integral experiments such as 
Phébus FP and with real plant accidents such as TMI-2 is an essential task; 
                                                 
4 PHWR : pressurized heavy water reactors (including the CANDU type that is designed by Canada) 
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- On the other hand in covering a broad matrix of ASTEC reactor applications, aiming at 
the most important SA scenarios for the diverse types of reactors (PWR including 
VVER, BWR and PHWR). Sensitivity and uncertainty calculations are being performed 
in order to demonstrate the reliability and consistency of the ASTEC calculations. 
Although not the prime objective, partners may benchmark ASTEC with other reference 
codes that they master, such as the integral codes MELCOR and MAAP and the 
detailed codes such as ICARE/CATHARE, ATHLET-CD, SCDAP/RELAP5, COCOSYS, 
CONTAIN, TONUS… 
5.7 Spreading of excellence 
The objective of the DATANET database, developed in the frame of SARNET, is to collect 
the available SA experimental data in a common format in order to ensure their 
preservation, exchange and processing, including all related documentation. The data are 
both previous experimental data that SARNET partners are willing to share within the 
network and all new data produced within SARNET. DATANET is based on the STRESA 
tool (Zeyen, 2009) developed by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra (Italy) and now 
managed by JRC-IE in Petten (The Netherlands). It consists of a network with several local 
databases. All access rights are managed in accordance with the rules adopted in the 
SARNET consortium. The protection of confidential data is an important feature that is 
taken into account as the information security of the database. Six STRESA nodes are open 
and the results of about 250 experiments from 35 facilities have been implemented. JRC-IE 
can create new local STRESA nodes for partners and support the users through training 
sessions when necessary. 
The public web site (www.sar-net.eu) aims at providing general information on the SA 
research field to the general public. For the communication between all network members, 
the e-collaborative Internet Advanced Communication Tool is used. About 300 papers 
related to SARNET work in the last 5 years have been presented in conferences or published 
in scientific journals. The dissemination of information is also done through periodic 
newsletters or participation to public events.   
Four ERMSAR conferences (European Review Meetings on Severe Accident Research) have 
been organized in the last five years successively in France, Germany, Bulgaria and Italy as a 
forum to the SA community. They are becoming the major event in the world on this topic. 
The 4th one, hosted by ENEA (Italy) on May 11-12, 2010 in Bologna (Italy), gathered 100 
participants. 
The Education and Training programme is focusing on raising the competence level of the 
university students (Master and PhD) and researchers engaged in SA research. Towards this 
purpose, education courses are elaborated on the phenomenology of the SA various areas. 
The teaching is not a survey but an in-depth treatment in order to allow the students and 
researchers to understand the methodology in the topics further and use analysis computer 
codes, mainly ASTEC, more effectively for any type of NPP. The description of the scenarios 
with event trees and fault trees is performed, with indication of the probabilities of the 
various events occurring. Best-estimate analyses are provided with uncertainty analyses. 
Close links exist with the European ENEN association (European Nuclear Education 
Network). Four one-week educational courses were organised during the last five years, 
gathering from 40 to 100 persons: the latter was organised in the University of Pisa in 
January 2011, with a special focus on Gen.III NPPs. Another training course will be 
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proposed in the future for staff of plant operators or regulatory authorities, with emphasis 
on identifying what the SAM procedures are based on, and why they are effective. 
The textbook on SA phenomenology was drafted during the SARNET FP6 project. It covers 
historical aspects of water-cooled reactors safety principles and phenomena concerning in-
vessel accident progression, early and late containment failure, fission product release and 
transport. It contains also a description of analysis tools or codes, of management and 
termination of SA, as well as environmental management. It gives elements also on Gen.III 
reactors. The final review was performed in 2010, and the publication is planned in the 
second part of 2011. 
Finally, a programme enables university students and researchers to go into different 
laboratories for education and training in the SA area. Some stages for master thesis may be 
organised in the ENEN framework to obtain the 20 credits necessary for the achievement of 
the European EMSNE (European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering) certification. 
The staff deputation programme has involved for the last five years about 40 secondments 
with an average duration of 3 months: a researcher from one laboratory can spend several 
months in another European Laboratory where he/she would participate in an area of the 
SA research ongoing there.  
6. Illustration on a specific R&D issue: Reflooding of debris beds 
One of the high-priority issues concerns the core and debris coolability and thermal-
hydraulics within particulate debris during core reflooding. PSA results do not give a 
unanimous answer for the ranking of the issue. While in German PSA studies the 
possibility of reflooding is classified with low probability, French PSA on 900 MWe 
reactors give a higher probability. Finally because reflooding of a degraded core can 
potentially terminate the core degradation and stop the accident, corresponding SAM 
measures are intended and consequently the investigation of conditions for successful 
reflooding is important.  
New QUENCH-Debris experiments (KIT) and CODEX experiments (AEKI) are foreseen in 
bundle configurations, analysing the relocation of cladding and fuel and the formation and 
cooling of in-core debris beds to gain information on the characteristics of the created 
particles. The main objective of these tests is the investigation of these processes under 
prototypical boundary conditions for a whole bundle. The QUENCH-Debris facility consists 
in modifications of the QUENCH existing facility to study debris formation and coolability 
within a rod bundle. Two tests are planned during the SARNET2 timeframe.  
The DEBRIS facility (IKE) concerns model-oriented experiments for improvement of 
constitutive laws for friction and heat transfer as well as study of specific two dimensional 
effects under top and bottom flooding conditions at different system pressures. New 
POMECO test facilities (KTH) are designed and constructed to perform isothermal and 
boiling two-phase flow tests with better instrumentation and flexibility to accommodate 
various prototypical conditions: they aim at analyses under boil-off conditions with 
emphasis on basic laws and specific 2D effects (downcomers) more oriented at lower head 
or ex-vessel situations but also addressing basically the situation in the degraded core. 
Both DEBRIS and POMECO programmes deal with irregular particles aiming at realistic 
debris. 
IRSN is preparing larger quenching experiments with 2D porous media allowing multi-
dimensional progression of the quench front. This PEARL programme (Figure 4) (Stenne et 
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al., 2009) will simulate the reflooding of a debris bed, characteristic of an in-core debris bed, 
surrounded by a more permeable medium (such as intact structures and rods). PEARL goes 
beyond DEBRIS quenching analyses by the larger size (60 cm diameter vs. 15 cm in DEBRIS) 
and thus the possibility to perform extended analyses on multidimensional effects. It will 
also provide a general basis for the assessment of the overall behaviour described in the 
codes (both in- and ex-vessel phenomena).  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. PEARL facility (©2010 IRSN) 
The PRELUDE preliminary program is ongoing in IRSN to test the performance of the 
induction heating system on stainless steel particles, in order to optimize the 
instrumentation in a two-phase flow. The debris bed is one-dimensional, with a smaller size 
than PEARL, at atmospheric pressure and up to temperatures of 1000°C. The investigated 
parameters are:  
- Stainless amagnetic steel particles, 2 and 4 mm in diameter,  
- Inlet water velocity between 1 and 8 mm/s (4 to 30 m3/h/m2), in the range foreseen in 
PEARL test matrix, 
- Power at 300 W/kg (maintained or not during the reflooding phase), 
- Initial temperature before reflooding at 420 K, 500 K, 600 K and 1000 K. 
Additional PRELUDE experiments were performed to evaluate the power distribution 
inside a larger debris bed diameter (from 110 to 280 mm). This campaign ended with two 
experiments with a heating sequence of a debris bed (test section diameter 180 mm, particles 
4 mm) up to 1000 K at about 140 and 200 W/kg before the water injection. Those 
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experiments were well instrumented with many thermocouples inside the debris bed 
(different radial and axial positions) to follow the water front propagation along time 
(Figure 5, shows the thermocouples measurements at different axial levels).  
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Fig. 5. PRELUDE measurements of the water front evolution along time 
The objective is to assure the consistency between the PEARL, DEBRIS and QUENCH-
DEBRIS experimental programmes. 
Concerning the coolability of porous media, theoretical analyses have indicated the 
importance of multi-dimensional effects. Quenching analyses performed in SARNET 
showed agreement concerning a strongly favoured coolability by inflow of water from 
lateral water-filled regions of the core with higher porosities. Since lateral water inflow, 
especially via lower regions, strongly improves coolability, in general the coolability is much 
better than concluded from 1D analyses with top flooding. 2D/3D computer codes 
including adequate descriptions of constitutive laws are thus required to analyse the real 
coolability situation. Also, it is necessary to improve the modelling of the formation of 
porous media in the core.  
In parallel, plant applications must be performed, along with uncertainty studies, on 
different in-vessel geometrical configurations, taking into account water supply, in order to 
reveal major trends (cooling vs. melt pool formation). The modelling work is being done in 
the detailed codes ICARE/CATHARE (IRSN) and ATHLET-CD (work by IKE on the 
MEWA module of the German GRS code). These codes aim at a detailed understanding and 
simulation of the physical phenomena. Their validation on above experiments will allow 
improving their models. The final objective is to derive simplified models from these codes 
and to implement them into the ASTEC code. 
7. Conclusion 
For severe accidents in Generation II-III nuclear power plants, R&D is progressing on the 
remaining open issues that have been ranked in the SARNET network of excellence. The 
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work concerns new experiments and new physical modelling, in particular in the ASTEC 
integral code that is considered as the European reference SA code. For Gen.II NPPs, the 
objective is to reduce the remaining uncertainties on SA and consolidate the accident 
management plans in order to lead their safety level closer to the level of the new Gen.III 
plants under construction. 
The accident in the Fukushima plant occurred when this chapter was written. It is very 
likely that the accident will imply some reorientations of the planned R&D but it is too early 
to get a clear view on that aspect. Nevertheless it can be already observed that the highest-
priority issues that were selected in the SARNET work programme have clearly conditioned 
the evolution of the accident: for instance reflooding of a degraded core, hydrogen explosion 
in the containment, and degradation of fuel bundles and release of fission products in an air 
atmosphere (in the case of spent fuel pools). The SARNET work programme is being 
reviewed in order to get as soon as possible a feedback of this accident on the needs of 
further R&D. In particular, it seems likely that the aspects of mitigation of the SA 
consequences will have to be emphasized in the near future. 
A first step towards a sustainable integration of the European SA research capacities has 
been reached. A strong link must be kept between the “SARNET community” and the 
“PSA2 community”, in continuation of the ASAMPSA2 FP7 project on PSA2 best-practice 
guidelines (ASAMPSA2, 2011). The European SNETP (Sustainable Nuclear Energy 
Technology Platform), that gathers all nuclear fission actors and aims at providing the 
stakeholders and the public with a 2020–2050 vision on R&D, has delegated to SARNET the 
coordination of R&D on SA for Gen.II-III NPPs. Such a living and unique pool of 
experts should periodically assess the remaining issues on SA, notably using the results of 
all international programmes (OECD/NEA, EC FP7-8, ISTP,…), update the research 
priorities and propose relevant R&D programmes to address them. Their scope of 
investigations could extend in the future to the new Generation IV plant designs. 
Efforts will continue in parallel on the transfer of knowledge to younger generations 
through the ERMSAR periodic international conferences, educational courses and 
delegations in laboratories. 
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Imaging of Radiation Accidents 
and Radioactive Contamination 
Using Scintillators 
 
Tomoya Ogawa et al.* 
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Japan 
1. Introduction  
An accident in a nuclear power plant, which can be caused by an unpredictable event such 
as an explosion, fire, and earthquake, has severe and far-reaching consequences. Therefore, 
it is crucial to carefully and constantly monitor the plant and precisely detect any radiation 
source. Radiation contamination in laboratories and in the environment due to nuclear 
fallout is among the issues that require an immediate solution. Radiation detection has 
become increasingly important because of the increasing number of nuclear power plants 
that have been established to replace conventional power plants, as part of the effort to 
suppress carbon dioxide emission. For these purposes, this chapter will discuss the principle 
and method of mapping flying radiations. Visual mapping of intensity and direction of 
                                                                 
* Nobuhiko Sarukura2, Masahito Watanabe3, Tsuguo Fukuda4, Nobuhito Nango5, Yasunobu Arikawa2, 
Kohei Yamanoi2, Tomoharu Nakazato2, Marilou Cadatal-Raduban2, Toshihiko Shimizu2, Mitsuo Nakai2, 
Takayoshi Norimatsu2, Hiroshi Azechi2, Takahiro Murata6, Shigeru Fujino7, Hideki Yoshida8, Kei 
Kamada9, Yoshiyuki Usuki9, Toshihisa Suyama10, Akira Yoshikawa11, Nakahiro Sato12, Hirofumi Kan12, 
Hiroaki Nishimura2, Kunioki Mima2, Masahito Hosaka13, Masahiro Katoh14, Nobuhiro Kosugi14, Kentaro 
Fukuda10, Takayuki Yanagida11, Yuui Yokota11, Fumio Saito11, Kouhei Sakai2, Dirk Ehrentraut11, Mitsuru 
Nagasono15, Tadashi Togashi15, Atsushi Higashiya15, Makina Yabashi15, Tetsuya Ishikawa15, Haruhiko 
Ohashi15,16, and Hiroaki Kimura15,16 
2Institute of Laser Engineering, Osaka University, Japan 
3Department of Physics, Gakushuin University, Japan 
4Fukuda Crystal Laboratory, Japan 
5Ratoc System Engineering Co., Japan 
6Department of Chemistry, School of Science, Tokai University, Japan 
7Department of Materials Process Engineering, Graduate School of Engineering, Kyushu University, Japan 
8Ceramic Research Center of Nagasaki, Japan 
9Furukawa Co., Ltd., Japan 
10Tokuyama Corporation, Japan 
11Institute of Multidisciplinary Research for Advanced Materials, Tohoku University, Japan 
12Central Research Laboratory, Hamamatsu Photonics K.K., Japan 
13Graduate School of Engineering, Nagoya University, Japan 
14UVSOR Facility Institute for Molecular Science, Japan 
15RIKEN XFEL Project Head Office, Japan 
16Japan Synchrotron Radiation Research Institute, Japan 
 
Nuclear Power – Operation, Safety and Environment 184 
incident radiations is necessary to detect any radiation accident and/or invisible radiation 
contamination. Discussion will focus on directional detection of radiation sources, being the 
minimum requirement for identifying and characterizing unpredictable accidents and 
contamination. 
Specifically, this chapter will discuss two-dimensional imaging of radiation accidents and 
radioactive contamination. It will also detail the development of a “panchromatic” detector 
that is suitable for use against radiation from different types of sources. This detector 
combines several types of scintillating elements into a bundle, which is composed of well-
designed and regularly arranged scintillation fiber-segments or thin cylinders to detect and 
display the radiation sources as a map, using the directional sensitivity of the segments or 
cylinders for locating sources of incident radiation. In addition, this chapter will discuss the 
numerical designs and the characteristics of two detector configurations. These are the 
telescope configuration, wherein all the extended lines of the scintillator fiber segments or 
thin cylinders composing the bundle are focused to a point; and the magnifier configuration, 
wherein all the extended lines of the segments within the bundle are diverging from the 
focus. 
An integral part of the radiation detector is the scintillator. Scintillators are created and 
developed to correctly detect and count incident radiations. In this regard, part of this 
chapter will also be devoted to the discussion of the properties of scintillators that are ideal 
for use in radiation detectors. In particular, the effect of scintillator shape and decay time 
will be outlined, leading to the attributes of an ideal imaging scintillator. For instance, one of 
the size effects is the directional sensitivity to incident radiations. This can be realized by 
using a thin cylinder-type or a fiber segment-type scintillator. The output signals from the 
thin cylinder are proportional to the number of radiations that passed through it, if its 
length is good enough to absorb the incident radiations. 
To complete the chapter, the performance of various scintillators will be discussed. Among 
the scintillators that will be discussed is the praseodymium-doped lithium glass 
(APLF80+3Pr), cerium-doped lutetium lithium fluoride (Ce3+:LuLiF4), zinc oxide (ZnO), and 
neodymium-doped lanthanum fluoride (Nd3+:LaF3).  
2. Scintillators 
Scintillators are fluorescent materials that mediate the detection of high energy (ionizing) 
electromagnetic or charged particle radiation. A scintillator absorbing high-energy radiation 
fluoresces at a characteristic Stokes-shifted (longer) wavelength that can be detected by 
conventional detectors like photodiodes or photomultiplier tubes. If the properties of the 
scintillator are known, then the high-energy radiation that it absorbed can in turn be 
characterized. Radiation detectors are typically useful for imaging by utilizing high-
penetration power radiation and for spectroscopy by utilizing characteristic radiation from 
each atom. As part of a detection unit, the broad application of scintillators comprises 
various scientific disciplines such as high-energy physics, nuclear physics, astronomy, and 
mineral exploration. It has also found applications in product quality control, airport 
security, nuclear safeguards verification, cargo container inspection, toxic dumpsite 
monitor, and environmental monitoring. Moreover, Positron Emission Tomography (PET) 
for medical imaging has gained popularity as a common clinical tool for detection of 
tumors. 
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2.1 Shape of scintillators 
Scintillation is caused by collision between a high-energy radiation and an electron 
belonging to a heavy dopant atom. This collision is considered as one of the ideal stochastic 
processes. As such, a scintillation detector is usually prepared as a very large block to 
correctly count incident radiations while excluding its size effects.  
 
Fig. 1. A thin cylinder or fiber segment scintillator and its incident radiation acceptance 
angle, where a is its diameter, L is its length, and Φ is the divergence of its sensitivity against 
incoming radiation. 
One of the size effects is the directional sensitivity to incident radiations. This can be 
realized by using a thin cylinder-type or a fiber segment-type scintillator. The output signals 
from the thin cylinder are proportional to the number of radiations that passed through it if 
its length is good enough to absorb the incident radiations. On the other hand, radiations 
crossing obliquely through a segment may or may not generate scintillation even if every 
radiation were moving along an identical line. This can, therefore, constitute random noise. 
The signals arising from radiation passing directly through the scintillator can be separated 
from the random noise generated by radiation crossing the scintillator obliquely through the 
well-known noise reduction technique using multi-integration.  
In most materials, the refractive index for high energy radiations is nearly equal to unity. 
Therefore, the aperture, Φ, of the cylinder for which incident radiations is detected is  
 2tan-1(a/L) (1) 
where L and a are the cylinder length and diameter, respectively, as illustrated in Fig. 1. 
Surface smoothness of the cylinder is very important since multiple scattering of the 
scintillation light at its surface is detrimental to the imaging of output light signals. 
2.2 The decay time of scintillation 
Since scintillators are created and developed to correctly detect and count incident 
radiations, a very short scintillation decay time is desirable for precise time-resolved 
radiation measurement. Decay time of well-known scintillators is much less than one 
microsecond. For the case of scintillators developed mainly for imaging, measurement is 
limited by the refresh rate of the television or monitor. The refresh rate of monitors and 
televisions is typically 30 frames per second. It is therefore acceptable that the decay time of 
imaging scintillators is in the millisecond range. This decay time is longer than the 
requirement for scintillators used in radiation counting. For this purpose, development of 
brighter scintillators without regard to decay times would be of primary importance when 
developing an imaging device. 
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2.3 Scintillation crystals 
A comparison of the performance of different scintillator materials is shown in Table 1 (Ishii 
& Kobayashi, 1991, 2007). One of the best candidates for imaging will be thin scintillation 
cylinders made from CsI:Tl crystals. This material is ideal as an imaging scintillator because 
among the materials in Table 1, it has the largest photoluminescence output per radiation 
energy of 59,000 photons/MeV. It also has a relatively long decay time of 1 μs. Moreover, it 
has a high melting point of 621℃ and is only slightly hygroscopic.  
 
 
 
Table 1. Characteristic features of scintillation crystals 
3. Configuration and compilation of the scintillation thin cylinders 
Visual mapping of intensity and direction of incident radiations is necessary to detect any 
radiation accident and/or invisible radiation contamination. For this purpose, thin cylinder 
scintillators or fiber segments are compiled to form a bundle where every extended line of 
the cylinder is either focused into a point, as shown in Fig. 2 or diverging from a point, as 
shown in Fig. 3. The former is referred to as the telescope configuration while the latter is 
referred to as the magnifier configuration (Ogawa, 2007, 2010). 
3.1 Telescope configuration 
Figure 2 demonstrates a typical telescope configuration. The terminal end of the scintillation 
cylinder bundle where the focus side is located is optically connected to a two dimensional 
photodetector, such as a charge coupled device (CCD). An image intensifier or a micro-
imaging plate is used to amplify the signals before reaching the CCD. 
The field angle or aperture of this telescope is determined by R and F, where R is the 
diameter of the circle circumscribed by the terminal ends and F is the distance between the 
focus and the terminal plane. With this configuration, the intensity and direction of incident 
radiations will be indicated as a map on the computer, after image processing. 
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Fig. 2. The telescopic configuration. All the extended lines of the scintillator fiber segments 
or thin cylinders composing the bundle are focused to a point. 
3.2 Magnifier configuration 
For the magnifier configuration, the size of the focal point is nearly equal to or a little larger 
than the diameter of the fiber. In this configuration, a radiation source such as an X -ray tube 
or a small block of 60Co is continuously emitting its radiation at the focal point. On the other 
hand, the specimen being studied is placed at a plane between the focus and the front of the 
bundle. This way, the transparency of this specimen against the radiation will be observed 
as its magnified image. This is similar to an optical magnifier. If radiation substances or 
radioactive isotopes are scattered on a plane, a map of this contamination will be observed 
when the focus of the magnifier either approaches or departs from that plane, as shown in 
Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3. The magnifier configuration. All the extended lines of the segments within the bundle 
are diverging from the focus. 
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4. Numerical designs 
In this section, we discuss the numerical considerations for designing the telescope and 
magnifier configurations. In particular, the characteristic features of the cylinders to be used 
in the telescope configuration as well as the diameter of the fiber segments for the magnifier 
configuration are discussed. 
4.1 Numerical designs of cylinders for the telescope configuration 
The sensitivity divergence, Φ, of a thin scintillation cylinder and the aperture for imaging, Θ, 
of the cylinder bundle are defined as follows: 
 Φ = 2 tan-1(a/L) (2) 
  = 2 tan-1(R/F) (3) 
On the other hand, the total number of the cylinders, N, is given by 
 N = 3n(n+1) + 1 (4) 
where n is number of cylinders along the radius of the circle circumscribed by the terminal 
ends. Thus Θ, Φ and n are related as follows: 
 Φ = (Θ/2n)p (5) 
In this equation, p is an overlapping or tolerance factor of the scintillation cylinder or fiber 
segment. In our calculations, we chose Θ as 47º, 24º, 8º, and 2.5º because these apertures 
correspond to the 50 mm, 100 mm, 300 mm and 1000 mm focal length lens of the 35 mm 
camera system, respectively.  
The length of a cylinder, L, is such that the incident radiation is enough to be absorbed for 
scintillation but the light generated within it will be perfectly received at the terminal end. 
In our calculations, L was assumed to be  
 L = 5Xo (6) 
where Xo is the radiation length of the scintillation material. In this case, the incident 
radiation will be attenuated to 1/e, which is equal to 0.0067 times (Fukuda et al., 2004). This 
attenuation value is acceptable for the present purpose. The radiation length of various 
scintillators is summarized in Table 1. As an example, by using a CsI:Tl crystal having an Xo 
of 18.6 mm, the suitable crystal length, L, would be 93 mm. Correspondingly, the diameter, 
a, of the CsI:Tl cylinders can be obtained using equations (2) and (5) with p = 2. Calculation 
results of the diameter of CsI:Tl cylinders for different apertures (Θ) and number of 
cylinders (n) are shown in Table 2. It is worth mentioning that the diameter of the 
commercially available Bi4Ge3O12 (BGO) cylinders is 0.6 times compared to that of CsI:Tl 
because the radiation length of BGO is 0.60 times shorter than that of CsI:Tl. 
4.2 Numerical designs of fiber segments for the magnifier configuration 
The size of the focal point is nearly equal to or a little larger than the diameter of the fiber 
segment, as indicated in Fig.3. It is, therefore, more desirable to make thinner fiber 
segments. Today, the diameter of commercially available scintillation fibers, for example the 
BGO fiber is about 30 μm (Fukuda & Chani, 2007; Fukuda et al., 2004). This is very similar in 
size to the focus of a commercial microfocus X-ray tube. If fibers with a 1 μm diameter were 
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available, the resolution of the transparent image against radiation will clearly be improved 
because the half shadow of the image will be dramatically diminished. 
 
Table 2. The diameter of CsI:Tl scintillation cylinders 
5. Scintillators for time-resolved measurement 
As mentioned in Section 2.2, a very short scintillation decay time is desirable for precise 
time-resolved radiation measurement. Over the past years, several scintillators have been 
studied for this purpose, wherein several schemes have been considered in order to improve 
the response time of fluoride, oxide, and glass scintillators. In this section, the characteristics 
of fluoride, oxide, and glass scintillators will be discussed. Emphasis will be given to the 
improvement in the fluorescence decay time. In particular, the scintillation properties of 
cerium-doped lutetium lithium fluoride (Ce3+:LuLiF4), praseodymium-doped lithium glass 
(APLF80 + 3Pr), neodymium-doped lanthanum fluoride (Nd3+LaF3), and zinc oxide (ZnO) 
will be discussed.   
5.1 Pr-doped glass 
In the field of fusion research, understanding the plasma dynamics could very well be the 
key in feasibly attaining controlled fusion. Moreover, studying the scattered neutrons is 
currently the most viable way of probing the fusion plasma. For this reason, neutron 
diagnostics is an indispensable tool for both inertial confinement fusion (ICF) and magnetic 
confinement fusion research (Cheon et al., 2008; Glebov et al., 2006; K.A. Tanaka et al., 2004; 
Lerche et al., 1995; Petrizzi et al., 2007; Ress et al, 1988). In particular, the observation of 
scattered neutrons from the high-density imploded deuterium plasma in laser fusion 
experiments is desired (Izumi et al., 2003). At the center of the imploded deuterium fuel 
plasma, deuterium-deuterium (DD) neutrons having energy of 2.45 MeV and scattered 
neutrons from the fuel deuteron are generated. The scattering probability depends only on 
the plasma areal density, which is the radial integral of density ρR, in units of g/cm2. In 
addition, a wide observable range of up to 3 g/cm2 is required for future fusion reactors. 
These factors make the scattered neutron diagnostics method, highly expected to be further 
developed as an invaluable tool in ICF research. For this purpose, a fast-response neutron 
scintillator with a high cross section for scattered neutrons is strongly required.  
The nuclear reaction, 
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 6Li(n,T) + 4.8 MeV (7) 
has a large cross section resonant peak, well-fit to the back scattered neutron spectrum peak 
around 0.27 MeV, and a large Q value producing enough photons for lower energy scattered 
neutrons. Thus, a 6Li scintillator with a high lithium density is an ideal detector for this 
method (Izumi et al., 2003). Since scattered neutrons having energy around 0.27 MeV must 
be discriminated from the overwhelming majority of the 2.45 MeV primary neutrons or x-
rays via time-of-flight experiments, a sufficiently fast time response is required. Moreover 
we must also discriminate the neutrons scattered by the experimental setup itself such as the 
vacuum chamber wall. Thus, the detector has to be placed at close proximity to the fusion 
plasma; necessitating a scintillator with a time decay of less than 20 ns. In this work, results 
are presented on the fast response time of a custom-developed Pr3+(Praseodymium)-doped 
lithium glass as a scintillator material (Arikawa et al., 2009). 
The Pr3+ ion with a higher emission cross section in the deep ultraviolet region (~270 nm) is 
preferred as a dopant (Yoshikawa et al., 2008) over the slower, albeit more widely-used 
Ce3+( Cerium) ion with its smaller emission cross section at longer wavelengths (Ehrlich  et 
al., 1979; Fairley & Spowart, 1978; Suzuki et al., 2002). Additionally, high Li-density fluoro-
lithium glass is chosen as the host material over UV-transparent, Li-doped fluoride crystals 
such as LiCaAlF6, primarily due to its ease-of-preparation and design flexibility. 
 
Fig. 4. Photoluminescence (PL) and photoluminescence excitation (PLE) spectrum of the 
APLF80+3Pr. The PL peak is observed at 279 nm while the PLE maximum occurs at 234 nm. 
The photograph shows the glass scintillator sample. The diameter is 6cm with a thickness of 
1 cm. 
The APLF80 + 3Pr glass sample, having a composition of 20Al(PO3)3 – 80LiF + 3PrF3 (in mol) 
using 95.5% 6Li enriched lithium fluoride, is shown in the inset of Fig. 4. It was prepared 
using the melt-quenching method, where PrF3-containing starting materials were melted in 
a glassy carbon crucible at 1100 degrees Celsius under nitrogen atmosphere. The glass melt 
was then cooled down to 400 degrees Celsius in the furnace, and subsequently annealed 
near the glass transition temperature. The lithium density was measured using an atomic 
absorption photometer to be 7.98 w%, 31.6 mmol/cc. This is the highest reported value for 
conventional 6Li glass scintillators, thus far (Saint-Gobain Crystals, 2007-2008). Fluorescence 
increase upon 241Am-alpha excitation was observed with higher doping of Pr+3. The highest 
doping of Pr+3 was found to be 3% at the present manufacturing procedure. The preliminary 
characteristics were reported in (Murata et al., 2009). 
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Before the neutron observation experiments were conducted, the spectral- and temporal- 
optical characteristics of the sample were evaluated. From the peak of the pulse height 
distribution of the APLF80+3Pr sample, we estimated the fluorescence photons yield to be 
about 300 photons / 5.5 MeV-alpha, taking into consideration the limited acceptance angle 
of the photomultiplier window even though the emission can be regarded to be isotropic in 
all directions. Figure 4 shows the photoluminescence (PL) and photoluminescence excitation 
(PLE) spectra of the sample. Strong emission at around 278 nm due to the 5d-4f transition, 
which was the design wavelength, was seen. Furthermore, the host material was found to 
have good transmission in the vacuum ultraviolet region down to 180 nm, and no 
absorption at the luminescence region was observed.  
 
Fig. 5. Streak camera image of the spectral and time resolved luminescence of the APLF+1Pr. 
The excitation source is the 4th harmonics of a Ti: Sapphire laser. 
The spectrally-resolved fluorescence lifetime of the APLF80+1Pr sample, excited with 217-
nm 150, fs pulses using the 4th harmonics of a Ti:sapphire laser, was measured using a 
streak camera as shown in Fig. 5. The spectrally-integrated fluorescence decay profile, along 
with the other decay profiles for other excitation sources are shown in Fig. 6; where all the 
decay curves were fitted with a single exponential decay in the region from 50 % to 10 % of 
the peak value. For ultraviolet excitation, the fluorescence lifetime was determined to be 19.5 
± 0.80 ns. The decay from short x-ray excitation pulses from laser-produced plasma was 
measured to be 20.8 ± 0.85 ns. In this experiment, a 10-μm thick aluminum plate target was 
irradiated by 4 ps/80 J Nd-glass laser pulses. The generated electron energy spectrum of a 
few MeV at the peak was also measured using an electron spectrometer. On the other hand, 
the fluorescence decay profile for 5.5 MeV 241Am alpha-particle excitation was 6.7 ± 0.03 ns. 
Neutron excitation, having energy from 0.5 MeV to 10 MeV using 252Cf, exhibited the fastest 
decay time of 5.9 ± 0.16 ns. This significant difference of decay times for neutrons and x-ray 
excitation is preferable for the time-of-flight measurements, although the mechanism of 
response time difference is not clear. A similar difference in the response time was also 
observed for conventional Ce3+-doped Li glass scintillation (Fairley & Spowart, 1978).  
Based on these information, we show the feasibility of the custom-developed APLF80 + 3Pr 
scintillator material as a fast-response neutron detector for laser fusion diagnostics. The 
detection of ICF-originated neutrons was successfully carried out in laser fusion 
experiments at the GEKKO XII facility of the Institute of Laser Engineering, Osaka 
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University. In this study, a fusion target made from a deuterated plastic shell was irradiated 
by the 12 high-intensity Nd-glass lasers of the GEKKO XII facility. A detailed description of 
typical fusion experiment at GEKKO XII is described in (Azechi et al., 1991). As much as 
5×105 DD-fusion neutrons were observed using conventional neutron detectors, based on 
plastic scintillators. The fluorescence from the APLF80 + 3Pr sample that was positioned at 
about 10 cm from the fusion target was transmitted using a bundle optical fiber and 
detected by an ultraviolet photomultiplier as shown in Fig. 7. Taking into account the 
distance between the target and the APLF80+3Pr glass scintillator, and the difference of the 
time-of-flight of X-ray (30 cm/ns) and neutrons (2.2 cm/ns), the signal at round 10 ns in Fig. 
8 was identified to be that of DD primal neutron. With decay time of about 80 ns, such clear 
discrimination between x-rays and neutrons in this short interval is impossible with 
traditional cerium doped lithium glass scintillators. 
 
Fig. 6. The APLF+3Pr luminescence lifetime for alpha, neutron, x-ray, and UV pulse 
excitation. The lifetime varies from ~20 ns to under 7 ns, depending excitation source. This 
variation in the sample’s decay time for different excitation energies suggests its capability 
to be used as detector in laser fusion time of flight experiments. 
 
Fig. 7. Experimental set up of the time-of-flight experiment for the neutron detector. The 
detector is placed about 10 cm from the deuterated plastic target. The target is irradiated by 
12 high energy beams of the GEKKO XII facility of the Institute of Laser Engineering, Osaka 
University. 
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Fig. 8. The neutron signal at about 12 ns was successfully detected at the GEKKO XII facility 
fusion experiment. 
5.2 Ce-doped fluoride 
As mentioned in section 5.1, 6Li is known to have a large cross section for high-energy 
neutrons. This makes lithium-rich compounds prominent candidates for a host, especially 
when doped with a high quantum efficiency light emitting ion. Particularly, Li-rich 
fluorides are important hosts for these applications because of their relatively wide 
bandgap, which make them transparent even down to the vacuum ultraviolet region (below 
200 nm). On the other hand, three trivalent ions are being considered as dopants, namely, 
Cerium (Ce3+), Praseodymium (Pr3+), and Neodymium (Nd3+) (van Eijk et al., 1994). 
Previously, Nd3+:LaF3 (Nakazato et al., 2010a) and Nd3+:LaxBa(1-x)F(3-x) (Cadatal et al., 2007, 
2008) have been reported as possible scintillator materials. However, of these three, Ce3+ has 
the smallest energy difference between the 4f and 5d levels, therefore resulting to a more 
efficient energy transfer to the dopant ion (van Eijk et al., 1994). The small energy difference 
also translates to a longer emission wavelength for Ce3+-doped materials. A longer emission 
wavelength is advantageous because it can easily match the sensitivity of light sensors. For 
these reasons, Ce3+:LuLiF4 (Ce:LLF) is explored as a viable scintillator material (Nakazato et 
al., 2010b). This material has been extensively investigated as a tunable ultraviolet laser 
medium and amplifier (Dubinskii et al., 1992; Sarukura et al., 1995a, 1995b, 1998).  
For the development of scintillators, specifically for nuclear fusion applications, material 
optimization and doping concentration are extremely important. Material screening is 
typically accomplished through characterization of the material’s response time for different 
neutron or photon excitation energies (M. Tanaka et al., 2007). However, since the short-
pulse and high-energy neutron generated by nuclear fusion is not available on a daily basis; 
the free electron laser (FEL) can be an alternative excitation source for material screening. 
Moreover, the FEL provides flexibility in tunability and operation, therefore making it an 
important aide in accelerating material development. Among such FELs, the storage ring 
free-electron laser (SRFEL) is an appropriate choice because of its adequately high repetition 
rate, which is needed for the suitable evaluation of fluorescence decay times that are 
typically in the order of tens of nanonseconds (Hosaka et al., 2002). These decay times have 
been characteristically observed from Ce3+ doped fluorides.  
In this section, Ce:LLF is reported as a fast scintillator using a SRFEL operating in the deep 
ultraviolet region. The response time is comparable to that of commercially available 
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scintillators, KG2 and GS2 (Saint-Gobain Crystals, 2007-2008). Fluorescence spectral and 
temporal profiles also seem to have a flat spectral response at each of its three excitation 
channels. This report is the first systematic study on Ce:LLF as a scintillator where SRFEL is 
also shown to be a powerful tool for material survey. 
 
Fig. 9. Transmission spectrum of the 10 mm thick Ce:LLF.. Central wavelength of the 
absorption bands are situated at around 204 nm, 245 nm, and 293 nm. The doping 
concentration of this material is 1mol%. 
The Ce:LLF crystal used in our experiments contained 1mol% Ce3+. The crystal, which was 
grown by the Czochralski technique, was cut into a half-cylinder with dimensions of 18mm 
for the diameter of the semi-circle and 10 mm for the length. The crystal’s c-axis is along its 
length, such that it is parallel to the direction of the excitation beam. All of the three flat 
surfaces were polished. Detailed specification of the Ce:LLF crystal used in this experiment 
is referred to in (Ranieri et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2000). 
The experiment was carried out at the UVSOR facility of the Institute for Molecular Science. 
The SRFEL, which is parasitically installed at the BL5U beam line, was used as the excitation 
source. Wavelengths from 199 nm to 800 nm with a repetition rate of 11 MHz and pulse 
duration of 15 ps were available for material characterization (Zen et al., 2009). This wide 
range of tunability is advantageous for material characterization because it allows one to 
choose the excitation wavelength to match the absorption band of the material. For the case 
of Ce:LLF, the wavelength was consecutively tuned to 216 nm and 243 nm. As shown in Fig. 
9, these wavelengths exactly match the absorption band of CeLLF. These well-defined bands 
can be attributed to 4f-5d transitions in Ce3+. The beam from the SRFEL was focused to the 
sample almost along the c-axis. A streak camera coupled to a spectrograph and a CCD 
camera was used to measure the time-resolved fluorescence spectra. The system has a 
spectral resolution of ~1 nm and a temporal resolution of ~9.4 ns. The spectral and temporal 
profile of the fluorescence spectra was also measured using the third harmonic (290 nm) of a 
Ti:Sapphire regenerative amplifier, for reference. The 290-nm emission of this laser system 
operated at a repetition rate of 1 KHz, a pulse energy of ~40 µJ, and a pulse duration of ~100 
fs. All experiments were done at room temperature. 
Fluorescence image, as captured by the streak camera, for the 243-nm excitation wavelength 
is shown in Fig. 10. Two spectra can be observed in this streak camera image. These are 
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fluorescence emissions from two consecutive excitation pulses. The 11 MHz repetition rate 
of the SRFEL meant that the sample is irradiated by one pulse every ~90 ns. Therefore, two 
fluorescence emissions from two consecutive pulses were detected in one streak camera 
scan. This is also the case for the 216 nm excitation. We obtained the time-integrated 
fluorescence spectrum by integrating the signal over the time axis of the time-wavelength 
map of the streak camera data; and we found two fluorescence peaks, one at 308 nm and the 
other at 326nm, as shown in Fig. 11 (blue line). These fluorescence peaks are consistent with 
previous reports (Sarukura et al., 1995; Ranieri et al., 2000; Rambaldi et al., 1998; Combes et 
al., 1997). The 4f25d excited state configuration of Ce3+ in a LLF host is split into four energy 
levels as a result of the the S4 point symmetry at the Ce3+ site (Sarukura et al., 1995; Combes 
et al., 1997). The three absorption bands in Fig. 9 correspond to the three lowest energy 
levels of this 4f25d configuration with energies at ~32.9x103 to ~35.3x103 cm-1 (304 to 283 
nm), ~39.7x103 to ~40.6x103 cm-1 (252 to 246 nm), and ~46.7x103 to ~50x103 cm-1 (214 to ~200 
nm). The 308 nm (~32.5x103 cm-1) and 329 nm (~30.4x103 cm-1) emission peaks can therefore 
be attributed to radiative transitions from the lowest energy level of the 4f25d excited state 
configuration to the 2F5/2 (0 cm-1) and 2F7/2 (~2x103 cm-1) energy levels of the 4f3 ground state 
configuration, respectively (Ehrlich et al., 1979). These energies are specified in the energy 
level diagram, shown in Fig. 12.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Streak camera image of the Ce:LLF emission excited by the SRFEL tuned at 243 nm. 
The SRFEL had a repetition rate of 11 MHz, therefore two fluorescence images were 
captured by the 100-ns window of the streak camera. 
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Fig. 11. Spectral profile of the fluorescence emission after consecutively exciting the three 
absorption channels of Ce:LLF with the SRFEL tuned at 243 nm and 216 nm and by the 290-
nm emission of a Ti:sapphire laser. Transition from the 4f25d excited state configuration to 
the 4f3 ground state configuration of Ce3+ resulted to two fluorescence peaks, one at 308 nm 
and the other at 329 nm. 
Two peaks, 308 nm and 326 nm, were also observed for the 216 nm SRFEL excitation, as 
shown in Fig. 11 (blue line). Since the emission was also influenced by the Ce3+ doping, 
these fluorescence peaks were similar to the 243-nm excitation case wherein the fluorescence 
peaks were located at 308 nm and 329 nm where the transition was from the lowest energy 
level of the 4f25d excited state configuration to the 2F5/2 and 2F7/2 energy levels of the 4f3 
ground state configuration.  
 
Fig. 12. Energy level diagram of Ce3+ in Ce:LLF. Two emission peaks originate from the 
transitions from the lowest 4f25d excited states to the 2F2/5 (308 nm emission) and 2F7/2 (329 
nm emission). 
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Fig. 13. Temporal profile showing fluorescence lifetimes for the 243 nm (SRFEL), 216 nm 
(SRFEL), and 290 nm (Ti:sapphire) excitation. These values are fast enough for ignition 
timing in fast-ignition, inertial confinement nuclear fusion using laser. 
The fluorescence of the same sample was also measured when a 290-nm, fs excitation laser 
was used. The spectral profile is shown in Fig. 11 as well. Similar to the results of the SRFEL-
excited fluorescence spectrum, peaks at 308 nm and 325 nm were observed. This similarity is 
indicative that the transitions brought about by the Ce3+ doping has a relatively flat spectral 
response across its absorption bands regardless of the excitation source, therefore making 
Ce:LLF as an attractive scintillator material for various excitation sources.  
The fluorescence decay times for the three excitation wavelengths are shown in Fig. 13. The 
decay curves are single exponential with lifetimes of 32 ns, 37 ns, and 45 ns for the 243-nm, 
216-nm, and 290-nm excitation wavelengths, respectively. The variation of these 
fluorescence decay times is less than the temporal resolution of the streak camera system, 
and thus within measurement uncertainty. The average value of the fluorescence decay time 
is ~40ns. The relatively flat spectral response across its absorption bands makes Ce:LLF a 
viable scintillator material for various short-wavelength excitation sources. The fluorescence 
decay time of commercial scintillators, for example KG2 or GS2, is ~40 ns (Saint-Gobain 
Crystals, 2007-2008). Scintillation decay time of Ce:LLF might be a few ns slower, however, 
it is still acceptable for ignition timing in fast-ignition, inertial confinement nuclear fusion 
using laser. 
5.3 Other scintillators 
Fast scintillators, with response times in the nanosecond or even picosecond regime would 
play an important role in the advancement of radiation detection. For completeness, this 
section will discuss two solid-state materials that have been studied and have been shown to 
have potential as fast scintillators.  
5.3.1 Zinc oxide (ZnO) 
The feasibility of ZnO crystal as a fast scintillator in the ultraviolet (UV) and extreme 
ultraviolet (EUV) region is reported. Over the past decade, ZnO has been intensively 
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studied as a light emitting diode and as a nanostructured material with improved optical 
properties (Cao & Du, 2007; Hauschild et al., 2006; Ichimiya et al., 2006; Jen et al., 2005; Ohta 
et al., 2000; Qian et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2007; Yu & Cardona, 2001; Zhang et al., 2007). In 
relation to this, the hydrothermal method is a novel growth method suitable for growing 
various crystals, including oxides such as ZnO. This method is capable of producing high-
crystalline quality and large-sized homogeneous samples (Ohshima et al., 2004). The efficacy 
of a hydrothermal-method-grown ZnO crystal as a scintillator for UV region has been 
previously demonstrated (Furukawa et al., 2008; M. Tanaka et al., 2007; Nakazato et al., 
2009), wherein the reported decay time of the ZnO scintillator was 1ns for EUV excitation at 
13nm using Ag-plasma EUV laser. However, a faster response time is needed. In this 
section, an intentionally iron (Fe)-doped, hydrothermal-method-grown, ZnO crystal, is 
demonstrated to exhibit a response time faster by over one order of magnitude for soft x-ray 
pulsed excitation from the actual XFEL prototype (SPring-8 compact self amplification of 
spontaneous emission source [SCSS] test accelerator) at the SPring-8 research facility in 
RIKEN (Shimizu et al., 2010; Yamanoi et al., 2010).  
 
 
Fig. 14. Experimental setup for the measurement of the time resolved spectrum using the 
SCSS test accelerator (200-fs pulse duration, 10-Jpulse energy, and 20-Hz repetition rate at 
51–61nm). The sample was placed inside a vacuum chamber and excited by the EUV pulse 
from the SCSS test accelerator. The fluorescence was observed using a streak camera with 
the spectrograph. 
The faster response time of the ZnO scintillator in this work was achieved by modifying the 
previously reported hydrothermal method ZnO crystal growth (Ohshima et al., 2004). The 
growth modification was aimed to introduce other fluorescence quenching channels by 
intentional doping during growth. To do this, the platinum lining of the crystal growth 
container was removed to facilitate the intentional doping of Fe-ion impurities. Three-
dimensional-transition metals such as Fe in other semiconductor materials are known to 
play the role of lifetime-shortening impurity. The concentration of other impurities such as 
Li, K, and Al also increased, when the Pt lining was removed. However, the rate of increase 
in these metals is one order lower than that of Fe. Moreover, the contribution of these metals 
to the shortening of the lifetime is known to be smaller than that of transition metals. These 
results suggest that Fe is the main impurity. The sample was grown at a temperature of 300–
400°C and at 80–100 MPa pressure and the crystal was cut at the (0001) surface orientation. 
The density of Fe-ion impurities in this sample was 0.61ppm, which is more than two orders 
of magnitude higher compared to previous ZnO samples grown with the Pt lining. 
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Fig. 15. Streak camera image of the fluorescence from ZnO. This is a 50000-shot integrated 
signal excited by 56 nm. The vertical axis is wavelength (nanometer) and the horizontal axis 
is time (nanosecond). The dominant fluorescence peak was centered at around 380 nm. 
 
Fig. 16. Temporal profiles of the ZnO fluorescence excited by (a) 51nm, (b) 56nm, and (c) 61 
nm. The observed profiles can be fitted by double exponential decays described as I=A1 
exp(−t/1)+A2 exp(−t/2) (dotted line). The fitting parameters are A1 =0.75, A2 =0.25, 1 
=70ps, and 2 =222ps.The estimated instrumental function was plotted with a dot line in 
each graph. (d) Slit image (dotted line) and a calculated curve of a convolution of the slit 
image and a normal distribution function (solid line). 
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Initially, the response time of Fe-ion doped ZnO scintillator was evaluated using the third 
harmonics of a mode-locked Ti:sapphire femtosecond laser at 290nm. The typical band-to-
band ultraviolet fluorescence at 380nm was successfully observed, with a decay time of 
~80ps. This is significantly faster compared with the previously reported 1-ns decay time for 
the 380-nm fluorescence of undoped ZnO. The 1x1cm2, 0.5-mm thick double-side polished 
ZnO crystal was mounted in a vacuum chamber, and the third harmonics of a neodymium-
doped YAG (Nd:YAG) laser was initially used as excitation for alignment purposes. The 
sample was illuminated from the backside, in a counter propagation configuration with the 
beam path of the SCSS test accelerator, as shown in Fig. 14. The SCSS test accelerator having 
200-fs pulse duration, 10-µJpulse energy, and 20-Hz repetition rate, was focused by an 
oblique mirror (Mimura et al., 2008). With a mirror focal length of 1m, the spot size at the 
focus was about 20 µm. To minimize the risk of damage, however, the sample was placed 5 
cm away from focus, and the radius of the beam at this location was estimated to be 500 µm. 
The emission wavelength of the SCSS test accelerator can be tuned from 51 to 61 nm. 
Fluorescence was collected and focused to the entrance slit of a spectrograph using quartz 
lenses. The fluorescence spectrum and the lifetime of the ZnO sample were measured using 
a 25-cm focal-length spectrograph (groovedensity600gr/mm) coupled to a streak camera 
unit (HAMAMATSUC1587) and a charge coupled device camera.  
The ZnO fluorescence, excited by light pulses of the SCSS test accelerator at 51, 56, and 61 
nm with 50000 shots was measured using the spectrograph coupled to the streak camera 
system. Figure 15 shows the streak camera image of the fluorescence using 56-nm excitation 
from the SCSS test accelerator. The dominant fluorescence peak was centered at around 380 
nm (Chen et al., 2000). The temporal profiles of this image at 51-, 56-, and61-nm excitation 
are shown in Figs. 16(a)–10(c), respectively. The measured decay profiles can be well-fitted 
to a double exponential decay with time constants of 70 and 222 ps for the fast and slow 
decay-time constants, respectively. These two decay constants have been previously 
reported in several works involving UV-excited ZnO single crystals, where the fast decay 
time is attributed to the lifetime of free excitons, while the slower decay time is assigned to 
trapped carriers (Wilkinson et al., 2004). This measured response time is currently the fastest 
for a scintillator operating in the 50–60 nm region. In addition, the fluorescence intensity and 
time decay profile appears to be independent of the excitation wavelength within the 50–60 
nm range. This flat response makes the Fe-doped ZnO scintillator ideal for operation both 
for UV and in soft x-ray excitation schemes.  
5.3.2 Neodymium-doped lanthanum fluoride (Nd3+:LaF3) 
Scintillators in the vacuum ultraviolet (VUV) region are continuously being developed for 
various applications. In this section, the scintillation properties of Nd3+:LaF3 is discussed. 
Characterization was performed by exciting the sample with the third harmonics of a 
Ti:sapphire regenerative amplifier having 1-KHz repetition rate, 10-J pulse energy, and 
200-fs pulse duration. The excitation wavelength in this case is at 290 nm; while the reported 
fluorescence wavelength of Nd3+:LaF3 is at 175 nm. With the unavailability of ultrashort-
pulse EUV sources, we attempt to demonstrate the scintillation properties of this crystal for 
ultrafast excitation using possibly a multiphoton process. Spectroscopic studies have 
revealed that the absorption edge of this crystal is at ~168 nm (Nakazato et al., 2010a). 
Pulses were focused by a 20-cm lens onto the sample inside a vacuum chamber. A VUV 
spectrometer and streak camera system was used to evaluate fluorescence from this sample. 
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The streak camera image of fluorescence is shown in Fig. 17 (a). The streak camera image of 
the 290-nm, fs excitation is also shown in the same figure as Fig. 17 (b) for reference. On the 
other hand, the spectral and temporal profile obtained by sweeping across the vertical axis 
is shown in Fig. 18. The fluorescence peak is centered at around 175 nm with a decay time of 
about 7.1 ns.  
The absorption spectrum of the sample from 200 to 400 nm revealed the presence of 
multiple absorption bands, particularly at 290 nm. Moreover, the slope of fluorescence 
intensity as a function of pump fluence was experimentally verified to be equal to unity. In 
this aspect, frequency up-conversion by energy transfer could have been the governing 
mechanism [3], owing to the absorption band at 290 nm. Since fluorides have low phonon 
energies, the lifetimes of intermediate levels are long enough (order of μs) for the 
accumulation of electrons in an intermediate excited state. Existing solid-state, inorganic 
scintillators in the ultraviolet region typically have decay times of a few tens of 
nanoseconds. As such, the Nd3+:LaF3 fluorescence decay time of about 7.1 ns would be 
among the fastest solid-state, inorganic scintillators. 
 
 
 
Fig. 17. (a) Streak camera image of fluorescence from a cuboid Nd3+:LaF3 excited by 290-nm 
femtosecond pulses shown in (b).  
 
 
 
Fig. 18. (a) Spectral and (b) temporal profiles of the fluorescence shown in Fig. 17 (a). 
(a) (b)
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6. Conclusion  
In the field of fusion research, understanding the plasma dynamics could very well be the key 
in feasibly attaining controlled fusion. The time-resolved fluorescence spectra of Ce:LLF when 
excited by SRFEL tuned at 243 nm and 216 nm and by the 290-nm emission of a Ti:sapphire 
laser were measured to determine the feasibility of using this material as a scintillator for fast-
ignition laser fusion. Two peaks were observed, one at 308 and another at 329 nm, which can 
be attributed to transitions from the lowest energy level of the 4f25d excited state configuration 
to one of the two energy levels in the 4f3 ground state configuration of Ce3+. The relatively flat 
spectral and temporal response across its absorption bands makes Ce:LLF an attractive 
scintillator material for various excitation sources. Scintillation decay time of Ce:LLF might be 
few ns slower, however, it is still acceptable for measurements of ignition timing in fast-
ignition, inertial confinement nuclear fusion using laser.  
In response to the need for a fast-response scintillator for precise time-resolved radiation 
measurement, we have succeeded in developing a fast-response 6Li glass scintillator 
material suitable for scattered neutron diagnostics of the ICF plasma, with a response time 
of about 20 ns. Using this custom-developed material, fusion-originated neutrons were 
successfully observed using the GEKKO XII laser at the Institute of Laser Engineering, 
Osaka University. These results could pave the way for a new class of scintillator devices, 
optimized for neutron detection. In particular, after proper growth and device design 
considerations are carried out, future discrimination between primary and low-energy 
scattered neutrons using this material could be realized.  
Due to the increasing demand for scintillators with fast response time, several materials are 
currently being investigated. In this aspect, vacuum ultraviolet fluorescence from a 
Nd3+:LaF3 crystal excited by 290 nm femtosecond pulses from a Ti:sapphire laser is reported. 
Peak emission at 175 nm with 7 ns lifetime is observed. This decay time would be one of the 
fastest among fluoride scintillators. On the other hand, a hydrothermal-method grown ZnO 
scintillator exhibited an over one-order of magnitude faster response time by intentional Fe 
ion doping. The rise and decay time constants of the fluorescence are measured to be less 
than 10 ps and 100 ps, respectively. Its fluorescence is also sufficiently bright to be detected 
by a streak-camera system even in single shot mode without any accumulation.  
Meanwhile, mapping of radiation sources is very useful to detect and characterize invisible 
radiation accidents and/or radioactive contamination. For this purpose, bundles composed 
of well-designed and regularly arranged scintillation fiber-segments or thin cylinders have 
been developed to detect and display the radiation sources as a map, using the directional 
sensitivity of the segments or cylinders for locating sources of incident radiation. In this 
case, the more important attribute would be scintillation intensity, regardless of decay time, 
since available moving picture systems are usually 30 frames per second. A bundle 
composed of several kinds of thin cylinder or fiber segment scintillators has appropriate 
sensitivity for several kinds of incident radiation and thus serves as a panchromatic 
detector; whereas a bundle made from a single type of scintillator functions as a 
monochromatic detector. By combining several types of scintillating elements into a bundle, 
we have developed a “panchromatic” detector that is suitable for use against radiation from 
different types of sources. 
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Simulation of Ex-Vessel Steam Explosion 
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1. Introduction  
A steam explosion is a type of a fuel-coolant interaction (FCI), which results from the rapid 
and intense heat transfer that may follow the interaction between the molten material and 
the coolant (Berthoud, 2000; Corradini et al., 1988; Sehgal et al., 2008; Turland and Dobson, 
1996). Such an interaction can occur when the melt is poured into the coolant, when the 
coolant is injected into the melt or when the melt and the coolant interact as stratified layers. 
As seen in Fig. 1, the steam explosion phenomenon is divided into the premixing and 
explosion phase. The explosion phase is further commonly divided into the triggering, 
propagation and expansion phases. The premixing phase covers the interaction of the melt 
with the coolant prior the steam explosion. At the interaction the coolant vaporizes around 
the melt-coolant interface, creating a vapour film (i.e. film boiling regime due to high melt 
temperature). The system may remain in the meta-stable state for a period ranging from a 
tenth of a second up to a few seconds. During this time the continuous melt (e.g. jet) is 
fragmented into melt droplets of the order of several mm in diameter, which may be further 
fragmented by the coarse break up process into melt droplets of the order of mm in 
diameter. If during the meta-stable state a local vapour film destabilization occurs, the steam 
explosion may be triggered due to the melt-coolant contact. A spontaneous destabilization 
could occur due to random processes or other reasons, e.g. when the melt contacts 
surrounding structures or if the water entrapped in the melt is rapidly vaporised. The 
destabilization can be induced artificially by applying an external trigger (e.g. chemical 
explosion, high pressure gas capsule). The destabilization causes the fine fragmentation of 
the melt droplets into fragments of the order of some 10 µm in diameter. The fine 
fragmentation process rapidly increases the melt surface area, vaporizing more coolant and 
increasing the local vapour pressure. This fast vapour formation due to the fine 
fragmentation spatially propagates throughout the melt-coolant mixture causing the whole 
region to become pressurized by the coolant vapour. If the concentration of the melt in the 
mixture is large enough and enough coolant is available, then the propagation velocity of 
the interaction front may rapidly escalate and the interaction may be sustained by energy 
released behind the interaction front. Subsequently, the high pressure region behind the 
interaction front expands and performs work on its surrounding. The time scale for the 
steam explosion phase itself is in the order of ms.  
Major limitations of the steam explosion strength are due to: 
 The limitation of the mass of the melt in the premixture. The mass of the melt in the 
premixture is limited due to the incomplete melt inflow and the incomplete melt 
fragmentation. 
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 The void production in the premixing phase. The presence of void hinders the steam 
explosion propagation and escalation due to the void compressibility and due to water 
depletion. 
 The melt solidification during the premixing phase. The fine fragmentation during the 
explosion phase is limited due to the solidification of melt droplets. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of the processes during the steam explosion phenomenon, 
starting with the melt pour into the coolant. 
1.1 Steam explosion issue and nuclear safety 
A steam explosion may occur during a hypothetical core melt accident in a light water 
reactor (LWR) nuclear power plant, when the molten corium interacts with the water 
(Corradini et al., 1988; Sehgal, 2006; Sehgal et al., 2008; Theofanous, 1995). Potentially severe 
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dynamic loadings on surrounding systems, structures and components could be induced by 
pressure peaks in the order of 100 MPa and duration in the order of ms. Steam explosions 
can therefore jeopardize the reactor vessel and the containment integrity (Esmaili and 
Khatib-Rahbar, 2005). Direct or by-passed loss of the containment integrity can lead to 
radioactive material release into the environment, threatening the safety of the general 
public. Consequently, the understanding of the steam explosion phenomenon is very 
important for nuclear safety. 
As seen in Fig.2, several FCI situations in LWR were identified in which a steam explosion 
could occur (Sehgal et al., 2008). An in-vessel FCI could occur when the molten corium is 
poured into water in the lower head of the reactor pressure vessel (poured FCI) or when the 
relocated melt in the lower head is flooded (stratified FCI). In-vessel FCI may result in a 
steam explosion which causes the failure of the upper or lower head of the pressure vessel. 
When the molten corium melts through the vessel, the melt is poured into the cavity. An ex-
vessel steam explosion can occur if the cavity is already filled with water (poured FCI) or if 
the cavity is flooded after the relocation of the melt in the cavity (stratified FCI).  
 
 
Fig. 2. Various FCI scenarios in LWR reactors. 
In the past, the issue of in-vessel steam explosions causing the upper head failure of the 
reactor vessel was mainly concerned in LWR (WASH-1400, 1975). In this so called alpha 
mode containment failure it is considered that the ejected upper head could endanger the 
containment integrity. International reviews of the alpha mode failure probability and 
experimental investigations have indicated that the upper head and bolts can withstand the 
in-vessel steam explosion (Corradini et al., 1988; Krieg et al., 2003; Sehgal et al., 2008). 
The importance of the poured in-vessel and ex-vessel steam explosions was recognized also 
by the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), which started 
the SERENA (Steam Explosion Resolution for Nuclear Applications) Phase 1 research 
programme in the year 2002 (OECD/NEA, 2007). The objective of the SERENA programme 
was to evaluate the capabilities of FCI codes in predicting steam explosion induced loads, 
reaching consensus on the understanding of important FCI processes relevant to the reactor 
simulations, and to propose confirmatory research to bring the predictability of steam 
explosion energetics to required levels for risk management. Two main outcomes were 
obtained. First, the calculated loads are far below the capacity of a typical intact reactor 
vessel in case of an in-vessel steam explosion. However, for ex-vessel poured steam 
explosions the programme outcome was that the calculated loads are partly above the 
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capacity of typical reactor cavity walls. But due to the large scatter of the simulation results, 
which reflects the deficiency in the steam explosion phenomenon understanding and 
uncertainties on modelling and scaling, the safety margins for ex-vessel steam explosions 
could not be quantified reliably. To resolve the remaining open issues on the FCI processes 
and their effect on ex-vessel steam explosion energetics, the SERENA Phase 2 was launched 
at the end of the year 2007  (OECD/NEA, 2008). The main objective is to reduce the 
uncertainties on the coolant void and the material effect in FCI. The second phase comprises 
an experimental and an analytical program. The aim of the experimental program is to 
clarify the nature of prototypic material having mild steam explosion characteristics and to 
provide innovative experimental data for code validation, aiming to reduce the scatter of 
code predictions and to enhance the geometrical extrapolation capabilities of FCI codes to 
cover reactor situations. The aim of the comprehensive analytical program is to increase the 
capability of FCI models and codes for use in reactor analyses. 
Due to the high risk significance of the steam explosion phenomenon for the containment 
integrity, the ex-vessel FCI issue is one of the six high priority safety issues, which were 
identified in the EU (European Union) network of excellence SARNET (Severe Accident 
Research NETwork of Excellence) Phase 1 (Albiol et al., 2008; Schwinges et al., 2010). The 
purpose of the SARNET network of excellence, which was founded in the year 2004, is to 
integrate European research capabilities on severe accidents in order to enhance the safety 
for the existing and future nuclear power plants. In the beginning of the year 2009 the 
follow-up SARNET Phase 2 was started. The purpose of the second phase is to focus on 
those safety issues, which were classified with high priority in the first phase. Beside the 
issue of ex-vessel FCI also the issues of the corium and debris coolability, the molten 
corium-concrete interaction, the hydrogen mixing and combustion in the containment and 
the source term are investigated. 
The issue of stratified steam explosions is not considered being as important as steam 
explosions occurring after the pouring of the melt into water. Namely, the mass of the melt 
which can participate in the mixing process is limited in stratified cases if compared with 
the premixture melt mass in pouring cases (Sehgal et al., 2008). 
The final goal of the FCI research related to nuclear safety is to bring the predictability of the 
steam explosion strength to required levels for the risk assessment in LWR. This is necessary 
for the risk management to be able to implement the optimal severe accident management 
approaches (e.g. flooding of reactor cavity, in-vessel retention, core catcher). 
This chapter focuses on the simulation of poured ex-vessel steam explosions, which are of 
greatest interest. With the FCI code MC3D (Meignen and Picchi, 2005) different scenarios of 
ex-vessel steam explosions in a typical pressurized water reactor cavity were analyzed to get 
additional insight in the ex-vessel steam explosion behaviour and the resulting pressure 
loads. A parametric study was performed varying the location of the melt release (central, 
right and left side melt pour), the cavity water subcooling, the primary system overpressure 
at vessel failure and the triggering time for explosion calculations. The main purpose of the 
study was to establish the influence of the varied parameters on the FCI behaviour, to 
determine the most challenging cases and to estimate the expected pressure loadings on the 
cavity walls. For the most challenging central, right side and left side melt pour scenarios, 
according to the performed simulations, a detailed analysis of the explosion simulation 
results was performed. In addition, the influence of the jet breakup modelling and the melt 
droplets solidification on the FCI process was analyzed. 
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First, the applied FCI modelling approach is described and the analyzed ex-vessel FCI 
scenarios are given. Then the various premixing and explosion phase simulation results are 
presented and the most challenging cases established. For the most challenging cases a more 
detailed analysis is provided. Finally, for the most challenging central melt pour case the 
influence of the jet breakup modelling and the melt droplets solidification on the simulation 
results is analyzed and discussed.  
2. Modelling 
The simulations were performed with the MC3D computer code, which is being developed 
by IRSN, France (Meignen and Picchi, 2005). MC3D is a multidimensional Eulerian code 
devoted to study multiphase and multi-constituent flows in the field of nuclear safety. It has 
been built with the FCI calculations in mind. It is, however, able to calculate very different 
situations and has a rather wide field of potential applications. MC3D is a set of two FCI 
codes with a common numeric solver, one for the premixing phase and one for the 
explosion phase (i.e. triggering phase, propagation phase and initial stage of expansion 
phase). In general, the steam explosion simulation with MC3D is being carried out in two 
steps. In the first step, the distributions of the melt, water and vapour phases at steam 
explosion triggering are calculated with the premixing module. And in the succeeding 
second step, the escalation and propagation of the steam explosion through the premixture 
are calculated with the explosion module, using the premixing simulation results as initial 
conditions and applying a trigger. 
The MC3D premixing module focuses on the modelling of the molten fuel jet, its 
fragmentation into large drops, the coarse fragmentation of these drops and the heat 
transfer between the melt and the coolant (Meignen, 2005). The fuel is described by two 
fields, the “continuous” fuel field (e.g. fuel jet or molten pool) and the “droplets” fuel field 
(melt droplets), considering the possible continuous or dispersed state of the fuel. The fuel is 
transferred between both fields during jet breakup and coalescence. In MC3D two jet 
breakup models are provided, a global model and a local model. In the global model the jet 
fragmentation rate is deduced from the comparison to a standard case (i.e. typical 
conditions in FARO experiments (Magallon and Huhtiniemi, 2001)) and the size of the 
created droplets is a user parameter. In the local model the jet fragmentation rate and the 
size of the created droplets are calculated based on local velocities applying the Kelvin 
Helmholtz instability model. Since the local model is very sensitive and in the process of 
being improved, the reference calculations were performed using the global jet breakup 
model. The diameter of the created droplets was set to 4 mm, what is the typical size of the 
melt droplets in the FARO experiments (Magallon and Huhtiniemi, 2001). 
The explosion module focuses on the fine fragmentation of the melt droplets, generated 
during premixing, and the heat exchange between the produced fragments and the coolant 
(Meignen, 2005). In this module the “continuous” fuel field is not present, but there are two 
fields related to the dispersed fuel, i.e. the “droplets” fuel field and the “fragments” fuel 
field. During the fine fragmentation process the fuel is transferred from the “droplets” field 
to the “fragments” field. Both fine fragmentation processes, i.e. thermal fragmentation, 
resulting from the destabilization of the vapour film around the melt droplets, and 
hydrodynamic fragmentation, resulting from the velocity differences between the melt 
droplets and the surrounding medium, are considered. The diameter of the created 
fragments, which is a user parameter, was set to the code standard value 100 µm, which is 
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based on KROTOS experiments (Huhtiniemi et al., 1999). The explosion is triggered by 
applying a user defined initial local pressure pulse. The trigger pressure was set to 2 MPa 
and prescribed to a single mesh cell, as explained in Section 3.1. Simulations showed that the 
triggering strength has no significant influence on the explosion strength, once the trigger is 
strong enough that it can trigger the explosion. 
In MC3D it is conservatively assumed that the melt droplets are completely molten if their 
bulk temperature is higher than the corium solidus temperature. This overpredicts the 
ability of corium droplets to efficiently participate in the explosion, since in reality, during 
premixing, a crust is formed on the corium droplets before the droplet bulk temperature 
drops below the solidus temperature (Huhtiniemi et al., 1999; Dinh, 2007). This crust 
inhibits the fine fragmentation process and if the crust is thick enough it completely 
prevents it. 
To be able to perform a series of simulations of different ex-vessel steam explosion 
scenarios, the reactor cavity was modelled in a simplified 2D geometry, as is common 
practise (Meignen et al., 2003; Kawabata, 2004; Esmaili and Khatib-Rahbar, 2005; Moriyama 
et al., 2006; OECD/NEA, 2007). The 2D geometry has to be appropriately defined to assure 
that the 2D simulation results reflect qualitatively and quantitatively as closely as possible 
the conditions in a real 3D reactor cavity. Therefore, the simulations were performed with 
two different 2D representations of a typical pressurized water reactor cavity: the 2D axial 
symmetric model (Fig. 3) and the 2D slice model (Fig. 4). The 2D axial symmetric model is 
limited on the treatment of axial symmetric phenomena in the cylindrical part of the reactor 
cavity directly below the reactor pressure vessel and around it. Consequently, the venting 
through the instrument tunnel cannot be directly considered, and therefore conservatively 
was not considered. Contrary to the axial symmetric model, which treats only part of the  
 
Reactor pressure vessel
Reactor cavity wall
 
Fig. 3. Geometry and mesh of 2D axial symmetric model of reactor cavity for central melt 
pour. The scales in horizontal and vertical directions are different.  
 
Simulation of Ex-Vessel Steam Explosion 
 
213 
reactor cavity, the 2D slice model treats the whole reactor cavity. However it does not take 
into account the 3D geometry and the 3D nature of the phenomena. So the cylindrical part of 
the reactor cavity and the cylindrical reactor pressure vessel are not treated as cylinders but 
as planparallel infinite plates. A similar approach was applied by Esmaili and Khatib-
Rahbar (2005). In the 2D slice model the height of the cavity opening on the left side (Fig. 4) 
was adjusted to match the opening area per reactor cavity width of the real 3D reactor cavity 
geometry. 
The cavity geometry and dimensions were set in accordance with a typical pressurized 
water reactor cavity. In the models the dimensions of the cavity are: length x ≈ 10.5 m, 
radius of cylindrical part r ≈ 2.5 m, height z ≈ 13 m, and the mesh sizes are: 2D axial 
symmetric model—25×35 cells (Fig. 3), 2D slice model: right side melt pour—62×39 cells and 
left side melt pour—77×39 cells (Fig. 4). In regions, which are more important for the 
modelling of the FCI phenomena, the numerical mesh was adequately refined; therefore the 
meshes for the right and left side melt pour are not identical (Fig. 4). The initial pressure in 
the domain was set to the containment pressure and a constant pressure boundary condition 
at the cavity openings was applied.  
 
Right wall
Middle
wall
Left wall
 
Fig. 4. Geometry and mesh of 2D slice model of reactor cavity for left and right side melt 
pour. The scales in horizontal and vertical directions are different.  
3. Simulation 
3.1 Simulated cases 
In the performed ex-vessel steam explosion study, a spectrum of relevant scenarios has been 
analyzed to establish the influence and importance of different accident conditions on the 
FCI outcome and to eventually capture the most severe steam explosions. The simulations 
have been performed in two steps. In the first step, the premixing phase of the FCI process 
has been simulated for selected scenarios and then, in the succeeding second step, the 
explosion phase simulations have been performed by triggering the so established 
premixtures at different times. 
As revealed in the MASCA experiments, the melt pool in the lower head may gradually 
stratify in three layers of different melt composition, i.e. a molten oxidic pool with a light 
metal layer on top and a heavy metal layer below (Seiler et al., 2007). Therefore the 
composition of the poured melt is expected to depend on the location of the reactor vessel 
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failure. The melt composition has an important influence on the triggerability and the 
energetics of the steam explosion (Huhtiniemi et al., 1999; Corradini, 1991). This material 
effect is still not understood in detail, and the uncertainties in its modelling and scaling are 
large. Therefore a conservative approach was applied, comprising artificial triggering and 
neglecting the inhibiting effects of the melt droplets crust formation on the fine 
fragmentation process, as explained in Section 2. Beside the melt composition, also the melt 
temperature is expected to depend on the vessel failure location. The temperature of the 
molten oxidic pool is estimated to be around 3000 K (OECD/NEA, 2007), whereas the 
temperature of the metal layer on top is estimated to be around 2100 K (Esmaili and Khatib-
Rahbar, 2005). The melt temperature defines the thermal energy, which is potentially 
available to be partially transferred to mechanical work during the steam explosion. Due to 
modelling uncertainties and uncertainties in the composition and temperature of the poured 
melt it was however decided to perform all simulations with the same melt composition, i.e. 
the standard MC3D oxidic corium (Table 1), and the same initial melt temperature of 
3000 K. By this the influence of the varied parameters may be established more directly. 
The premixing phase simulations have been performed for the cases presented in Table 2. 
The initial conditions were set reasonably according to expected conditions at vessel failure 
during a severe accident in a typical pressurized water reactor. They are comparable to the 
conditions used in the ex-vessel reactor simulations in the OECD programme SERENA 
phase 1, where a central melt pour was analyzed (OECD/NEA, 2007). Central and side melt 
pours were considered and a parametric analysis was performed varying the primary 
system overpressure (0 MPa, 0.2 MPa) and the water temperature (60–100 °C). The water 
saturation temperature at the assumed 0.15 MPa containment pressure is 111.4 °C, so the 
cavity water subcooling was in the range of 11.4–51.4 K. The simulated cases were denoted 
with three designators defined in Table 2 (e.g. case C2-60 is a central melt pour at 0.2 MPa 
primary system overpressure into cavity water with a temperature 60 °C). 
 
Property Value 
Liquidus temperature 2800 K 
Solidus temperature 2700 K 
Latent heat 3.608×105 J/kg 
Specific heat—liquid 520 J/kg/K 
Specific heat—solid 380 J/kg/K 
Density 8000 kg/m3 
Thermal conductivity 2.88 W/m/K 
Dynamic viscosity 0.008 Pa/s 
Table 1. Physical properties of applied standard MC3D oxidic corium. 
The premixing phase was simulated 10 s after the start of the melt release. For each 
premixing simulation, a number of explosion simulations were performed triggering the 
explosion at different times. The explosion triggering times (Table 3) were selected so that 
the most important stages of the case specific melt releases were captured. In the central 
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melt pour cases with 0.2 MPa primary system overpressure (C2), when most melt was 
released from the reactor vessel, gas started to flow out of the vessel opening and dispersing 
the melt jet. To capture this phenomenon the explosion was triggered also at that time. The 
side melt pour cases with a depressurized primary system (R0, L0) were not triggered before 
1.5 s, since about 1 s was needed for the melt to reach the water surface. 
 
 
Parameter Value Designator 
Melt composition Standard MC3D oxidic corium (properties presented in Table 1) / 
Melt temperature 3000 K / 
Melt level 1.25 m / 
Melt mass 50 t / 
Free fall 0.44 m / 
Water level 3 m / 
Cavity radius 2.5 m / 
Annulus thickness 0.11 m / 
Containment pressure 0.15 MPa / 
   
Melt pour location Central (Fig. 3) C 
 Right (Fig. 4) R 
 Left (Fig. 4) L 
   
Reactor vessel opening size Central pour: radius 0.2 m Side pour: height 0.2 m / 
   
Primary system overpressure 0 MPa 0 
 0.2 MPa 2 
   
Water temperature 100 °C (11.4 K subcooling) 100 
 80 °C (31.4 K subcooling) 80 
 60 °C (51.4 K subcooling) 60 
   
Melt volume flow rate for central pour 
(estimated) 
0.62 m3/s (0 bar overpressure) 
1.08 m3/s (2 bar overpressure) / 
   
Melt velocity at water contact for 
central pour (estimated) 
5.75 m/s (0 bar overpressure) 
9.12 m/s (2 bar overpressure) / 
 
Table 2. Initial conditions for simulated premixing cases (also some estimations of the melt 
volume flow rate and the melt velocity at water contact are provided). 
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In addition to the triggering times listed in Table 3, for each simulated premixing case the 
explosions were triggered also at additional times when the calculated explosivity criteria 
were the highest. The explosivity criteria were based on the volume of liquid melt drops in 
contact with water as 
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where the symbols l , g , d  denote the liquid water, void and liquid melt droplets 
volume fractions, and cV  is the mesh cell volume. The explosivity criteria actually represent 
the volume of liquid melt drops in cells where the water content is high enough that the 
melt may efficiently participate in the steam explosion, and so are a good measure for the 
expected strength of the steam explosion. In this way it was tried to capture the strongest 
steam explosions. For the most explosive central melt pour case, e.g. case C2-60 (presented 
in the next section), a series of explosion simulations were performed triggering the 
explosion every 0.2 s during the whole simulated premixing duration in order to get a better 
insight in the influence of the triggering time on the steam explosion outcome. The 
explosion phase was simulated 0.1 s after triggering, capturing the significant loading 
events. The explosion was triggered in the cell, where the local cell explosivity criterion 2 
(Eq. 1) was the highest (Meignen and Picchi, 2005). 
 
 
Cases Triggering times (s) 
C0 0.5 1 / 2 / 5 / 10 
C2 0.5 1 / 2 / 5 6.5 10 
R0, L0 / / 1.5 2 3 5 / 10 
R2, L2 0.5 1 / 2 3 5 / 10 
Table 3. Triggering times for explosion phase simulations. 
3.2 Simulation results 
The premixing and explosion simulations were performed with the code MC3D version 
3.5 with patch 1 on a network of PC computers with Windows operating system, having 
altogether about 30 processors, using the Condor distributed computing system. So a 
number of simulations could be performed simultaneously, each simulation running on 
its own processor. To establish the best model parameters enabling stable calculations, 
first a number of test simulations were performed. In Table 4 some computing 
information regarding stability and CPU times of simulations is provided. The water 
subcooling had the largest influence on the stability of the simulations. At a water 
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temperature of 50 °C (subcooling ~60 K), the premixing simulations diverged already 
shortly after melt-water contact. The stability of premixing simulations could be 
significantly increased by increasing the minimum bubble diameter from the default 0.5 
mm to higher values, whereas this did not work for explosion simulations. So, if the 
premixing simulations did not converge, the minimum bubble diameter was increased 
gradually (to 1 mm, 2 mm) up to 5 mm, where most of the problematic simulations 
remained stable over the whole simulation time. By increasing the minimum bubble 
diameter, the surface area for condensation in subcooled conditions is reduced and so the 
heat transfer terms are less stiff, which has a benevolent influence on the numerical 
stability. Since the minimum bubble diameter influences the physics of the bubbly flow 
regime and the subsequent explosion phase, it was strived to perform the simulations 
with an as small as possible reasonable minimum bubble diameter. 
In Fig. 5, the calculated explosivity criteria (Eq. 1) during premixing are presented for 
some representative simulated cases. In general, the explosivity criteria are highest in the 
beginning of the simulation, when the melt jet enters the water and the void build up is 
still low (Figs. 3 and 4). The later evolution of the explosivity criteria however is case 
specific. In the depressurized central cases (C0, Fig. 5a) and the pressurized side cases (R2 
and L2, Figs. 5d and 5f) the explosivity criteria remain low until the end of the simulation 
due to the void buildup. In the pressurized side cases the explosivity criteria at later 
stages are additionally reduced since after about 3 s the melt level in the reactor vessel is 
reduced to the lower boundary of the vessel opening and so only small amounts of melt 
are ejected from the vessel after that time. In the pressurized central cases (C2, Fig. 5b), 
after about 5 s when most of the melt is already released from the vessel, gas starts to flow 
with high velocity out of the reactor vessel and dispersing the melt jet. Due to the 
increased melt dispersal, more melt droplets are created, what results in an increase of the 
explosivity criteria (Fig. 5b). In the depressurized side cases (R0 and L0, Fig. 5c and 5e), 
more explosivity criteria peaks occur during the melt release since, due to the pressure 
buildup in the reactor cavity, the melt outflow from the reactor vessel is interrupted and 
so the melt release occurs in intervals. Each melt release interval produces one explosivity 
criteria peak. 
  
 
 
Parameter Stability (more stable to less stable) 
CPU time 
(shorter time to longer time) 
Melt pour location Central > Right > Left 
Central < Right < Left 
Premixing: C: ~day, L: 
~week 
Explosion: C: ~hour, L: ~day 
Primary system 
overpressure 0 bar > 2 bar / 
Water temperature 100 °C > 80 °C > 60 °C / 
 
Table 4. Stability and CPU times of performed simulations. 
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e)  L0-60 (most explosive left side case) f)  L2-60 (diverged after 5.06 s) 
 
 
Fig. 5. Explosivity criteria during premixing for representative central (top), right (middle) 
and left (bottom) pour cases at a depressurized (left) and pressurized (right) primary 
system. 
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In Fig. 6, the calculated maximum pressures in the cavity and maximum pressure impulses 
(integral of pressure over simulation time) at the cavity walls (cavity floor and vertical 
walls) are presented for the performed explosion phase simulations. The time axis denotes 
the explosion triggering times. In the calculation of the pressure impulses, the initial 
containment pressure was subtracted from the calculated absolute pressure since the 
dynamic pressure loads on the cavity walls are caused by the pressure difference. For some 
cases (e.g. case C0-60) more points are plotted at the same triggering time. This means that, 
in these cases, more premixing simulations were performed for the same conditions, using 
different minimum bubble diameters in the calculations, mostly due to convergence 
problems during premixing or later during the explosion simulation, and so on the figures 
the available explosion simulation results based on different premixing simulations are 
presented. By this an impression of the uncertainty of the calculation results may be 
obtained. The variation of the results for different minimum bubble diameters is quite large, 
e.g. in case C0-60 the variation of the maximum pressure and pressure impulse (Fig. 6a-b) 
for the triggering times around 1 s is up to a factor of two. It turns out that the influence of 
the minimum bubble diameter on the pressure loads is stochastic, what reveals the 
complexity of the FCI process. Some explosion simulations did not converge, and the results 
for these cases are consequently not presented in the graphs. 
The strength of the steam explosion depends on the mass of melt droplets, which can 
efficiently participate in the steam explosion – that is the mass of liquid melt droplets in 
regions with high water content. In Fig. 7 the mass of liquid melt droplets in regions with 
different void fractions is presented for the most explosive cases during premixing. In the 
side melt pour cases, represented by 2D slice models (Fig. 4), in the mass calculation a slice 
of 1 m thickness was considered, what corresponds to a side melt pour through a fish mouth 
opening with a length of about 1 m. During the premixing phase some tons of melt droplets 
are formed in the considered scenarios (curve “Total”). A significant amount of these melt 
droplets are frozen (compare curves “Total” and “<100%”) and so can not participate in the 
steam explosion since they are not able to undergo fine fragmentation. In addition, most of 
the liquid corium droplets are in regions with a high void content (compare curves “<100%” 
and “<60%”), whereas for the steam explosion development enough water has to be 
available for vaporization and for enabling the fine fragmentation process. It is estimated 
that the void fraction has to be at least below about 60% for a steam explosion escalation to 
develop. Despite these limiting factors, there are still (depending on scenario and triggering 
time) up to some hundreds of kilograms of liquid corium droplets available to participate in 
the energetic FCI process, resulting in severe pressure loads (Fig. 6). 
The pressure curves and pressure impulse curves (Fig. 6) are reasonably correlated to the 
corresponding explosivity criteria curves (Fig. 5) and mass of liquid melt droplets curves 
(Fig. 7), as was expected. The results for the central melt pour cases show that, in the 
initial stage of the melt pour, stronger explosions mainly occur for higher cavity water 
subcooling and higher melt pour driving pressure. The reason for this could be that 
higher water subcooling results in less void build up and that higher driving pressure 
increases the melt fragmentation. On the contrary, at the later stage of the simulations, 
stronger explosions mainly occur for lower water subcooling, probably due to less droplet 
solidification with lower water subcooling. But the influence of the water subcooling on 
the explosion strength is not very clear, indicating that in the considered subcooling range 
the effects of void build up and melt droplets solidification nearly compensate. The 
results of the side melt pour cases reveal that stronger explosions may be expected with a 
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Fig. 6. Calculated maximum pressures in the cavity (left) and maximum pressure impulses 
at the cavity walls (right) for performed explosion phase simulations. The time axis denotes 
the explosion triggering times. 
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depressurized primary system. The reason for this could be that with a pressurized 
primary system the melt is ejected sidewards on the cavity wall, sliding then into water at 
the wall, which hinders the formation of an extensive premixture. Moreover, with a 
pressurized system, already a tenth of a second after the start of the melt release gas starts 
to flow through the vessel opening into the cavity and pushes the water through the 
instrument tunnel out of the cavity, creating a highly voided region below the reactor 
vessel. For the side melt pour cases the influence of the water subcooling on the steam 
explosion strength seems to be somewhat stochastic, probably due to compensation 
effects of void buildup and melt droplets solidification in combination with the complex 
melt release dynamics. 
In general, the highest pressures and pressure impulses were reached in the initial stage of 
the melt release (Fig. 6, Table 5). The highest pressure was obtained in case C2-60 (nearly 
300 MPa) and the highest pressure impulse in case R0-80 (nearly 0.7 MPa·s). The maximum 
pressure and the maximum pressure impulse present only a rough measure of the steam 
explosion strength. To reveal the real damage potential of a steam explosion, the space and 
time development of the pressure field has to be analysed. Therefore for the most explosive 
central and side melt pour cases a detailed analysis was performed. As the criteria for 
establishing the most explosive cases, the maximum pressure impulse was taken (Table 5). 
For the central melt pour case the highest maximum pressure impulse was predicted for 
case C2-80, but since in case C2-60 the maximum pressure impulse is only slightly lower and 
remains high over a wide triggering time window (Fig. 6b), the latter was chosen for the 
detailed analysis. 
 
Pour location Maximum pressure Maximum impulse 
 p (MPa) Case I (MPa·s) Case 
C 293.7 C2-60 0.47 C2-80 
R 105.1 R0-60 0.66 R0-80 
L 116.1 L2-80 0.40 L0-60 
Table 5. Maximum pressures in the cavity and maximum pressure impulses at the cavity 
walls (cavity floor included) for different melt pour locations.  
3.3 Detailed analysis 
The detailed analysis of the explosion simulation results was performed for the most 
explosive central (C2-60), right side (R0-80) and left side (L0-60) melt pour cases. For each 
melt pour case the pressure field, the corium fraction and the liquid water fraction during 
the explosion were investigated in detail and the pressure development with corresponding 
pressure impulses at different wall locations was analyzed. Here only the main results are 
briefly presented. 
In the central melt pour case C2-60, soon after the triggering of the explosion a high pressure 
peak occurs in the centre of the cavity floor. This high pressure peak of short duration is 
created due to geometrical reasons, since the pressure field build up in the outer premixture 
region is focused in the central part of the cavity due to the applied 2D cylindrical geometry. 
Consequently this high pressure peak can not be considered as realistic for a 3D explosion. 
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a) Central melt pour: most explosive case C2-60 
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b) Left side pour: most explosive case L0-60 
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c) Right side pour: most explosive case R0-80 
Fig. 7. Mass of liquid corium droplets in regions with different void fractions during 
premixing. The results are presented for regions with a void fraction below 20% (<20%) up 
to regions with a void fraction below 100% (<100%). In addition also the total (liquid and 
solid) corium droplets mass is presented (Total).  
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The highest calculated pressure on the vertical wall is much lower, only up to about 35 MPa. 
The maximum pressure impulse on the vertical wall (0.22 MPa·s) is about half of that 
calculated in the centre of the cavity floor (0.41 MPa·s). In the right side melt pour case R0-80 
the highest pressure is reached at the bottom of the right wall (up to 46 MPa; see Fig. 4 for 
wall position), but it decreases quickly with height, so that at higher elevations the 
maximum pressure remains below 20 MPa. The whole cavity remains pressurized at around 
5 MPa at the end of the explosion simulation, and there is no indication of a pressure 
decrease. Therefore, the pressure impulses at the walls are very high (0.66 MPa·s on the right 
wall) and rise at the end of the simulation. In the left side melt pour case L0-60 the highest 
pressure, nearly 90 MPa, is achieved on the cavity floor below the middle wall, where the 
premixture conditions are most favourable for the steam explosion escalation. The peak 
pressures on the cavity walls are much lower, only about 23 MPa. Similar to the right side 
melt pour case, the cavity remains pressurized at nearly 5 MPa at the end of the explosion 
simulation, and there is no indication of a pressure decrease. However the highest 
calculated pressure impulses on the walls are lower (0.34 MPa·s on the right wall; see Fig. 4 
for wall position) due to the distance between the premixture, formed in the middle of the 
cavity, and the cavity walls. 
In Table 6 the maximum calculated pressures and pressure impulses at the vertical cavity 
walls are given for the most explosive central (C2-60), right side (R0-80) and left side (L0-60) 
melt pour scenarios. As expected, the maximum calculated vertical wall pressures are 
significantly lower than the maximum calculated pressures in the cavity (Table 5) since the 
pressure is reduced during the propagation from the explosion region to the cavity walls. 
The maximum pressure impulses are predicted on the cavity walls, which are closest to the 
explosion. For the central and left side pours this is the cavity floor, and for the right side 
pour this is the right wall. Therefore for the central and left side pours the maximum 
pressure impulses in Table 6 are lower than those in Table 5, where also the cavity floor was 
considered. This reduction is more expressive for the central pour than for the left side pour 
since due to the cylindrical geometry of the central pour the pressure wave weakens faster 
and venting is more efficient.  
The pressure impulses were calculated as the integral of the excess pressure (initial 
containment pressure subtracted) over the entire explosion simulation time. The planned 
explosion simulation time was 0.1 s, but due to stability problems some simulations stopped 
earlier, and in these cases consequently a shorter integration period had to be applied. The 
explosion simulation of the most explosive central pour case (C2-60, triggered at 1.4 s) was 
stable, but the most explosive right (R0-80, triggered at 2 s) and left (L0-60, triggered at 2 s) 
side pour calculations became unstable at about 0.08 s and 0.06 s, respectively, and so the 
corresponding pressure impulses consider this shorter periods. 
The pressure impulse is a good measure to estimate the destructive consequences of a steam 
explosion if it considers the period with significant loading events. The lasting pressure load 
capacity of a typical pressurized water reactor cavity is estimated to be of the order of some 
MPa (based on Meignen (2004) and Hessheimer (2006) it was roughly estimated that lasting 
pressures of about 3 MPa could cause some damage to the cavity). The cavity may 
withstand also higher pressures if their duration is short enough. In this case the 
experienced pressure impulse is the decisive factor (Smith, 1994). It is estimated that a 
pressure impulse of the order of some tens of kPa·s may induce some damage to the cavity 
(OECD/NEA, 2007). However it should be stressed that for an accurate assessment of the 
damage caused by a steam explosion the real pressure history has to be taken into account. 
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For the mutual comparison of calculation results it is mainly important that for the 
calculation of the pressure impulse the same integration period is used. But for the 
assessment of the damage potential, the pressure impulse is only meaningful if it is 
calculated over the period, when the pressure exceeds the lasting pressure load capacity of 
the cavity. Therefore in Table 6 also the estimated maximum pressure impulses considering 
only the period of significant loading, when the pressure exceeds about 5 MPa (set 
arbitrarily) are given. By setting the cut-off pressure to ~5 MPa and reasonably applying it, 
the long lasting cavity pressurization in the side pour cases was not taken into account in 
the pressure impulse calculation. It may be observed that also the so determined pressure 
impulses are high. In the central pour case the maximum “significant loading” pressure 
impulse builds up in the bottom region of the cylindrical wall, when the pressure shock 
reaches the wall soon after explosion triggering. In the right side pour case the maximum 
“significant loading” pressure impulse builds up at the right wall in the region below the 
annulus, when the phases mixture is violently pushed through it, and in the left side pour it 
builds up at the right wall, when the water is pushed in the region between the reactor 
vessel and the cavity wall. 
 
Pour location Maximum pressure Maximum impulse (MPa·s) 
 p (MPa) Entire simulation Significant loading 
C 36.3 0.22 (0.1 s) ~0.16 
R 45.7 0.66 (~0.08 s) ~0.56 
L 23.0 0.34 (~0.06 s) ~0.19 
Table 6. Maximum pressures and pressure impulses at the vertical cavity walls for different 
melt pour locations and different pressure integration periods. 
4. Sensitivity study 
For the most explosive central melt pour case C2-60 the influence of the jet breakup 
modelling and the melt droplets solidification on the FCI process was analyzed to get an 
impression about the uncertainty of the simulation results. 
4.1 Influence of jet breakup modelling 
In MC3D two jet breakup models are provided (Meignen and Picchi, 2005). The first model 
is a global model, which is based on the hypothesis that the fragmentation can be obtained 
through a correlation considering only the local physical properties of the fuel, liquid and 
vapour, whereas the local velocities have not to be calculated. The second model is a fully 
local model, which is based on the Kelvin-Helmholtz instability model considering also the 
local velocities. 
The global model is, strictly speaking, applicable only for single large very hot jets in a water 
pool, so that the fragmentation is due to the friction of the vapour film, whose characteristics 
are governed mainly by buoyant forces. The model was validated on FARO steam explosion 
tests (Magallon and Huhtiniemi, 2001), so extrapolations to situations far from those of 
FARO are questionable. In the model, the volumetric jet fragmentation rate to droplets is 
deduced from the comparison to a standard case as 
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where for the standard case typical FARO conditions are chosen: reference fragmentation 
rate 0 = 0.1 m3/m2/s, jet temperature 0T  = 3000 K, vapor viscosity ,0g  = 10-3 kg/m/s, jet 
density 0 = 8000 kg/m3 and jet surface tension 0 = 0.5 N·m. The diameter of the created 
drops is a user input parameter, with the default value of  dd = 4 mm. 
The local model is based on the Kelvin-Helmholtz instability model, which was modified to 
take into account the multiphase aspect. In the model the volumetric jet fragmentation rate 
is calculated with 
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where subscript j stands for the jet and subscript amb for the ambient fluid, which properties 
are calculated by different ways of averaging. fN  is the jet fragmentation parameter with 
an expected value between 1 and 6. Direct comparisons with FARO experiments lead to use 
fN = 2. In this model, the diameter of the created drops dd  is related to the wavelength   
of the instability, which is established from the wave number maxk  (Eq. 3)  
 
max
2, .d dd N k
    (4) 
dN  is the droplet diameter parameter with an expected value between 0.1 and 0.5; the 
recommend value, based on comparisons with FARO experiments, is dN = 0.2. 
In the sensitivity study, performed for the most explosive central melt pour case C2-60,  the 
global model with default parameters and the local model, using different values for the jet 
fragmentation and droplet diameter parameters, were applied. The performed simulation 
cases are presented in Table 7. 
In Fig. 8a the time evolution of the jet and droplets mass during the jet breakup is presented 
for the simulated cases, applying different jet breakup models and model parameters. As 
expected, the jet fragmentation rate depends on the jet fragmentation parameter (Eq. 3). In 
case KH-2_02, in the beginning of the simulation the jet fragmentation rate is about two 
times larger than in the simulation using the global jet breakup model. In case KH-1_10, the 
jet fragmentation rate is about the same as with the global model. In case KH-2_02 after 
about 2.5 s a sort of runaway jet breakup reaction starts, voiding the premixture and 
expelling the droplets through the annulus and vessel out of the simulation domain. 
Beside the mass of droplets in the premixture, an important FCI parameter is the size of 
droplets, since it determines the droplets surface area for heat transfer. In Fig. 8b the 
development of the droplets mean Sauter diameter is presented. The Sauter diameter is 
defined as the diameter of a sphere that has the same volume/surface area ratio as the 
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particle of interest. In the global model the size of the created droplets is a user parameter, 
and the default value of 4 mm was chosen in the simulation. So the initial mean Sauter 
diameter was 4 mm, and decreased to 3 mm during the simulation due to coarse drop 
breakup. The size of the droplets created with the local jet breakup model is in the initial 
stage of the jet penetration into water much smaller. Only about 0.3-0.5 mm in case 
KH-2_02. This is significantly lower than was measured in the FARO experiments, where 
the typical droplet size was in the range of 3-5 mm (Magallon and Huhtiniemi, 2001). But it 
should be stressed that in FARO experiments the conditions were different. In the analyzed 
reactor case the primary system is slightly pressurized, so the melt pour is pressure driven 
resulting in higher melt water penetration velocities than in FARO experiments. In case 
KH-1_10 the mean Sauter diameter is as expected larger (about 0.5-0.8 mm), but still much 
smaller than obtained with the global model. 
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Fig. 8. Jet and droplets mass (left) and droplets mean Sauter diameter (right) during jet 
breakup for simulated cases (jet breakup model: Global, KH-2_02, KH-1_10). 
 
 
Case Model Parameter 
Global Global 
Default 
Fragmentation rate: 0 = 0.1 m3/m2/s 
Droplets diameter: dd = 4 mm 
KH-2_02 Local 
Default 
Jet fragmentation parameter: fN = 2 
Droplet diameter parameter: dN = 0.2 
KH-1_10 Local fN = 1, dN = 1.0 
 
Table 7. Applied models and model parameters in sensitivity study. 
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The strength of the steam explosion depends on the mass of droplets, which can efficiently 
participate in the steam explosion - that is the mass of liquid droplets in regions with high 
water content. In Fig. 9 the mass of liquid droplets in regions with different void fractions is 
presented during premixing. It may be observed that most of the melt drops are frozen and 
so can not participate in the steam explosion since they are not able to undergo fine 
fragmentation (compare curves “Total” and “<100%”). Most of the liquid droplets are in 
regions with a high void content (compare curves “<100%” and “<60%”). If it is assumed 
that the void fraction has to be at least below 60% that the melt drops can efficiently 
participate in the steam explosion process, the mass of melt which can participate in the 
explosion (active melt mass) is the following: for case Global up to ~1000 kg, for case KH-
2_02 up to ~100 kg and for case KH-1_10 up to ~1000 kg. In case KH-2_02 during the jet 
breakup process very small droplets are created (Fig. 8b) resulting in a highly voided 
premixture (Fig. 9b) due to increased heat transfer. Therefore the active melt mass is so 
small. In case KH-1_10 larger droplets are formed (Fig. 8b) resulting in a less voided region 
(Fig. 9c) and consequently in a larger active melt mass. 
In Fig. 10 the maximum calculated pressures in the cavity and the maximum calculated 
pressure impulses at the cavity walls are presented for the simulated cases. Some explosion 
simulations did not start, since no trigger location was found (too voided premixture in 
regions with liquid melt droplets), and some simulations did not converge. The results for 
these cases are consequently not presented in the graphs (e.g. case KH-2_02 between 3 and 9 
seconds). 
It may be observed that the selection of the jet breakup models and their parameters has a 
significant influence on the strength of the steam explosion. As expected, the pressure 
impulse curves (Fig. 10b) reasonably reflect the premixture conditions presented in Fig. 9. In 
general the largest pressure loads are obtained for explosions triggered at times when the 
mass of liquid melt in low voided regions is high. The highest maximum pressures were 
reached in case Global (nearly 300 MPa) since large droplets were created already in the 
beginning of the simulation (Fig. 8b) resulting in an initially less voided premixture, which 
is due to the low compressibility capable to build up so high pressures, when the pressure 
wave travels from the outer premixture region towards the centre of the 2D axial symmetric 
simulation domain. As expected, the lowest pressure impulses were obtained in case 
KH-2_02 (up to 0.11 MPa·s) due the smallest melt droplets (Fig. 8b) resulting in a highly 
voided premixture. The maximum calculated pressures and pressure impulses for the 
simulated cases are listed in Table 8. 
 
 
Case Maximum pressure (MPa) Maximum impulse (MPa·s) 
Global 293.7 0.42 
KH-2_02 15.1 0.11 
KH-1_10 78.3 0.23 
 
 
Table 8. Maximum pressures in the cavity and maximum pressure impulses at the cavity 
walls (cavity floor included) for different jet breakup models. 
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a) Global model: case Global 
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b) Local model: case KH-2_02 
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c) Local model: case KH-1_10 
Fig. 9. Mass of liquid corium droplets in regions with different void fractions during 
premixing. The results are presented for regions with a void fraction below 20% (<20%) up 
to regions with a void fractions below 100% (<100%). In addition also the total (liquid and 
solid) corium droplets mass is presented (Total). 
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Fig. 10. Calculated maximum pressures in the cavity (left) and maximum pressure impulses 
at the cavity walls (right) for performed explosion phase simulations (jet breakup model: 
Global, KH-2_02, KH-1_10). The time axis denotes the explosion triggering times. 
4.2 Influence of melt droplets solidification 
In the explosion simulations it was assumed that the corium droplets in the premixture can 
potentially undergo fine fragmentation, and so contribute to the explosion escalation, if the 
droplets bulk temperature is higher than the corium solidus temperature. This overpredicts 
the ability of corium droplets to efficient participate in the explosion, since in reality, during 
premixing, a crust is formed on the corium droplets much earlier than the droplets bulk 
temperature drops below the solidus temperature (Huhtiniemi et al., 1999; Dinh, 2007). This 
crust inhibits the fine fragmentation process and if the crust is thick enough it completely 
prevents it. To find out the impact of the melt droplets solidification on the explosion 
results, for the most explosive central melt pour case C2-60 additional explosion simulations 
were performed, considering different corium droplet bulk temperatures, below which the 
fine fragmentation process is suppressed. In this parametric study for the minimum fine 
fragmentation temperatures (MFFT) the corium solidus temperature 2700 K (default), the 
liquidus temperature 2800 K and the temperature 2750 K in-between were taken. The 
simulation results are presented in Fig. 11.  
It may be observed that MFFT has a significant influence on the strength of the steam 
explosion. As is summarized in Table 9, both, the maximum pressure in the cavity and the 
maximum pressure impulse at the cavity walls, decrease with increasing MFFT. This was 
expected, since with a higher MFFT a smaller fraction of the corium in the premixture is hot 
enough to fulfil the strained temperature criterion for fine fragmentation, and consequently 
a smaller fraction of the corium in the premixture can potentially participate in the explosion 
process. 
In Fig. 12 the time evolution of the mass of hot corium droplets, with the bulk temperature 
higher than MFFT, in regions with different void fractions is presented during premixing. 
During premixing nearly 8000 kg of corium droplets are formed (curve “Total”). The mass 
of hot corium droplets, which are potentially available to participate in the explosion (curves 
“<100%”), depends on the selected MFFT, and is up to ~3000 kg for MFFT 2700 K, up to 
~2500 kg for MFFT 2750 K, and up to ~2000 kg for MFFT 2800 K. The hot corium droplets 
can efficiently participate in the explosion only in regions with enough water available for 
vaporization and for enabling the fine fragmentation process, which is essential for the 
steam explosion development. Therefore a better indicator for the expected strength of the 
resulting explosion is the available mass of hot droplets in regions, where the void fraction 
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is not too large, that is in regions, where the vapour fraction is below 60% (active melt mass). 
The so established corium droplet masses are much lower, up to ~900 kg for MFFT 2700 K, 
up to ~600 kg for MFFT 2750 K and up to ~300 kg for MFFT 2800 K. These differences in the 
active melt masses are reasonable reflected in the calculated pressure loads presented in 
Fig.11 and Table 9.  
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Fig. 11. Calculated maximum pressures in the cavity (left) and maximum pressure impulses 
at the cavity walls (right) for performed explosion phase simulations (minimum fine 
fragmentation temperature: 2700 K, 2750 K, 2800 K). The time axis denotes the explosion 
triggering times.  
 
 
 
 
 
Minimum fine fragmentation 
temperature (K) 
Maximum 
pressure (MPa) 
Maximum 
impulse (MPa·s) 
2700 293.7 0.42 
2750 235.0 0.21 
2800 114.7 0.11 
 
 
 
Table 9. Maximum pressures in the cavity and maximum pressure impulses at the cavity 
walls (cavity floor included) for different minimum fine fragmentation temperatures. 
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a) MFFT: 2700 K (solidus) 
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b) MFFT: 2750 K 
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c) MFFT: 2800 K (liquidus) 
Fig. 12. Mass of corium droplets with the bulk temperature above the given minimum fine 
fragmentation temperature (MFFT) in regions with different void fractions during 
premixing. The results are presented for regions with a void fraction below 20% (<20%) up 
to regions with a void fractions below 100% (<100%). In addition also the total (liquid and 
solid) corium droplets mass is presented (Total). 
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5. Conclusions 
An assessment of ex-vessel steam explosion pressure loads in a typical pressurized water 
reactor cavity was performed with the FCI code MC3D. To be able to perform a series of 
simulations, the reactor cavity was modelled in a simplified 2D geometry, trying to assure 
that the 2D simulation results reflect qualitatively and quantitatively as closely as possible 
the conditions in a real reactor cavity. A spectrum of relevant scenarios has been analyzed 
and a sensitivity study has been performed addressing the influence of the jet breakup 
modelling and the melt droplets solidification on the FCI process. 
The simulation results revealed that the strongest steam explosions may be expected in the 
initial stage of the melt release, when the void build up is not so extensive. The results for 
the central melt pour cases showed that, in the initial stage of the melt pour, stronger 
explosions mainly occur for higher water subcooling and higher primary system 
overpressure. An explanation for this could be that higher water subcooling results in less 
void build up and that higher driving pressure increases the melt fragmentation. At the later  
stage of the simulations, stronger explosions mainly occur for lower subcooling, probably 
due to less droplet solidification with lower water subcooling. However the influence of the  
water subcooling on the explosion strength is not very clear, indicating that in the 
considered subcooling range the effects of void build up and melt droplets solidification 
nearly compensate. The results of the side melt pour cases revealed that stronger explosions 
may be expected with a depressurized primary system, since with a pressurized primary 
system the melt is ejected sideward on the cavity wall hindering the formation of an 
extensive premixture; moreover gas flows through the vessel opening into the cavity 
forming a highly voided region below the reactor vessel. 
The high calculated pressure loads in the side pour cases could be attributed to the used 2D 
slice modelling of the reactor cavity, where the melt is released in the form of an infinite 
wide curtain and the explosion is triggered through the whole width of that curtain. This is 
quite conservative since, due to the 2D treatment, venting and pressure relief is 
underpredicted and the explosion development is overpredicted. So the performed side 
pour simulations should be regarded more as providing some basic qualitative insight in the 
FCI behaviour for side pour scenarios. For a more reliable estimation of the expected 
pressure loads in side pour scenarios a 3D modelling approach would be needed. The 
central pour cases are closer to the reality since for a central melt pour the 2D axial 
symmetric representation is quite suitable. So the reliability of central pour simulation 
results is higher than the reliability of side pour simulation results. 
The sensitivity study revealed that the jet breakup and the melt droplets solidification have 
a significant influence on the strength of the steam explosion, and consequently have to be 
adequately modelled. Especially the correct establishment of the size of the created melt 
droplets during jet breakup is crucial, since the droplets size defines the melt surface area 
for heat transfer, which governs the melt droplets solidification and the void build. Both, the 
melt droplets solidification and the void build up may significantly reduce the strength of 
the steam explosion, as demonstrated by the preformed simulations. 
The nature of FCI is very complex and already small modelling changes can have a 
significant influence on the simulation results. Therefore additional experimental and 
analytical work is needed, as being carried out in the OECD programme SERENA phase 2 
and in the network of excellence SARNET-2 within the 7th EU framework program, to be 
able to reliably extrapolate the various experimental findings to reactor conditions and to 
perform reliable reactor simulations. 
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1. Introduction  
The generation of electricity from nuclear power has become increasingly important due to 
the growing concerns of global climate change. Nuclear energy has long been recognized as 
a leading energy source that produces minimal pollution to the environment that can 
contribute to this phenomenon. In addition, nuclear power offers an attractive option for 
countries looking for energy source diversification. Currently there are 442 commercial 
nuclear power reactors operating in the world (International Atomic Energy Agency 
[IAEA], 2010, 2011). These power plants contribute about 19% of the electricity production 
today. The United States of America (U.S.) has the largest commercial nuclear reactor fleet in 
the world with 104 operating reactors (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission [USNRC], 
2010). Of these reactors, 69 are pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and 35 are boiling water 
reactors (BWRs), located on 65 sites around the country. These power plants contribute 
about 20% of the U.S. electricity production. 
Although it is known that commercial nuclear power plants release small amounts of 
radioactivity into the environment, there is still the potential for these releases to impact 
public health. This is especially important today as changes are occurring in nuclear power 
plant operations including: higher electric generating capacities, increased power levels due 
to mechanical uprates, and plant life extensions. Public health effects must be reexamined as 
new light water reactor designs are being considered for construction. In addition, recent 
events at multiple nuclear power plants in the U.S. involving unplanned releases, especially 
tritium (3H), have led to increased scrutiny on monitoring and evaluating releases. Changes 
in radiation protection recommendations and regulations also warrant further and 
continued investigations in these matters. Although Harris (2007) and Harris & Miller (2008) 
have performed numerous studies of nuclear power effluent releases and environmental 
monitoring, data collection and analysis must continue to be performed for the entire 
nuclear industry.  
This chapter focuses on recent research that has been conducted in the areas of commercial 
nuclear power radiological releases and environmental monitoring by the author. Although 
the emphasis will be on studies performed in the United States of America, international 
comparisons will be made where appropriate. 
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2. Background 
Commercial nuclear power plants release small amounts of radiation into the environment 
under normal operating conditions. Many of the radioactive isotopes that are released are in 
the form of gaseous or liquid effluents and solid radioactive waste conditioned by the plant. 
These releases represent some of the by-products of electrical energy generation (Eisenbud 
& Gesell, 1997).  
Three categories of radioactive by-products are produced during routine operation of a 
commercial light-water reactor: fission products, neutron activation products, and tritium 
(Glasstone & Jordan, 1980). Fission products are created as a result of the radioactive decay 
of the nuclear fuel. Approximately 300 different nuclides are formed in the operating 
reactor. Most of these nuclides are radioactive. Although there is a large quantity of fission 
products formed, many have little impact on the radioactive releases to the environment 
because of their extremely short half-lives (<1 day), small quantities, or biological 
insignificance. Gaseous fission products important to these releases include: 3H, 85Kr, and 
133Xe. Iodine, solid at room temperature, is also released as a gaseous effluent due to 
vaporization. Important dose significant iodine isotopes include: 131I, 133I, and 135I. Other 
decay daughters of produced fission products may also appear in the gaseous effluents as 
particulate matter (USNRC, 1976a, 1976b). 
Activation products are formed by neutron interactions with oxygen in water and air, with 
nitrogen and argon in air, and with impurity corrosion elements. Like fission products, 
many of the neutron activation products produced are insignificant in reactor effluents due 
to their short half-lives (<1 day) or small quantities. Relevant gaseous activation products 
include: 13N, 14C, 16N, and 41Ar (NCRP, 1985, 1987). Important liquid and solid waste 
activation products arising from interaction of neutrons with corrosion and erosion elements 
include: 51Cr, 58Co, 60Co, and 59Fe (Kahn, 1980; USNRC, 1976a, 1976b). 
Tritium (3H or T), is produced as a result of both nuclear fission (ternary fission) and 
neutron activation of deuterium (2H). Tritium is typically treated separately because it is 
produced in such large quantities compared to any other effluent nuclide and because it 
arises from other nuclear reactions. One significant source of tritium is the interaction of 
high energy neutrons with boron. Boron is used in PWRs for shim control (as boric acid) and 
BWRs as a burnable poison (Glasstone & Jordan, 1980). Tritium is also formed from the 
interaction of neutrons with 6Li (as lithium hydroxide in water treatment). 
Typically, the radioactive emissions from operating nuclear power reactors result in 
insignificant doses to the general population. In 1988, when 110 nuclear power plants were 
operating at 70 sites in the United States, the mean collective effective dose commitment 
from all pathways ranged from a low of 1.1 x 10-5 person-Sv (0.0011 person-rem) to a high of 
0.16 person-Sv (16 person-rem). The collective dose commitment for the 150 million persons 
living within the 2-80-km annuli was 0.75 person-Sv (75 person-rem) for that year (USNRC 
1995). Other studies performed throughout the world have shown similar results for 
population doses around nuclear power plants (Walmsley et a.l, 1991; Ziqiang et al., 1996; 
Kim & Han, 1999; Nedveckaite et a.l, 2000; Liu et al., 2003; Quindos Poncela et al., 2003). 
Harris (2007) performed a study to look at the doses for maximally exposed individuals 
from all plants. A review of epidemiological studies of cancer in populations near nuclear 
facilities showed that in all scientific reports analyzing nuclear power plants, a cause and 
effect relationship between cancer risk and radiation exposure could not be found (Patrick, 
1977; Jablon et al., 1990; Shleien et al., 1991; Lopez-Abente et al., 1999). 
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There has been a gradual reduction in both liquid and gaseous emissions from power 
reactors due to improvements in fuel performance and radioactive waste treatment system 
technology (Harris, 2002). However, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) reports 
that although radioactive isotopes captured by these systems reduce effluent quantities, 
radioactive solid waste volumes increase (2003). Also, with longer operating times and 
license extensions, the accumulation of spent fuel is becoming more important. Many plants 
have begun storing spent fuel on-site in independent storage facilities. The ageing of 
existing nuclear power facilities and the increasing accumulation of radioactive wastes have 
led to an increased emphasis on solid radioactive waste disposal However, at this time 
doses to the public have not increased during the handling or transportation of radioactive 
waste shipments. Worldwide estimates also show that nuclear power will continue to grow 
and thus remain a source of radioactivity exposure to the public. 
2.1 Regulatory criteria of releases 
The principles that apply to U.S. nuclear power plant radiological releases include 
consensus scientific recommendations, governmental regulations (Code of Federal 
Regulations [CFR]), and specific criteria in each plant’s operating license. Dose limits, 
concepts and models based on scientific agreement about radiation effects are 
recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and the 
NCRP. Government radiation protection guidance is developed by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA) and approved by the President to assist federal agencies, such 
as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), in developing radiation protection 
regulations. This guidance is usually in agreement with the ICRP or the NCRP. The 
regulatory standards developed are then required to be incorporated into each nuclear 
power plant as radiological effluent technical specifications (RETS) that are to be followed 
through procedures and programs (Andersen, 1995). 
Since the inception of nuclear power, federal radiation protection regulations have been 
based upon the recommendations of the ICRP. The initial ICRP recommendations, 
published as ICRP Publication 1 and ICRP Publication 2, provided dose limits, models, and 
radiation concepts. Subsequent to these initial recommendations, the ICRP issued three 
major revisions, ICRP Publication 26, ICRP Publication 60, and ICRP Publication 103. These 
recommendations lowered the annual dose limits for members of the public and revised 
dose models and concepts. ICRP Publication 26 (1977) recommended an annual dose limit of 
5 mSv y-1 (0.5 rem y-1) to critical members of the general population (pregnant women and 
children). Critical members of the general population are those that are more susceptible to 
radiation effects. ICRP Publication 60 (1991) lowered recommended annual dose limits 
further to 1 mSv y-1 (0.1 rem y-1) for members of the general population. ICRP Publication 
103 (2007) continues with this dose limit. Another important recommendation in terms of 
reactor releases is given in ICRP Publication 29. This document provides the Committee’s 
recommendations for evaluating pathways between radioactive materials released into the 
environment and man (ICRP, 1978). 
One important recommendation made by the NCRP, published as NCRP Report 92, is 
specifically concerned with public radiation exposure resulting from nuclear power (NCRP, 
1987). The report outlines dose concepts, risks, and technical information regarding the 
nuclear fuel cycle. In 2011, NCRP will release another recommendation (Report 169) on 
effluent and environmental monitoring design. Other organizations, including the United 
Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), have had a 
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tremendous influence on the understanding of radiation concepts. The UNSCEAR reports 
yearly to the General Assembly and periodically issues (every four to five years) the 
important publication, Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation (2000). Another United 
Nations organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), also influences the 
practice of radiation protection and issues radiation related reports. 
The updated regulations important to nuclear power plant radiological effluents are found 
in 40 CFR 190 (USEPA 1977). These regulations include limits on radiation doses received by 
members of the public off-site of the nuclear power plant. During normal operation, the 
annual dose to any member of the public shall be limited to:  0.025 mSv y-1 (25 mrem y-1) to 
the whole (total) body; 0.075 mSv y-1 (75 mrem y-1) to the thyroid; and 0.025 mSv y-1 (25 
mrem y-1) to any other organ. The USEPA has also set forth guidelines for the maximum 
amount of radioactivity released into the environment (e.g. 5 mCi of 129I per gigawatt-year of 
electrical energy produced). 
The USNRC issues standards and regulations for radiation protection and nuclear plant 
operations. Standards for radiation protection are contained in 10 CFR 20 (USNRC, 1991). 
These standards incorporate the dose concepts and models from the older ICRP Publication 
26 and 40 CFR 190. The criteria in 10 CFR 20 regarding dose limitations include: a public 
dose limit of 1 mSv y-1 (0.1 rem y-1), compliance with USEPA’s 40 CFR 190 standards, and a 
requirement for a licensee survey of radiation levels in unrestricted areas, in controlled 
areas, and in effluent releases. Appendix B to 10 CFR 20 includes limits on effluent 
concentrations for radiological releases in air and water. These concentration limits are 
derived from occupational inhalation and ingestion annual limits on intake (ALIs) adjusted 
to reflect the dose limits set forth by the standards. 
USNRC standards for nuclear power plant operations are contained in 10 CFR 50. These 
standards include criteria for radiological effluent technical specifications, effluent release 
design objectives and limits, and notification and reporting for events involving the release 
of radioactive materials. Technical specifications on effluents from nuclear power plants are 
listed in 10 CFR 50.36a (USNRC, 1996). The specifications require that the licensee comply 
with 10 CFR 20; that procedures be established and followed regarding the control of 
effluents; that a radioactive waste treatment system be installed, maintained, and used; that 
a report be submitted annually to the USNRC regarding effluent releases and the attributed 
estimated doses to the public; and that procedures be developed that comply with the 
principle of achieving radiation levels ALARA. Appendix I to 10 CFR 50 gives numerical 
guides for design objectives and limiting conditions for operation to meet the ALARA 
criterion for radiological effluents. Doses to members of the general public from radioactive 
material in liquid effluents released to unrestricted areas shall be limited to 0.003 mSv y-1 (3 
mrem y-1) to the whole (total) body, and 0.010 mSv y-1 (10 mrem y-1) to any other organ. The 
air dose due to the release of noble gases in gaseous effluents is restricted to 0.010 mGy y-1 
(10 mrad y-1) for gamma radiation, and 0.020 mGy y-1 (20 mrad y-1) for beta radiation. The 
public dose from 131I, 3H, and all particulate radionuclides with half-lives greater than eight 
days in gaseous effluents is limited to 0.015 mSv y-1 (15 mrem y-1) to any organ. Standards in 
10 CFR 50 also cover notification in the event of an abnormal radiological release.  
Criteria for nuclear power plant effluents are contained in the radiological effluent technical 
specifications (RETS), which are part of the nuclear power plant operating license. The RETS 
include the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO). The LCO is a description of the criteria 
that are to be met, the conditions under which the criteria apply, the actions to be taken if 
criteria are not met, and surveillance requirements to demonstrate that the criteria have 
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been met. The RETS must also contain a site specific Offsite Dose Calculation Manual 
(ODCM). The ODCM contains both the methodology and parameters used in calculating 
offsite doses resulting from radiological effluents and the REMP. The USNRC Regulatory 
Guide 4.1 outlines the programs for monitoring radioactivity in the environs of nuclear 
power plants (USNRC, 1975). The RETS and ODCM must be approved by the USNRC as 
part of the license application and approval process. Radiological effluent technical 
specifications guidelines are contained in NUREG-0133 (USNRC, 1978). The annual effluent 
report covers plant operations from the previous calendar year. The report includes a 
summary of the quantities of radiological effluents and solids discharged by the plant. 
USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.112 aids nuclear power plants in calculating effluent releases.  
2.2 Environmental monitoring 
Prior to the issuance of a construction permit or an operating license for a nuclear power 
station, federal agencies (i.e. USNRC) are required to assess the potential environmental 
effects of that facility to ensure that issuance of the permit or license will be consistent with 
the national environmental goals prescribed by the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) of 1969 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. In order to obtain information 
needed for this assessment, applicants are required to submit a report on the potential 
environmental impacts of the station and associated facilities. After the station becomes 
operational, an annual environmental report must be submitted to ensure continued 
compliance of the requirements set forth in the facility’s license and of the Acts stated 
previously. 
Radiological environmental monitoring programs at nuclear power plants are required in 
accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations. Development and maintenance of these 
programs are under the guidance of several federal documents. These radiological 
environmental monitoring programs are established to monitor the radiological impact of 
reactor operations on the environment. Objectives of these programs include: identification, 
measurement and evaluation of existing radionuclides in the environs of the facility and 
fluctuations in radioactivity levels which may occur; evaluation of the measurements to 
determine the impact of operations on the local radiation environment; collection of data to 
refine radiation transport models; verification that radioactive material containment systems 
are functioning to minimize environmental releases to levels that are as low as reasonably 
achievable (ALARA) and; demonstration of compliance with regulations. Implicit in these 
objectives are the requirements to trend and assess radiation exposure rates and 
radioactivity concentrations in the environment that may contribute to radiation exposures 
to the public. The results of the REMP are submitted as part of the plant’s annual 
environmental report. 
Each plant establishes their own, unique REMP program to reflect site-specific conditions 
and surrounding population characteristics. The program consists of preoperational and 
operational components. The preoperational program is conducted in part to measure 
background levels and their variations in environmental media in the area surrounding the 
plant. Environmental media include: milk produced from cows or goats, broadleaf 
vegetation, fish, fruits and vegetables, edible aquatic invertebrates, surface water, drinking 
water and ground water. 
Each plant is to also make changes to its REMP program as conditions change. But, it has 
been reported recently that many plants are decreasing their programs due to budget 
constraints and lack of positive radioactivity measurements. This reduction can lead to 
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decreased litigation protection, decreased public confidence, and potential unreported or 
undetected releases. Reduced REMP programs have led to recent public opinion and 
regulatory problems for several facilities due to unexpected and/or undetected tritium 
releases. Decreased lower limits of detection (LLDs) and minimal detectable activities 
(MDAs) reportedly have led to newly quantifiable low levels of many radionuclides in the 
environs around nuclear power stations. Changes in operating conditions may also lead to 
new radionuclide transport pathways being developed, as has been seen with precipitation 
scavenging and concentration in ice. 
Ultimately, a nuclear power plant’s REMP program is designed to assess the impact of 
radiological releases on the environment and the public. Public opinion of the nuclear 
power industry has traditionally been very troubled, especially with the accidents at Three-
Mile Island and Chernobyl. Positive public opinion to nuclear power can only be achieved 
through truthfulness by the nuclear power company regarding operations and radiological 
releases and accurate and comprehensive monitoring of these releases. 
3. Effluent release study 
As commercial nuclear power electrical generation steadily increases in the U.S. and the rest 
of the world, it has become even more important to evaluate the release of radioactive 
materials into the environment. An easy way to track industry wide effluent releases is by 
performing trend analyses. Accumulated data may also be used for analysing reactor power 
up-rate consequences, protecting the nuclear power industry against litigation, and for 
assisting in new power plant siting. Most importantly, collecting and maintaining an 
effluent database is necessary in maintaining a favourable public perception regarding the 
low environmental and biological impact of nuclear power. This is especially important now 
as several recent, inadvertent releases of radioactive materials from nuclear power plants 
have occurred. Because of these circumstances, the author has compiled and analysed the 
effluent data for all U.S. commercial nuclear power plants since 1995. Presented here is also 
an update of the comprehensive study performed by Harris & Miller (2008). 
The classification and monitoring of liquid and gaseous radiological releases is fairly 
uniform around the world. The classification is based on the nuclide, chemical or physical 
form, and dose or activity significance. In the U.S., gaseous effluents are divided into fission 
and activation gases, iodines, particulates (with half-lives greater than eight days), and 
tritium. Liquid effluents are divided into fission and activation products, dissolved and 
entrained gases, tritium, and gross alpha activity. International organizations and other 
nations use the same categories, but combine the fission and activation products and the 
dissolved and entrained gases in liquid effluents (UNSCEAR, 2000; Harris, 2002). 
The classification of radioactive releases is important because dose calculations are based 
upon them. For example, the collective effective doses calculated by UNSCEAR (2000) use 
these effluent categories. The groupings also allow plants and nations to compare and 
benchmark with another. Unlike the simplified general UNSCEAR model, the USNRC 
model requires specific nuclide, meteorological, and site specific conditions. Hence, this 
model provides more accurate estimates of dose. 
Other studies have been performed to assess the doses from nuclear power radiological 
releases. Vold (1984) determined the ratio of the collective effective dose equivalent (CEDE) 
via a specified ingestion pathway relative to that CEDE by inhalation per annual releases of 
a radionuclide. Kim & Han (1999) and Liu et al. (2003) assessed the impact of tritium 
 
Radiological Releases and Environmental Monitoring at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants 
 
243 
released from nuclear power plants in China. Both of these studies confirmed that the doses 
were less than 1% of the regulatory limits. Ziqiang et al. (1996) reported similar results not 
only for tritium, but for other radionuclides as well. 
What is very common in the nuclear power industry is trending and benchmarking of data. 
This is done to improve plant operations and management. Many organizations that oversee 
different aspects of nuclear power plants use these methods for comparison. These 
comparisons may be advantageous or detrimental to a plant. For example, with radiological 
releases, high activities compared to other plants can lead to lower profits due to higher 
premiums from American Nuclear Insurers (ANI). It can also lead to scrutiny from the 
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and greater surveillance from USNRC. Thus, 
these comparisons are very important. Gilbert (1994) identifies statistical analyses suitable 
for detecting trends in environmental contamination data. Accurate trend analyses can aid 
plants in these aforementioned areas. Trend analyses were performed for the data over the 
15 year period using the Mann-Kendall non-parametric test. Inspections of release trends 
over the fifteen year period help identify areas of concern with these releases. Future 
estimates of release radioactivity and public doses can then be made from these analyses.  
3.1 Methodology 
The data utilized for the effluent release study were taken from the annual radioactive 
release reports provided by the nuclear power plants to the USNRC as required in their 
operating license conditions. These reports were either provided directly to the author from 
the licensee or taken from the USNRC Agency wide Documents Access and Management 
System (ADAMS). The reports provide categorical effluent release data, nuclide specific 
radioactivity, and site specific data needed for dose calculations. Population information not 
provided by the licensees was taken from appropriate census reports (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2010). 
Data was analysed for those reactors that have operated for the 15 year period of 1994-2009. 
This length of time is long enough to allow plants to stabilize in the event of long shutdown 
periods and allows evaluation of plants for at least seven refuelling cycles. Events that may 
affect releases, such as power-uprates and failed fuel from defects, will also show up in this 
period. The beginning of this data set also coincides with the cessation of tracking 
radiological effluents by the U.S. in 1994. In this time frame, 103 reactors were operating. 
Browns Ferry Unit 3 began operation in 2006, to become the 104th operating reactor.  
Effluent radioactivity was obtained from data reported by the nuclear power plants in their 
annual radioactive material release reports. The effluent data was compiled for all operating 
PWR and BWR plants from 1995 - 2005. The completeness of the data was 98%. In keeping 
with U.S. nuclear power effluent report formatting, data was compiled and analysed using 
the same categories as those listed in USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.21. The four gaseous 
effluent categories used were: fission and activation gases (F/A), total iodine (131I), 
particulate matter or particulates, and tritium. The three liquid effluent categories used 
were: fission and activation products, dissolved and entrained gases, and tritium. Because 
the radioactivity levels of the fission and activation products and dissolved and entrained 
gases are several orders of magnitude smaller than tritium, those two categories were added 
together and listed as “F/D”. This category replicates the reporting done by UNSCEAR. 
Gross alpha radioactivity was not included in this study. 
Trend analyses were performed for the data over the time period using the Mann-Kendall 
non-parametric test. This procedure was used since missing values were allowed and the 
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data need not conform to any particular distribution (Gilbert, 1994). Inspection of trends 
over the time period identifies the overall direction of industry effluent releases and can 
roughly be used to predict future releases.  
For this updated study, one dose assessment methodology was used. The collective effective 
doses (CED) were calculated for the U.S. population using the UNSCEAR methodology. For 
these dose calculations, the effluent data was normalized. This was achieved by taking the 
amount of radionuclides released per unit of electrical energy generated each year. This 
method is the most common way to normalize effluent data. The electrical energy generated 
per year was obtained by multiplying the net electrical energy generated by the capacity 
factor. Capacity factor is defined as the gross electricity generated divided by the product of 
the licensed capacity and reference time. Normalizing data in this manner takes into account 
the operational performance of the nuclear power plant. However, it also assumes that 
effluent release amounts are a direct consequence of operation time. The author cautions 
against making simplistic comparisons of radioactive releases with the electrical energy 
generated because of the many factors which affect the amount of radioactive materials 
released, including the condition of the fuel, primary system integrity, design of effluent and 
radioactive waste treatment systems, maintenance activities, operations, and equipment 
performance. 
3.2 Results and discussion 
3.2.1 Radiological effluent releases  
The annual variation of total nuclear power plant radioactivity released in gaseous effluents 
in PWRs and BWRs are shown in Figs. 1 and 2, respectively. As expected, the activity from 
PWR releases is higher than that from BWRs due to the greater number of plants. Regardless 
of this fact, the average tritium release from PWRs is also higher due to chemistry practices 
that create more tritium in the plant. Nearly every category from both reactor types is fairly 
level in terms of activity released for the entire time period. The evaluation of the data over 
the time period partly eliminates variations in annual values. The advantage of using 15 
years of data is that operation anomalies, such as long shutdown times for maintenance, are 
averaged out. The one notable exception appears in the PWR particulate category. In 2003, 
one plant experienced an annual release over five orders of magnitude above the mean. This 
single event was significant enough to skew the entire industry release activity, especially 
since the annual radioactivity released in particulate matter is so low compared to tritium or 
fission and activation gases. The increase in 2005 was due to higher activity releases by 
several plants. 
The annual variation of total nuclear power plant radioactivity released in liquid effluents in 
PWRs and BWRs are shown together in Fig. 3. As expected, and for reasons similar to that of 
the gaseous releases, PWR liquid radioactivity in releases is higher than in BWRs. Liquid 
releases have stayed very constant over the 11-year period. The most notable exception is 
the pronounced decline in BWR non-tritium (F/D) radioactivity from 2003 - 2007. 
3.2.2 Radiological effluent trends  
U.S. industry effluent trends were evaluated using the Mann-Kendall non-parametric test. 
The Mann-Kendall test was performed as follows: For any given release category, x, its 
feature vector consists of the release summation from all plants appearing in a given year i. 
These release activities are ordered from the first year, 1995, to the final year, 2009, that data 
was gathered. 
 
Radiological Releases and Environmental Monitoring at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants 
 
245 
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
10-1
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
 F/A Gases
 Iodines
 Tritium
 Particulates
A
ct
iv
ity
 (G
Bq
)
Year
 
Fig. 1. Variation of total radionuclide activity released in gaseous effluents from PWR plants 
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Fig. 2. Variation of total radionuclide activity released in gaseous effluents from BWR plants 
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Fig. 3. Variation of total radionuclide activity released in liquid effluents from PWR and 
BWR plants 
The x value for each year is compared to all other years greater than that year, and Kendall’s 
statistic S is calculated as follows: 
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Generally, if a dataset displays a consistently increasing or decreasing trend, S will be 
positive or negative, respectively, with a larger magnitude indicating the trend is more 
consistent in its direction. By using the sgn function, the algorithm used was able to detect 
trends featuring either large or small increase steps from year to year equally. The S statistic 
is then compared to the corresponding P-value (Hollander & Wolfe, 1999).  
Under the null hypothesis, H0, that there is no trend displayed by the time series, the 
distribution of S is then expected to have a zero-mean and variance. The Mann-Kendall test 
was performed on BWR plant releases, PWR plant releases, and all plant releases (BWR and 
PWR combined) at a significance level of 0.05.  
The results of the trend test are shown in Table 1. Over the past 15 years, it can be seen that 
for most effluent categories, the releases are level, meaning there is no increasing or 
decreasing trend. For these categories, improvements in radioactive waste treatment and 
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reactor operations are offset by increased power production, increased capacity factors, and 
power up-rates. Looking at PWRs only, gaseous fission and activation products and liquid 
F/D have decreased while liquid tritium has increased. Reduction in the fission and 
activation products over the years is probably a direct result of longer holdup times for 
radioactive decay. In addition lower fission and activation product activities may be due to 
improved fuel performance from better manufacturing methods. Also, longer operation 
times in recent years provide stability to the reactor, leading to less fuel shock and defects. 
The increasing trend for liquid tritium activity is due to an increase in liquid discharges by 
these plants. Formerly zero-discharge plants have begun to release liquids again to avoid 
build-up of their tritium inventory. Coupled with this practice, over the last fifteen years 
many plants have reduced recycling of boron for reactor control. This procedure contributes 
to increased tritium production.  
 
Release Category S Statistic Trend 
PWR Gaseous--F/A gases -61 Decreasing 
PWR Gaseous--Iodines -15 None 
PWR Gaseous--Tritium -3 None 
PWR Gaseous--Particulate -11 None 
PWR Liquids--Tritium 57 Increasing 
PWR Liquids—F/D -35 Decreasing 
BWR Gaseous--F/A gases -41 Decreasing 
BWR Gaseous--Iodines -13 None 
BWR Gaseous--Tritium 31 Increasing 
BWR Gaseous--Particulate 7 None 
BWR Liquids--Tritium 27 Increasing 
BWR Liquids—F/D -7 None 
Total Gaseous--F/A gases -65 Decreasing 
Total Gaseous--Iodines -21 Decreasing 
Total Gaseous--Tritium -3 None 
Total Gaseous--Particulate 13 None 
Total Liquids--Tritium 57 Increasing 
Total Liquids—F/D -13 None 
Table 1. Mann-Kendall trend results for U.S. commercial nuclear power plant radiological 
effluent releases from 1995 – 2009 
For BWRs, liquid tritium and gaseous releases have increased and gaseous fission and 
activation releases have decreased. The increase in gaseous and liquid tritium are relatively 
new phenomenon and is probably related more to the increased power production and 
capacity factors over the last several years than anything else. Looking at the entire industry 
(PWRs and BWRs combined), all effluent releases except gaseous fission and activation 
products and iodine and liquid tritium are level. Because PWRs make up 66% of the U.S. 
industry, their releases have a greater impact on the overall release trends, as is evident with 
the increasing liquid tritium. 
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3.2.3 Radiological impact of effluent releases  
Tracking effluent release quantities is important in determining radioactivity levels in the 
environment. However, dose determination of the effluents must be performed to estimate 
the human effects of these radiation sources. The collective effective dose (CED) from 
radiological effluent releases was obtained using an average collective dose calculation 
method used by UNSCEAR. UNSCEAR (2000) calculates population dose by first 
calculating the CED per unit release of radionuclides released from reactors and then 
normalizes the value with the electrical energy generated. The CED is divided according to 
type of release (airborne or liquid), radionuclide category (noble gases, tritium, C-14, iodine, 
and particulate matter), and pathway (immersion, ingestion, inhalation, and external 
irradiation. The normalized collective effective dose model is given by: 
 i
i
i
CE DE
AD   (2) 
where: Ai =activity of release category i (GBq); DCE = total CED (person-Sv GW-1 y-1); Di  = 
collective dose for release category i (person-Sv PBq-1); and E  =energy produced by the 
nuclear reactor (GW y-1). 
The dose assessment procedures for this model are applied to a model site with 
representative environmental conditions. The average population density used is 20 km-2 
within 2,000 km of the site. Within 50 km of the site, the population density is taken to be 
400 km-2. These parameters were obtained from previous UNSCEAR assessments and take 
into account the transport and dilution of released radionuclides from nuclear installations. 
The parameters used are assumed to not underestimate dose. Using this model site, the 
collective effective dose per unit release is obtained for the different release categories. Due 
to its lack of specificity, this model should be used for general comparisons only. The 
collective effective doses estimated from commercial nuclear power plant radiological 
effluent releases are very low especially when compared to other man-made sources of 
radiation. The doses only represent up to a few percent of the regulatory limits (Harris & 
Miller, 2008).  
From the collective effective doses, effective doses were computed for the entire U.S. 
population to give average annual doses. This was done by taking the CEDs calculated for 
each release category, gaseous and liquid, and dividing them by the U.S. population for 
each year (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). The effective doses were than summed to give a total 
dose for each person. The results of these effective doses are given in Table 2. For the 15-year 
period, total effective doses ranged from 5.42 × 10-8 mSv (5.42 × 10-6 mrem) to 1.68 × 10-7 
mSv (1.68 × 10-5 mrem). The doses to an average person would be expected to be even lower 
since many do not live near a nuclear power plant. This is just one of several ways to 
calculate a very general effective dose for the population. 
4. U.S. REMP evaluation 
An evaluation of all U.S. nuclear power plant radiological environmental monitoring 
programs (REMP) was conducted from 1995-2007. An attempt was made to assess the 
significance of the radionuclides detected in the environment compared to natural and 
other man-made radiation sources. It is important to note that detected concentrations of 
radionuclides in the local environment as a result of nuclear power radiological releases 
 
Radiological Releases and Environmental Monitoring at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants 
 
249 
are very low. The percentage of plants sampling different pathways, the percent 
cumulative exposures, and differences between control and indicator measurements were 
determined.  
4.1 Methods 
Inspection and analysis of the industry REMP data was taken from the annual summary 
tables from each nuclear power plant’s annual radiological environmental monitoring 
report. The summary data includes the following parameters: sample medium, type and 
number of analyses performed, required (LLD), the mean and range of the positive 
measured values of the indicator locations, the mean, range, and location of the highest 
indicator annual mean, the mean and range of the positive measured values of the control 
locations, and the number of non-routine reports sent to the USNRC. In this evaluation, the 
highest indicator values were compared to the control values. 
The following environmental pathways and sample analyses (in parentheses) were 
investigated: bottom/shoreline sediment (gamma spectral analysis),  fish (gamma spectral 
analysis), edible aquatic invertebrates (gamma spectral analysis), surface water (gamma 
spectral analysis, gross beta, and 3H), drinking or potable water (gamma spectral analysis, 
gross beta, and 3H), ground water (gamma spectral analysis, gross beta, and 3H), air 
particulate filters (gamma spectral analysis and gross beta), airborne radioiodine (131I), milk 
(90Sr and 131I), food products such as fruits and vegetables (gamma spectral analysis),  
broadleaf vegetation (gamma spectral analysis), soil (gamma spectral analysis), grass 
(gamma spectral analysis), and direct radiation using thermoluminescent dosimeters 
(TLDs). In addition, pathways not normally sampled by most plants, like precipitation, were 
also studied. 
For all data, only positive measured values were used in the statistical calculations. During 
the study period there were over 1.6 × 106 analyses performed on environmental media 
collected as part of the required monitoring programs. Broken down, this averages to about 
1.27 × 105 analyses y-1 and 2.0 × 103 analyses site-1 y-1. 
4.2 Results and discussion 
4.2.1 Cumulative dose contribution from effluent release pathways 
The percent contribution by each pathway to the public was determined using previously 
complied effluent data. The calculations provided by each plant from their REMP data 
identified the most important pathways for their respective sites. Fig. 4 shows the mean 
results for the seven most frequently sampled pathways or media for all plants. The greatest 
dose contributor comes from direct radiation released by the plant. This is especially true for 
BWR plants, which have no secondary loop for the reactor produced steam. 
The water, milk, and sediment media, at about the same level, provide the next highest 
percent contributions to dose. Water media, which includes surface, ground, and drinking 
types, may contribute to dose to a much larger extent depending on the plant location. 
Those that are on saltwater sites may not have a known drinking water pathway, or dilution 
may be so great that submersion doses are low or non-existent. On the other hand, plants on 
freshwater sites typically have drinking water pathways and less dilution of their effluents 
(with the exception of sites located on the Great Lakes). All other pathways contribute to a 
much lesser extent.  
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Year 
Electrical 
Energy 
Produced 
(GW) 
U.S. 
Population 
(x 104) 
Annual Effective Dose (mSv GW-1 person-1) 
Gaseous Releases Liquid Releases Total 
   F/A Gases
Total
I-131 Tritium Particulates Tritium F/D Gases  
1995 77.1 266,557 8.36 x 10-8 1.95 x 10-10 1.68 x 10-8 1.28 x 10-9 2.93 x 10-8 2.90 x 10-8 1.60 x 10-7 
1996 77.3 269,667 7.79 x 10-8 2.75 x 10-10 1.31 x 10-8 1.10 x 10-9 3.18 x 10-8 2.89 x 10-8 1.53 x 10-7 
1997 71.9 272,912 1.08 x 10-7 1.29 x 10-10 1.90 x 10-8 1.47 x 10-9 2.71 x 10-8 1.22 x 10-8 1.68 x 10-7 
1998 74.9 276,115 1.38 x 10-8 2.80 x 10-10 1.46 x 10-8 2.66 x 10-9 2.68 x 10-8 1.37 x 10-8 7.19 x 10-8 
1999 82.3 279,295 7.00 x 10-9 1.75 x 10-10 1.57 x 10-8 3.06 x 10-10 2.83 x 10-8 1.10 x 10-8 6.24 x 10-8 
2000 85.2 282,402 7.98 x 10-9 1.80 x 10-10 1.48 x 10-8 1.08 x 10-9 3.05 x 10-8 1.07 x 10-8 6.53 x 10-8 
2001 87.8 285,329 5.58 x 10-9 9.21 x 10-11 1.50 x 10-8 8.57 x 10-10 2.54 x 10-8 7.97 x 10-9 5.49 x 10-8 
2002 88.6 288,173 8.42 x 10-9 1.95 x 10-10 1.73 x 10-8 6.62 x 10-10 2.70 x 10-8 1.96 x 10-8 7.32 x 10-8 
2003 87.0 291,028 1.44 x 10-8 3.79 x 10-10 1.51 x 10-8 3.04 x 10-9 2.87 x 10-8 1.15 x 10-8 7.30 x 10-8 
2004 88.1 293,907 6.94 x 10-9 2.67 x 10-10 1.39 x 10-8 2.07 x 10-10 2.64 x 10-8 6.38 x 10-9 5.42 x 10-8 
2005 88.6 295,753 7.49 x 10-9 9.78 x 10-11 1.59 x 10-8 5.11 x 10-9 2.77 x 10-8 5.99 x 10-9 6.23 x 10-8 
2006 89.3 298,593 5.40 x 10-9 9.84 x 10-11 1.28 x 10-8 4.24 x 10-10 2.96 x 10-8 6.18 x 10-9 5.45 x 10-8 
2007 88.9 301,580 4.82 x 10-9 1.09 x 10-10 1.13 x 10-8 9.48 x 10-9 2.61 x 10-8 4.95 x 10-9 5.67 x 10-8 
2008 88.9 304,375 4.44 x 10-9 1.03 x 10-10 1.21 x 10-8 1.85 x 10-9 2.82 x 10-8 1.01 x 10-8 5.68 x 10-8 
2009 86.8 307,007 5.77 x 10-9 7.31 x 10-11 1.14 x 10-8 3.32 x 10-10 2.41 x 10-8 1.41 x 10-8 5.58 x 10-8 
Table 2. Average effective doses received by members of the public in the U.S. from 
commercial nuclear power plant radiological effluent releases 
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Fig. 4. Percent total cumulative dose contribution of various pathways resulting from U.S. 
nuclear power plant effluent releases 
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4.2.2 Plant pathway sampling 
The investigation of the number of pathways sampled by each plant is important to gauge 
the diversity and scope of each plant’s REMP in relation to each other. Used in conjunction 
with the results from Section 4.3.1, omissions of pathways can be reconsidered based on the 
overall percent contribution of dose. Obviously, programs will vary greatly since the power 
plant sites themselves also vary greatly. For example, plants may be located on coastal sites, 
in river valleys, in arid locations, or on small, man-made bodies of water. The level of 
human activity around the plant will also influence the degree of surveillance. The number 
of media sampled by plants ranged from five to more than 20, with a mean of 11. 
The results of the percentage of plants sampling different media in their REMP are 
displayed in Fig. 5. As expected, 100% of plants sample for air particulate matter, 131I and 
direct radiation. Direct radiation is important as it is the greatest dose contributor to 
members of the public, especially from BWR plants. Milk, once sampled by nearly all plants, 
is now sampled by only 52% of plants. This is due to the reduction of the milk pathway 
(from cows or goats) in areas around plants. In lieu of milk sampling, plants may substitute 
broadleaf vegetation. One important characteristic of the data is that nearly 56% of plants 
sample groundwater. Recent unplanned tritium releases went unnoticed at several plants 
due to the lack of groundwater monitoring at those sites. In part due to this study and a 
national industry initiative, all plants began a groundwater monitoring program starting in 
2006. At the time of this research and writing, updated data on nuclear power plant 
groundwater monitoring was not available. The dose important fish pathway is sampled by 
88% of plants. Edible aquatic invertebrates are sampled by only 19% of the plants, mainly 
due to the lack of the pathway. 
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Fig. 5. Percent of U.S. nuclear power plants sampling different REMP pathways and 
performing specific analyses 
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4.2.3 REMP summary 
Numerical results for the REMP summary are not listed here due to the breath of the study. 
Comparisons are only made between the control samples and the indicator or test 
measurements. Direct radiation pathways include radiation from buildings and plant 
structures, airborne material that might be released from the plant, cosmic radiation, 
“fallout”, and the naturally occurring radioactive materials in soil, air and water. Analysis of 
the TLDs, which are used by all plants, indicated that there were no increased radiation 
levels attributable to plant operations. The mean BWR exposure was slightly higher than 
that for PWR plants, but the control locations actually gave higher mean values for all plant 
types. 
Airborne pathway measurements include analyses of 131I, gross beta, and gamma spectra. 
For all 131I measurements, the values were below the LLD. Therefore, the reported mean and 
median measurements are for half of the LLD values. For the entire 13 years, only one plant 
reported an indicator value above the LLD. The gross beta and gamma spectral analyses 
showed no difference between the control and indicator stations. These airborne pathway 
measurements indicated that there was no increased radioactivity attributable to plant 
operations.  
Terrestrial pathways that include milk, vegetation, grass, and food products, all gave 
calculated mean indicator measurements that were below that of the controls, Similarly for 
all waterborne pathways (drinking water, ground water, surface water, fish and 
invertebrates, and sediments), measurements of the media indicated that there was no 
adverse radiological impact to the surrounding environment attributed to plant operations 
for the study period. Individually, several plants have had measurements that resulted in 
indicator values being significantly higher than those from control stations.  
The summary data strongly suggest that for the great majority (>99.9%) of the analyses, the 
control and indicator concentrations were indistinguishable. Potential plant produced 
radionuclides were detected in both indicator and control locations. In the past 13 years, the 
concentration of radionuclides in the environment has stayed nearly level. Prior to this time, 
radionuclide concentrations showed significant downward trends, mainly due to the decay 
of “fallout” radionuclides, evidenced in the historical data provided by the plants. The 
overall trend of the REMP data for these plants is “de minimis” levels of anthropogenic 
radioactivity with occasional samples showing radioactivity above the LLD. These data also 
indicate no correlation between total dose and distance from the plants.  
The analytical results from the REMP study demonstrate that the routine operation of all 
facilities had no significant or measurable radiological impact to the environment for the 
study time period. Also, these environmental surveillance programs continued to 
demonstrate that the doses to members of the public as a result of nuclear plant operations 
remained significantly below the federally required dose limits specified in 10 CFR 20 and 
40 CFR 190. 
5. Tritium recapture study 
Tritium is an isotope of hydrogen that decays with a half-life of 12.3 y to helium (3He), while 
emitting a low energy beta particle (18.6 keV). In nuclear reactors, tritium is formed in two 
different ways: by ternary fission of uranium, and by activation (Luykx & Fraser, 1986). 
Produced tritium that ultimately ends up in the nuclear reactor coolant can then be released 
into the environment through waste discharge in either gaseous or liquid forms (Kim & 
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Han, 1999). Because tritium is generated in very large volumes, it is the predominant 
gaseous and liquid effluent released by these reactors. 
Although tritium is not considered to be a particularly toxic radionuclide (Hill and Johnson 
1993) and releases by commercial nuclear power plants have traditionally been well below 
regulatory limits, control and monitoring is important because of sensitive public concerns 
regarding radioactivity releases (Andersen 1995; Liu et al 2003). This is especially vital at the 
present time because recent, unplanned tritium releases have occurred at several nuclear 
power plants in the U.S. These unplanned releases may result in additional dose both to 
occupational workers and members of the public. This has led to increased scrutiny by plant 
owners and government agencies. In 2007, Harris also reported that the largest number of 
non-routine environmental sampling results was from tritium in surface water.  
This section describes research conducted at the Cook Nuclear Plant (U.S.) to investigate the 
behaviour of tritium released in airborne effluents. In addition to studying the behaviour 
and movement of tritium in the environment, the study has been conducted to help develop 
a sampling and analysis protocol for other plants to adopt. Methods and results are 
primarily taken from Hinchcliffe, 2010. 
5.1 Background 
At the Cook Nuclear Plant, a site consisting of two PWRs, an event in 2007 set off an 
investigation into tritium release on the site. The plant is located in the state of Michigan 
along the eastern shore of Lake Michigan. In May of that year sampling began on the site as 
a result of a leak containing tritium found outside the auxiliary building. This sampling 
resulted in elevated tritium levels being discovered in the north storm drain outfall, which 
drains into Lake Michigan. This outfall had previously been sampled on a semi-annual basis 
with no previous indication of elevated tritium levels (Harris et al., 2008). The investigation 
concluded that tritium originating in the spent fuel pool was leaving the monitored vents on 
top of the containment buildings of both units and contributing to the elevated levels. 
Findings led to increased sampling of precipitation, air-conditioning condensate, surface 
and well water, and frost formed in refrigerators/freezers (Harris et al. 2008). The 
importance of precipitation was noted in the form of washout in which tritium can be 
scavenged by falling raindrops and tritium vapour can exchange with ordinary water in the 
atmosphere (Chamberlain & Eggleton, 1964; Tokuyama & Oonishi, 1997; Harris et al., 2008). 
In this way, precipitation becomes contaminated with tritium and sampling can be used to 
calculate a washout coefficient. This coefficient allows for estimation of tritium washout due 
to the precipitation which can be used to estimate the extent of tritium recapture on site 
property (Harris et al., 2008). 
After an initial study in 2007 it was decided that additional sampling should be performed 
to determine the variations in recapture on the site as the weather changed through the year, 
and that snow should be sampled during the winter. Snow was sampled to determine if 
there was a difference in washout between rain and snow and to determine if recapture of 
tritium occurred differently with snow than it did with rain. 
5.2 Methodology 
The investigation of tritium washout was performed by taking samples at pre-determined 
site locations and analysing the collected samples for tritium. For rain collection, gauges 
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with a surface area of 7.85 x 10-4 m2 were placed 0.25 m above the ground surface. Thirty 
two (32) rain gauges were placed in each land-based 22.5° sector of the plant site. Additional 
gauges were located in the predominant seasonal wind directions; SW in the summer and N 
and NE in the winter. The rain samples from this investigation were collected between 22 
October 2007 and 21 October 2008 during 13 rain events. Snow was collected on 28 March 
2008, 11 February 2009 through 16 February 2009, and 5 January 2010 through 10 March 
2010.  
Samples were taken both inside and outside the plant Protected Area, as shown in Fig. 6 and 
7. The sample locations varied in distance from the containment stacks, ranging from 5 m 
(location 12) to 1.5 km (location 32). For control purposes, location 16 was placed 24 km from 
the release point. Snow was collected immediately after snow fall events, sampled from the 
surface of existing snow piles, and sampled with cores to evaluate depth differences from 
existing piles. Surface snow samples were obtained using 20 mL collection cups. Core 
samples yielded four to six, 10 cm sections, depending on pile depth. Ground level 
concentrations of tritium were also determined for calculation of a new washout coefficient. 
Sample analysis was done using a liquid scintillation counter (Model 2910TR, PerkinElmer). 
The samples were prepared by mixing 5 mL to 10 mL of the sample with 10 mL of 
scintillation cocktail in 20 mL vials and counting for 30 minutes. The tritium counting 
efficiency was 60%, and the lower limit of detection (LLD) was 30 Bq (819 pCi). 
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Fig. 6. Rain and snow sample locations located outside the Cook Nuclear Plant protected 
area 
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- Rain and Snow sample locations
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Fig. 7. Sample locations for rain and snow within and immediately outside the Cook 
Nuclear Plant protected area 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Tritium concentrations 
In total, 23 of the 32 rain locations had a positive result for tritium at some point in the study. 
With the snow, 44 of 56 sample locations resulted in a tritium concentration above the LLD. 
The highest rain concentration was 514 Bq L-1 (13,900 pCi L-1), and occurred at location 18, 130 
m NE of the Unit 1 containment vent. The highest snow concentration was 1,014 Bq L-1 (27,400 
pCi L-1), and occurred at snow sample location 110, 140 m SSE of the Unit 1 containment vent. 
The highest concentrations of tritium in the snow occurred in the old snow that had 
accumulated in piles on site. The positive results were found to match well with the 
meteorological data, with positive samples collected in the predominant wind direction. 
There were a total of five core samples taken and all indicated the presence of tritium in at 
least one core piece. Four of the five core samples showed an increasing concentration of 
tritium closer to the surface of the snow pile. The only core sample that did not show this 
pattern was core sample V which was taken from the visitor’s parking lot, 200 m NNE from 
the Unit 1 containment vent. All core pieces in this sample were below LLD, with the 
exception of core piece “2” (second piece from the bottom of the core). 
5.3.2 Washout 
A rain washout coefficient was calculated from the measured tritium concentrations found 
in the samples, the atmospheric tritium level, and the meteorological data gathered at the 
Cook Nuclear Plant. The washout coefficient is calculated by: 
 
eff0 Hχ
ω
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where: Λ = washout coefficient (s-1); ω = tritium deposition rate (Bq m-2 s-1); χ0 = atmospheric 
tritium concentration at ground-level (Bq m-3); and Heff = effective height (m). The effective 
height is calculated using the dispersion equation (Chamberlain & Eggleton, 1964): 
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  (4) 
where: Q = tritium emission rate (Bq m-2 s-1); σys = standard deviation of distribution of 
concentration in the y direction (m); Us= mean wind speed (m s-1); Χ0,cal = mean concentration 
for the ground-level atmospheric concentration (m). The subscript S refers to the atmospheric 
stability. Using the local meteorological conditions, the deposition rate is given as:  
 
3600
IC R  (5) 
where: C = tritium concentration in rainwater (Bq L-1); and IR = mean rainfall intensity 
(mm h-1). 
The emission rates were calculated using the continuous tritium release rates from the Cook 
Nuclear Plant Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports (ARERR) for the periods on which 
the precipitation events occurred. The precipitation intensities were calculated for each 
precipitation event, with an average value of 3.1 mm h-1 for rain, and 1.1 mm h-1 for the snow. 
For the rain samples the washout coefficient values ranged from 7.84 x 10-7 s-1 to 1.13 x 10-4 s-1 
with an average washout coefficient of (2.04 ± 1.85) x 10-5 s-1. Washout coefficients were only 
calculated for the fresh snow. The reason for this as that as the snow sits, it accumulates tritium 
from the atmosphere, and thus skews the value of the washout coefficient. The fresh snow was 
analysed shortly after the snow event. The calculated washout coefficients for the fresh snow 
ranged from 2.21 x 10-6 s-1 to 2.33 x 10-5 s-1 with an average value of (1.30 ± 0.75) x 10-5 s-1. Upon 
comparing the rain and snow washout coefficient sample populations using a two sample t-
test, it was determined that there was a significant difference between the washout coefficients 
in the snow and rain at the 0.05 decision rule level. 
5.4 Discussion  
Several other studies have reported values of washout coefficients in the literature. A 
theoretical washout coefficient based on the rate of exchange of tritiated water (HTO) 
vapour by rain, was calculated to be 10-4 s-1 (Chamberlain & Eggleton, 1964). In Japan, 
Tokuyama & Oonishi (1997) used a mean rainfall intensity of 2 mm h-1 and calculated a 
washout coefficient from releases at a nuclear plant to be (7.3 ± 4.1) x 10-5 s-1. The previous 
study at Cook Nuclear Plant calculated a washout coefficient of (9.70 ± 8.40) x 10-5 s-1, based 
on a rainfall intensity of 6.2 mm h-1 (Harris et al., 2008). The rain washout coefficient in this 
study is smaller than those previously listed, but on the same order of magnitude as 
Tokuyama & Oonishi and Harris et al. The release rates used for this study were monthly 
averages rather than instantaneous rates used in several of the other studies. In addition, the 
calculated effective heights were calculated higher in this study than the other studies that 
listed the effective height used.  
Annual fluctuations of weather have multiple effects on the process of tritium recapture at 
nuclear sites. The locations of greatest recapture vary between seasons and even within 
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particular seasons. Snow recapture at the Cook Nuclear Plant occurred in locations of the 
site that previously were not known for rain recapture, thus presenting new pathways of 
tritium movement needing to be studied. Snow also presents a unique problem, as it is not 
removed from the site at the same rate that rain would be removed, thus allowing for 
tritium to be absorbed into snow piles that accumulate around the site. This allows for snow 
piles to obtain tritium concentrations far above what simple washout can cause in 
precipitation alone. The piles also appear to accumulate a higher concentration of tritium on 
and near the surface of the pile where the snow is exposed to the atmosphere. 
The results here suggest that individual sites will have to come up with their own sampling 
methods based on individual site characteristics such as annual fluctuations in wind and 
precipitation. Variables will change from site to site, and long term annual studies will need 
to be performed to fully comprehend the behaviour of tritium recapture. A single industry 
model would be unable to account for the many individual variables that would change 
between sites. Studies are on-going at Cook Nuclear Plant to better understand tritium 
behaviour. 
6. Future research 
Although the research presented here provided important insights into commercial nuclear 
power plant discharges, more studies are needed to truly understand effluent trends and 
nuclear power plant radioactivity. As long as commercial nuclear power plants continue to 
operate and release radioactivity into the environment, there will always be a need to 
monitor, track, and evaluate these releases. This is especially true as new power plants are 
constructed and existing plants make operational changes. Evolutions in standards, 
recommendations, and regulations may also warrant studies to address the potential 
impact. One expansive area of research that is developing comes from recommendations 
made by the ICRP in Publications 103 and 108 (2007, 2009). Specifically there is mention of 
radiological protection of the environment and the development of reference plants and 
animals. If nations adopt these recommendations, large scale studies at nuclear power 
plants may need to be undertaken. 
In the U.S., a number of potential new areas of research involving nuclear power 
radiological releases are being investigated. First, revisions in 2009 of USNRC Regulatory 
Guides 1.21 and 4.1 have prompted plants to begin monitoring their 14C emissions. Only a 
few plants had done this prior to the release of these revisions and now several 
organizations are evaluating methods and procedures to best accomplish this. Other 
countries are also evaluating this scenario, if they are not already monitoring for 14C. In 
conjunction with the tritium washout study presented in Section 5, several plants are 
conducting their own studies on tritium releases and movement. The majority of plants in 
the U.S. are now monitoring groundwater and studying its movement and transport of 
radionuclides. Finally, with the construction and operation of new plants, studies on 
effluent fate and transport, dose assessment and environmental impact are sure to be 
conducted.  
7. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the research presented here will hopefully provide stakeholders with some 
additional insights on assessing nuclear power plant radiological releases and 
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environmental monitoring programs. Evaluation of radionuclide impacts in terms of 
potential increased dose to people, in relation to natural background, is necessary to 
determine the true significance of any detection. Maintained effluent tracking and analysis 
will continue to be important for the future of the commercial nuclear power industry. 
Effluent trending may also reveal insight into the effect of increased reactor lifetime 
operation on radioactivity releases. Currently, many plants have been approved for, or are 
applying for, operating license extensions. Tracking data for siting of new nuclear power 
plants may also be used to determine environmental radionuclide build-up and long-term 
nuclear power health effects. 
Although the research presented here showed that normal nuclear power operations have 
no significant effect on the environment, continued surveillance is important. The potential 
development of new pathways may require changes in monitoring techniques. Doses to 
members of the general public, and even occupational workers, may increase because of 
these pathways.  Finally, continued industry analysis of radiological effluent releases and 
environmental monitoring are important for maintaining favourable public opinion about 
nuclear power. The more accurate, scientifically based information that citizens can be 
provided with, the more likely they are to make informed, non-emotional judgments about 
nuclear power. 
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1. Introduction  
Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (INPP) is situated in the Northeastern part of Lithuania close 
to the borders with Latvia and Belarus at a Lake Druksiai utilized as cooling pond (Fig. 1). 
The two RBMK-1500 reactor units, Unit 1 and Unit 2, were put into operation in December 
1983 and August 1987, respectively. Like Chernobyl NPP, the INPP was equipped by RBMK 
type reactors, i.e. channel-type, graphite moderated pressure tube boiling water nuclear 
reactors. The RBMK reactors belong to the thermal neutron reactor category each of a design 
capacity of 1500 MW(e). Unit 1 was shut down on December 31, 2004 and Unit 2 on 
December 31, 2009 (http://www.iae.lt). 
Lake Druksiai is the largest lake in Lithuania and has its eastern margin in Belarus, where 
the lake is called Drisvyaty. The total volume of water is about 369 × 106 m3 (water level 
altitude of 141.6 m). The total area of the lake, including nine islands, is 49 km2 (6.7 km2 in 
Belarus, 42.3 km2 in Lithuania). The greatest depth of the lake is 33.3 m and the average is 
7.6 m. The length of the lake is 14.3 km, the maximum width 5.3 km and the perimeter 60.5 
km. Drainage area of the lake is only 613 km2. 
The water regime of Lake Druksiai is formed by interaction of natural and anthropogenic 
factors. The main natural factors are the climatic conditions of the region which determine 
the amount of precipitations onto the surface of the water reservoir and natural evaporation 
from the lake surface and watershed. The anthropogenic factors, which are mainly related 
with INPP operation, are water discharges by the hydro-engineering complex. The yearly 
amount of water discharged from INPP is 9 times the volume of the lake and 27 times the 
natural annual influx of water to the lake. 
The aim of this study was to evaluate radiological and environmental effects of radioactive, 
chemical and thermal pollution in cooling pond of INPP (Lake Druksiai). Main efforts were 
given to assess the presumptive radioactive impact on the lake non-human biota, with 
special emphasize on macrophytes and fish communities. Macrophytes were selected as 
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appropriate biological indicators of changes in radioecological situation which comprise one 
of the largest biomass and able to intensive accumulate radioactive and other substances. 
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Fig. 1. The location of INPP (left) and permanent sampling (monitoring) stations, industrial 
storm water (ISW 1.2), cooling water (CW) and waste water treatment plant (WWTP) 
channels in Lake Druksiai (right) 
The need for a systematic approach to the radiological assessment of non-human biota is 
now accepted by a number of international and national bodies (US DOE, 2002; ICRP, 2008). 
This requires the development and testing of an integrated approach where decision making 
can be guided by scientific judgments. The assessment of nuclear sites in context of 
comparison of non-human biota exposure due to discharged anthropogenic radionuclides 
with that due to background radiation is required and presented in this study. 
2. Materials and methods 
2.1 Lithuanian State research and academic institutions INPP environment 
investigations 
The purpose of the environment investigation programmes (Lithuanian State Scientific 
Research Programme, 1998) was to detect INPP impacts, as they occur, to estimate their 
magnitude and ensure that they are the consequence of a well identified activity. The INPP 
environment investigation programs include all environmental exposure pathways that may 
exhibit long term concentration effects, such as in the case of the Lake Druksiai sediments. 
This investigation allows also the assessment of the effectiveness and mitigation of remedial 
measures and includes the follow-up of impacts and their verification against predictions. 
Samples of lake water, bottom sediments and non-human biota were collected and 
measured from the very beginning of INPP operation up to shut down period of time. 
2.2 Anthropogenic radioactive pollution and natural-background radionuclides 
The first stage in the distribution of radionuclides in freshwater ecosystem is quick and 
intense processes of accumulation of radionuclides in the bottom sediments. That stipulates 
the rather rapid decrease of the amounts of radionuclides in water. Therefore, data of 
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radionuclide activity concentrations in the water are insufficient in the assessment of the 
pollution of the freshwater ecosystem by radionuclides. Bottom sediments reflect the long-
term pollution of Lake Druksiai by anthropogenic radionuclides.  
This investigation amongst others presents the comparison of freshwater macrophytes and 
fish exposure due to discharged anthropogenic radionuclides (54Mn, 60Co, 90Sr, 134;137Cs) with 
that due to semi-natural and background radionuclides (3H, 14C, 40K, 210Pb, 210Po, 238U, 226Ra, 
232Th) mostly based on bottom sediments activity data accumulated during Lake Druksiai 
radiogeochemical mapping and other measurements, as presented in Fig. 2-4. 
An assumption in the calculations was that the spatial distribution of investigated 
radionuclides in the INPP cooling-pond bottom sediments was uniformly distributed. 
However, the largest amounts of activated corrosion product radionuclides (54Mn and 90Co) 
coming from the INPP enter the lake with cooling waters (CW) and industrial stormwater 
discharge (ISW-1,2) outflows. The specific activity of activated corrosion products remains 
generally low in much of the lake and is concentrated especially close to the outflows (Fig. 3).  
Frequency histograms depicting activity concentrations of some primary anthropogenic and 
naturally-occurring radionuclides in Lake Druksiai sediments are presented in Fig. 4. 
Long-term radioecological investigations of Lake Druksiai showed that during the period of 
1988–2008 the highest values of 137Cs, 90Sr, 60Co and 54Mn activity concentration in bottom 
sediments was estimated in 1988–1993 when both Units of INPP were operating. The 
tendency of decrease of the activity concentration of these most important radionuclides in 
the bottom sediments was observed from the beginning of 1996 (Fig. 5). 
 
 
Fig. 2. The maps of spatial distributions (left) and frequency histograms (right) depicting 
activity concentrations of naturally-occurring background 232Th and 238U in Lake Druksiai 
sediments 
 
Nuclear Power – Operation, Safety and Environment 
 
264 
 
Fig. 3. The spatial pattern of activated corrosion products 54Mn and 90Co in bottom 
sediments (left) and frequency histograms (right) of Lake Druksiai. The highest activity 
concentrations corresponded the ISW-1,2 and CW sampling points 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Frequency histograms depicting activity concentrations of some anthropogenic and 
naturally occurring radionuclides in Lake Druksiai bottom sediment 
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Fig. 5. Time-depended activity concentration of anthropogenic radionuclides in bottom 
sediment of Lake Druksiai 
Traces of 3H and 14C originating from the INPP are found in the surface water (Fig. 6). For 
the period of 1980-2008 the highest 3H activity concentration in Lake Druksiai was in 2003 
year and reached 24 Bq/l. During this period 3H activity concentration in the background 
water bodies was 2-3 Bq/l, so approximately 20 Bq/l was originated from INPP releases. 14C 
activity concentration in background water bodies in Lithuania well fits with the 
international data for Northern Hemisphere. The excess of 14C originated from 
thermonuclear weapon tests declines almost to the 14C level of cosmogenic origin for all 
studied surface water bodies in Lithuania. From period of 1992-1993 in the atmosphere and 
in the surface water all over the world predominates 14C of cosmogenic origin. Almost for all 
period of 14C observation in surface water influence of INPP has been hardly estimated. 
Only from 2002 the 14C excess in water influenced by INPP was observed. Very insignificant 
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fraction of 14C originated from INPP in surface water bodies can be observed in channels 
and in Lake Druksiai. In 2005 14C activity in water from outlet channel compared to 
background level has increased about 30%. But in 2007 14C activity already did not differ 
from background level (Mazeika, 2010).  
 
 
Fig. 6. Time-dependent activity concentrations of 3H and 14C in Lake Druksiai water (left) 
and frequency histograms (right) 
2.2 Chemical and thermal pollution 
The Lake Druksiai was impacted not only by radionuclide pollutions, but also by chemical 
and thermal pollution. Ignalina NPP discharges into the Lake Druksiai various waste water, 
which are mainly multicomponent mixtures of chemicals substances (biogenic elements, 
diluted weak organic acids, heavy metals, petrolic hydrocarbons and so on (Joksas, 1998)). 
The main pollution source of Lake Druksiai is the treated waste water used for household 
needs in settlements, Visaginas town and INPP industrial storm water sewers. The 
wastewater treatment plant is designed for biological treatment and complementary 
cleaning with sand filters. The treated waste water is discharged into Lake Druksiai through 
the tertiary treatment pond. However, these facilities can nowadays be considered as a 
secondary source of organic pollution since the settled biomass or superior plants have not 
been removed and the accumulation of the produced biomass leads to a secondary 
eutrophication process. Around 5.5×106–8.5×106 m3 of water enters Lake Druksiai annually 
from the wastewater treatment plant.  
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Actually the household waste water discharges from Visaginas town and the INPP are 
major contributors of nutrients into the lake. (Fig. 7). Up to 1000 tons of organic carbon, 700 
tons of nitrogen and 50 tons of phosphorus has been entering the lake annually with 
maximum values before the year 1991 (Mazeika et al., 2006).  
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Fig. 7. Nitrogen and phosphorus load into Lake Druksiai 
It was evaluated that mean annual concentrations of nitrogen and phosphorus in treated 
effluents even after the pond of additional purification at that time were 37.7 mg N/l and 3.5 
mg P/l accordingly. These figures considerably decreased in the last few decades due to 
improvement of the purification facility of household effluent. Still this source supplies 55% 
of nitrogen and 80 % of phosphorus of total annual amount to the lake (Table 1) (Mazeika et 
al., 2006). 
A slightly increasing tendency of total dissolved salts in the water has been observed 
recently. Waters of Lake Druksiai are dominantly bicarbonate-calcium with medium total 
dissolved solids (TDS) content. Evaporation from the surface of a lake was expected to 
become the most important push to increase the concentration of salts in the remaining 
water. However, it did not have a noticeable effect during several decades of operation of 
the INPP mainly due to the decrease of HCO3- and Ca2+ concentration despite the fact (Table 
2) that the content of chlorides, sodium, potassium, sulphates, magnesium increased 
(Salickaite-Bunikiene & Kirkutyte, 2003; Paskauskas et al., 2009). 
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Sources Nt,  metric tons year -1 
Pt,  
metric tons year -1 
Domestic and urban runoff 85.53 15.291 
stormwater drainage of INPP site 1,2 1.663 0.244 
stormwater drainage of INPP site 3 0.335 0.081 
treated household effluents of INPP and Visaginas 81.625 14.720 
stormwater drainage of Visaginas town 2 0.617 0.046 
stormwater drainage of Visaginas town 1 0.416 0.04 
stormwater drainage of site of spent nuclear fuel 
storage facility 0.870 0.16 
Natural runoff 62.02 3.88 
Total input 147.54 19.17 
Prorva river (output) 98 14.11 
Table 1. Long-term balance (1991-2000) of total nitrogen (Nt) and total phosphorus (Pt) load 
to Lake Druksiai 
 
Parameters 
Periods 
1979–1983 1984–1988 1989–1993 1994–1997 2001–2006 
Cl-,mg/l 8.8 9.9 10.7 9.8 12.9 
SO42-, mg/l 8.9 12.6 18.6 19.3 18.0 
HCO3-, mg/l 160.5 150.4 157.6 159.4 169.5 
Ca2+, mg/l 39.3 35.8 36.8 35.8 37.9 
Mg2+, mg/l 10.0 10.9 12.9 13.8 15.9 
Na+, mg/l 4.6 6.3 7.0 6.9 7.5 
K+, mg/l 1.8 2.7 3.0 2.9 3.2 
TDS, mg/l 233.9 228.6 246.6 247.9 264.3 
Table 2. Average long-term main ion concentrations and TDS values in Lake Druksiai 
Direct contamination on Lake Druksiai emanate from the industrial areas and the town via 
storm water release systems, supplying the lake ecosystem with many contaminants and 
inhibitors of biological processes. However, the concentration of copper, lead, chrome, 
cadmium and nickel has not exceeded the allowable values for the water quality 
(Marciulioniene et al. 1998) 
Concentrations of heavy metals (HM) in the waste water of the INPP and Lake Druksiai 
during the INPP operation time was higher in comparison with concentrations measured 
before the plant had been launched. Maximal concentrations of HM (soluble and suspended 
forms) discharged into the lake from the ISW-1,2 and WWTP channels (Table 3). The largest 
amount of Fe, Mn and Co got into the lake and migrated together with suspended particles. 
The main part of these metals deposited in the bottom sediments (Table 4) and the other 
part of them were involved into biological processes. 
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Sampling 
station No. Year 
Cd Cr Cu Ni Mn Zn Pb 
g/l 
1 
1996 – 0.2 3.7 1.3 15.1 4.5 0.25 
1997 – 0.05 4.8 1.1 2.0 6.0 1.4 
1999 0.1 0.2 4.6 0.57 1.0 0.2 0.3 
2 
1996 – 0.7 4.1 0.6 15.1 2.9 0.3 
1997 – 0.01 3.7 1 0.6 2.0 1 
1999 0.1 0.3 6.0 0.22 38.0 1.8 3.1 
6 
1996 – 0.7 3.9 1.4 29.6 4.0 0.3 
1997 – 0.01 3.3 1.0 0.7 1.0 1 
1999 0.1 0.6 6.4 0.58 125.0 29.0 2.9 
Table 3. Average midsummer heavy metals concentrations in water of Lake Druskiai 
It has been estimated that heavy metal contaminated sediments (from intermediate to high 
level of contamination) cover 27.5 % of the lake bottom sediment area, slightly polluted area 
covers 41%, and non-polluted area covers about 32% (Joksas et al., 1998). Pollution with oil 
products was identified in 3.9 % of the bottom sediment area but major part of this has a 
natural origin since the natural hydrocarbons dominate. Concentration of hydrocarbons in 
the water was not high and varied from 2 to 44 μg/l. Their concentration in the surface layer 
of bottom sediments was from 1.12 to 127 mg/kg dry weight (DW) (Joksas et al., 1998). 
 
Sampling 
station No. 
Pb Cd Cr Zn Cu 
mg/kg, DW 
1 39.8 1.4 8.4 80.0 74.0 
4 10.4 0.2 3.3 23.1 111.3 
6 21.8 0.7 5.8 46.0 55.1 
7 1.8 0.1 0.8 4.6 4.9 
Table 4. Heavy metals concentrations in bottom sediments of Lake Druskiai 
Thermal aspects together with chemical and radioactive pollution must be taken into 
account considered ecological risk. Lake Druksiai has been used as the source of cooling 
water already since 1983 when first unit was put into operation. When passing through the 
cooling system of the INPP, the quality of cooling water does not normally change in any 
other way than that the temperature raises approximately 9–11 °C. Heated water discharge 
led to changes in the hydrological conditions of the lake: the surface temperatures increased, 
the natural vertical thermal stratification altered and evaporation rates increased. The 
increased temperature of the lake and the subsequent decrease of the cold water volume 
(Fig. 8) did not only stimulate the acceleration of eutrophication of the lake but also changed 
the prevailing conditions unfavorably for stenothermal cryophilic species. In Druksiai water 
temperature at 10 m depth has risen by 4°C and at 30 m depth by nearly 2°C (Balkuviene & 
Parnaraviciute, 1994). 
Due to the complex (thermal and chemical) anthropogenic impact the following ecological 
zones, as presented in Table 5, have developed in Lake Druksiai: 
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 Zone A: The most eutrophicated south-eastern part of the lake, where the main source 
of eutrophication is the household effluents of the INPP and Visaginas town with an 
elevated amount of nutrients (N, P). Increased amount of plankton as well as enhanced 
activity of production-decomposition processes are observed in this area.  
 Zone B: The cooling water outflow zone is the area of the greatest thermal impact, 
where water temperature in many cases exceeds 28 °C. The lowest abundance and 
variety of most planktonic organisms (phytoplankton and zooplankton) as well as 
lower rates of primary production and more intensive decomposition processes of 
organic matter are observed in this area; 
 Zone C: The rest of the lake, including the deep and mediate deep zones, where the 
various impact factors affect the ecosystem occasionally, depending on the INPP 
operation, wind direction, waves, etc. 
In conclusion, eutrophication, the increase of salts content and warming of the lake water, 
interact to influence the habitats and ecosystems of the lake. Despite these changes in the 
lake ecosystem, the parameters examined still meet the requirements and range within the 
guide values.  
 
 
Fig. 8. The distribution of thermal zones during summer stratification in Lake Druksiai, 
1977–1983 – A and 1984–1997 – B (Balkuviene & Parnaraviciute, 1994) 
 
Parameter Zone A Zone B Zone C 
Secchi depth, m 1.0–2.8 3.0–3.9 1.2–6.5 
Chlorophyll a, µg/l 6.6–113.5 0.88–16.5 0.99–70.0 
Zooplankton biomass, mg/m3 2 046–7 180 431–1 863 596–1 153 
Phytoplankton primary production, mg C/m3 d-1 330–2 800 44–440 2–1 500 
Corg. total in bottom sediments, % 11.7–12.4 3.5–3.7 7.6–12.6 
Organic matter mineralization in bottom 
sediments, mg C/m2 d-1 1 127–1 590 915–939 513–720 
Table 5. Fluctuation range of some parameters in different zones of Lake Druksiai 
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3. Radioactive pollution and non-human biota exposure 
Concerning dose calculations to non-human biota the data of radiological investigations and 
radionuclide transport pathway must be taken into account. 
Radionuclide transfer modeling in various ecosystems using differential equations and 
transfer factors is desirable. For radiation doses to freshwater biota evaluation ERICA 
assessment tool (Environmental Risk of Ionizing Contaminants Assessment and 
Menagement – http://project.facilia.se/erica/) and site specific LIETDOS-BIO  code 
(Nedveckaite et al., 2010) has been used.  
3.1 ERICA biota exposure dose rates assessment approach 
The ERICA project (the European Community 6th Framework programme at a European 
level) was carried out between 2004 and 2007. The final outcome of the project is the 
delivery of the ERICA Integrated Approach. The use of Integrated Approach is facilitated by 
ERICA Tool which is a software code that keeps records and communicates with a number 
of purpose-built databases. 
The Community research in radiation protection underpins European policy and has 
already contributed to the high level of environmental protection. To put assessment of 
nuclear sites into context a comparison of biota exposure due to discharged anthropogenic 
radionuclides with that of background radionuclides is required. This investigation presents 
the comparison of freshwater Lake Druksiai reference biota (the reference organisms are the 
default organisms included in the ERICA code Tool) exposure due to discharged 
anthropogenic radionuclides with that due to natural background radionuclides using 
ERICA approaches. The data presented enlarge knowledge about the concentrations of 
radionuclide in European freshwater ecosystems in order to understand the exposure dose 
rates of freshwater organisms due to major discharged radionuclides and natural series 
contributors.  
 
 
Fig. 9. The comparison of dose rates to freshwater reference organisms from natural 
background radionuclides (left) and the corresponding percentage due to separate 
radionuclides (right) in Lake Druksiai. The percentage of  210Pb and 232Th are less than 1% 
In the case of INPP cooling pond Lake Druksiai the estimated exposure of freshwater 
ecosystem reference organisms  is determined mostly by natural background radionuclides 
and arises from internally incorporated alpha emitters, with 210Po, 226Ra and 238U being the 
major contributors (Fig. 9). The contribution of anthropogenic radionuclides exposure 
composes about 5% of this dose rates (Fig. 10). The exposure of reference organisms due to 
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the natural background exposure stands out above anthropogenic discharged radionuclides 
exposure.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. The comparison of total dose rates derived by freshwater reference organisms 
inhabiting Lake Druksiai from anthropogenic (a) and natural-anthropogenic (b) 
radionuclides (left) and the corresponding percentage due to separate radionuclides (right) 
3.2 Site-specific LIETDOS-BIO computer code designed for non-human biota 
exposure assessment approach 
The site-specific LIETDOS-BIO assessment approach to non-human biota exposure 
protection from ionizing radiation is being developed to address contamination issues 
associated with nuclear power production and radioactive waste repository in Lithuania. 
LIETDOS-BIO model and computer code for biota exposure dose rate calculation was 
validated during IAEA EMRAS (Environmental Modeling for Radiation Safety) Working 
Group designated for model validation for biota dose assessment (Vives-i-Batlle et al., 2007; 
Beresford et al., 2008a; Beresford et al., 2008b; Beresford et al., 2009; Yankovich et al., 2010). 
The user is the Centre of Physical Science and Technology and Nature Research Centre.  
LIETDOS-BIO code was designed to be consistent with MCNPX (general purpose Monte 
Carlo radiation transport code that can be used for neutron, photon, electron, or coupled 
neutron/photon/electron transport) (MCNPX, 2002) as well as Crystal Ball software 
(www.oracle.com/crystalball/index.html) for uncertainty analyses.  
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3.2.1 Preparing MCNPX input file for dose conversion coefficients (DCC) calculations 
The MCNPX code is widely used for radiation transport simulation with relatively high 
flexibility and is now applied to many fields including radiation safety management, health 
physics, medical physics and reactor design. Based on information about the organism 
geometry specification, description of materials, specification of the particle source, the type 
of answers desired (energy deposited in a given volume) LIETDOS-BIO automatically 
creates an input file (specially designed to LIETDOS-BIO) that is sub sequentially read by 
MCNPX and calculates dose conversion coefficients for non-human biota. Examples of 
geometry specification model for dose conversion coefficient of external exposure 
calculation by MCNPX code is presented in Fig. 11. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Geometry specification model for non-human biota DCC of external exposure 
calculation by MCNPX code: organism on the bottom of water layer (left), organism in the 
middle of water layer (right), rooted submerged hydrophytes (below) 
3.2.2 Method used for deriving uncertainty and accuracy estimates 
Like any complex environmental problem, the evaluation of ionizing radiation impact is 
confounded by uncertainty. In radioecology stochastic calculations are used to an increasing 
extent. At all stages, from problem formulation up to exposure evaluation,  the assessments 
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depend on models, scenarios, assumptions and extrapolations as well as technical 
uncertainties related to the data used. Uncertainties can be categorized as follows: 
 Knowledge uncertainties defined as a lack of scientific knowledge about parameters 
and factors or models. It includes measurement errors as well as model 
misrepresentation and can be reduced through further study. It may be possible to 
represent some of these uncertainties by probability distributions. 
 Variability is defined as a natural variability due to changes in a data set. Variability is 
easier to represent quantifiable through simple standard deviation or a frequency 
distribution or through probability density function. 
To estimate the uncertainty of the endpoints of the exposure assessment, uncertainties in the 
inputs and parameters must be propagated through the model using Monte-Carlo analysis. 
Point estimates in a model equation are replaced with probability distributions, samples are 
randomly taken from each distribution, and the results are combined, usually in the form of 
a probability density function, in order to obtain 95% confidence interval. The uncertainties 
in LIETDOS-BIO model has been determined by Crystal Ball code statistical technique with 
10 000 number of trials and the Latin Hypercube sampling method.  An example of external 
dose rate evaluation is presented in Fig. 12. Sensitivity analysis is used to identify the 
relative quantitative contribution of uncertainty associated with each input and parameter 
value to the endpoint interested.  
 
 
Fig. 12. An example of Druksiai Lake macrophytes external dose rate evaluation (Crystal 
Ball statistical techniques was used with 20 000 number of trials and Latin Hypercube 
sampling) 
3.2.3 LIETDOS-BIO libraries and data bases 
LIETDOS-BIO contains Nuclide library (ICRP, 1983) and site-specific parameters library 
(terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems). An example of site-specific freshwater ecosystem 
macrophytes 90Sr concentration factor (CF) evaluation is presented in Fig. 13. Various 
species of macrophyte forming a greatest phytomass in water were investigated 
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(Marciulioniene et al., 1992). An amount of stable Sr and Ca as well as many biological and 
physical processes plays the main role among the factors determining 90Sr concentration 
levels of the investigated species. The frequency of 90Sr CF distribution based on 250 
samples of 19 macrophyte species evaluation in Lithuanian lakes is presented in Fig. 13. 
The examples of site-specific CF values, based on environmental monitoring of discharged 
radionuclide activity concentration in the submerged plants and water have been evaluated 
completing data gaps in freshwater environment. The concentration factors based on 
submerged hydrophyte and water activity measurements was estimated. Data presented in 
Table 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 13. Site-specific values of 90Sr activity concentrations for different types of freshwater 
ecosystem macrophytes (a) and the distribution of corresponding CF values (b) 
 
 
 
Parameters 
Concentration factor, m3 kg-1 
40K 54Mn 60Co 90Sr/90Y 137Cs/137mBa 
Mean 1.510+1 1.210+1 8.610+0 2.010+0 2.510-1 
Median 1.010+1 2.310+0 3.610+0 1.110+0 1.110-1 
Standard Deviation 1.710+1 4.510+1 1.710+1 2.710+0 4.810-1 
Range Minimum 1.410-1 1.010-3 8.010-3 1.010-2 1.010-3 
Range Maximum 3.710+2 2.610+3 5.410+3 6.410+1 1.310+1 
Table 6. The submerged freshwater hydrophyte site-specific CF values 
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4. Exposure of biota in the INPP cooling pond Lake Druksiai 
On the basis of the long-term studies of the radionuclides in biotic and abiotic components 
of Lake Druksiai (Marciulioniene et al., 1992; Lithuanian State scientific research 
programme, 1998) the potential impacts of radioactive pollution on lake non-human biota, 
with special emphasis on macrophytes were evaluated. 
4.1 Submerged macrophytes exposure dose rates assessment 
A decline in a hydrophyte population may indicate water quality problems. Such problems 
may be the result of chemical or thermal lake pollution, as well as exposure by radionuclide 
ionizing radiation. Internal and external exposures of submerged hydrophytes were 
estimated by means of LIETDOS-BIO code separately for above-sediment and rooted plant 
parts. Eighty-five samples of submerged macrophytes (Myriophyllum spicatum, Ceratophyllum 
demersum, Nitellopsis obtusa) have been measured to determine the activity concentrations of 
54Mn, 60Co, 137Cs, 90Sr, 40K, 210Pb. 
Based on the knowledge of radionuclide distribution within the freshwater environment a 
simplified compartmentalization of the ecosystems was used as a basis for selecting suitable 
target geometries (phantoms) for the macrophyte’s above sediment and rooted parts dose 
rate calculations. The aquatic ecosystem has been considered as two compartments: bed 
sediment and water column (Fig. 11). It is reasonably safe to suggest that the above-
sediment part of submerged rooted plants receive lower external radiation doses as 
compared with the external exposure of roots in sediments that is in a system which has 
been receiving radionuclides for a number of years. Consequently, the external and internal 
exposure of above-sediment and rooted parts of plant must be evaluated separately. An 
example of DCC values for rooted submerged hydrophyte’s parts, calculated by means of 
LIETDOS-BIO code, are presented in Table 7. 
 
Exposure DCC, Gy/h per Bq/kg 
54Mn 60Co 90Sr/90Y 137Cs/137mBa 
External 2.31E-04 7.63E-04 4.82E-04 2.77E-04 
Exposure DCC, Gy/h per Bq/kg (FW) 
40K 210Pb 226Ra 232Th 
External 2.41E-04 6.76E-07 2.58E-06 4.41E-08 
Table 7. Submerged hydrophyte’s rooted part weighted DCC for anthropogenic and 
background radionuclides (assuming weighting factor of 5 for -radiation, both --
radiation – 1) 
Estimates of exposure were therefore made using two groups of model parameters:  
 site-specific data when available - activity concentration in plants, bottom sediments 
and in most cases water (assuming site-specific equilibrium between two phases); 
 generic parameters when site-specific data were lacking, for example CF values were 
generally needed for 232Th and 238U.  
Some examples of submerged hydrophytes root external exposure dose rates evaluation due 
to discharged anthropogenic and natural background radionuclides are presented in Fig. 14. 
As presented in (Nedveckaite et al., 2007; Nedveckaite et al., 2011) the ionizing radiation 
exposure dose rates to submerged hydrophyte roots and above sediment parts due to the 
anthropogenic radionuclides (54Mn, 60Co, 137Cs, 90Sr) discharged into Lake Druksiai were 
0.044 mGy h-1 and 0.004 mGy h-1, respectively. 
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Fig. 14. The examples of submerged hydrophyte’s root external exposure dose rates 
evaluation due to discharged anthropogenic and natural background radionuclides 
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5. The investigation of radiological, chemical and thermal pollution effects on 
the lake biota 
5.1 Macrophytes 
Aquatic plants make up a large biomass and intensively concentrate radionuclide’s 
occurring in the environment in micro amounts by assimilating them both from water and 
bottom sediments. Therefore, to assess the radioecological state of a hydroecosystem, the 
plants (bioindicators) are used. Radionuclide activity concentrations in bioindicators are 
integrated in time (a month, a year or even longer period of time) as well as in space, 
whereas in the environment they demonstrate fast alteration due to environmental factors. 
Radionuclide activity concentrations in bioindicators can be established comparatively 
accurately, even in such cases, when their activity concentrations in other environmental 
components are under the minimal detectable level (Marciulioniene at al., 2011a). Activity 
concentration of radionuclides in macrophytes of Lake Druksiai during twenty years period 
of time is presented in Fig. 15. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Time-depended activity concentration of anthropogenic radionuclides in submerged 
macrophytes of Lake Druksiai 
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Macrophytes were collected in the stations of littoral zone at a depth less than 8 m. Ninety-
five samples of different submerged macrophytes were measured to determine the 
radionuclide activity concentrations (Marciulioniene et al., 1992; Mazeika, 2002). In most 
cases co-located bottom sediment and water samples were also analyzed. It should be 
stressed that bottom sediment activity which contain radionuclides accumulated over a 
number of years determined the rooted submerged macrophyte exposure to a greater extent 
as compared with water activity. 
5.1.1 Macrophytes and chemical pollution 
Waste water polluted not only with radionuclides, but also with chemical contaminants 
(acid and alkali solutions, weak organic acids, heavy metals and etc.) were constantly 
discharged from WWTP and ISW-1,2 channels of INPP into Lake Druksiai, which 
accumulated in bottom sediments. A tendency of increasing toxicity of INPP WWTP 
channel discharge and bottom sediments as well as the water of ISW-1,2 channel discharges 
into Lake Druksiai zone and especially bottom sediments was observed. However, this 
waste water taking into account the degree of toxicity can be subsumed as low-toxicity 
waste water. 
 
 
 
Fig. 16. Impact of INPP industrial storm water discharge channel on radionuclide 
accumulation (as compared with the control, %) in algae Nitellopsis obtusa and higher plant 
Elodea canadensis 
The results of INPP industrial storm water discharge channel impact on radionuclide 
accumulation in algae Nitellopsis obtusa and higher plant Elodea canadensis are presented in 
Fig. 16.  
5.1.2 Macrophytes and thermal pollution 
It is known that stimulation of the growth of aquatic plants under high temperature of water 
is deviated from the normal functioning of plants. Hence, we may conclude that after the 
rapid development of the all species of plant of Lake Druksiai (1986–1989), the suppression 
of species, more sensitive to high temperature, had occurred. Temperature of water is one of 
the main factors which influence the physiological state of plant and it is strongly related 
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with the sensitivity of plants to chemical and radioactive matters. Accumulation of 
radionuclides in the Nitellopsis obtusa and Elodea canadensis under laboratory conditions 
showed that the increase in water temperature from 22 to 31°C influenced the accumulation 
levels of different radionuclides in the tested plant species differently (Fig. 17), accumulation 
level of 134Ce increased signally. 
 
 
 
Fig. 17. Impact of thermal pollution (31°C) on radionuclide accumulation (as compared with 
the control at 22°C , %) in algae Nitellopsis obtusa and Elodea canadensis 
It was found that impact of thermal and chemical pollution on accumulation of 137Cs taking 
part in the metabolic processes in the aquatic plants may depend more on changes of the 
functional status of plant. Accumulation of microelement 60Co and 54Mn participating in 
metabolic processes of the aquatic plants under thermal impact may depend on both the 
functional status of the plant and changes of physical-chemical properties of these 
radionuclides. 
5.1.3 Macrophytes and complex chemical, thermal and radioactive pollution 
The main source of 60Co and 54Mn discharging into the lake was the waste water of the ISW-
1,2 and CW channels (Fig. 3). The activity concentration of these radionuclide’s in the 
bottom sediments from above mentioned channels were higher than that in Lake Druksiai. 
The decrease of the activity concentration of 60Co and 54Mn in the bottom sediments of the 
INPP’s discharge channels and the lake was observed since 1994. Since 1996 the activity 
concentration of 54Mn in the bottom sediments of the INPP’s channels and the lake in the 
most cases was lower than minimal detection limit. It is necessary to stress that values of 
137Cs activity concentration in bottom sediments of Lake Druksiai were higher than that in 
hydrophytes. However, activity concentration of 60Co and 54Mn in bottom sediments were 
lower than that in hydrophytes (Table 8). 
Presumably, high radionuclide activity concentrations in ISW-1,2 channel were induced due 
to planned maintenance of INPP. It should be indicated that the highest 60Co and 54Mn 
activity concentrations in macrophytes were established at the outlet of the channel, 
however, at its end, they markedly decreased: 60Co by 5 times, 54Mn by 43 times. 137Cs and 
134Cs activity concentrations in plants differed insignificantly both at the outset of the 
channel and at its end. 
Such differences in radionuclide accumulation in macrophytes can be explained by varying 
chemical and physical chemical characteristics of these radionuclide’s, upon which not only 
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radionuclide accumulation in macrophytes, but also their dispersion in hydroecosystem 
depends. Although the investigated radionuclide activity concentrations in macrophytes 
sharply decreased in 2009 in comparison with 2008, however, they were higher than those in 
2007 (Table 8).  
 
 
Nuclides 
Ceratophyllum demersum Myriophyllum spicatum 
2007 2008 2009 2008 2009 
137Cs 202** 39247** 40654*** 221.2*** 
16633* 
27120*** 
181.6* 
131.1** 
60Co 342** 75451** 63450*** 633.0*** 
2185108* 
463 23*** 
461.9* 
371.6** 
54Mn 20.6** 2203147** 1774129*** 753.0*** 
6428372* 
15188*** 
442.3* 
462.1** 
mdl – minimal detectable level;  ISW-1,2 channel: outset – *, middle – **, end – *** 
 
Table 8. Radionuclides activity concentration (Bq/kg) in  macrophytes in INPP industrial 
storm water discharge channel (ISW-1,2) (2007–2009) 
The macrophytes growing in this channel performed the role of cleaning 
(phytoremediation) of the channel waste water by accumulating large content of 
radionuclides. The flux of radionuclides discharged from this channel into the lake was low 
due to low water flow rate in ISW-1,2 channel and large water volume of lake what 
stipulated activity dilution.  
5.2 Ichtiofauna 
Lake Druksiai is important for commercial and free-time fisheries. In this connection the 
corresponding percentage contributions of different radionuclides to the various kinds of 
fish from key Lake Druksiai radionuclides has been investigated.  
The factors that have an effect on the evolution of fish populations are: inputs of 
sedimentary substance (from the increase of the lake water level due to the construction of a 
dam and an active erosion of the lake banks), water temperature, in particular the optimum 
temperature for fish populations, the average biomass of phytoplankton, the average 
concentration of dissolved nitrogen and phosphorus.  
The time-dependent changes in radionuclide activity concentrations in average annual 
specific activity of radionuclides in fishes are presented in Fig. 18. Corresponding fish 
muscle activity concentration distributions in Fig. 19. 
As regards the fishery and corresponding committed effective human dose assessment as 
result of fish consumption, Lake Druksiai continues to be a high-productivity water body 
with intensive angling and possible commercial fishing. The distributions of ingestion doses 
as a result of fish consumption from the key radionuclides discharged from INPP  
performed using site-specific consumption data and the LIETDOS computer code 
demonstrate that adult human annual effective doses would be as small as a few μSv and  
are mostly attributable to the background radionuclides, for example, 40K. 
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Fig. 18. Time dependent activity concentration of radionuclides in the whole fish and fish 
muscle from Lake Druksiai 
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Fig. 19. Pelagic fish muscle activity concentration data (Marciulioniene et al., 1992) from key 
radionuclides discharged from the INPP into Lake Druksiai cooling pond and 40K 
5.3 Macrophytes and fish community changing 
73 aquatic macrophyte species were recorded in Lake Druksiai. Among them eight 
Charophyta, two Bryophyta, one Equisetophyta, and 58 Magnoliophyta species. Before operation 
of the INPP Lake Druksiai was characterized as a typical mesotrofic lake of moderate depth 
with well developed submerged vegetation (dominant species Chara rudis, C. filiformis, 
Nitellopsis obtusa, Potamogeton lucens, P. perfoliatus) and fragmentally developed floating 
leaved and emerged vegetation (Potamogeton natans, Phragmites australis) (Marciulioniene et. 
al., 1992). Maximum depth limit for vegetation varied from 7 to 9 meters. 
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After 20 years of INPP operation significant changes were observed in all ecological zones of 
aquatic vegetation. Charophyta species have totally become extinct from the submerged plant 
zone of shallow areas near the INPP. The intensive development of filamentous green algae 
during a prolonged vegetation period and decrease of water transparency was an important 
reason for the decline of submerged vegetation. The areas occupied by helophyte 
communities (Phragmites australis, Schoenoplectus lacustris) increased significantly in shallow 
areas up to 2 m. 
The fish species diversity in Lake Druksiai significantly decreased from 23–26 fish species to 
the current list of 14 species mostly due to total anthropogenic pressure and thermal load 
(Kesminas & Olechnoviciene, 2008). The changes occurred mainly after the first years of 
INPP operation, and then the successive changes slowed down. During the last years the 
lake fish community has changed insignificantly. There were also some adaptations among 
some species populations. Vendace (stenothermal fish) population partially adapted to the 
changed environmental conditions and its abundance in the recent years is quite high and 
constant. The survival and partial rehabilitation of Vendace indicates that some fish species 
may become acclimated to the disrupted thermal and eutrophic conditions in the lake 
(Ecosystem, 1992; Institute of Botany, 2008). 
6. Conclusions and relevance 
Considering the findings of this study, it can be assumed that changes in macrophyte 
species and fish communities diversity in Lake Druksiai could be induced by the total 
chemical, predominant thermal and very limited radioactive pollution as anthropogenic 
pressure which had a negative impact on some aquatic organisms. 
The data presented enlarge knowledge about the concentration of radionuclides in European 
freshwater ecosystems in order to understand the internal and external exposure dose rates of 
macrophytes and fish communities due to major discharged radionuclides and natural series 
contributors. In the case of INPP cooling pond - Lake Druksiai the estimation of weighted 
internal exposure of macrophytes and fish is mostly determined by natural background 
radionuclides and arises from internally incorporated α-emitters with 238U, 226Ra and 210Po 
being the major contributors. The total exposure due to anthropogenic discharged 
radionuclides is substantially lower as compared with the natural background exposure.  
The INPP operational history and the routine radiation in environment monitoring data 
evidenced that INPP was operated safely and helpfully for the society from radiation 
protection point of view. However environmental changes in Lake Druksiai related mostly 
to the chemical, thermal and general urbanization pressure are unavoidable and acceptable 
from society side traces of electric power industry development. 
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1. Introduction 
Power uprate is presently being considered by several nuclear power plant (NPP) utilities as 
a promising way to increase the power generation efficiency of existent power plants with 
or without increasing nuclear fuel consumption since 1970s. In general there are three types 
of power uprate: measurement uncertainty recapture power uprate (MURPU, <2%), stretch 
power uprate (SPU, 2 to 7 %), and extended power uprate (EPU, 7 to 20%) (US NRC, 2011 a). 
Thorough evaluations of existing plant equipments and environmental impact must be 
assessed before a final decision and an optimal selection of power uprate are made. Upon a 
power uprate, the power density and thermal release of a nuclear reactor would increase 
instantly, followed by the impact due to the waste heat from the thermal effluent to the 
environment. In Taiwan, two BWR NPPs and one PWR NPP were scheduled for MURPU. 
These NPPs are all located at the seacoast and using marine water as the coolant due to that 
fact that there is no rivers can supply enough light water near the site of the NPP in Taiwan. 
The marine water temperature is high during summer time due to the fact that Taiwan’s 
weather is marine tropical. According to the Effluent Standards of Taiwan’s Environmental 
Law: for effluents discharged directly into marine waters, the temperature at the discharge 
point shall not exceed 42°C; and the temperature difference should not exceed 4°C for 
surface water at 500 meters from the discharge point. Hence, the effect from the waste heat 
is always a very crucial issue to the power uprate of NPPs in Taiwan. 
Currently the three operating NPPs of Taiwan are all owned by the Taiwan Power 
Company (TPC). There are two reactor units setup at each NPP. The technology chosen for 
the reactors is General Electric (GE) BWR for Chinshan Nuclear Power Plant (NPP1) and 
Kuosheng Nuclear Power Plant (NPP2), and Westinghouse PWR for Maanshan Nuclear 
Power Plant (NPP3). Moreover, Lungmen Nuclear Power Plant (NPP4), which is GE ABWR 
and will to be the largest NPP in Taiwan, is still under construction at present. Fig. 1 shows 
the locations of NPPs in Taiwan. As can be seen, NPP1 and NPP2 are located in the most 
northern part of Taiwan in which is a subtropical zone, whereas NPP3 is located in the most 
southern part of Taiwan where is a tropical zone. They are all located next to the seacoast 
and using marine water as the coolant due to the fact that there is no any big rivers can 
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enough supply light water near the site of the NPPs. Table 1 lists the basic operational 
parameters for one unit of NPP1, NPP2, and NPP3, respectively. The total installed capacity 
is 5144 MWe which is around 20% of its entire electricity generation in 2007. This makes 
 
 
Fig. 1. The locality and outlook of nuclear power plants in Taiwan 
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Taiwan the 15th largest user of nuclear power in the world. TPC was planned to perform the 
1.7% MURPU for all TPC’s three operating nuclear power stations by schedule before the 
end of 2009 (Table 2). Therefore, the impact from the increasing power density and thermal 
release of a nuclear reactor to the environment from the heated effluent of NPP could 
enlarge simultaneously. Due to Taiwan's climate is marine tropical, the entire island is hot 
and humid from June to September. Moreover, the western side of the Pacific Ocean is 
warmer than the east as a result of the ocean current (WTT, 2011).  
The marine water temperature around Taiwan could be more than 30°C during summer 
time. Therefore the impact from the waste heat of NPP could be severe and is needed to be 
evaluated when performing the power uprate of NPPs. Furthermore, to comply with the 
Effluent Standards of Taiwan’s Environmental Law, especially in summer, the thermal 
effluent’s problem will cause the reactor must be operated at a reduced power and 
consequently influence the electricity supply. This paper studies the power uprate effect 
due to waste heat release from the thermal effluent of Taiwan NPPs. The investigations 
were based on the thermal equilibrium of 100%, 105%, and 110% rated power, respectively. 
The long term monitor data of marine water temperature were also used to evaluate the 
impact level from waste heat during normal operation of NPPs. Moreover, the assessments 
of some helpful methods to mitigate thermal impact on thermal effluent from NPPs and the 
feasibility of these methods are also discussed correspondingly.  
 
Parameter NPP1 NPP2 NPP3 
Thermal efficiency 35% 33% 34% 
Rated thermal power 1817 MW 2985 MW 2785 MW 
Net electric power 636 MW 985 MW 951 MW 
Waste thermal power 1181 MW 2000 MW 1834 MW 
Cooling water flow rate 34570 kg/sec 43906 kg/sec 47442 kg/sec 
Table 1. The operational parameters of each NPP reactor unit in Taiwan 
 
Reactor Unit NPP1 NPP2 NPP3 
Unit 1 2009.02.24 2007.11.30 2009.07.07 
Unit 2 2008.07.09 2007.07.07 2008.12.02 
Table 2. The MURPU completed date of NPPs in Taiwan 
2. Impact of waste heat in Taiwan 
In accordance with the second law of thermodynamics of Derive Kelvin Statement which 
is also called heat engine formulation, it is impossible to convert heat completely into 
work in a cyclic process (Hyperphysics, 2011). Hence, it is unattainable to extract energy 
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by heat from a high-temperature energy source and then transfer all of the energy into 
work. At least some of the energy must be passed on to heat a low-temperature energy 
sink. Therefore, there is no heat engine with 100% efficiency is possible. Waste heat is 
always an unavoidably by-product of NPPs. Generally the electrical efficiency of NPP, 
defined as the ratio between the input and output energy, most of the time amounts up to 
33%. So the 67% heat is waste heat and must be released to the environment. 
Economically the most convenient way is to exchange such heat to water and then 
discharge them to sea, lake or river. If no sufficient cooling water available, most of the 
NPPs will equip with cooling towers to reject the waste heat into the atmosphere. In 
Taiwan, all NPPs are using marine water as the coolant and discharge the thermal water 
to the nearby sea. Therefore, waste heat impact to the marine environment is very 
sensitive and monitor by the public rigorously. Much more attention has been paid to 
workplace ecology for quite a time. 
In northern Taiwan, a number of deformed thornfishes (Fig. 2. (a)) were first found since 
1993 near the thermal outlet of NPP2. Although there is no clear links between the deformed 
fishes and the NPP, people directly think that the radiation is from nuclear power plant and 
therefore resulted in the deformed fishes. Through research studies, high temperature of 
ocean water had been proved to be the main factor of deformed Terapon jarbua and Liza 
macrolepis (Hung et al., 1998; Fang et al., 2004). In southern Taiwan, coral bleaching (Fig. 2. 
(b)), the whitening of diverse invertebrate taxa, was reported in July 1987 and July 1988 in 
adjacent marine water of the NPP3 (Fang et al., 2004). High sea surface temperature with 
high irradiance is assumed to be the primary factor in summer coral bleaching (Huang et al., 
1992; Fang et al., 2004; Shiah et al., 2006). The increasing use of marine water for industrial 
cooling and the global warming might present a potential threat to the ecological 
environment in the ocean. 
 
  
(a)      (b) 
Fig. 2. (a) Deformed thornfishes in northern Taiwan ; (b) Coral bleaching in southern Taiwan 
(Ching-wai Yuen, 2011) 
normaldeformed 1
deformed 2 deformed 3
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3. Effluent temperature evaluation 
Because the events mentioned above were related to thermal discharge from NPPs, which 
elevated the marine water temperature and caused the damage, so the Effluent Standards 
of Taiwan’s Environmental Law: for effluents discharged directly into marine waters, the 
temperature at the discharge point shall not exceed 42 °C; and the temperature difference 
should not exceed 4 °C for surface water at 500 meters from the discharge point, are 
 
 
Fig. 3. The schematic diagram of (a) a PWR; (b) a BWR. The heat transfer routes are also 
depicted, respectively. (background images are taken from USNRC, 2011 b) 
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formulated to protect the ecological environment in adjacent marine water of NPPs. To 
assure the feasible of power uprate in Taiwan’s NPPs, based on the Effluent Standards, 
we conservatively evaluate the temperature difference between the outlet and inlet of 
condenser at 100%, 105%, and 110% rated power, respectively, by simply using specific 
heat capacity equation and the basic data in Table 1. Moreover, inlet and outlet 
temperatures of condenser, the marine water temperatures of 500 from the effluent 
discharge points, and the background marine water temperatures of 1000~1500 meters 
from the effluent discharge points, which were all taken from long term temperature 
monitor setup by TPC’s NPPS, are used to assess the impact level of thermal water from 
June to September, respectively.  
Fig. 3 (a) shows the schematic diagram of a PWR system and Fig. 3 (b) is the schematic 
diagram of a BWR system. As can been seen the cooling cycle from the figure, an amount of 
heat QH, which can be derived from the thermal power of NPP, is transferred from the 
reactor, the net work W is delivered to the electric generator as it is driven by turbine, and 
the waste heat QC is rejected to the cooling water in the condenser and then discharged to 
the sea which could lead to the thermal pollution problem. To evaluate the elevated 
temperature of the effluent from NPPs, the waste heat QC of the is simply got by the 
following equation: 
 C out inQ m C (T T ) m C T= ⋅ ⋅ − = ⋅ ⋅ Δ? ?  (1) 
where m? is the mass flow rate of cooling water (kg/sec), C  is the specific heat of water 
(4186 joule/kg/°C), outT  is the outlet temperature of condenser (°C), inT  is the inlet 
temperature of condenser (°C), and TΔ  is the difference between the outlet temperature and 
of the inlet temperature condenser (°C). Moreover, the waste heat QC can also be expressed 
by 
 C HQ Q (1- )η=  (2) 
whereηis the thermal efficiency and is defined as: 
 H C
H H
W Q -Q
Q Q
η = =  (3) 
Using (1), (2), and the data listed in Table 1, the elevated temperature can be simply 
calculated. Furthermore, the TΔ  at 100% power is used to predict the average elevated 
temperature of cooling water at 105%, and 110% power, respectively. 
4. Effluent temperature and the reduction of seawater temperature 
Table 3 lists the results of calculated temperature difference between inlet and outlet of 
condenser at 100%, 105%, and 110% rated power of NPP1, NPP2, and NPP3, respectively. 
The differential temperature from on-line monitor, at 100% normal operation power, and the 
predicted temperature differences at 105% and 110% rated power, are also shown in the 
table, correspondingly. 
Fig. 4 displays the average water temperature of each NPP at the condenser inlet and outlet 
from June to September in 2006. Apart from, the corresponding data of 2007 are shown in 
Fig. 5. The elevated temperatures of cooling water after passing through condenser can also 
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be seen in the figures. As can be seen, the average inlet temperatures are 27.0, 27.9, and 28.9 
°C for NPP1, NPP2, and NPP3; whereas the corresponding outlet temperatures are 36.2, 
39.9, and 36.8 °C for NPP1, NPP2, and NPP3 by averaging the values of 2006 and 2007, 
respectively. Also shown in the figures of the elevated temperatures are calculated to be 8.2, 
10.9, and 9.2 °C for NPP1, NPP2, and NPP3; whereas the corresponding monitoring data are 
9.2, 12.0, and 7.9 °C for NPP1, NPP2, and NPP3 by averaging the values of 2006 and 2007, 
respectively. Therefore, the temperature difference between calculated and monitor data are 
1.0, 1.1, and -1.3 °C. The different trend between them might be caused by more heat loss 
into atmosphere during heat exchanging at steam generator of PWR. Notably, the highest 
elevated temperature of NPP2 is 12 °C. According to the ocean observation of Taiwan, the 
marine water temperature could be near 30 °C in summer (CWBS 2011), thus the outlet 
temperature of condenser could be possible over 42 °C. From Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, we can also 
observe the outlet temperature of condenser is just around 42 °C especially in July. To avoid 
the effluent temperature exceeding 42 °C which is the limitation temperature of the 
Environmental Law, TPC cautiously operates NPP in the condition that the outlet 
temperature of condenser could be under 42 °C. Otherwise the operators of NPPs will 
operate the reactor from full power to a lower power. This will make TPC in a dilemma 
especially when the electricity demands are often urgent in summer. Thus for NPP2’s power 
uprate it is better to take feasible engineering actions to lower 0.6~1.1 °C of the elevated 
temperature. 
 
 
% 
Power 
Calculated elevated 
temperature (°C ) 
Average elevated 
temperature of cooling 
water (°C) 
NPP1 
100 8.2 9.2 
105 8.6 9.6* 
110 9.0 10.0* 
NPP2 
100 10.9 12.0 
105 11.5 12.6* 
110 12.0 13.1* 
NPP3 
100 9.2 7.9 
105 9.6 8.3* 
110 10.1 8.8* 
      *Predicted value 
Table 3. Average water temperature differences between condenser inlet and outlet of 
NPP1, NPP2, and NPP3, respectively 
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Fig. 4. The average temperature of NPP1, NPP2, and NPP3 at the condenser inlet and outlet 
from June to September in 2006. ΔT is the elevated temperature of cooling water between 
the condenser inlet and outlet. NPP3 was not operated in full power before June 15 
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Fig. 5. The average temperature of NPP1, NPP2, and NPP3 at the condenser inlet and outlet 
from June to September in 2007. ΔT is the elevated temperature of cooling water between 
the condenser inlet and outlet 
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To reduce the effect of thermal effluent to the marine water ecology adjacent NPP, some 
effective methods: for example, prolong the discharge point by extending the path distance 
of effluent, lower the influent temperature by pumping deep level (deeper than 300 m) 
marine water, enlarge the transfer area of condenser, increase the flow rate of coolant by 
using higher power pumps, and improve the heat transfer efficiency by cleaning the pipes 
or replacing high efficiency pipes, can be used. However, these methods could be difficult to 
perform because of the huge engineering cost or the induction of side effects, such as water 
hammer, to the reactor system. Therefore, they are economically impractical or infeasible in 
solving the thermal effluent problem of NPPs.  
Recently, a possible technical solution for increasing the thermoelectrical plant efficiency has 
been proposed by reducing the cold source temperature (Şerban et al., 2010). The method is 
originated from the concept of lowering the cooling water temperature by pumping deep 
level marine water. Approximate 10~20 °C reduction of influent temperature can be 
achieved by pumping from the 150~500 m ocean depth where the temperature is 
independent on the season and ranges between 5 ~15 °C. It can effectively reduce the cold 
source’s temperature for open circuit and may increase the rated power of a thermal power 
plant with 2~4 % without increasing fuel consumption. The method can obviously 
overcome the problem of large variations of temperature function of the weather conditions 
and season. Moreover, the surface sea water often contains a lot of microorganisms that can 
nourish and deposit on the heat transfer pipes. Thus can more or less affect the heat 
exchange ability and lower the power efficiency. This innovative installation can provide a 
cold influent to NPPs and circumvent the pumping of polluted sea water. It will be very 
helpful to the power uprate of NPPs. 
In Taiwan, dilution pump, which is currently being used at NPP3 (Fig. 6), of the same level 
as circulation pump can be employed to pump the background marine water (~30 °C) to 
mix with thermal effluent (~38 °C) before it is discharged into the ocean. Moreover, there are 
at least two obvious advantages to install the dilution pump at NPP although additional 
electricity consumption needed to operate the pump: firstly, it can regulate the thermal 
effluent temperature of NPP especially in summer time; secondly, it can be also a 
redundancy of circulation pump. 
The idea of dilution pump is originated with the thermal equilibrium concept:  
Heat rate lost by thermal water = Heat rate gained by cool water 
 tw cwQ Q− =? ?  (4) 
and then the following equation can be utilized to calculate the reduced temperature diluted 
by the marine water, 
 tw tw cw cwCm T Cm T− Δ = Δ? ?  (5) 
where twQ? is the thermal water heat loss rate (W/sec), cwQ? the cool water heat gain rate 
(W/sec), twm? the thermal water flow mass (kg/sec), cwm? the cool water flow mass (kg/sec), 
C the specific heat of water (4186 joule/kg/°C), twTΔ the temperature difference of thermal 
water (°C), cwTΔ the temperature difference of cool water (°C), respectively. 
In NPP3, there are four circulation pumps for each unit; the power of dilution pump is 1.07 
larger than the circulation pump. Thus 2.1 °C reduction of the outlet coolant for one unit can 
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be got from equation (5). Similarly, the reduced temperature of the outlet coolant can be 2.4 
°C if one dilution pump installed on one unit at NPP2. It is sufficient to compensate the 
thermal impact causing by the power uprate and make sure that the effluent temperature 
can be less than 42 °C.  
 
 
Fig. 6. The schematic flow diagram of dilution pump at NPP3 
On the other hand, the Effluent Standards also require that the temperature difference (ΔT) 
should not exceed 4°C for surface water at 500 meters from the discharge point. Therefore, 
TPC arranges temperature monitors around the outfall point at each NPP to biweekly 
inspect the water temperature (Peir et al., 2009). Fig. 7, Fig. 8, and Fig. 9 show the monitor 
locations of NPP1, NPP2, and NPP3, respectively. As can be seen, there are two monitor 
groups, group A which is 500 m away from the discharge point, and corresponding group 
B, which is 1000~1500 m away from the discharge point and is set as the background 
temperature of marine water. The monitor results showed that the average temperature 
differences between group A and corresponding group B should less than 4 °C. The most 
probable zone forΔT exceeding 4°C is an area in the range of thermal effluent outfall and 
group A monitors. Intuitively, the ΔT greater than 4°C should be more frequently observed 
at the points N1A1, N2A2, N2A3, N3A2, and N3A3 than other points. But the discharged 
effluent travels in a canal and then mixes with sea water at a distance of 50-500 meters from 
the discharge point. The travelled distance of the effluent is dependent on the coastal 
current and littoral drift. Therefore, we observe some of the prompt values of ΔT could not 
be as expected under the limitation of 4°C (RRTC, 2006, 2007). 
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Fig. 7. The locations of water temperature monitors group A, N1A1, N1A2, and N1A3 and 
corresponding group B, N1B1, N1B2, and N1B3 at NPP1. Group A is 500 m away from the 
effluent discharge point. Group B is set as the background temperature of marine water 
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Fig. 8. The locations of water temperature monitors group A, N2A1, N2A2, and N2A3 and 
corresponding group B, N2B1, N2B2, and N2B3 at NPP2. Group A is 500 m away from the 
effluent discharge point. Group B is set as the background temperature of marine water 
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Fig. 9. The locations of water temperature monitors group A, N3A1, N3A2, and N3A3 and 
corresponding group B, N3B1, N3B2, and N3B3 at NPP3. Group A is 500 m away from the 
effluent discharge point. Group B is set as the background temperature of marine water  
 
ID No. 2006 2007 
NPP1 
N1A1 0 0.49 
N1A2 0 0 
N1A3 0 0 
NPP2 
N2A1 0 1.61 
N2A2 0.18 0.62 
N2A3 0.85 0.13 
NPP3 
N3A1 0.03 0 
N3A2 0 0 
N3A3 0 0 
Table 4. The prompt probability that the temperature difference greater than 4°C between 
monitor group A and corresponding group B in 2006 and 2007 
Table 4 lists the prompt probability of exceeding temperature, which is the data number 
ratio between exceeding temperature and all measured data, that the temperature difference 
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is greater than 4 °C between group A and corresponding group B in 2006 and 2007, 
respectively. As shown, the probability is highest at NPP2; while NPP1 is the second and 
then is the NPP3. The temperature differences were all less than 4.8 °C and all events were 
happening in summer (RRTC, 2006, 2007). The probability is apparently dependent on the 
elevated temperature of effluent and probably on its flow rate, its discharge type, the wind’s 
direction, and coastal current. Current stagnation near the coast, where forming the most 
probable zone for the temperature difference greater than 4 °C, could also be another 
possible reason. As shown in Table 5 (the seawater temperatures measured at Longdong 
buoy which is also set up by Central Weather Bureau located at 120.82280E, 21.90220N near 
NPP1 and NPP2) and Table 6 (the seawater temperatures measured at Erluanbi buoy which 
is set up by Central Weather Bureau located at 121.93073E, 25.09348N near NPP3), the 
average seawater temperatures in adjacent to NPP3 can be 1.0~2.1 °C higher than those of 
NPP1 and NPP2 during summer, while the prompt probability of exceeding temperature is 
not correspondingly high. Obviously, by using the dilution pump the heated effluent can be 
effectively diluted with the background marine water and the discharge flow rate can be 
increased. The former will directly reduce elevated temperature of effluent; while the latter 
makes the thermal water be pushed longer away from the seashore. Thus makes the power 
uprate of NPPs not violating the Environmental Law. Besides, according to the observation 
data of the seawater temperatures in Table 5 and Table 6, the average seawater temperatures 
were in the range of 26.1 ~ 27.9 ℃near NPP1 and NPP2, and of 28.2 ~ 29.1 ℃near NPP3 from 
 
 
Month 
Maximum 
Seawater 
Temperature(℃)
Observation 
Year 
Average 
Seawater 
Temperature(℃)
Minimum 
Seawater 
Temperature(℃)
Observation 
Year 
1 22.8 2001 19.1 15.6 2003 
2 23.2 2007 18.7 15.1 2005 
3 25.0 2007 19.4 13.8 2000 
4 27.9 2002 21.6 14.5 2000 
5 28.9 2007 23.9 18.2 2009 
6 29.7 2001 26.1 20.0 1999 
7 31.5 2001 27.6 16.6 2008 
8 31.7 2001 27.9 16.1 2009 
9 31.1 2001 26.7 18.6 2008 
10 27.4 2000 24.0 19.2 2005 
11 26.3 2001 22.2 17.5 2009 
12 24.2 2006 20.2 16.8 2004 
Table 5. The seawater temperatures measured at Longdong buoy which is set up by the 
Central Weather Bureau located in the northern Taiwan near NPP1 and NPP2 (CWBS, 2011) 
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June to September, respectively. In the northern Taiwan near NPP1 and NPP2, the 
maximum seawater temperature 31.7 ℃ was observed in August, 2001, and in the southern 
Taiwan near NPP3, the maximum seawater temperature 36 ℃ was observed in July, 2005. 
Notably TPC has performed the 1.7% MURPU for all TPC’s operating NPPs during 2007 
and 2009. The increasing release of waste heat should directly causing the maximum 
seawater temperature is observed immediately after 2007. However, based on the 
observation data of CWBS, the elevation of seawater temperature does not increase 
correspondingly after the MURPU of NPPs in Taiwan. Although the additional influence of 
the ecology due to the thermal effluent of MURPU is insignificant at present, TPC has better 
monitor the seawater temperatures near NPPs continually for further power uprate (SPU or 
EPU) in the future. Moreover, the installation of dilution pump or innovation of pumping 
deep level water to effectively reduce the influent temperature could be two feasible options 
for prevailing over the difficulty of waste heat problem in power uprate. 
 
Month 
Maximum 
Seawater 
Temperature(℃)
Observation 
Year 
Average 
Seawater 
Temperature(℃)
Minimum 
Seawater 
Temperature(℃)
Observation 
Year 
1 28.9 2001 24.8 18.7 2006 
2 28.4 2001 24.9 20.1 2005 
3 30.6 2001 25.5 20.7 2005 
4 31.2 2001 27.1 22.4 2005 
5 32.5 2001 27.8 19.8 2002 
6 32.1 2007 28.2 21.2 2002 
7 36.0 2005 29.1 20.8 2002 
8 33.7 2007 29.0 23.0 2004 
9 32.7 2007 28.9 22.5 2005 
10 30.4 2009 28.1 21.0 2001 
11 29.4 2002 26.4 21.1 2003 
12 29.2 2002 25.1 16.1 2003 
Table 6. The seawater temperatures measured at Erluanbi buoy which is set up by the 
Central Weather Bureau located in the southern Taiwan near NPP3 (CWBS, 2011) 
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the 100%, 105%, and 110% rated power of Taiwan’s NPPs are performed to 
assess the power uprate effect on thermal effluent under normal operation. Based on the 
long term monitor data of marine water temperature from June to September in 2006 and 
2007, the results show that the effluent temperatures of NPP2 could have the opportunity to 
exceed the limitation 42 °C at the discharge point and the prompt probability of temperature 
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difference exceeding 4 °C for surface seawater at 500 meters from the discharge point could 
be higher for each NPP in summer. Feasible engineering actions, such as prolonging the 
discharge point by extending the path distance of effluent, increasing the flow rate of 
effluent, or using dilution pump to mix the thermal effluent with the background marine 
water, could be considered to mitigate the NPP’s power uprate effect to the environment. 
Among others, adding the dilution pump at reactor unit is a very useful method to reduce 
the elevated temperature of effluent in summer. It can economically and efficiently 
compensate the power uprate influence of thermal waste heat discharging from NPPs. TPC 
has accomplished the 1.7% MURPU for its three operating NPPs during 2007 and 2009. The 
elevation of seawater temperature is currently not significant after the MURPU of NPPs. 
Long term observation of the additional influence on the ecology due to the thermal effluent 
of MURPU is needed in the future. 
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1. Introduction   
The production of nuclear energy may be a source of exposure to ionizing radiations, either 
for nuclear workers or the general population. Ionizing radiations are one of the most 
studied and ubiquitous carcinogens in our environment. The main basis for estimating the 
carcinogenic risk to humans  are studies conducted on survivors of the Japanese atomic 
bomb, a population essentially exposed to acute high dose rates (Cardis et al., 2005b). 
Epidemiological studies of nuclear workers, who have been chronically exposed to much 
lower radiation doses show evidences that the classic approach of radiation protection based 
on the linear non threshold (LNT) model is valid: an excess relative risk (ERR) of cancers 
other than leukemia of 0.97 per Sv was found among a cohort of more than 400,000 nuclear 
workers in 15 different countries, all individually monitored for external exposure. 
Additionally, the study showed an ERR of 1.93 per Sv for leukemia, a disease that may be 
associated with radiation exposure (Cardis et al.,  2005b). Nevertheless, these findings were 
not confirmed in a later study of workers from the French National Electricity Company 
(Rogel et al.,  2005), and neither in the study of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
Authority (Atkinson et al.,  2004). Conversely, both studies showed a strong healthy worker 
effect (HWE). Higher cancer rates are related to a significant cumulative radiation dose 
(Hunter and Muirhead,  2009). Besides, an adverse effect on the pulmonary function when 
exposed to 137Cs has also been recently demonstrated for children living near the Chernobyl 
exclusion zone (Svendsen et al.,  2010). Currently, there is a tremendous interest in the study 
of the Techa River cohort (TRC), a population which was exposed to low to moderate 
radiation doses at low-dose rates from radioactive  releases from the Mayak plutonium 
production facilities into the Techa river between 1950 and 1956 (Degteva et al.,  2000; 
Tolstykh et al.,  2001; Krestinina et al.,  2010).  At total body doses as high as 10 Gy, 30% of 
cancer deaths have been attributed to plutonium exposure among the Mayak workers 
(Sokolnikov et al.,  2008). In that particular case of worker exposure to high doses of 
radiation, the ERR due to plutonium exposure was 7.1 per Gy for males at age 60.  
While numerous studies of the effect of ionizing radiation on nuclear workers exist, there 
are only a few studies which extend their research to the general population. Among any 
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given population, children are considered at higher risk (BEIR7,  2006) and several studies 
have focused on the risk of leukemia for children living in the proximity of a nuclear power 
plant (NPP)(Roman et al.,  1999; Doyle et al.,  2000; Cardis et al.,  2005a; Kaatsch et al.,  2008; 
Nussbaum,  2009). Laurier et al. (Laurier et al.,  2008) have reviewed studies dealing with as 
much as 198 nuclear installations, three of them showing a significant excess of leukemia 
among children under  18 years of age (on the order of 5 cases detected for less than one 
expected). While the statistics tend to support the excess risk, the radioecological studies 
carried out on these sites failed to correlate the ERR with a significant increase of 
radioactivity burden in the environment or in food (Heasman et al.,  1986; Black et al. 1994; 
Bithell et al.,  1994; Hoffmann et al.,  1997). The most recent study concerning the adverse 
effects of living in the proximity of a NPP revealed an odd ratio (OR) of 2.19 (with lower 
one-sided 95% confidence limit of 1.51) for leukemia in young children living in the vicinity 
of German NPP (Kaatsch et al.,  2008). This study gave rise to new questions about the 
relationship existing between ERR and the distance to a NPP and the way to demonstrate 
the role, if any, of ionizing radiation in the observed ERR. 
Most epidemiological studies on the effect of NPP on a general population, especially 
children, link leukemia statistics with the proximity to a NPP. No clear evidence came out of 
these studies and by their nature, these studies are subject to bias. There have been very few 
attempts to correlate leukemia cases with radiation dose because this latter is mostly 
unknown with respect to the general population, or considered much lower than the natural 
radiation background. In this respect, some authors have introduced a measure of doubt 
regarding the validity of the dose factors used for the fetus and newborn (Nussbaum,  2009; 
Shore,  2009); ERR of leukemia among children under 5 years of age living in the vicinity of 
a NPP may be the consequence of the father’s exposure to radiation or direct fetus exposure, 
with a possibility that dose factors have been largely underestimated. While this assumption 
may be valid, Doyle et al. (Doyle et al.,  2000) found no evidence of a link between exposure 
to low-level ionizing radiation before conception and an increased risk of adverse 
reproductive outcomes in men working in the nuclear industry. Nevertheless, the authors 
state that a possible link between a woman’s exposure to radiation before conception and an 
increased risk of fetal death requires further investigation.  
In addition to the lack of knowledge about the exposure dose to the population, dose rates 
due to in-vivo alpha-emitters, particularly transuranic elements, have been totally 
overlooked, mainly because of measuring difficulties (Schmitz-Feuerhake et al.,  2005). Our 
opinion is that there is a lack of data on the radioactivity body burden of the general 
population, and in particular children. This information would facilitate the interpretation 
of leukemia statistics in terms of radiation dose rather than in terms of the distance to a 
radiation emission source (e.g. a NPP).  
The determination of the external radiation dose in the vicinity of a NPP is obviously 
mandatory but may be of little use in the case of the risk related to very low doses of 
ingested or inhaled radionuclides. In this respect, the main challenge of national authorities 
is to survey diet and, possibly, the population body burden. While radioactivity surveys of 
food and the environment are a dedicated task of every laboratory dealing with 
environmental radioactivity surveys (Froidevaux et al.,  2006a), the determination of very 
low-levels of radioactivity in the body is another challenge; whole body counting may 
provide data on 137Cs (or other γ-emitters) contamination (Hodgson et al.,  2004), but 
previous studies show that 90Sr and plutonium could be the most radiotoxic isotopes that 
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should be searched for (Atkinson et al.,  2004). Over the last ten years, mass-spectrometry 
has been applied as an alternative detection method for measuring actinides, especially 
plutonium. Using ICP-MS, the detection limit is lowered by a factor of ten compared to 
alpha-spectrometry. The detection limits at the femtogram-level needed for some particular 
environmental samples, are typically obtained by double focusing sector-field ICP-MS 
instruments or TIMS (Kim et al.,  2000; Becker,  2003; Boulyga et al.,  2003; Agarande et al.,  
2004; Baglan et al.,  2004; Lindahl et al.,  2010; Qiao et al.,  2010). Using sf-ICP-MS, we were 
recently able to determine 239Pu and 239Pu/240Pu ratio in the milk teeth of children born in 
Switzerland between 1951 and 1995 (Froidevaux and Haldimann,  2008) and in the vertebrae 
of individuals who died between 1962 and 2004 (Froidevaux et al.,  2010). 
Bones and teeth are both the main targets of plutonium and 90Sr entering the blood stream. 
Approximately 100% of 90Sr and 50% of the plutonium incorporated in humans is located in 
the skeleton. Another 30% of the plutonium burden is located in the liver (ICRP 
(International Commission on Radiological Protection),  1986). In this respect, the analysis of 
teeth and bones may be of great help to investigate low dose and low dose-rate exposure to 
radionuclides potentially emitted throughout the process of nuclear energy production 
(Culot et al.,  1997). Among teeth, milk teeth (deciduous teeth) are very precious indicators 
of bone-seeking radionuclides that can be transferred from the mother’s blood plasma to the 
fetus. Because deciduous enamel forms between week 13 in utero up to 9 months 
postnatally (thereafter essentially becoming inert), the analysis of milk teeth allows for the 
retrospective measurement of prenatal and early postnatal trace-element uptake during a 
critical period of child development (Dolphin et al.,  2005). Another advantage of milk teeth 
as a tool for retrospective studies of bone-seeking radionuclide contamination is the fact that 
they are naturally shed at ages 6-12 years old. Conversely, there exists no other possibility of 
bone sampling except for collection at autopsy. Unfortunately, due to legal difficulties in 
obtaining samples for analysis, there are only limited data available worldwide, mostly 
concerning 90Sr (Hodgson et al.,  2004). The USTUR (United States Transuranium and 
Uranium Registries) is a source of very valuable information for human tissue studies, 
including bones, biokinetics, bioeffects and the dosimetry of uranium and transuranium in 
human. However, this database contains mainly tissues from workers exposed to 
radionuclides. As an example, USTUR studies show that, in addition to skeleton and liver, 
muscle is an appreciable reservoir for both plutonium and americium (Kathren,  1995). 
We propose to use the 90Sr and plutonium fallout of the nuclear bomb tests (NBT) of the 
sixties as a proxy to determine the radioactivity body burden that the population has 
received as a consequence of the tests. We used the Swiss databases on 90Sr and 239Pu in milk 
teeth and bones because this latter is the most complete that is currently available 
worldwide and covers a range of years from 1952-2002 (milk teeth) and 1960 to 2009 
(vertebrae). We compared our results with other studies carried out worldwide. We 
hypothesized that the level of both radionuclides incorporated in the skeleton has been very 
low but significant as well as measurable using careful radiochemical and analytical 
procedures. We put the incentive on the analysis of 239Pu and 90Sr in milk teeth of children 
born from 1953 to 2005 to demonstrate the danger that these radionuclides may create if 
transferred to the fetus across the placental barrier. In addition, we collected vertebrae of 
deceased individuals (1960-2005) to measure the incorporation of very low-levels of bone-
seeking 239Pu and 90Sr in the body. 
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2. Experimental 
90Sr analysis in milk teeth and bones is a very dedicated task and must be carried out with 
particular care to avoid bias due to other radionuclides that will be present in the sample, 
such as uranium isotopes, radium isotopes and their daughter products. As a consequence, 
a careful radiochemical separation of 90Sr (or 90Y) from the matrix and other radioisotopes is 
compulsory, because 90Sr is a β-emitter whose counting, either by LSC or proportional 
counting,  will be submitted to bias if other β-emitters are still present. In this respect, the 
analytical method used by the Radiation and Public Health project (RPHP, see 
www.radiation.org) for the determination of 90Sr in milk teeth appears not satisfactory for 
the purpose of the authors and the conclusions that they draw from their studies. This is 
because the RPHP method does not use any chemical separation, except for a carbonate 
precipitation that will hardly remove 90Y, radium isotopes, 210Pb isotopes and its daughter 
210Bi, as well as thorium isotopes and many others (see for instance Mangano and Sherman, 
2011). Thus, we propose below a method that is an alternative to the classical method using 
Eichrom Sr.spec resin in the analysis of 90Sr, particularly for large sample sizes containing 
significant amounts of Ca, such as teeth, milk and bone. For 239Pu determination, the main 
problem resides in the purification of plutonium from uranium, because the 238UH+ hydride 
will interfere with the determination of 239Pu; our methodological procedure is addressed in 
the corresponding sub-chapter. 
2.1 Sampling 
The vertebrae have been collected by pathologists over the last 45 years all over Switzerland. 
They were taken during autopsy from different adults (n=1200), of whom 80% were older than 
60 and none younger than 8 at the date of death. 90% were older than 20 years in 1960. Thus 
our database represents the impact of nuclear bomb tests fallout on a population of adults, 
minimizing the problem of age-dependency in modelling. Milk teeth were collected by 
dentists (mainly school dentists). Both vertebrae and milk teeth were collected as part of the 
Sampling Program of the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health for environmental radioactivity 
survey, from the beginning of the nuclear era. The whole program is currently ongoing for 90Sr 
determination in vertebrae and milk teeth. 90Sr determination in vertebrae was carried out on 
individual cases as early as 1960 and required at least 5 g of bone ash; this study reports on the 
data set obtained during the last 50 years. 90Sr analysis of milk teeth requires also at least 5 g of 
teeth ash, which necessitates about 10 milk teeth of children born during the same year in the 
same region. 239Pu determination by mass spectrometry was carried out only after 2005, when 
adequate technology became available (see below). The samples for 239Pu analyses are sub-
samples of the vertebrae and milk teeth samples set used for 90Sr determination that were 
preserved for further analyses. In this respect, the plutonium data set represents a 
retrospective study. To reach a satisfactory detection level and to minimize the effect of inter-
individual variability, we pooled the samples of several individuals deceased in the same year 
to obtain at least 30 g of vertebrae ash per analysis. For milk teeth, we also used about 30 g of 
teeth ash, which required pooling about 50 teeth of children born the same year in Switzerland 
(Froidevaux et al.,  2006b; Froidevaux and Haldimann,  2008; Froidevaux et al.,  2010). 
2.1 Radiochemistry 
2.1.1 Plutonium analysis 
Teeth ash was spiked with 10±0.5 mBq of 242Pu and submitted to microwave digestion in a 
Milestone MLS Ethos Plus digester (MLS GmbH, Leutkirch, Germany) for 40 minutes at 
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170°C in 8 M nitric acid (100 ml). After filtration plutonium was extracted on a Bio-Rad (Bio-
Rad, Reinach, Switzerland) ionic exchanger (100-200 mesh, 25 ml in 1 cm diameter 
chromatography column) and purified on a micro-column (100 mg) of Eichrom® TEVA resin 
(Eichrom Environment, Bruz, France) while taking care to use Ultrapur® reagents (Merck, 
VWR International, Dietikon, Switzerland) to minimize the uranium content (plutonium 
was extracted in 5 ml of HNO3 8 M, the column was washed with 10 ml of HNO3 3M, 3 ml 
of HCl 9 M and once again with 3 ml of HNO3 3 M). Plutonium was measured in 5% HNO3 
by SF-ICP-MS (see below). The same analytical procedure was used for the vertebrae. 
Calcium was measured on all samples by AA with a Perkin Elmer 4100 apparatus (Perkin 
Elmer AG, Schwerzenbach, Switzerland) and results of plutonium isotopes activity are 
given as Bq g Ca-1 (Froidevaux and Haldimann,  2008). 
2.1.2 90Sr analysis 
From 1963 to 1971, milk teeth and bones were analysed using the nitric acid fuming method 
(Froidevaux et al.,  2006b). After 1974 and until now, we used a method using two cation 
exchange chromatography columns (AG 50w-x8, 50 and 8 ml) and specific complexing 
agents such as EDTA and CyDTA (trans-1,2-cyclohexylen-dinitrilo tetraacetic acid) to purify 
90Sr. After ingrown into 90Sr, 90Y daughter product was purified using a cationic exchanger 
(AG 50w-x8, 8 ml) and a malonate eluting solution. After precipitation of 90Y as oxalate, the 
micro-precipitated source was counted in a low-level (0.3 dpm) proportional counter 
(Tennelec LB 4100w). For details of the procedure, see (Froidevaux et al.,  2006b) 
2.2 Mass spectrometry 
Determining 239Pu levels in most samples is hampered by the ubiquity and abundant 
presence of uranium. Consequently, peak tailing from 238U+ and the formation of 238U1H+ 
molecular interference isobaric to 239Pu are the limiting factors of plutonium analysis. The 
hydrogen originates from the water solvent (Zoriy et al.,  2004). Because the degrees of 
ionization of uranium and hydrogen atoms in argon plasma are 100 % and about 0.1 %, 
respectively, uranium hydride UH+ is formed in the plasma, most probably through 
reaction:  
U+ +  H  →  UH+ 
To minimize the formation of 238U1H ions, the chemical separation of uranium and 
plutonium using a TEVA resin prior to analysis did not yield sufficient removal of uranium. 
Therefore, it is essential to further reduce the formation of uranium hydride interference and 
correct for the residual signal contribution at m/z 239 in order to obtain unbiased 
plutonium measurements at ultra trace levels. The reduction of hydride formation of 
uranium requires special sample introduction systems, such as a micronebulizer with a 
desolvator. In this study, we equipped the instrument with an APEX Q desolvation device 
(Elemental Scientific, Scientific, Omaha, NE, USA) in combination with an ACM membrane 
unit (Elemental Scientific) that was effective in removing the solvent from liquid samples, 
thereby greatly reducing the formation of 238U1H+ while retaining plutonium for transport to 
the plasma ion source in the form of a dry aerosol. Additionally, this special configuration 
improved the signal-to-noise ratio by a factor of about 10, which was necessary to reach the 
very low plutonium concentrations. The 238U1H+/238U ratio was determined experimentally 
and a correction factor was applied to calculate the net 239Pu response. The measured 
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238U1H+/238U ratio of 1.4 x 10-5 ± 1 x 10-6 was constant under the selected experimental 
conditions and falls well into the range of 1.2 x 10-4 - 5.0 x 10-6 reported in the literature 
(Becker et al.,  1999; Kim et al.,  2000; Boulyga and Becker,  2001; Taylor et al.,  2001; Wyse et 
al.,  2001). We used a double focusing SF-ICP-MS (Element2; Thermo, Bremen, Germany) for 
measuring the 239Pu, 240Pu, and 242Pu isotopes. Furthermore, we monitored the 238U isotope 
to correct for residual background contributions to the 239Pu signal as a result of variable 
uranium concentrations in the actual sample solutions. Moreover, 199Hg was measured to 
check for potential 199Hg40Ar interference. We performed 36 consecutive scans on each 
sample. The total measurement time per sample was 94 s. We applied the low-resolution 
mode (m/Δm = 300) to obtain maximum ion transmission. Optimum argon flow conditions 
in the PFA-100-1036 nebulizer (Elemental Scientific) were in the range of 0.9–1.1 l/min at a 
sample uptake rate of 235 μL/min. All other parameters of the ICP-MS corresponded to 
normal operating conditions. We conducted quality controls of the chemical separation and 
ICP-MS measurements by spiking 100 mL of 8 M HNO3 with a reference solution of 239Pu 
and subjected it to the overall 239Pu determination process. The measured value of 2.7 ± 0.1 
mBq (n = 7) agreed well with the reference value of 2.8 ± 0.3 mBq.  
3. 90Sr in milk teeth 
The level of 90Sr in milk teeth has been recorded in several countries since the beginning of 
the nuclear weapon tests. Data show that there are two peaks in the concentration of 90Sr in 
milk teeth versus the year of birth, in 1958 and in 1965, followed by an exponential decrease 
after the entry into force of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (Rosenthal et al.,  1964; Aarkrog,  
1971; Rytomaa,  1972). There were several further studies on teeth, including permanent 
teeth, initiated punctually to answer specific questions, such as how much radiation the 
population received following the Chernobyl NPP accident (Kulev et al.,  1994; Stamoulis et 
al.,  1999), the contamination from the Sellafield reprocessing plant (ODonnell et al.,  1997) 
or the contamination of the Techa river (Tolstykh et al.,  2003; Tolstykh et al.,  2008). In 
Switzerland, a monitoring program of 90Sr in milk teeth was initiated by the Federal Office 
of Public Health in the late fifties and is still ongoing (Froidevaux et al.,  2006b). Figure 1 
displays the features of the 90Sr content of milk teeth monitored in Switzerland (1951-2002, 
(Froidevaux et al.,  2006b)), Denmark (1953-1963, (Aarkrog,  1971), United-Kingdom (1960-
1971, (Hodgson et al.,  2004)), Germany and Northern Ukraine (1982-1986, (Schmitz et al.,  
2004)) and shows the maximum value determined in Norway (1965) and Finland (1963) and, 
between 1976 and 1979, in French Polynesia (Badie et al.,  1987). Dates must be understood 
as the birth year of the children. For the United-Kingdom, the data represent activities found 
in premolar roots of milk teeth from children aged 10 (Hodgson et al.,  2004). In this respect, 
and because the roots of teeth have a bone-like structure (Gulson and Gillings,  1997),  these 
data correspond better to the activities that can be found in trabecular bones, rather than in 
the enamel of milk teeth. Figure 1 shows that 90Sr (Bq/gCa) activities found in Switzerland 
are situated between the maximum values found in Norway and Finland and the activities 
determined in Denmark. Activities of premolar roots from the UK are significantly lower, 
showing that milk teeth may actually accumulate 90Sr to a larger extent than bones. 90Sr 
originating from the Chernobyl disaster (1986) has not significantly impacted Switzerland 
and Germany, but possibly the slightly higher values found in milk teeth of children from 
northern Ukraine may reflect the contamination of foodstuff with 90Sr of Chernobyl or other 
origins in this region. Current values found in Switzerland are close to 25 mBq/gCa.  
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90Sr is mostly incorporated through ingestion of contaminated food, a situation which may 
last for decades after fallout deposition on soil. Worldwide studies on milk teeth 
contamination demonstrate that NBTs fallout from the sixties has significantly increased the 
90Sr activity of food, especially milk, so that a very significant increase in 90Sr (up to a value 
of 0.3 Bq/gCa in 1963 in Switzerland) is observed in milk teeth. Figure 2 shows the results of 
90Sr analysis of milk for Switzerland (1954-2009) and Norway (1953-1972, (Christensen et al.,  
1975)). Additionally, data for milk from New-Zealand are added for comparison of both 
Northern and Southern hemispheres (Badie et al.,  1987). While several large NBTs were 
conducted in the Southern hemisphere, this latter presents an overall contamination several 
times less than the Northern hemisphere. This fact is reflected by the very low activity 
(average 14 mBq/gCa) determined in the milk teeth collected in French Polynesia, 4 times 
less than in Switzerland for the same date of birth. For Switzerland, the data presented in 
Figure 2 are issued from the analysis of milk collected in the Swiss lowlands. As a matter of 
fact, milk activities considerably differ if the milk is sampled from cows who grazed in 
Alpine pastures, with a ten times increase in activity for grazing land located at 2000 m 
above sea level (Pourcelot et al.,  2007). 
 
 
Fig. 1. 90Sr activities (Bq/gCa) in milk teeth as a function of the year of birth of the children. 
Activities in milk samples display essentially the same features as milk teeth, with a 
maximum activity observed in 1963, just before the entry into force of the Partial Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty that ended American, British and former Soviet Union atmospheric nuclear 
weapon tests. Accordingly, we can conclude that the food (milk)-mother-fetus-milk teeth 
pathway is the most important mechanism of milk teeth contamination. A very significant 
correlation is observed between milk contamination and milk teeth contamination in 
Switzerland (Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.92) with a milk-to-milk teeth transfer factor 
of 0.2. In this respect, milk contamination by 90Sr is a very good proxy of milk teeth 
contamination. 
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3.1 Influence of the Swiss nuclear power plants on 90Sr activities of milk teeth 
The Swiss database on 90Sr contamination of milk teeth contains information concerning 
three distinct regions of Switzerland; the first region includes the canton of Zürich and a 
large part of the Swiss German lowlands. The Gösgen, Beznau and Leibstadt nuclear power 
plants (NPPs) are included in this region. The second region is the French-speaking part of 
Switzerland, mainly the canton of Vaud. There is a potential influence of the Mühleberg 
NPP in the Eastern part of this region. The third region is the Italian-speaking part of 
Switzerland, which is shielded from the Swiss NPPs by the Alps and borders Italy which 
has no active nuclear program (Froidevaux et al.,  2006b). 
 
 
Fig. 2. 90Sr activities (Bq/gCa) in milk sampled in Switzerland, Norway and New-Zealand. 
Figure 3 shows the results of an analysis of the 90Sr activities of the cantons of Tessin and 
Zürich as a function of the 90Sr activities measured in the canton of Vaud, for the same years 
of birth. Both correlations are very strong (Pearson coefficient =0.99), which means that the 
contamination of milk teeth originated from the same event, e.g. the NBT fallout of 90Sr. 
Nevertheless, both slopes differ from unity (0.84 for Zürich and 0.82 for Tessin). This fact 
may reflect a difference in consumption habits in the canton of Vaud compared to the 
cantons of Tessin and Zürich . Additionally, the canton of Vaud includes large areas of the 
Jura mountains and pre-alpine mountains that possibly contribute to a higher contamination 
of milk (Pourcelot et al.,  2007). The canton of Zürich , which is potentially under the 
influence of 4 among the 5 nuclear reactors located in Switzerland, presents no statistical 
differences compared with the canton of Tessin county,  which is shielded from these same 
reactors by the Alps. This indicates that the Swiss NNPs have had no significant impact on 
the 90Sr activities of milk teeth and that the 90Sr in these human samples arises only from the 
NBT fallout of the sixties that contaminated foodstuff and the mother-to-fetus 
contamination across the placental barrier. 
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4. Plutonium in milk teeth 
There exist only a few studies on teeth contamination by plutonium. The lack of data on 
plutonium in teeth is a result of the difficulty of the analysis, which requires a large sample 
size to yield results above the detection limit. This is because the plutonium activity is so 
low that a classical alpha-spectrometry technique is barely satisfactory to produce activities 
and uncertainties that could be used to demonstrate the potential influence of NPP on the 
plutonium body burden. 
 
 
Fig. 3. 90Sr activities (Bq/gCa) of milk teeth of the cantons of Tessin and Zürich as a function 
of the 90Sr activities of milk teeth of the canton of Vaud, for the same years of birth (1953-
1996). 
Long et al. (1991) have determined the activity of 239+240Pu in milk teeth of 35 different 
geographically located child populations in the United Kingdom. The average concentration 
was 5.2 mBq/kg of teeth ash. They concluded that there was no correlation with mean 
annual rainfall, that can be used as a proxy for the intensity of the radionuclide deposition 
(Renaud et al.,  2003; Pourcelot et al.,  2007), or with the distance from the Sellafield 
reprocessing plant. In contrast, O’Donnel et al. (1997) found a significant correlation 
between the plutonium content of milk teeth and the distance to the Sellafield plant, with 
activities near the plant close to 6 mBq/kg ash. At a distance above 150 miles from Sellafield, 
the activity drops to 3.0 mBq/kg ash.  
The use of sf-ICP-MS allows us to analyse our set of milk teeth sampled from 1951 to 1995 
for 239Pu content and 239Pu/240Pu ratio (Froidevaux and Haldimann,  2008). In fact, we used 
the 239Pu activity in milk teeth to probe for the potential of plutonium, a highly radiotoxic 
nuclide, to cross the placental barrier. We hypothesized that the plutonium inhaled by the 
mother will possibly cross the placental barrier, leading to a similar activity profile as 
observed for 90Sr in milk teeth. Surprisingly, results show a very different situation, with 
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239Pu activity peaking for the years of birth 1954-1956, some 9 to 10 years earlier than the 90Sr 
peak (Figure 4). Nevertheless, the 240Pu/239Pu isotopic ratio is 0.21±0.06 (n=23) from which 
we infer that the plutonium source is indeed the NBT fallout (Kelley et al.,  1999; Warneke et 
al.,  2002). 
 
 
Fig. 4. 239Pu (mBq/gCa) and 90Sr (Bq/gCa) activities in milk teeth of children born in 
Switzerland 1950-1996. 
A careful analysis of the year at which children shed their teeth shows that most of the milk 
teeth collected in the Swiss study are coming from children about 9 to 11 years old. This is 
because the teeth are collected by dentists, usually by school dentists. Most of the teeth 
sampled in this way are thus larger teeth (e.g. premolar or molar) that are shed at an older 
age compared to other teeth e.g. incisors. The offset between the highest activities of 
plutonium found in milk teeth and the maximum highest activities that were measured in 
air during the sixties represents exactly the time necessary to shed the teeth. Thus we 
interpret this offset as a proof that plutonium has not crossed the placental barrier, 
otherwise the plutonium activities in the milk teeth would have peaked for the same year of 
birth than 90Sr. Instead, the plutonium activities that we measured in the teeth reflect the 
plutonium concentration in the air during the year or so before tooth shedding, which takes 
place on average 10 years after birth according to our study (Froidevaux and Haldimann,  
2008). Because our study used whole teeth, we measured plutonium that was present in the 
root and cementum structures of the teeth, both remodelling at the same rate as the 
trabecular bone socket (Gulson and Gillings,  1997). To confirm this hypothesis, we roughly 
separated the roots of milk teeth from the rest of the teeth for two samples (born 1954 and 
1965, 30 teeth) before measurement and found that 239Pu in the roots has activities up to 9 
times higher than the rest of teeth (mainly enamel). It is likely that the low residual 239Pu 
activity found in the enamel represents a contamination by residual root and dentine 
structures still present in the enamel sample. Therefore, it is highly probable that the enamel 
laid down in utero is virtually free of 239Pu. Consequently, neonates were probably born free 
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of plutonium, even when the environmental plutonium was at its highest, in the early 1960s. 
Our interpretation of the plutonium activity in deciduous teeth as a function of the year of 
birth is that neonates start to incorporate plutonium through inhalation of contaminated air 
after birth, until they shed their milk teeth. Because of the exchange of the bone-like 
structure of the teeth with the blood plasma, a higher concentration in milk teeth will show 
up for children shedding their whole teeth when the plutonium concentration in the air was 
at its highest, i.e. 1963. Thus 239Pu activity will peak in milk teeth of children born circa 1953, 
as observed in Figure 4.  
To compare our results with the results from the literature, we used a conversion factor of 
0.35 g Ca/g ash (Swiss database, n=182, mean= 0.35±0.04) because results were given as 
mBq/kg ash in the former literature. We also used a multiplication factor of 1.68 of our 239Pu 
value because the literature data concern the activity of both 239Pu and 240Pu isotopes as 
given by alpha-spectrometry. O’Donnell (ODonnell et al.,  1997), found a mean activity of 5 
mBq/kg ash in permanent teeth sampled in 1990 in the UK to compare with our value of 0.6 
mBq/kg ash. Long et al. found similar values in a study of 35 different regions of the UK, 
with a mean value of 5.2 mBq/kg ash. The factor of 9 found between milk teeth in our study 
and permanent teeth in the UK studies confirms that plutonium does not cross the placental 
barrier and does not contaminate the enamel of the deciduous teeth that was laid down 
during pregnancy. In this respect, the activity of the permanent teeth possibly represents a 
proxy for the activity that might be found in bone. We did not discover any potential 
influence of the 5 Swiss NPPs on the 239Pu contamination of milk teeth, as demonstrated by 
the 240Pu/239Pu isotopic ratio of 021±0.06, close to the reference value of 0.187 for NBT fallout 
(Kelley et al.,  1999; Warneke et al.,  2002; Froidevaux and Haldimann,  2008). A significant 
decrease of this ratio would have supported the hypothesis that some of the plutonium 
arises from other sources, e.g. burnt nuclear fuel (Ketterer et al.,  2004a), while a significant 
impact of the Chernobyl accident would have increased it up to 0.35 (Ketterer et al.,  2004b).  
5. 90Sr in bones 
Similarly to milk teeth, several countries have initiated a program of measuring the 90Sr 
body burden through analysis of bones sampled at autopsy (Aarkrog,  1971; Christensen et 
al.,  1975; Bauman et al.,  1977; Dehos and Kistner,  1980; Kalmykov et al.,  1997; Stamoulis et 
al.,  1999; Hodgson et al.,  2004; Froidevaux et al.,  2010). In the particular case of bones 
analysis, the choice of the type of bones sampled is very critical. The strontium levels in 
bone vary according to the bone structure, and higher amounts of strontium are found in 
cancellous bone than in cortical bone after stable strontium ingestion. However, strontium 
levels at different skeletal sites are strongly correlated, and the strontium content of the 
lumbar vertebra may be estimated from iliac crest bone biopsies in the monkey (Dahl et al.,  
2001). Usually cancellous bone such as vertebrae, ribs or the iliac crest are used for a 90Sr 
survey because the remodeling rate is higher compared to compact bones (Martin and 
Seeman,  2008; Zebaze et al.,  2010). In this way, a better evaluation of the radioecological 
situation in a given location is obtained using cancellous bones because the activity found in 
the bone will reflect more accurately the current contamination of foodstuff. Nevertheless, 
the use of cortical bone such as the tibia may be of help when an archive of contamination is 
needed. 
In Switzerland, the Federal Office of Public Health initiated a 90Sr survey program   using an 
analysis of 90Sr in vertebrae of individuals deceased between 1960 and now. To our 
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knowledge, the Swiss database is the only one reflecting the 90Sr contamination of the 
human skeleton for the last 50 years and which is still ongoing. Results are presented in 
Figure 6, in which data from several other studies from the literature are also given for 
comparison; the 90Sr activities for Switzerland are situated between the average activities 
found worldwide in adults and activities found in Denmark for children deceased before 
their first year. Higher values were also found in children less than 5 years in Norway 
(highest activity=0.52 Bq/gCa for the year of death 1965) with a children/adults (>20y) 
activity ratio of 2.5 for children less than one year, of 3.3 for children less than 5 years and 
1.7 for children between 5 and 20 years at the time of death (Christensen et al.,  1975). 
Current activities are in the order of 0.028 Bq/gCa), a value that is typically found elsewhere 
(Stamoulis et al.,  1999). 
 
 
Fig. 6. 90Sr (Bq/gCa) in cancellous (trabecular) bones sampled at autopsy as a function of the 
year of death. 
Swiss data are significantly above the world average data or United Kingdom data, which is 
most likely a reflection of the Swiss population’s high consumption of dairy products.  The 
highest activity is found for the year 1965-1967 in adults in Switzerland and worldwide and 
in children 5-19 years in UK, but significantly earlier in children less than one year old in 
Denmark and Norway (1963-1965; (Aarkrog,  1971; Christensen et al.,  1975)). This 
observation is supported by the higher remodeling rate of bones and bone growth measured 
in younger children. As a consequence, the incorporation of 90Sr in bones is faster (and 
higher) for young children than for adults (see also (Papworth and Vennart,  1984) for a 
discussion on the uptake and turnover of 90Sr in the human skeleton). In this way, 90Sr 
contamination of the environment and foodstuff will have a greater negative impact on 
children than on adults, leading to an absorbed dose in the marrow to age 70 about 30 times 
higher if 90Sr is incorporated when less than one year old, compared to a similar ingestion at 
the age of 20 years (Papworth and Vennart,  1984). No effect of the Chernobyl accident was 
Long-Term Effects of Exposure to Low-Levels of Radioactivity:  
a Retrospective Study of 239Pu and 90Sr from Nuclear Bomb Tests on the Swiss Population 
 
317 
observed on the vertebrae activities in Switzerland, the pre-Chernobyl activities being 
somewhat higher (0.044 Bq/gCa, 1980-1985) before the accident than after (0.037 Bq/gCa, 
1986-1989). Vertebrae were collected in different regions of Switzerland, and two regions are 
still currently being sampled; for the same year of death, the activities in vertebrae sampled 
in the canton of Vaud are strongly correlated with the activities in vertebrae collected in the 
canton of Tessin (Pearson=0.98), in the Basel area (Pearson=0.96), and in the St-Gallen area 
(Pearson=0.99). Nevertheless, the slopes differ from unity for all correlations, showing that 
vertebrae collected in the canton of Vaud contain 18% more 90Sr than vertebrae collected in 
the Basel area, 2% more than in vertebrae from the St-Gallen region and 25% less than in the 
canton of Tessin. These data confirm that the contamination of the skeleton is coming from 
the same event (the NBT fallout) and that the canton of Tessin , which has received more 
deposition from the NBT fallout because of a higher average rainfall rate, shows a slightly 
higher 90Sr body burden. Our results do not support the assumption that the Swiss NPPs 
have a potential influence on the 90Sr body burden of the population living within range of 
the NPPs emission (mostly the Basel region here). Conversely, a higher 90Sr skeleton burden 
is found in the canton of Tessin, an area which is shielded from the Swiss NPPs by the Alps. 
 
 
Fig. 7. 90Sr activities (Bq/gCa) in vertebrae of the Basel area, of the St-Gall region and of the 
canton of Tessin as a function of the 90Sr activities in vertebrae of the canton of Vaud, for the 
same year of death. 
6. Plutonium in bones 
If human data for 90Sr are widely available, they are rather scarce for plutonium. USTUR 
represents probably the most important database for biokinetic modelling of actinides 
(Kathren,  1995). A review of contributions of human autopsies to the dosimetry of 
plutonium in man has been further proposed by Kathren (Kathren,  2004). Nevertheless, 
most of the data concern individuals that have been previously exposed to plutonium 
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because of their activities in the nuclear industry. Only few studies concern the effect of the 
NBT fallout on the general population (Taylor,  1995; ODonnell et al.,  1997; Takizawa et al.,  
2000; Froidevaux and Haldimann,  2008); the most extensive is probably McInroy’s work on 
plutonium in autopsy tissues which contains data on more than 260 people, both from the 
general public in the US as well as workers from the nuclear industry (McInroy et al.,  1979). 
Nevertheless, all these studies were carried out using alpha-spectrometry, which is a less 
sensitive technique for plutonium determination than mass spectrometry. Moreover, alpha-
spectrometry cannot separate 239Pu and 240Pu signals while the 240Pu/239Pu is a very good 
signature of the origin of the plutonium contamination.  
In our work, we determined the 239Pu and 240Pu activities in vertebrae of individual who were 
mostly older than 20 years at the time of the highest fallout rate of plutonium, using high 
sensitivity sf-ICP-MS. Data contain results for people who died between 1962 and 2004 in 
Switzerland. In this respect, our database is probably the most complete database covering the 
last 40 years for a given population. This allows us to determine, with a significant confidence 
level, how long plutonium is retained in the skeleton, a very important data in dose 
assessment that was not previously ascertained (Froidevaux et al.,  2010). Results are presented 
in Figure 8, in which a comparison with published data is included. Because published data 
usually are given as mBq per kg of wet weight in the former literature, we apply a factor of 
4.8% Ca per kg of wet weight and a factor of 1.68 to take into account the 240Pu/239Pu isotopic 
ratio of the NBT fallout to recalculate the activity in mBq/gCa.  
 
 
Fig. 8. 239Pu activity (mBq/gCa) as a function of the year of death. 
Figure 8 shows that the activities of 239Pu in vertebrae in Switzerland increased similarly to 
90Sr, peaking in 1970 at a value of 0.086 mBq/gCa. The 240Pu/239Pu isotopic ratio is 0.18±0.01 
(n=48), from which we infer that plutonium measured in this study originated only from the 
fallout of the atomic bomb tests (Froidevaux et al.,  2010). Significantly higher values were 
found in the US (McInroy et al.,  1979) and in New York City (Fisenne et al.,  1980), possibly 
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because these databases contain autopsy tissues from both the general public and workers 
of the nuclear industry. Similar values to Switzerland were determined in Germany (Bunzl 
and Kracke,  1983) and in the UK (Popplewell et al.,  1985) for the years around 1980. Higher 
values were obtained at the Semipalatinsk test site (STS) during the 2000’s, indicating an 
effect of the test site fallout in the plutonium body burden of the population (Yamamoto et 
al.,  2006). Using ICP-MS, (Yamamoto et al.,  2008) found a significantly lower 240Pu/239Pu 
isotopic ratio of 0.125 in autopsy tissues (bone) of individuals from the STS, confirming the 
influence of the STS fallout on plutonium incorporation. 
There were too few bone ash samples in our study to separate individuals from different 
regions, especially the ones potentially affected by the Swiss NPPs. Accordingly, our data 
represent a pool of bone samples from all over Switzerland. Nevertheless, the 240Pu/239Pu 
isotopic ratio of 0.18 indicates, beyond any reasonable doubts, that the plutonium inhaled by 
the Swiss population comes from the fallout of the NBTs of the sixties.  
7. Retention half-times in the skeleton of 90Sr and plutonium  
The retention half-time in the skeleton of bone-seeking radionuclides such as 90Sr and 
plutonium is a key parameter used for their dosimetry in humans. Currently, only a partial 
answer is given to the question of how long plutonium will stay in the body. Values found 
in the literature are situated between 15 to 100 years, with a proposed value by ICRP 56 or 
Kathren (1995) of 50 y. Our long-term study of 90Sr and plutonium in the vertebrae allowed 
us to determine, with a high statistical significance, the retention half-time of both 
radionuclides in cancellous bones. It is of 40±15 y (95% confidence) for plutonium and 
13.5±1.5 for 90Sr (Figure 9). Meanwhile, the retention time of 90Sr is very close to the retention 
time found in milk teeth, milk, grass and soil (0-5 cm, Table 1).  
 
 
Fig. 9. The use of the data from our long-term study for the determination of the retention 
time of 90Sr and plutonium in cancellous bones. 
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Site Soil (0-5 cm) Grass Milk milk teeth Vertebrae 
Grangeneuve 12.3±3.6 11.6 ±3.9 14.8 ±2.3   
Mühleberg 9.0 ±1.3 7.6 ±1.3 14.5 ±2.6   
Gösgen  7.8 ±0.9 6.7 ±1.1 10.1 ±2.7   
Leibstadt 8.9 ±1.5 12.3 ±3.9 12.5 ±2.5   
Switzerland 9.5±2 9.5±3 13±2 10.0 ±3 13.0 ±1 
Table 1. Retention half-time of 90Sr in different compartments of the environment, food and 
human for different locations in Switzerland. 
These results demonstrate that the calculated retention half-time for 90Sr is in fact an 
apparent retention half-time because 90Sr is still incorporated in bones after the Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty, due to ingestion of contaminated food, especially milk. In this respect, the 90Sr 
activity in vertebrae is a better reflection of the contamination of the food chain and the 
environment rather than any mechanism of 90Sr excretion. Consequently, bones remain 
contaminated by 90Sr as long as environmental contamination lasts (Froidevaux et al.,  2010). 
8. Conclusion 
In this work we show that plutonium and 90Sr from NBTs fallout have contaminated the 
Swiss population. The level of the contamination is very low and the potential effect of this 
contamination can be classified within the very low dose effects. In this respect, the NBTs 
contamination can be viewed as a surrogate for the potential effect that a NPP could have on 
a nearby population in case of accidental release of low intensity. Compared to other studies 
conducted worldwide on the same problem, we see that the Swiss population received 
NBTs fallout similar to other Northern Hemisphere regions but that the incorporation of 90Sr 
might have been slightly higher because the diet of the Swiss population includes a 
significant portion of dairy products. The determination of plutonium in milk teeth at a very 
low-level using sensitive sf-ICP-MS technique allowed us to demonstrate that plutonium 
does not cross the placental barrier and that the babies were probably born free of 
plutonium. Nevertheless, the determination of significant amounts of plutonium in bones of 
adults shows that the incorporation of NBT plutonium in the skeleton of the babies starts as 
soon as they begin to breathe and continues as long as the plutonium is present in air. 90Sr 
has been incorporated as a consequence of food contamination, as demonstrated by the 
strong correlation between the milk activity and the milk teeth activity, and 90Sr in the body 
will stay in equilibrium with the 90Sr present in the environment. We also show that the 
analytical part of such a study has to be handled with great care because the levels 
measured are so low that contamination of the samples by other radionuclides easily 
happens. In this respect, careful radiochemical work must be carried out on the samples, 
either for 90Sr or plutonium analyses, otherwise results are submitted to significant bias. In 
addition, our long-time study allowed us to determine the retention half-time of plutonium 
and 90Sr in the skeleton. We think that this kind of study forms a very good basis for 
epidemiological studies involving the effects of a low dose of radiation (Wakeford et al.,  
2010). We thus conclude that a survey of the population by yearly sampling of milk teeth 
and vertebrae is very useful to demonstrate an increase in the population body burden that 
may be attributed to air and/or environmental contamination. In view of the presence of 5 
NPPs in Switzerland, this program helps to determine any potential negative effect of the 
NPPs on the population in case of accidental release. This survey program is well accepted 
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by the population and offers reassurance that people are not submitted to unacceptable 
doses of radiation.  
9. Acknowledgment 
Research funding was provided by the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health for PF and MH 
and by the University of Lausanne (PF and FBo). We thank J.-J. Geering for his long-term 
collection of vertebrae and milk teeth, in collaboration with pathologists and dentists from 
different regions of Switzerland, and for 90Sr analyses from 1960 to 2001. F. Barraud is 
acknowledged for her careful work in the 90Sr analyses of teeth and bones samples. We 
thank A. Alt for instrumental assistance with the sf ICP-MS. 
10. References 
Aarkrog, A. (1971) Prediction Models for Sr-90 in Shed Deciduous Teeth and Infant Bone. 
Health Physics, Vol.21, No.6, pp. 803-&, ISSN 0017-9078. 
Agarande, M., Benzoubir, S., Neiva-Marques, A. M., & Bouisset, P. (2004) Sector field 
inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry, another tool for plutonium 
isotopes and plutonium isotope ratios determination in environmental matrices. 
Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, Vol.72, No.1-2, pp. 169-176, ISSN 0265-931X. 
Atkinson, W. D., Law, D. V., Bromley, K. J., & Inskip, H. M. (2004) Mortality of employees of 
the United Kingdom atomic energy authority, 1946-97. Occupational and 
Environmental Medicine, Vol.61, No.7, pp. 577-585, ISSN 1351-0711. 
Badie, C., Arnould, C., Sarbach, J., Arnaud, M., Lemercier, R., Bernard, C., Howell, P., & 
Texier, T. (1987) Sr-90 Levels in Human-Teeth Collected in French-Polynesia. 
Radioprotection, Vol.22, No.4, pp. 325-332, ISSN 0033-8451. 
Baglan, N., Hemet, P., Pointurier, F., & Chiappini, R. (2004) Evaluation of a single collector, 
double focusing sector field inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer for the 
determination of U and Pu concentrations and isotopic compositions at trace level. 
Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry, Vol.261, No.3, pp. 609-617, ISSN 
0236-5731. 
Bauman, A., Franic, N., Baumstark, M., & Popovic, V. (1977) Sr-90 in Human Bone. Health 
Physics, Vol.32, No.4, pp. 318-321, ISSN 0017-9078. 
Becker, J. S. (2003) Mass spectrometry of long-lived radionuclides. Spectrochimica Acta Part B-
Atomic Spectroscopy, Vol.58, No.10, pp. 1757-1784, ISSN 0584-8547. 
Becker, J. S., Soman, R. S., Sutton, K. L., Caruso, J. A., & Dietze, H. J. (1999) Determination of 
long-lived radionuclides by inductively coupled plasma quadrupole mass 
spectrometry using different nebulizers. Journal of Analytical Atomic Spectrometry, 
Vol.14, No.6, pp. 933-937, ISSN 0267-9477. 
BEIR7 (2006) Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation: BEIR VII - 
Phase 2. National research council of the national academies, the national 
academies press, Washington DC, ISBN 10-309-53040-7 (2006).  
Black,R.J., Sharp,L., Harkness, E.F., & McKinney, P.A. (1994) Leukaemia and non-Hodgkin’s 
lymphoma: incidence in children and young adults resident in the Dounreay area 
of Caithness, Scotland in 1968–91. J Epidemiology and Community Health, Vol.48, pp. 
232–236, ISSN 0143-005X. 
 
Nuclear Power – Operation, Safety and Environment 
 
322 
Bithell, J. F., Dutton, S. J., Draper, G. J., & Neary, N. M. (1994) Distribution of Childhood 
Leukemias and Non-Hodgkins-Lymphomas Near Nuclear Installations in England 
and Wales. British Medical Journal, Vol.309, No.6953, pp. 501-505, ISSN 0959-8138. 
Boulyga, S. F. & Becker, J. S. (2001) Determination of uranium isotopic composition and U-
236 content of soil samples and hot particles using inductively coupled plasma 
mass spectrometry. Fresenius Journal of Analytical Chemistry, Vol.370, No.5, pp. 612-
617, ISSN 0937-0633. 
Boulyga, S. F., Desideri, D., Meli, M. A., Testa, C., & Becker, J. S. (2003) Plutonium and 
americium determination in mosses by laser ablation ICP-MS combined with 
isotope dilution technique. International Journal of Mass Spectrometry, Vol.226, No.3, 
pp. 329-339, ISSN 1387-3806. 
Bunzl, K. & Kracke, W. (1983) Fallout Pu-239-240 and Pu-238 in Human-Tissues from the 
Federal-Republic of Germany. Health Physics, Vol.44, No.pp. 441-449, ISSN 0017-
9078. 
Cardis, E., Kesminiene, A., Ivanov, V., Malakhova, I., Shibata, Y., Khrouch, V., Drozdovitch, 
V., Maceika, E., Zvonova, I., Vlassov, O., Bouville, A., Goulko, G., Hoshi, M., 
Abrosimov, A., Anoshko, J., Astakhova, L., Chekin, S., Demidchik, E., Galanti, R., 
Ito, M., Korobova, E., Lushnikov, E., Maksioutov, M. A., Masyakin, V., Nerovnia, 
A., Parshin, V., Parshkov, E., Piliptsevich, N., Pinchera, A., Polyakov, S., Shabeka, 
N., Suonio, E., Tenet, V., Tsyb, A., Yamashita, S., & Williams, D. (2005a) Risk of 
thyroid cancer after exposure to I-131 in childhood. Journal of the National Cancer 
Institute, Vol.97, No.10, pp. 724-732, ISSN 0027-8874. 
Cardis, E., Vrijheid, M., Blettner, M., Gilbert, E., Hakama, M., Hill, C., Howe, G., Kaldor, J., 
Muirhead, C. R., Schubauer-Berigan, M., & Yoshimura, T. (2005b) Risk of cancer 
after low doses of ionising radiation - retrospective cohort study in 15 countries. 
British Medical Journal, Vol.331, No.7508, pp. 77-80B, ISSN 0959-8146. 
Christensen, G. C., Alstad, J., Kvale, E., & Pappas, A. C. (1975) Strontium-90 in Human Bone 
in Norway 1956-1972. Health Physics, Vol.28, No.6, pp. 677-684, ISSN 0017-9078. 
Culot, J. P., Blommaert, W., Hurtgen, C., & Minon, J. P. (1997) Radioactivity of teeth in the 
follow-up of old contamination cases. Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear 
Chemistry, Vol.226, No.1-2, pp. 139-143, ISSN 0236-5731. 
Dahl, S. G., Allain, P., Marie, P. J., Mauras, Y., Boivin, G., Ammann, P., Tsouderos, Y., 
Delmas, P. D., & Christiansen, C. (2001) Incorporation and distribution of strontium 
in bone. Bone, Vol.28, No.4, pp. 446-453, ISSN 8756-3282. 
Degteva, M. O., Kozheurov, V. P., Tolstykh, E. I., Vorobiova, M. I., Anspaugh, L. R., Napier, 
B. A., & Kovtun, A. N. (2000) The Techa River Dosimetry System: Methods for the 
reconstruction of internal dose. Health Physics, Vol.79, No.1, pp. 24-35, ISSN 0017-
9078. 
Dehos, R. & Kistner, G. (1980) Sr-90 Content in Human-Bone of West-German Residents. 
Health Physics, Vol.39, No.4, pp. 682-683, ISSN 0017-9078. 
Dolphin, A. E., Goodman, A. H., & Amarasiriwardena, D. D. (2005) Variation in elemental 
intensities among teeth and between pre- and postnatal regions of enamel. 
American Journal of Physical Anthropology, Vol.128, No.4, pp. 878-888, ISSN 0002-
9483. 
Doyle, P., Maconochie, N., Roman, E., Davies, G., Smith, P. G., & Beral, V. (2000) Fetal death 
and congenital malformation in babies born to nuclear industry employees: report 
from the nuclear industry family study. Lancet, Vol.356, No.9238, pp. 1293-1299, 
ISSN 0140-6736. 
Long-Term Effects of Exposure to Low-Levels of Radioactivity:  
a Retrospective Study of 239Pu and 90Sr from Nuclear Bomb Tests on the Swiss Population 
 
323 
Fisenne, I. M., Cohen, N., Neton, J. W., & Perry, P. (1980) Fallout Plutonium in Human-
Tissues from New-York-City. Radiation Research, Vol.83, No.1, pp. 162-168, ISSN 
0033-7587. 
Froidevaux, P., Bochud, F., & Haldimann, M. (2010) Retention half times in the skeleton of 
plutonium and Sr-90 from above-ground nuclear tests: A retrospective study of the 
Swiss population. Chemosphere, Vol.80, No.5, pp. 519-524, ISSN 0045-6535. 
Froidevaux, P., Dell, T., & Tossel, P. (2006a) Radionuclides in Food and Foodstuff, In 
Radionuclide concentrations in food and the Environment, Pöschl and Nollet ed, pp 225-
268, Taylor and Francis, ISBN 0-8493-3594-9, Boca Raton.  
Froidevaux, P., Geering, J. J., & Valley, J. F. (2006b) Sr-90 in deciduous teeth from 1950 to 
2002: The Swiss experience. Science of the Total Environment, Vol.367, No.2-3, pp. 
596-605, ISSN 0048-9697. 
Froidevaux, P. & Haldimann, M. (2008) Plutonium from Above-Ground Nuclear Tests in 
Milk Teeth: Investigation of Placental Transfer in Children Born between 1951 and 
1995 in Switzerland. Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol.116, No.12, pp. 1731-
1734, ISSN 0091-6765. 
Gulson, B. L. & Gillings, B. R. (1997) Lead exchange in teeth and bone - A pilot study using 
stable lead isotopes. Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol.105, No.8, pp. 820-824, 
ISSN 0091-6765. 
Heasman, M. A., Kemp, I. W., Urquhart, J. D., & Black, R. (1986) Childhood Leukemia in 
Northern Scotland. Lancet, Vol.1, No.8475, pp. 266-266, ISSN 0140-6736. 
Hodgson, S. A., Ham, G. J., Youngman, M. J., Etherington, G., & Stradling, G. N. (2004) A 
review of measurements of radionuclides in members of the public in the UK. 
Journal of Radiological Protection, Vol.24, No.4, pp. 369-389, ISSN 0952-4746. 
Hoffmann, W., Dieckmann, H., Dieckmann, H., & SchmitzFeuerhake, I. (1997) A cluster of 
childhood leukemia near a nuclear reactor in northern Germany. Archives of 
Environmental Health, Vol.52, No.4, pp. 275-280, ISSN 0003-9896. 
Hunter, N. & Muirhead, C. R. (2009) Review of relative biological effectiveness dependence 
on linear energy transfer for low-LET radiations. Journal of Radiological Protection, 
Vol.29, No.1, pp. 5-21, ISSN 0952-4746. 
ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection) (1986) The Metabolism of 
Plutonium and Related Elements.  
Kaatsch, P., Spix, C., Schulze-Rath, R., Schmiedel, S., & Blettner, M. (2008) Leukaemia in 
young children living in the vicinity of German nuclear power plants. International 
Journal of Cancer, Vol.122, No.4, pp. 721-726, ISSN 0020-7136. 
Kalmykov, L., Paschenko, G., & Gur, E. (1997) Sr-90 internal irradiation of population 
residing in the north-east region of Ukraine. Radiation Protection Dosimetry, Vol.71, 
No.1, pp. 57-60, ISSN 0144-8420. 
Kathren, R. L. (1995) The United-States Transuranium and Uranium Registries - 1968-1993. 
Radiation Protection Dosimetry, Vol.60, No.4, pp. 349-354, ISSN 0144-8420. 
Kathren, R. L. (2004) A review of contributions of human tissue studies to biokinetics, 
bioeffects and dosimetry of plutonium in man. Radiation Protection Dosimetry, 
Vol.109, No.4, pp. 399-407, ISSN 0144-8420. 
Kelley, J. M., Bond, L. A., & Beasley, T. M. (1999) Global distribution of Pu isotopes and Np-
237. Science of the Total Environment, Vol.238, No.pp. 483-500, ISSN 0048-9697. 
Ketterer, M. E., Hafer, K. M., Link, C. L., Kolwaite, D., Wilson, J., & Mietelski, J. W. (2004a) 
Resolving global versus local/regional Pu sources in the environment using sector 
 
Nuclear Power – Operation, Safety and Environment 
 
324 
ICP-MS. Journal of Analytical Atomic Spectrometry, Vol.19, No.2, pp. 241-245, ISSN 
0267-9477. 
Ketterer, M. E., Hafer, K. M., & Mietelski, J. W. (2004b) Resolving Chernobyl vs. global 
fallout contributions in soils from Poland using Plutonium atom ratios measured 
by inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry. Journal of Environmental 
Radioactivity, Vol.73, No.2, pp. 183-201, ISSN 0265-931X. 
Kim, C. S., Kim, C. K., Lee, J. I., & Lee, K. J. (2000) Rapid determination of Pu isotopes and 
atom ratios in small amounts of environmental samples by an on-line sample pre-
treatment system and isotope dilution high resolution inductively coupled plasma 
mass spectrometry. Journal of Analytical Atomic Spectrometry, Vol.15, No.3, pp. 247-
255, ISSN 0267-9477. 
Krestinina, L., Preston, D. L., Davis, F. G., Epifanova, S., Ostroumova, E., Ron, E., & Akleyev, 
A. (2010) Leukemia incidence among people exposed to chronic radiation from the 
contaminated Techa River, 1953-2005. Radiation and Environmental Biophysics, 
Vol.49, No.2, pp. 195-201, ISSN 0301-634X. 
Kulev, Y. D., Polikarpov, G. G., Prigodey, E. V., & Assimakopoulos, P. A. (1994) Sr-90 
Concentrations in Human Teeth in South Ukraine, 5 Years After the Chernobyl 
Accident. Science of the Total Environment, Vol.155, No.3, pp. 215-219, ISSN 0048-
9697. 
Laurier, D., Jacob, S., Bernier, M. O., Leuraud, K., Metz, C., Samson, E., & Laloi, P. (2008) 
Epidemiological studies of leukaemia in children and young adults around nuclear 
facilities: a critical review. Radiation Protection Dosimetry, Vol.132, No.2, pp. 182-190, 
ISSN 0144-8420. 
Lindahl, P., Keith-Roach, M., Worsfold, P., Choi, M. S., Shin, H. S., & Lee, S. H. (2010) Ultra-
trace determination of plutonium in marine samples using multi-collector 
inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry. Analytica Chimica Acta, Vol.671, 
No.1-2, pp. 61-69, ISSN 0003-2670. 
Mangano, J.J & Sherman, J. D. (2011) Elevated In Vivo Strontium-90 From Nuclear Weapons 
Test Fallout Among Cancer Decedents: A Case-control Study Of Deciduous Teeth. 
International Journal of Health Sciences, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp 137-158. 
Martin, T. J. & Seeman, E. (2008) Bone remodelling: its local regulation and the emergence of 
bone fragility. Best Practice & Research Clinical Endocrinology & Metabolism, Vol.22, 
No.5, pp. 701-722, ISSN 1521-690X. 
McInroy, J. F., Campbell, E. E., Moss, W. D., Tietjen, G. L., Eutsler, B. C., & Boyd, H. A. 
(1979) Plutonium in Autopsy Tissue - Revision and Updating of Data Reported in 
La-4875. Health Physics, Vol.37, No.1, pp. 1-136, ISSN 0017-9078. 
Nussbaum, R. H. (2009) Childhood Leukemia and Cancers Near German Nuclear Reactors: 
Significance, Context, and Ramifications of Recent Studies. International Journal of 
Occupational and Environmental Health, Vol.15, No.3, pp. 318-323, ISSN 1077-3525. 
ODonnell, R. G., Mitchell, P. I., Priest, N. D., Strange, L., Fox, A., Henshaw, D. L., & Long, S. 
C. (1997) Variations in the concentration of plutonium, strontium-90 and total 
alpha-emitters in human teeth collected within the British Isles. Science of the Total 
Environment, Vol.201, No.3, pp. 235-243, ISSN 0048-9697. 
Papworth, D. G. & Vennart, J. (1984) The Uptake and Turnover of Sr-90 in the Human 
Skeleton. Physics in Medicine and Biology, Vol.29, No.9, pp. 1045-1061, ISSN 0031-
9155. 
Popplewell, D. S., Ham, G. J., Johnson, T. E., & Barry, S. F. (1985) Plutonium in Autopsy 
Tissues in Great-Britain. Health Physics, Vol.49, No.2, pp. 304-309, ISSN 0017-9078. 
Long-Term Effects of Exposure to Low-Levels of Radioactivity:  
a Retrospective Study of 239Pu and 90Sr from Nuclear Bomb Tests on the Swiss Population 
 
325 
Pourcelot, L., Steinmann, P., & Froidevaux, P. (2007) Lower variability of radionuclide 
activities in upland dairy products compared to soils and vegetation: Implication for 
environmental survey. Chemosphere, Vol.66, No.8, pp. 1571-1579, ISSN 0045-6535. 
Qiao, J. X., Hou, X. L., Roos, P., & Miro, M. (2010) Rapid and simultaneous determination of 
neptunium and plutonium isotopes in environmental samples by extraction 
chromatography using sequential injection analysis and ICP-MS. Journal of 
Analytical Atomic Spectrometry, Vol.25, No.11, pp. 1769-1779, ISSN 0267-9477. 
Renaud, P., Pourcelot, L., Metivier, J. M., & Morello, M. (2003) Mapping of Cs-137 deposition 
over eastern France 16 years after the Chernobyl accident. Science of the Total 
Environment, Vol.309, No.1-3, pp. 257-264, ISSN 0048-9697. 
Rogel, A., Carre, N., Amoros, E., Bonnet-Belfais, M., Goldberg, M., Imbernon, E., Calvez, T., 
& Hill, C. (2005) Mortality of workers exposed to ionizing radiation at the French 
National Electricity company. American Journal of Industrial Medicine, Vol.47, No.1, 
pp. 72-82, ISSN 0271-3586. 
Roman, E., Doyle, P., Maconochie, N., Davies, G., Smith, P. G., & Beral, V. (1999) Cancer in 
children of nuclear industry employees: report on children aged under 25 years 
from nuclear industry family study. British Medical Journal, Vol.318, No.7196, pp. 
1443-1450, ISSN 0959-8138. 
Rosenthal, H. L., Austin, S., Oneill, S., Takeuchi, K., Bird, J. T., & Gilster, J. E. (1964) 
Incorporation of Fall-Out Strontium-90 in Deciduous Incisors + Foetal Bone. Nature, 
Vol.203, No.494, pp. 615-&, ISSN 0028-0836. 
Rytomaa, I. (1972) Sr-90 in Deciduous Teeth Collected in Northern Finland from Children Born 
in 1952-1964. Acta Odontologica Scandinavica, Vol.30, No.2, pp. 219-&, ISSN 0001-6357. 
Schmitz, M., Schmitz, K., & Aumann, D. C. (2004) A simple radiochemical method for 
determining bone-seeking radionuclides in bone and teeth: Sr-90 in teeth of 
children from Ukraine and Germany. Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear 
Chemistry, Vol.260, No.3, pp. 451-457, ISSN 0236-5731. 
Schmitz-Feuerhake, I., Dieckmann, H., Hoffmann, W., Lengfelder, E., Pflugbeil, S., & 
Stevenson, A. (2005) The Elbmarsch leukemia cluster: Are there conceptual 
limitations in controlling immission from nuclear establishments in Germany? 
Archives of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology, Vol.49, No.4, pp. 589-600, 
ISSN 0090-4341. 
Shore, R. E. (2009) Low-Dose Radiation Epidemiology Studies: Status and Issues. Health 
Physics, Vol.97, No.5, pp. 481-486, ISSN 0017-9078. 
Sokolnikov, M. E., Gilbert, E. S., Preston, D. L., Ron, E., Shilnikova, N. S., Khokhryakov, V. 
V., Vasilenko, E. K., & Koshurnikova, N. A. (2008) Lung, liver and bone cancer 
mortality in Mayak workers. International Journal of Cancer, Vol.123, No.4, pp. 905-
911, ISSN 0020-7136. 
Stamoulis, K. C., Assimakopoulos, P. A., Ioannides, K. G., Johnson, E., & Soucacos, P. N. 
(1999) Strontium-90 concentration measurements in human bones and teeth in 
Greece. Science of the Total Environment, Vol.229, No.3, pp. 165-182, ISSN 0048-9697. 
Svendsen, E. R., Kolpakov, I. E., Stepanova, Y. I., Vdovenko, V. Y., Naboka, M. V., 
Mousseau, T. A., Mohr, L. C., Hoel, D. G., & Karmaus, W. J. J. (2010) (137)Cesium 
Exposure and Spirometry Measures in Ukrainian Children Affected by the 
Chernobyl Nuclear Incident. Environmental Health Perspectives, Vol.118, No.5, pp. 
720-725, ISSN 0091-6765. 
Takizawa, Y., Hisamatsu, S., Abe, T., & Yamashita, J. (2000) Actinides and long-lived 
radionuclides in tissues of the Japanese population: Summary of the past 20-year 
 
Nuclear Power – Operation, Safety and Environment 
 
326 
studies. Journal of Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry, Vol.243, No.2, pp. 305-312, 
ISSN 0236-5731. 
Taylor, D. M. (1995) Environmental Plutonium in Humans. Applied Radiation and Isotopes, 
Vol.46, No.11, pp. 1245-1252, ISSN 0969-8043. 
Taylor, R. N., Warneke, T., Milton, J. A., Croudace, I. W., Warwick, P. E., & Nesbitt, R. W. 
(2001) Plutonium isotope ratio analysis at femtogram to nanogram levels by 
multicollector ICP-MS. Journal of Analytical Atomic Spectrometry, Vol.16, No.3, pp. 
279-284, ISSN 0267-9477. 
Tolstykh, E. I., Degteva, M. O., Vorobiova, M. I., & Kozheurov, V. P. (2001) Fetal dose 
assessment for the offspring of the Techa Riverside residents. Radiation and 
Environmental Biophysics, Vol.40, No.4, pp. 279-286, ISSN 0301-634X. 
Tolstykh, E. I., Shagina, N. B., Peremyslova, L. M., Degteva, M. O., Phipps, A. W., Harrison, 
J. D., & Fell, T. P. (2008) Reconstruction of Sr-90 intake for breast-fed infants in the 
Techa riverside settlements. Radiation and Environmental Biophysics, Vol.47, No.3, 
pp. 349-357, ISSN 0301-634X. 
Tolstykh, E. I., Shishkina, E. A., Degteva, M. O., Ivanov, D. V., Shved, V. A., Bayankin, S. N., 
Anspaugh, L. R., Napier, B. A., Wieser, A., & Jacob, P. (2003) Age dependencies of 
Sr-90 incorporation in dental tissues: Comparative analysis and interpretation of 
different kinds of measurements obtained for residents on the Techa River. Health 
Physics, Vol.85, No.4, pp. 409-419, ISSN 0017-9078. 
Wakeford, R., Darby, S. C., & Murphy, M. F. G. (2010) Temporal trends in childhood 
leukaemia incidence following exposure to radioactive fallout from atmospheric 
nuclear weapons testing. Radiation and Environmental Biophysics, Vol.49, No.2, pp. 
213-227, ISSN 0301-634X. 
Warneke, T., Croudace, I. W., Warwick, P. E., & Taylor, R. N. (2002) A new ground-level 
fallout record of uranium and plutonium isotopes for northern temperate latitudes. 
Earth and Planetary Science Letters, Vol.203, No.3-4, pp. 1047-1057, ISSN 0012-821X. 
Wyse, E. J., Lee, S. H., La Rosa, J., Povinec, P., & de Mora, S. J. (2001) ICP-sector field mass 
spectrometry analysis of plutonium isotopes: recognizing and resolving potential 
interferences. Journal of Analytical Atomic Spectrometry, Vol.16, No.9, pp. 1107-1111, 
ISSN 0267-9477. 
Yamamoto, M., Hoshi, M., Sakaguchi, A., Shinohara, K., Kurihara, O., Apsalikov, K. N., & 
Gusev, B. I. (2006) Plutonium and uranium in human bones from areas 
surrounding the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. Journal of Radiation Research, Vol.47, 
No.pp. A85-A94, ISSN 0449-3060. 
Yamamoto, M., Oikawa, S., Sakaguchi, A., Tomita, J., Hoshi, M., & Apsalikov, K. N. (2008) 
Determination of Pu-240/Pu-239 isotopic ratios in human tissues collected from 
areas around the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site by sector-field high resolution ICP-
MS. Health Physics, Vol.95, No.3, pp. 291-299, ISSN 0017-9078. 
Zebaze, R. M. D., Ghasem-Zadeh, A., Bohte, A., Iuliano-Burns, S., Mirams, M., Price, R. I., 
Mackie, E. J., & Seeman, E. (2010) Intracortical remodelling and porosity in the 
distal radius and post-mortem femurs of women: a cross-sectional study. Lancet, 
Vol.375, No.9727, pp. 1729-1736, ISSN 0140-6736. 
Zoriy, M. V., Halicz, L., Ketterer, M. E., Pickhardt, C., Ostapczuk, P., & Becker, J. S. (2004) 
Reduction of UH+ formation for U-236/U-238 isotope ratio measurements at 
ultratrace level in double focusing sector field ICP-MS using D2O as solvent. 
Journal of Analytical Atomic Spectrometry, Vol.19, No.3, pp. 362-367, ISSN 0267-9477. 
15 
The Biliprotein C-Phycocyanin Modulates the 
DNA Damage Response in Lymphocytes from 
Nuclear Power Plant Workers 
K. Stankova1, K. Ivanova1, V. Nikolov1, K. Minkova2, 
L. Gigova2, R. Georgieva1 and R. Boteva1 
1National Center of Radiobiology and Radiation Protection 
2Institute of Plant Physiology and Genetics 
Bulgaria 
1. Introduction 
The biliprotein C-phycocyanin (C-PC) is a light-harvesting photoreceptor in cyanobacteria 
and in red algae (Rhodophyta and Cryptophyta) with applications as a natural colorant in 
nutritional industry and cosmetics (Prasanna et al., 2007) and as a fluorescent marker in 
medical and biological studies (Glazer, 1994; Sun et al., 2003). The protein is composed of 
two homologous subunits - α and β (Stec et al., 1999; Contreras-Martel et al., 2007), 
respectively with one and two phycocyanobilin chromophores, covalently attached to 
cysteine residues. The subunits form αβ complexes which aggregate into α3β3 trimers and 
α6β6 hexamers, the latter being the functional unit of the protein. C-PC has been shown to 
display a variety of pharmacological activities, related to the antioxidant, anti-inflammatory, 
neuro- and hepato-protective, anti-tumour and wound-healing mechanisms (Romay et al., 
2003; Ge et al., 2006; Li et al., 2005; Madhyastha et al., 2008). These properties have attracted 
attention to the compound as a possible radio-protective agent. It has been demonstrated 
that rats exposed to 5 Gy of X-rays and fed phycocyanin normalized their antioxidant 
system within 4 weeks after exposure (Karpov et al., 2000).  
Recently, we studied the effects of C-PC in combination with ionizing radiation on 
lymphocytes, isolated from nuclear power plant workers, exposed to low doses of ionizing 
radiation (IR), and compared them with the effects on lymphocytes from nonexposed controls 
(Ivanova et al., 2010). We found that the biliprotein stimulated the expression of the 
antioxidant enzymes manganese superoxide dismutase (MnSOD), catalase and glutathione-S-
transferase (GST) during the early radiation response of lymphocytes from workers, but not 
from controls. Since the biliprotein positively affects the antioxidant defense pathways, it 
might be of interest for the radioprotection of occupationally exposed people.  
In this study we have further characterized the effects of C-PC on the early radiation response 
of lymphocytes from unexposed controls and from workers, exposed to low doses of radiation. 
We quantified the level of persisting radiation-induced DNA double-strand breaks (DSBs) in 
the presence and absence of C-PC. DSBs are the most dangerous type of DNA lesions, induced 
by several genotoxic agents, including gamma IR (γ-IR). The ability of cells to readily process 
DSBs is of vital importance for genomic integrity, as failure to repair these lesions results in 
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chromosomal breakage, fragmentation and translocation. Moreover, impaired or defective 
rejoining of radiation-induced DNA strand breaks usually correlates strongly with the 
individual susceptibility to cancer (Alapetite et al., 1999; Berwick & Vineis, 2000).  
The amount of persisting DSBs in cells was determined by the comet assay (CA), a quick, 
simple and reliable method for analyzing DNA damage and repair that requires a small 
number of cells and can be performed on both freshly isolated and cryopreserved cells 
(Decordier et al., 2010). Due to its sensitivity, the method is preferred in human 
epidemiological studies related to biomonitoring (Möller et al., 2000; Touil et al., 2002). 
Additionally, the CA is able to provide information on different types of DNA damage/repair 
and detect cellular damage in a wide dose range of exposures from 0.05 to 10 Gy (Kalthur et 
al., 2008; Mohseni-Meybodi et al., 2009; Palyvoda et al., 2003). The experiments were 
performed on human lymphocytes, which, due to their radiosensitivity and circulation 
throughout the body, reflect the overall state of the organism and are the cellular type most 
frequently used for assessment of the systematic radiation response (Collins et al., 2008; 
Decordier et. al., 2010). A major problem with CA is that its sensitivity often leads to detection 
of a high variation within a single individual. A reliable methodology should be able to detect 
differences between individuals, but should show a minimal intra-individual variation. 
Therefore, prior to the epidemiological experiment, in an attempt to achieve minimal intra-
individual variation and a linear dose-response curve, we carefully tested a number of 
conditions. We attained a stable linear dose-response dependence of DNA lesions, persisting 
2h after exposure in the dose range from 0.5 to 8 Gy gamma rays.  
Our data indicated that C-PC might stimulate the repair of radiation-induced DNA lesions 
in lymphocytes from both occupationally exposed subjects and non-exposed controls. 
Moreover, the biliprotein seems to limit the manifestations of high radiosensitivity. 
Interestingly, we registered a pronounced lower genotoxicity of C-PC in lymphocytes from 
workers with cumulative doses higher than 20 mSv. Additionally, the effects of C-PC were 
age-dependent.  
2. Experimental procedures 
2.1 Subjects and sampling 
The exposed group consisted of 44 workers aged between 26 and 62 years, employed at the 
“Kozloduy” Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), Bulgaria. Cumulative exposure to ionizing 
radiation (IR), estimated from personal dosimeter records, ranged from 0.32 to 330.77 mSv 
and represented the sum of the doses collected for the whole period of occupation in the 
“strictly controlled area”. The control group included 12 non-exposed subjects from the NPP 
administrative staff, aged between 42 and 58 years. In order to exclude external effect on the 
results of this study, we recorded information on the smoking habits, alcohol consumption, 
use of medications and previous diagnostic exposure to X-rays. The studied groups were 
homogenous on the aforementioned criteria and the statistical analysis found no significant 
effects due to any factor. The study was performed under the National Program 
“Genomics” of the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education, Youth and Science of 
Bulgaria. Informed consent was obtained from all participants.  
Blood (2 ml) drawn by venipuncture and collected in EDTA-coated tubes (Vakutainer, 
Benton Dickinson, Oxford, UK) was delivered to the laboratory and stored at 40C for up to 
24h before processing. The samples from the control and exposed subjects were handled 
concurrently and the assays were run on coded samples.  
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2.2 Isolation, treatment with C-PC and irradiation of lymphocytes from human 
peripheral blood 
C-PC was extracted, purified and concentration-adjusted as previously described (Ivanova 
et al., 2010). 
Peripheral blood mononuclear cells were isolated by density-gradient centrifugation 
(Lymphoflot, Biotest, Dreieich, Germany), suspended in 1 ml RPMI 1640 supplemented with 
10% fetal calf serum (RPMI, Sigma, St Louis, MO, USA) and counted on haemocytometer. 
The lymphocytes from each subject were then split and subjected to four different 
treatments, using the conditions, described by Ivanova (Ivanova et al., 2010) as shown in 
Fig. 1a: (A) 4 hours of incubation with RPMI before lysis; (B) 2 hours of incubation in RPMI, 
followed by irradiation with 2 Gy (137Cs gamma source, dose rate 2.07 Gy/min), incubation 
for another 2 hours and lysis; (C) 4 hours of incubation in RPMI, supplemented with 5μM C-
PC (RPMI-C-PC) before lysis; (D) 2 hours of incubation in RPMI supplemented with 5μM C-
PC, followed by irradiation (as described), incubation for another 2 hours and lysis. All 
above procedures were carried out at room temperature.  
2.3 Single Cell Gel Electrophoresis (Comet assay) 
The neutral comet assay was applied for analysis of radiation- and/or C-PC-induced strand 
breaks in DNA. Three comet test slides were prepared from each treatment, described in 
Section 2.2 and Fig. 1a. Lymphocytes (5 x 105 cells/ml) were suspended in  low melting 
point agarose (final concentration 0.7% in phosphate buffered saline), dropped onto frosted 
glass slides which had been precoated with 0.5% normal melting point agarose, then 
refrigerated (4ºC) for 15 min. To dissolve cellular proteins and lipids, the slides were 
immersed in lysis buffer (10 mM Tris, 100 mM EDTA, 2.5 M NaCl, 1% Triton X-100, pH 8.0) 
for 40 min at 4ºC, and washed 3 times for 5 min in pre-cooled TBE buffer, pH 8.0. 
Electrophoresis was performed in TBE for 20 min at 0.5 V/cm2. Finally, the slides were 
washed in ethanol and air-dried, stained with ethidium bromide (5 µg/ml) and analyzed 
under a fluorescence microscope (Olympus BX41). Double-strand breaks were analyzed by 
the parameter “tail moment” (TM), determined by the Comet Score 1.5 Software for fifty 
cells per slide. This parameter is the product of tail length and % DNA in the tail and is 
considered most informative when low levels of damage are present (Collins et al., 2008).  
2.4 Statistical analysis 
Distributions of variables were determined using Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test (Marques de Sá 
& Frias, 2007). Lilefors and Levene tests were used to determine the homogeneity of 
variance. The effects of different treatments (such as exposure to IR, C-PC treatment or the 
combination of C-PC treatment plus irradiation) were analyzed using one way ANOVA. 
Student t-test for dependent variables was carried out in order to compare every factor pair 
in each group. Results showing p<0.05 were considered significant. As a null hypothesis it 
was presumed that there is no difference between groups.  
3. Results  
3.1 C-PC induces changes in DNA response to irradiation in non-irradiated subjects 
included in the control group 
First we wanted to analyze whether the cells of each individual responded with an increase 
in DNA lesions to the different treatments. For this we determined the standard deviation 
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for the TM values which we had calculated from each triplet of comet test slides. Average 
TM values which increased for different treatments with more than two standard 
deviations, were considered elevated. Thus, as evident from Table 1, in vitro irradiation 
alone generates elevated levels of persisting DNA lesions in the lymphocytes from all 
(100%) of the non-exposed subjects included in the control group. 5 μM C-PC by itself also 
causes an increase in the lesions in more than half (67%) of the cases suggesting that 
treatment with C-PC is toxic for more than half of the subjects, included in the control 
group. Notably, when incubated with C-PC prior to irradiation, the samples from only half 
of the subjects show levels of DNA lesions, higher than those of the non-treated samples. 
This means that C-PC treated cells do not accumulate additional lesions upon radiation 
exposure. Thus, despite the fact that C-PC shows some toxicity, it also seems to protect cells 
from additional radiation damage. 
There was a significant increase in the median value of the parameter TM, upon irradiation of 
cells which were grown in the absence of C-PC (Fig. 1b, B vs. A, t11=6.4). In contrast, for cells 
grown in C-PC supplemented medium, the median value slightly decreased upon irradiation 
(Fig. 1b, D vs. C, t11=2.36). The lower median TM value, calculated for the combined treatment, 
C-PC plus irradiation (D), in comparison to the separate treatments with C-PC (C) or 
irradiation (B), suggested that the biliprotein exerted radio-protection. Residual damage 
calculations (B minus A vs. D minus C) confirmed these findings (data not shown).  
The relatively high levels of data dispersion (wide confidence intervals), observed in all 
conditions (Fig. 1b) are consistent with high inter-individual variations in the cellular 
response of the control subjects. Notably, the cells irradiated after treatment with C-PC (D) 
showed a lower level of data scattering than that of treatments (B) or (C), which was 
comparable to the dispersion range of values found for the non-treated samples (A). This is 
evidently due to a reduction of the maximal TM values in (D). This observation suggests 
that the biliprotein limits the manifestations of high radiosensitivity.   
3.2 C-PC induces changes in the DNA response of lymphocytes from workers with 
very low cumulative doses of radiation 
The average annual exposure of 17 subjects with very low cumulative doses, ranging from 
0.32 to 12.12 mSv, did not exceed 1 mSv/year - the public dose limit, mandated by ICRP 
(ICRP 60, 1990), and these workers were unified in a group with very low dose occupational 
exposure. Cumulative doses and data on the levels of DNA damage in the workers are 
summarized in Table 2. Similar to the non-exposed control group, the additional, in vitro 
irradiation of the cells generated а significant increase in the levels of persisting lesions (Fig. 
1c, B vs. A, t16=3.63) in the majority of cases (76%). Treatment of the cells with C-PC also 
generated elevated levels of unrepaired DNA strand breaks in the majority (82%) of the 
subjects (Fig. 1c, C vs. A, t16=3.11). Notably, after irradiation, samples, which had been pre-
incubated with C-PC, showed lower median levels of DNA breaks  as well as a reduction in 
the number of the subjects with higher levels of persisting DNA lesions (59% of the subjects) 
when compared with the samples which were irradiated only (Fig. 1c, D vs. B, t16=2.68) or 
incubated with C-PC without in vitro irradiation (Fig. 1c, D vs. C, t16=2.77). This result was 
similar to the effect of the protein on the non-exposed control group and demonstrated its 
radio-protective effect on the subjects with a very low dose occupational exposure.  
As seen in Fig. 1c, the exposure of the cells only to C-PC or to IR (B and C) elevated the 
median values of TM and extended the range of the data dispersion. This is consistent with 
the cellular toxicity of the two agents. The data dispersion towards the higher break 
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extremes was more drastic with C-PC (C) than with irradiation alone (B), although the 
median values of damage levels in C-PC treated cells (C) was lower than that of irradiated 
cells (B). Notably, in combination, C-PC and radiation (D) induced a well pronounced 
decrease in the median values of TM, which were brought down almost to the levels of the 
controls (A). Additionally, the combination of the two agents (D) narrowed the range of 
data dispersion, again bringing it close to that of controls (A).  In conclusion, for this group 
we observed a beneficial effect of C-PC on lymphocytes treated prior to radiation exposure, 
despite the toxicity of the protein.  This conclusion was further confirmed by residual 
damage calculations (B minus A vs. D minus C). 
 
 
(a) Lymphocytes from each subject were treated as follows: A - 4 hours of incubation with 
RPMI before lysis (controls); B - 2 hours of incubation in RPMI, followed by irradiation, 
incubation for another 2 hours and lysis; C - 4 hours of incubation in RPMI, supplemented 
with 5μM C-PC; D - 2 hours of incubation in RPMI supplemented with 5μM C-PC, followed 
by irradiation, incubation for another 2 hours and lysis.   
(b) TM for the different treatments of lymphocytes from non-exposed subjects  
(c) TM for the different treatments of lymphocytes from workers with cumulative doses, 
ranging from 0.32 to 12.12 mSv 
(d) TM for the different treatments of lymphocytes from workers with cumulative doses, 
ranging from 26.77 to 330.77 mSv 
Whiskers represent non-outlier range, boxes: 25-75% confidence intervals (CI), (■) median 
value and (●) outlier values. 
Fig. 1. Treatment patterns and their effects on subjects from different exposure groups 
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3.3 C-PC induces changes in the DNA response of lymphocytes from workers with 
higher cumulative doses of radiation 
This group included 27 professionals with cumulative doses, ranging from 26.77 to 330.77 
mSv. Data, summarized in Table 3, showed, that in this group, in comparison with the two 
previous groups (non-exposed controls and exposed to very low doses of radiation), which 
were characterized by high levels of radiation-induced DNA lesions in the majority of 
samples (100 and 76%, respectively), the number of workers with persisting DNA lesions, 
induced after the in vitro exposure of the cells to 2 Gy gamma rays or treatment with C-PC 
was reduced by half to 48% and 44%, respectively. This is consistent with improved repair 
capacity of the subjects included in this group, which is probably relevant to their chronic 
low dose radiation exposure, which may have acted as in vivo adaptive dose. C-PC showed 
the lowest cytotoxicity in this group of workers since the median TM values and the range 
of data scattering were similar to those in untreated samples (Fig. 1d, C vs. A). This is also 
consistent with a general robustness of the cellular DNA repair capacity of this group of 
subjects, which is evident from the similar TM median of treatments A and B (Fig. 1d) - a 
sign of possible protective adaptation to toxic exposures, developed in subjects with higher 
cumulative doses of radiation. Significant differences in the levels of persisting lesions were 
detected only between the cells, irradiated in vitro and those treated with C-PC (Fig. 1d, C 
vs. B, t24=2.44). It is important to note, however, that regardless of the similarity of TM 
median values of B and A (Fig. 1d), irradiation of cells caused a definite increase in the data 
scattering towards the higher TM values, as compared to non-irradiated cells. Such an 
increase was not evident in the cells treated with C-PC only (Fig. 1d, C vs. A), rendering the 
C-PC treatment in this group less toxic to DNA than in the previous two groups (Fig. 1b and 
1c). However, in contrast to the other two groups of subjects, C-PC treatment in this case did 
not cause a decrease in the amount of radiation-induced DSBs (Fig. 1d, D) – a finding that 
was confirmed by residual damage calculations (B minus A vs. D minus C).  
3.4 The magnitude of the C-PC effect depends on the cumulative doses of exposure 
We compared the ТМ values for each treatment among the three subject groups. As seen in 
Fig. 2, the only significant differences found were for treatment of cells with C-PC only (C),  
which showed that the protein was less toxic for workers with cumulative doses higher than 
20 mSv (Fig. 2, group 3) and this effect contrasted with the toxicity registered for the 
controls and the group of professionals with very low dose radiation exposure (Fig. 2, 
groups 1 and 2). This indicates that chronic occupational exposure might stimulate the 
cellular defense mechanisms and induce resistance to DNA damage, caused by agents, such 
as C-PC. The workers with higher cumulative doses might also be more resistant to 
radiation-induced toxicity since in the same group (Fig. 1d, B) we registered lower median 
values of TM in the lymphocytes irradiated with 2 Gy gamma rays as compared to the TM 
values in the other two groups (Fig. 1b, B and 1c, B). 
It is worth noting the differences between the control (Fig. 1b) and the two groups of 
workers (Fig. 1c and 1d) regarding the median values of the parameter TM. For both groups 
of professionals, we found lower median values of TM upon each of the exposures (C-PC, 2 
Gy or the combination of the two agents) in comparison with the median TM values of the 
non-exposed controls (Group 1). This result suggests that workers possess lower levels of 
persisting DNA lesions than the controls, which is probably due to improved DNA repair 
capacity induced by the low dose professional exposure. This may also be relevant to radio-
adaptive phenomena, mobilizing and activating repair of DNA damage in the groups of the 
professionals.  
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Fig. 2. TM in non-exposed controls (Group 1) and in subjects with cumulative doses, ranging 
from 0.32 to 12.12 mSv (Group 2) or from 26.77 to 330.77 mSv (Group 3) treated with 5 μM 
C-PC. Vertical bars represent 95% CI.  
3.5 Age dependence of the DNA response of lymphocytes treated with C-PC and/or 
irradiated with 2 Gy gamma rays  
All individuals, non-exposed controls and occupationally irradiated workers, were divided 
into two groups. The first one included 24 subjects (3 controls and 21 occupationally 
exposed) of the age from 26 to 46 years. The second group consisted of 32 subjects, all of 
them older than 46 years (9 controls and 23 occupationally exposed). Comparison of all 
mean TM values in the first group showed significant differences between the levels of 
DNA damage in the non-treated samples and the in vitro irradiated lymphocytes in the 
presence and absence of C-PC (Fig. 3a, A vs. B and D, t23=2.35 and t23=2.03, respectively). 
We also observed a significant narrowing of the dispersion of the TM values for the cells, 
irradiated after pre-treatment with C-PC (Fig. 3a, D), indicating reduction of the inter-
individual variability and unification of the radiation responses by C-PC. Notably, the 
dispersion was narrowed predominantly by reducing the non-outlier range from the top – 
indicating that C-PC, combined with radiation, selectively improves the repair capacity of 
cells which, in all other conditions (A, B and C) demonstrate impaired DNA repair 
mechanisms. The last observation suggested that the protein stimulated better the repair of 
the radiation-induced DNA lesions in lymphocytes of the susceptible individuals. This 
observation may be important for the maintenance of genomic integrity in this high-risk 
subgroup of the population.  
Comparison of the TM values obtained for the older group (age 46-62 years, Fig. 3b) showed 
increased levels of persisting DNA lesions (p=0.05) in the cells irradiated in vitro (B, t31= 
3.54), incubated with C-PC (C, t31=2.26), or incubated with C-PC prior to radiation exposure 
(D, t31=2.93), when compared to the control setting in this group (A). As with the younger 
group, the median values of the TM for treatment B, C and D were similar. However, the 
significant top-down reduction in the TM value scattering, described for the younger group 
after irradiation of the cells, pre-treated with C-PC (Fig.3a, D) , was not evident in this group 
of subjects. 
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Fig. 3. Effect of different treatment patterns on subjects, grouped according to age: (a) from 
26 to 46 years and (b) from 47 to 62 years. Note that both groups included exposed subjects 
and non-exposed controls. Whiskers represent non-outlier range, boxes: 25-75% confidence 
intervals (CI), (■) median value and (●) outlier values. 
 
 
 
No. Age TM (Ctrl.) TM (2Gy) TM (C-PC) TM (C-PC + 2Gy) 
1 50 1.85 ± 0.21 3.41 ± 0.32 6.16 ± 0.11 3.88 ± 0.19 
2 48 3.10 ± 0.22 6.80 ± 0.10 6.86 ± 0.07 7.15 ± 0.16 
3 50 3.86 ± 0.13 5.38 ± 0.18 2.38 ± 0.51 4.91 ± 0.29 
4 45 7.71 ± 0.15 9.82 ± 0.13 6.65 ± 0.24 6.24 ± 0.10 
5 58 7.23 ± 0.17 8.24 ± 0.13 8.36 ± 0.08 6.80 ± 0.16 
6 50 3.23 ± 0.04 3.78 ± 0.09 3.93 ± 0.04 4.13 ± 0.04 
7 47 5.38 ± 0.01 7.45 ± 0.04 4.52 ± 0.14 4.12 ± 0.06 
8 53 4.44 ± 0.09 7.28 ± 0.05 5.84 ± 0.01 3.91 ± 0.05 
9 49 1.61 ± 0.09 1.79 ± 0.02 2.07 ± 0.03 2.02 ± 0.09 
10 42 5.21 ± 0.04 7.10 ± 0.12 5.32 ± 0.07 5.13 ± 0.07 
11 54 4.62 ± 0.02 6.68 ± 0.04 6.39 ± 0.05 7.70 ± 0.05 
12 42 5.46 ± 0.02 7.13 ± 0.41 5.28 ± 0.03 5.00 ± 0.26 
 
 
Table 1. Levels of persisting DNA strand breaks determined by TM in lymphocytes of non-
exposed controls treated like in Fig. 1a. 
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No. Age Cumulative dose (mSv) 
TM 
(Ctrl.) 
TM 
(2Gy) 
TM 
(C-PC) 
TM 
(C-PC + 2Gy) 
1 33 0.32 3.32 ± 0.28 8.44 ± 0.17 11.29 ± 0.48 4.77 ± 0.51 
2 32 1.15 2.82 ± 0.02 3.75 ± 0.08 3.08 ± 0.04 2.08 ± 0.10 
3 37 1.33 4.36 ± 0.03 11.19 ± 0.13 8.78 ± 0.16 8.34 ± 0.05 
4 35 1.67 4.15 ± 0.03 5.29 ± 0.08 4.45 ± 0.08 4.11 ± 0.17 
5 32 1.79 3.46 ± 0.02 3.98 ± 0.07 3.69 ± 0.02 3.78 ± 0.05 
6 38 1.80 2.35 ± 0.09 2.30 ± 0.04 2.97 ± 0.04 3.08 ± 0.08 
7 55 2.29 4.22 ± 0.14 5.05 ± 0.44 7.77 ± 0.39 4.64 ± 0.18 
8 55 2.29 3.62 ± 0.16 7.35 ± 0.12 7.96 ± 0.13 6.62 ± 0.08 
9 55 2.59 1.24 ± 0.45 1.01 ± 0.18 1.16 ± 0.42 1.69 ± 0.73 
10 55 3.50 5.47 ± 0.02 6.18 ± 0.04 6.58 ± 0.10 4.84 ± 0.03 
11 26 4.71 3.62 ± 0.53 3.90 ± 0.31 5.67 ± 0.09 4.55 ± 0.15 
12 46 6.55 4.50 ± 0.07 6.21 ± 0.09 6.15 ± 0.04 6.38 ± 0.04 
13 52 8.37 4.14 ± 0.03 5.82 ± 0.06 4.39 ± 0.05 3.80 ± 0.10 
14 26 9.32 5.57 ± 0.02 7.07 ± 0.03 7.11 ± 0.04 6.36 ± 0.06 
15 44 9.71 2.14 ± 0.10 4.16 ± 0.09 4.21 ± 0.04 3.56 ± 0.08 
16 30 10.06 1.86 ± 0.27 3.72 ± 0.26 0.86 ± 0.16 1.77 ± 0.09 
17 49 12.12 1.08 ± 0.12 0.91 ± 0.20 0.82 ± 0.02 1.33 ± 0.27 
Table 2. Levels of persisting DNA strand breaks (TM) in lymphocytes of workers with very 
low cumulative doses (0.32-12.12 mSv) treated like in Fig. 1a.  
4. Discussion 
Our study has addressed three main questions: (i) are there significant differences in the 
DNA strand break repair in lymphocytes of workers, chronically exposed to low doses of IR 
and of non-exposed controls; (ii) can the biliprotein C-PC modify the DNA repair capacity of 
lymphocytes and the early cellular radiation response; (iii) is the level of the chronic 
exposure of significance for the impact of the biliprotein on the repair of DNA lesions. To 
answer the questions we assessed the amount of unrepaired DNA lesions in lymphocytes by 
the neutral comet assay 2h after irradiation of the cells in the presence or absence of C-PC.  
The experiments were performed with freshly drawn human G0 phase lymphocytes 
(Kaczmarek et al., 1987), which are known to utilize the NHEJ pathway for the repair of 
DSBs in DNA, supposedly the main lesions, detected by the neutral CA. NHEJ is a relatively 
fast process, which is completed within 2h after the exposure (Lankoff et al., 2006; Palyvoda 
et al., 2003). This was also confirmed by kinetics, utilizing the comet test in our laboratory 
(data not shown). With our setup we have detected changes in the cellular capacity to mend 
breaks in DNA generated after exposure to toxic agents, but not the differences in initial IR-
induced lesions.  
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No. Age Cumulative dose (mSv) TM (Ctrl.) TM (2Gy) 
TM 
(C-PC) 
TM 
(C-PC + 2Gy) 
1 38 26.77 0.90 ± 0.05 0.78 ± 0.11 3.46 ± 0.08 3.82 ± 0.04 
2 44 28.47 2.05 ± 0.06 4.10 ± 0.10 1.79 ± 0.06 2.80 ± 0.15 
3 53 31.14 4.65 ± 0.18 2.92 ± 0.09 2.44 ± 0.07 4.14 ± 0.28 
4 54 31.43 7.82 ± 0.09 8.54 ± 0.09 6.23 ± 0.05 7.73 ± 0.18 
5 48 36.39 3.47 ± 0.17 2.63 ± 0.20 0.94 ± 0.11 2.27 ± 0.11 
6 56 37.06 1.61 ± 0.15 0.58 ± 0.05 0.76 ± 0.13 1.06 ± 0.06 
7 48 38.05 5.76 ± 0.08 6.84 ± 0.12 6.33 ± 0.03 5.25 ± 0.16 
8 32 38.72 3.74 ± 0.18 5.64 ± 0.26 4.11 ± 0.19 3.90 ± 0.05 
9 45 44.66 1.44 ± 0.20 1.09 ± 0.08 1.30 ± 0.23 1.33 ± 0.30 
10 50 53.19 0.81 ± 0.20 0.58 ± 0.12 0.67 ± 0.10 1.07 ± 0.01 
11 36 56.07 3.97 ± 0.02 3.47 ± 0.16 2.90 ± 0.06 2.39 ± 0.10 
12 49 67.76 4.06 ± 0.02 5.36 ± 0.07 5.17 ± 0.07 5.36 ± 0.03 
13 41 70.46 5.36 ± 0.11 4.05 ± 0.13 3.88 ± 0.15 3.56 ± 0.06 
14 50 73.21 2.54 ± 0.03 3.40 ± 0.12 3.04 ± 0.08 3.24 ± 0.05 
15 45 84.57 4.34 ± 0.45 10.16 ± 0.54 6.16 ± 0.33 4.10 ± 0.15 
16 54 85.80 1.04 ± 0.22 3.21 ± 0.14 1.43 ± 0.08 1.76 ± 0.08 
17 48 87.48 3.95 ± 0.10 6.05 ± 0.03 4.66 ± 0.04 5.88 ± 0.07 
18 56 88.28 3.60 ± 0.05 2.89 ± 0.09 5.00 ± 0.14 7.41 ± 0.05 
19 50 95.02 2.35 ± 0.10 2.76 ± 0.17 2.19 ± 0.18 2.38 ± 0.12 
20 52 95.14 2.10 ± 0.35 10.85 ± 0.96 11.05 ± 1.11 9.01 ± 1.64 
21 62 116.82 2.95 ± 0.12 3.03 ± 0.09 2.98 ± 0.05 2.88 ± 0.17 
22 42 125.17 2.82 ± 0.03 1.65 ± 0.21 0.91 ± 0.07 2.48 ± 0.32 
23 48 126.39 2.55 ± 0.28 11.12 ± 0.41 2.76 ± 0.22 5.06 ± 0.11 
24 41 130.23 1.22 ± 0.80 1.61 ± 0.38 3.45 ± 0.24 4.26 ± 0.32 
25 41 180.61 3.37 ± 0.39 7.97 ± 0.34 4.03 ± 0.43 9.29 ± 0.37 
26 40 246.94 8.21 ± 0.13 4.82 ± 0.14 3.79 ± 0.08 5.02 ± 0.02 
27 48 330.77 2.42 ± 0.16 2.68 ± 0.15 2.52 ± 0.02 2.22 ± 0.11 
Table 3. Levels of persisting DNA strand breaks (TM) in lymphocytes of workers with 
cumulative doses ranging from 26.77 to 330.77 mSv treated like in Fig. 1a. 
The comet assay which we have used is an approach, applied in a number of studies to assess 
the repair capacity of occupationally exposed populations and recently reviewed by Decordier 
(Decordier et al. 2010). The CA method has also been applied in several small pilot studies, 
comparing the DNA repair capacity between cancer patients and healthy subjects (Alapetite et 
al., 1999; Leprat et al., 1998; Djuzenova, et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2006). In these studies, the CA 
has demonstrated an impaired DNA lesion repair capacity in the lymphocytes of cancer 
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patients, when compared to that of the healthy controls. It has also been shown that CA could 
be a useful approach to study the radiosensitivity and individual risk of radiation therapy 
induced toxicity in cancer patients after in vitro challenging of the cells with ionizing radiation.   
The results of our work have indicated large inter-individual variations in the baseline 
endogenous levels of DNA lesions in lymphocytes from workers and non-exposed controls. 
Notably, the data dispersion covered a relatively large range of values and was registered in 
all three experimental groups, including the non-exposed control group. In the control group 
we observed the highest variation in persisting baseline levels of DNA lesions (Fig. 1b, A). In 
vitro irradiation with 2 Gy γ-rays or treatment with C-PC of the cells additionally enlarged the 
range of data dispersion, indicating significant differences in the individual susceptibility of 
the subjects to toxic exposures. Exposure to 2 Gy gamma rays exerted the strongest effects on 
data scattering in the group of professionals with cumulative doses higher than 20 mSv (Fig. 
1d, B) whereas C-PC generated highest level of data dispersion in samples from the group  of 
workers, exposed to very low doses of occupational IR (Fig. 1c, C).  
The biliprotein elevated the number of persisting, unrepaired DNA lesions in the group of 
subjects with lower professional irradiation and in the control group. Such toxicity was not 
observed in the group of professionals with higher doses of occupational radiation exposure 
(Fig. 2). This effect might be attributed to induction of adaptive processes, due to the chronic 
exposure to low doses of radiation of the subjects in the last group. Studies of other 
laboratories on the repair capacity of nuclear power plant workers (Toili et al., 2002) or 
workers exposed to xenobiotics, lead or pesticides (Restreppo et al., 2000; Vodicka et al., 
2004; Piperakis et al., 2009) have shown, similar to our results, that workers repair DNA 
damage more efficiently than the non-exposed controls. The authors attributed this 
phenomenon to adaptive response by the sub-chronic genotoxic exposures. The adaptive 
protection, shown in this study is also consistent with the conclusion of our previous study 
(Ivanova et al., 2010). 
Notably, in combination with radiation exposure, C-PC exerted protective effects on 
lymphocytes of controls and of workers exposed to very low doses of radiation. For these 
groups, the lymphocytes, treated with C-PC and exposed to gamma rays, showed reduced 
levels of DNA lesions (in comparison to C-PC treatment alone), which suggested that the 
protein neutralized the genotoxic effects of IR and exerted radio-protection. It seems that the 
biliprotein selectively improved the DNA repair capacity of the individuals with higher 
radiosensitivity, which could be of particular interest for the radio-protection of high-risk 
subgroups of the population and workers.  
The toxic effect of C-PC, registered in this study, is probably linked to the photosensitizing 
properties of the protein (Padula & Boiteaux, 1999; Zhang et al., 1999; Paul et al., 2006). It has 
been shown that visible light, absorbed by the tetrapyrrolic chromophores of 
phycobiliproteins, can generate reactivate oxygen species (ROS), such as hydroxyl radical 
and singlet oxygen, which induce oxidative damage to DNA. The photosensitizing 
properties of C-PC may also contribute to the apoptotic effects of the protein in cancerogenic 
cell lines (Roy et al., 2007; Subhashini et al., 2004) and macrophages (Reddi et al., 2003). 
Apoptotic activity, however, is evident only for higher protein concentrations (>20 μM) and 
longer incubation times of the cells with the protein (>24h). The trends in DNA damage, 
induced by C-PC, were found quite similar to those, induced by ionizing radiation or by 
hydrogen peroxide in the presence of transition metals (Epe, 1995; Padula & Boiteaux, 1999). 
Notably, for subjects with low cumulative doses of IR and for those from the control group, 
we registered higher levels of unrepaired DNA lesions both in cells, treated with C-PC and 
in those, irradiated with 2 Gy. 
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5. Conclusion 
The data from this and from a previous study, carried out in our laboratory, which was 
focused on the effects of C-PC on the enzymatic anti-oxidant defense system of lymphocytes 
(Ivanova et al., 2010), suggest that C-phycocyanin can affect the anti-oxidant and repair 
mechanisms in lymphocytes, and modulate the early radiation response. They showed that 
the protein impacts the repair of deleterious forms of DNA damage, generated upon 
exposure of the cells to γ-rays, which is essential for the preservation of genomic integrity. 
Notably, the biliprotein might selectively improve the DNA repair capacity of the 
individuals with higher radiosensitivity, which could be of particular interest for the radio-
protection of the high-risk subgroups of population and workers. The protein induced 
significantly less persisting DNA lesions in the group of workers with higher doses (>20 
mSv, Fig. 2, group 3) in comparison with the other two groups, which is relevant to adaptive 
phenomena induced by the chronic occupational exposure of the subjects. However, the 
present study should be considered a pilot one and additional experiments are needed to 
decide whether the protein could be applied for the protection of occupationally exposed 
individuals (such as nuclear power plant workers, miners, some medical doctors and pilots), 
and subgroups of the population with higher susceptibility to the toxic effect of ionizing 
radiation.  
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Effects of Gamma-Ray Irradiation on Tracking 
Failure of Polymer Insulating Materials 
Boxue Du, Yu Gao and Yong Liu 
Tianjin University 
China 
1. Introduction 
Electrical insulation and dielectrics play a key role in the performance and reliability of most 
electrical systems, where a single-point system failure may prove catastrophic or even fatal 
to the electrical equipment. Polymers are the most commonly used dielectrics because of 
their reliability, availability, ease of fabrication and low cost. The selection of the proper 
polymer dielectric for a desired application depends on the requirements and operating 
conditions of the system. Voltage surges are known to be one of the factors leading to 
tracking failure, which often appear in lighting, switching and circuit breaker operation. 
Tracking failure is a dielectric breakdown phenomenon occurring on polymer surfaces 
comprising carbonized conductive paths. When a sufficiently intense discharge lasts for a 
considerable time, the decomposed carbon products, with some parts of the channel 
carbonized, are progressive and rapidly form on the sample surface. When the carbonized 
deposits bridge the interval between electrodes, a sudden decrease in the insulating 
resistance occurs. The importance of this information has been revealed for preventing fires, 
short-circuit and insulation failure in electrical appliances and devices, and especially the 
tracking and ignition of polymers have been examined. 
Polymer materials are widely used in radiation environments, such as scientific research 
fields and nuclear power stations, where the high safety and reliability are demanded. 
The polymer insulating materials are inevitably exposed to various kinds of radiation. The 
changes in their physical and chemical properties could prematurely terminate the useful 
life of the dielectric. Outside and inside of the secondary shield in the containment vessel 
of nuclear power plants, the maximum dose rates of irradiation are 0.01 Gy/h and 1 
Gy/h. The dose rate in nuclear power plants varies widely from 10 µGy/h to 10 kGy/h 
with a potential of total exposure 1000 kGy or greater. The high reliability is based on 
construction safety and system safety during the use of electrical equipment. Accordingly, 
it is important to investigate the influence of radiation on polymeric insulating materials 
used in the radioactive environments. Presently, the researches on irradiation aging are 
mostly concentrated on electrical and mechanical performance, but the effect of radiation, 
especially the radiation aging theory is rarely studied. Kuriyama et al have measured the 
physical and electrical properties of gamma-ray irradiated PVC jacketed cable and 
concluded that the electrical receptivity of PVC is reduced obviously. We have 
investigated the tracking resistance of gamma-ray irradiated polyethylene and modified 
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polycarbonate materials, and the results reveal that the tracking resistance is improved by 
irradiation for cross-linking type materials, but the conclusions for degradation type 
materials are opposite. 
The polymers used in the field of electrical and electronic engineering are not only subject to 
an electric field alone, quite often they operate under the influence of both electric and 
magnetic fields. In addition to shielding effects against space plasma flux, magnetic field 
changes the electron kinematics and the gas desorption rate, and hence the flashover 
potential. The effect of a magnetic field parallel to an applied electric field has been 
considered and reported that a magnetic field can shorten the formative time lag of 
breakdown. Magnetic field might influence dielectric breakdown in different ways. The 
basic mechanisms and physical phenomena providing magnetic insulation have been 
investigated in the past mainly for vacuum-insulator interfaces in high-power transmission 
lines and vacuum diodes. The influence of magnetic field on the sparking voltage has been 
examined for a slightly non-uniform electric field applied perpendicularly to a magnetic 
field, including its effects on the formative time lag and on the cycloidal movement of 
electrons. Low energy non-disruptive discharge carbonized “track” marks have been 
identified by a number of users on gas insulating switchgear (GIS) insulating surfaces and 
the cause of this phenomenon has not yet been identified. However, there have been very 
few investigations concerning the influence of magnetic field on the tracking failure of 
polymer materials used in electrical equipments. Therefore, it is necessary to study how 
their electrical characteristics change under magnetic field. 
Polymers are used on space equipment with the examples of these devices working at high dc 
voltage on satellites such as ionic propulsion systems, photomultiplier tubes, scientific 
electronic instruments, communication systems and solar cell power supply systems. 
Energetic electromagnetic radiation and low pressure are two main factors in the space 
environment. We have reported that surface discharge occurs earlier at low pressures than 
atmospheric pressure. In fact, surface discharge is one of the principal causes for premature 
failure in electronic equipments used in low pressure regions. The dielectric properties of the 
polymers under the environments of low pressure and radiation may change. It is necessary to 
study the way how their electrical characteristics change under the combined environments. 
As technology advances, increasing demands on the reliable operation under various 
operating and environmental conditions are made on materials and components. Therefore, 
it is necessary to study how their electrical characteristics change with consideration of 
radiation, low pressure and magnetic field. However, knowledge of influence of irradiation 
under combined conditions of radiation, low pressure and magnetic field is limited, and 
systematic study is desirable. 
Polymer materials are widely used in electrical insulation because of their high breakdown 
strength, high resistivity and low dielectric loss. Polybutylene naphthalate is widely used in 
aerospace electronics, electric engineering, chemical, metallurgy and medical equipment. 
Polybutylene terephthalate is usually used for electric coupler, blind plug, switch and 
insulating cover. Polyethylene terephthalate is one of the most widely used polymers for 
electrical and electronic industries. Whether the dielectric property of the polymers is 
changed by irradiation and magnetic field or not are worth investigating. In this chapter, 
effects of total dose of gamma-ray irradiation on tracking failure of polymer materials are 
described. The results reveal that the tracking failure properties are greatly changed by 
gamma-ray irradiation. 
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2. Experiment setup and procedure 
2.1 Test samples 
Polybutylene naphthalate (PBN) and polybutylene terephthalate (PBT) are produced with 
butanediol by reaction with 2, 6-naphthalic acid and dimethyl terephthalate, respectively. 
Polyethylene terephthalate (PET) is produced with ethylene glycol by reaction with purified 
terephthalic acid. For comparison, both polycarbonates mixed with 3% polyethylene (M-PC) 
and polyethylene (PE) samples are also tested. 
The samples are irradiated in air up to 100 kGy and then up to 1000 kGy with a dose rate of 
10 kGy/h by using a 60Co gamma-source. The thickness and dimensions are 3 mm and 20 
mm×20 mm. The sample surface is cleaned with ethyl alcohol and dried in a desiccator in 
air at room temperature for 24 h or longer before the testing. 
2.2 Experimental apparatus and procedure for pulse voltage application 
Schematic diagram of experimental set-up is shown in Fig. 1. Test sample is stressed 
electrically under a HV pulse voltage at the level of 30 kV and the pulse width is 1 ms. The 
pulse interval is adjusted from 5 ms to 10 ms. The electrode geometry is needle-plate 
electrode pattern, where the needle electrode is connected to the HV voltage and the plate 
electrode is grounded through the discharge detecting circuit. The length of each stainless 
steel electrode is 45 mm, the radius of the semicircle plate electrode is 5 mm and the 
thickness is 0.5 mm. The diameter of the needle electrode is 0.65 mm and the interval 
between the electrodes is 3 mm. The magnetic environment is produced by the 
electromagnet (PEM-50). The magnetic flux density (MFD) is 495 mT and the direction of 
E×B is 0, 90 and 270 degrees with respect to the sample surface. The vacuum chamber is 
made from a glass tube with two sheets of acrylic board for the cover and bottom. 
 
 
(a) Relative angles 
     
(b) Experimental apparatus          (c) Experiment setup for reduced pressure 
Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of test system for pulse voltage 
Tracking failure is defined as the insulation failure under electric field with consequent lack 
of dielectric properties, which is determined when the surface is burning or short-circuit of 
the electrodes has persisted for 2s. The tracking failure is caused by decomposed carbon on 
the sample surface due to heat generated by the discharge, which starts locally across the 
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electrodes and forms on the sample surface. A high-speed general purpose AD conversion 
module (DRF2A) is connected with the experimental circuit in order to measure the 
discharge current. The sampling time used by this method is 25 μs. The test is repeated 10 
times, thus each datum is an average of ten measurements. A monocular-video-zoom 
microscope with the magnification of 420 is used to acquire the pictures of tracking failure 
for the detailed analysis to identify the tracking failure phenomenon. 
2.3 Experimental apparatus and procedure for IEC 60112 tracking test 
The experimental set-up of tracking failure is constructed according to the specifications 
given in IEC 60112 as shown in Fig. 2. The thickness of each electrode is 2 mm, the length 45 
mm, the width 5 mm, and the interval distance between the two electrodes 4 mm. The 
solution is 0.1% NH4Cl in de-ionized water, giving a resistivity of approximate 395 Ω·cm at 
the temperature of 23 °C. Droplets are applied at the intervals to keep up the discharge 
between the electrodes on the sample surface. The droplet size of the electrolyte is 20 mm3 
and the time interval between each added droplet is 30 s. Tracking failure is defined as 
when the sample burns or the current exceeds 0.5 A and persists for 2 s. But because some of 
the samples do not track evenly at the highest test voltage, repeated discharges gradually 
cause the erosion of the sample surface between the electrodes. The erosion depth and 
weight loss are measured after adding 100 droplets. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Experimental set-up for IEC 60112 test   
 
Fig. 3. Estimate of largest Lyapunov exponent 
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3. Methods of data-processing 
3.1 The proof for chaos in the discharge process 
Detecting the presence of chaos in the discharge process is a precondition for applying the 
non-linear method to analyze discharge currents. Lyapunov exponents characterize the 
exponential divergence of neighbor embedding vectors X(i) and X(j) in phase space and one 
or more positive Lyapunov exponents can provide a necessary and sufficient proof for a 
dynamic system to be chaotic. By calculating the largest Lyapunov exponent of an 
experimental time series, the discharge process is proved chaotic. Fig. 3 shows an estimation 
of the largest Lyapunov exponent by the algorithm given by Rosenstein. The data are 
sampled at the middle state of the tracking test with unirradiated PBT at 375 V. Here, the 
largest Lyapunov exponent is calculated as 0.032632 indicating that the process is chaotic. 
3.2 Recurrence plot method 
Recurrence plots (RPs), which are used to characterize the degree of aperiodicity of time series, 
are first introduced by Eckmann. The RP method provides a useful graphical framework for 
extracting information from time series. By using the RP method, the non-linear characteristics 
of dynamical systems can be illustrated. The RP method is constructed as follows: 
First, according to Takens’ embedding theorem, vector X(i) can be reconstructed from a time 
series x(i) : 
 ( ) [ ( ), ( ),..., ( ( 1) )], 1,2,3...     iX x i x i x i m i  (1) 
Where X(i) is the embedding vector, m is the embedding dimension, and τ is the delay time; 
x(i) is the time series which stands for the discharge current series in this paper. The 
embedding dimension m and delay time τ can be chosen by the C-C method. For a given 
time series x(i), the estimation of τ assures that the coordinates x(i) and x(i+t) are somewhat 
independent but not completely uncorrelated. The C-C method provides a good criterion for 
the choice of m and τ and also works well in the presence of noise, especially for noise levels 
below 30%. 
Then the RP can be drawn based on the following matrix: 
 , ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( )( || || ), , , , (1, )    mi j i j i jR H X X X X R i j M  (2) 
where ε is a predefined threshold, H(x) is the Heaviside function, and M is the number of 
X(i) vectors constructed from the time series. The value one in this matrix is plotted in black 
in the RP. The choice of ε is the critical, if it is too big, it will produce irrelevant points, and if 
it is too small, useful information will be lost. In the investigation, ε is chosen as 0.25σ. 
Where, σ is the standard deviation of the time series. 
The discharge currents sampled directly from the tracking test of IEC 60112 have power 
frequency components of leakage currents, which have negative effects on non-linear 
analysis. To filter the power frequency components, wavelet transform of discharge currents 
are applied and the Morlet wavelet db8 is chosen as the mother wavelet. 
Fig. 4 shows an RP example of discharge current with unirradiated PBT at 325 V. Fig. 4a 
shows an original discharge current and the related RP. It can be concluded that the 
discharge occurs frequently at the positive and negative peaks of the waveform. Due to the 
ac voltage, the current waveform has power frequency components. Reflected in the RP, 
recurrence points are mainly parallel to the diagonal. The distribution of recurrence points 
of sinusoidal series in RP is determined by the RP method. The periodic characteristic of RP 
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(a) Before wavelet transform         (b) After wavelet transform 
Fig. 4. Examples of recurrence plots of discharge current 
covers non-linear features and acts as adverse factor for non-linear analysis. Fig. 4b shows 
the treated discharging sequence by wavelet transform and its reconstructed RP. After the 
data preprocessing, the recurrence points are randomly distributed in the picture and the 
topological structure can actually reflects the non-linear characteristics. The effects of 
dosages of gamma-ray irradiation on the resistance to tracking for both PBT and PET are 
presented by comparing the RP structure, as the above description. 
4. Dielectric breakdown and tracking resistance 
4.1 Dielectric breakdown by HV pulse voltage application 
Fig. 5 shows the photographs of sample surface after the discharge for 20 s at the discharge 
interval of 10 ms. The color of sample surfaces in both PBN and PBT are gradually dark as 
the total dose of gamma-ray irradiation increases. The noticeable changes of sample surface 
in the breakdown process are evidently observed. The repetitive discharges occur before the 
dielectric breakdown and the quantity of decomposition carbon increases in the area close to 
the electrodes. As shown in Fig. 5, a carbonization conducting path forms on the surface 
between the electrodes. The surface is carbonized by the heat energy from the 
discharge.With the high repetition rate of discharges, there is a high increase of discharge 
quantity which affects the carbonization progress and the situation of carbon deposition. 
When the intensive discharge lasts for a certain time, the surface is carbonized first to the 
area close to the electrodes. Due to the conductive nature of carbonization products, they act 
as the extension of the electrodes. After a sufficiently long time, the carbonized conduction 
path finally forms between the electrodes. By comparing Fig. 5a and 5b, the features of 
dielectric breakdown phenomenon are significantly different between PBN and PBT. The 
carbonized area decreases with increasing the total dose of irradiation with PBN, but 
increases with PBT. The difference indicates that the thermal properties are improved with 
PBN, but worsened with PBT. 
Fig. 6 shows the relation between the time to dielectric breakdown and the total dose of the 
irradiation. For the investigated range of the irradiation, the time to dielectric breakdown 
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increases with the increase of the total dose with PBN, but decreases with increasing the 
total dose with PBT. The time to dielectric breakdown of both PBN and PBT decreases with 
 
 
(a) PBN          (b) PBT 
Fig. 5. Sample surface after carbonization 
 
 
(a) PBN      (b) PBT 
Fig. 6. Relation between the time to dielectric breakdown and the total dose of irradiation 
the decrease of the discharge interval. With the increase of the total dose of irradiation, the 
time to dielectric breakdown of PBN increases, which indicates that the thermal properties 
are improved. However, the time to dielectric breakdown of PBT decreases with the increase 
of the total dose, which indicates that the thermal properties are worsened. The atoms that 
make up a polymer are bounded together by weak covalent bonds that are disrupted easily 
by gamma-ray radiation, and as bonds are broken new ones are formed and the structure of 
the polymer is altered. In practice, cross-linking and degradation reaction often occur 
simultaneously, the reaction result is determined by the one that is dominant. For PBN, it is 
supposed that the cross-linking reaction exceeds the degradation reaction and the 
combination between the molecules extends the three-dimensional networks. For PBT, it is 
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supposed that the degradation reaction exceeds the cross-linking reaction and the scission of 
the main chain bonds results in the formation of low-molecular-weight chain fragments. 
With the decrease of the discharge interval, the tendency of the time to dielectric breakdown 
decreases. When the discharge interval decreases, electron emission from the electrode 
becomes more frequent, the heat caused by the discharge energy which makes the carbon 
chain of the molecules broken increases, and the carbon conductive path of polymer surface 
forms more steadily. As a result, the time to dielectric breakdown decreased. By the way, at 
the discharge interval of 10 ms, the accurate time to dielectric breakdown of the test results 
does not show in the figure as the dielectric breakdown did not occur until 200 s under the 
same condition at discharge intervals of 7 ms and 5 ms. 
Fig. 7 shows the relation between the discharge quantity and the total dose of irradiation 
after the discharge for 600 times. The dielectric breakdown is mainly dependent upon the 
thermal energy formed by the discharge. The discharge quantity is the total integrated 
charge of the discharge current during the dielectric breakdown period, which is the 
degree of the heat-durability. If the discharge quantity is smaller, it suggests that the 
carbon chain is harder to be broken. In other words, the heat-durability of the material is 
better. With the increase of the total dose, the discharge quantity decreases with PBN, 
which suggests that the thermal property is improved and the dielectric breakdown 
becomes not easy. As mentioned in Fig. 6a, the time to dielectric breakdown is delayed 
with the increase of the total dose. This fact may be due to the occurrence of the cross-
linking reaction. With the increase of the total dose of irradiation, the discharge quantity 
increases with PBT, which suggests that the thermal properties are worsened and the 
dielectric breakdown becomes faster. As mentioned in Fig. 6b, the time to dielectric 
breakdown decreases with the increase of the total dose. The reason for this may be due to 
the degradation reaction by irradiation. 
 
  
(a) PBN       (b) PBT 
Fig. 7. Relation between the discharge quantity and the total dose of irradiation 
From Fig. 7a and 7b, the discharge quantity increases with the decrease of discharge interval 
for PBN, but the tendency is opposite for PBT. The discharge is much more intensive in the 
shorter discharge interval because the accumulative energy of consecutive discharge is 
higher, and the dielectric breakdown occurs more quickly. For PBN, the dielectric 
breakdown is not easy due to the inherent property and the discharge was continuous. The 
formation of carbon conductive path is gradual, and the discharge quantity is bigger at the 
shorter discharge interval. For PBT, the carbonization and dielectric breakdown are faster. 
The discharge is discontinuous from the visual observation. At the shorter discharge 
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interval, the carbonization forms more quickly and the brief short circuit occurs more 
frequently, and the discharges could not completely take place, so the total discharge 
quantity is smaller as shown in Fig. 7b. 
The dielectric properties are improved for PBN but worsened for PBT by gamma-ray 
irradiation. This difference is attributed to the radiation-induced cross-linking and 
degradation. The effect of the total dose on electrical properties is markedly different, 
depending on the chemical structure of the base polymer. The radiation adds a particular 
dimension to the aging problem, because it interacts strongly with materials in general and 
brings about structural changes that alter their properties. This is because that it can alter the 
macroscopic properties of polymeric materials through mechanisms like chain scission, 
cross linking and oxidation. Comparing the molecule formulas, there are two phenyls in the 
main chain of PBN but one for PBT. The amount of phenyl in the main chain plays a main 
role on the result of the radiation reaction. In another word, the dielectric properties of 
polybutylene polymers are improved for PBN which contains more combined phenyls in 
the main chain. It is known that to disrupt the two combined phenyls needs more energy 
than one phenyl. It is supposed that the disruption of the bonds is harder for PBN than PBT 
after the same dosage of the irradiation. The formation of new bonds does not seem to have 
much difference because of the same fringe structure. The new main chain is bigger for PBN 
because of more phenyls. For PBN, it is considered that the effects of the new bonds exceed 
the disruptive ones. For PBT, it is considered to be opposite to PBN. Therefore, PBN 
represents cross-linking type results and PBT represents scission type results. 
4.2 Effects of tracking resistance by use of IEC60112 method 
To estimate the resistance to tracking of polymer material, there are many traditional 
methods including recording the time to dielectric breakdown, calculating the discharge 
quantity, measuring the dielectric loss angle and testing the CTI value. Among the 
methods, the CTI value is extremely important and also considered as an index mark to 
select insulating materials. The minimal voltage, which could cause tracking failure with 
the application of 50 drops of electrolyte, is used as a measure of the susceptibility of the 
material to tracking and is defined as the CTI value according to IEC60112. The example 
of discharge events is shown in Fig. 8. The test solution is evaporated by Joule heat caused 
by leakage current which flows between the electrodes across the sample surface. A 
discharge appears at the dry band. After the appearance of the discharge, the sample 
surface is eventually dried between the electrodes. The initiation of a carbon deposit is 
 
    
(a) Scintillation discharge  (b) Arc discharge  (c) Discharge and carbonization  (d) Intense discharge 
Fig. 8. Example of discharge events with 100 kGy irradiated M-PC. 
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closely related to the location where a dry band is formed in the evaporation of solution 
due to Joule heat, and to heat degradation of the sample surface caused by scintillation 
discharge across the dry band. With further application of the test solution, the erosion of 
the sample surface occurs as a result of the tracking test. Fig.9 shows the relation between 
dosage of the irradiation and the CTI value for both PET and PBT with ac voltage 
application. As total dosage increases, the CTI value of PET increases, but the CTI of PBT 
decreases. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Relation between the CTI value and the dosage of gamma-ray irradiation 
 
 
(a) Erosion depth     (b) Weight loss 
Fig. 10. The changes of tracking resistance on M-PC 
Fig. 10 shows the relationship between the biggest erosion depths, weight loss and test 
voltage with M-PC. For the range of irradiation, both the erosion depths and weight loss are 
smaller than that of unirradiated samples. It indicated that after the irradiation, the tracking 
resistance was improved. A cross-linking reaction of an organic material is one main factor 
for improving tracking resistance and conversely a degradation reaction is conceivable as a 
factor for decreasing tracking resistance. It is believed that the improvement is due to the 
result of the cross-linking reaction. However, both the erosion depths and weight loss 
decreases with increasing the total dose from 0 kGy to 100 kGy, but increases from 100 kGy 
to 1000 kGy. It indicates that there is a threshold value for the tracking resistance of M-PC 
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around 100 kGy. When the total dose exceeds the threshold value, the tracking resistance 
begins to decrease. The decrease might be attributed to the result of the degradation 
reaction. 
The M-PC is mixed with 3% PE. It is known that gamma-ray irradiation caused degradation 
reaction with PC. Therefore, the mixing of PE maybe one main reason for the improvement 
of the tracking resistance with irradiated M-PC. In order to confirm the judgment, the 
tracking resistance of PE after gamma-ray irradiation was investigated. 
Fig. 11 shows the relationship between the biggest erosion depths, weight loss and test 
voltage with PE. For the range of the irradiation, both the erosion depths and weight loss 
decreased with the increase of the total dose. Accordingly, the trend that the tracking 
resistance improves through gamma-ray irradiation is assumed. It is also supposed that the 
heat from irradiation causes the formation of 3-dimensional structures, which strengthens 
the PE by cross-linking reaction. Therefore, the mixing of PE is probably one main reason for 
the improvement of the tracking resistance with irradiated M-PC. 
 
 
(a) Erosion depth     (b) Weight loss 
Fig. 11. The changes of tracking resistance on PE 
5. Effect of gamma-ray irradiation on tracking resistance under reduced 
pressure 
The relation between the time to tracking failure and the total dose of the irradiation under 
100 kPa and 1 kPa are shown in Figs. 12, 13 and 14. With increasing the total dose of 
irradiation, the time to tracking failure increases with PBN and PET, but decreases with PBT 
for the investigated range of the irradiation. With the decrease of the atmospheric pressure, 
the time to tracking failure of all samples increases. With decreasing the pulse interval, the 
time to tracking failure of all samples decreases. 
With the increase of the total dose, the time to tracking failure of PBN and PET increase, 
which indicates the thermal properties of tracking resistance are improved. However, the 
time to tracking failure of PBT decreases with the increase of the total dose, which 
indicates that the thermal properties of tracking resistance are worsened. Evidently, the 
total dose has different effects on the polymers. A cross-linking reaction is one main factor 
for improving tracking resistance and conversely a degradation reaction is conceivable as 
a factor for decreasing tracking resistance. The atoms that make up a polymer are 
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bounded together by weak covalent bonds that are disrupted easily by gamma-ray 
radiation, and as bonds are broken, new ones are formed and the structure of the polymer 
is altered. In practice, cross-linking and degradation reaction often occur simultaneously, 
and the reaction result is determined by the one that is dominant. For PBN and PET, it is 
supposed that the cross- linking reaction is superior to the degradation reaction and the 
combination between the molecules extends the three-dimensional networks. For PBT, it 
is supposed that the degradation reaction is superior to the cross-linking reaction and the 
scission of the main chain bonds results in the formation of low-molecular-weight chain 
fragments. 
The time to tracking failure of all samples increases with the decrease of the atmospheric 
pressure. Under the reduced pressure, the supply of oxygen is not sufficient. The probability 
of the oxidation reaction on sample surface and the cracked gas decreases with the decrease 
of the oxygen content. The burning becomes more difficult and the complete carbonized 
conductive path becomes hard to form. Therefore, the time to tracking failure increases with 
the decrease of the atmospheric pressure. 
 
 
(a) Pulse interval with 7 ms   (b) Pulse interval with 5 ms 
Fig. 12. Relation between the time to tracking failure and the total dose of irradiation for 
PBN 
 
 
(a) Pulse interval with 7 ms   (b) Pulse interval with 5 ms 
Fig. 13. Relation between the time to tracking failure and the total dose of irradiation for PET 
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(a) Pulse interval with 7 ms    (b) Pulse interval with 5 ms 
Fig. 14. Relation between the time to tracking failure and the total dose of irradiation for PBT 
The time to tracking failure of all samples decreases with the decrease of the pulse interval. 
When the pulse interval decreases, electron emission from the electrode becomes more 
frequent, the heat caused by the discharge energy makes the carbon chain of the molecules 
broken increases, and the carbon conductive path of polymer surface forms more steadily. 
As a result, the time to tracking failure decreases. In addition, at the pulse interval of 10 ms, 
the accurate time to tracking failure is not shown from Figs. 12 to 14 as the tracking failure 
does not occur until 300 s under the same condition as pulse intervals of 7 ms and 5 ms. 
The discharge quantity is a token of the heat-durability. The tracking failure mainly depends 
upon the heat energy formed by the discharge. If discharge quantity is smaller, it suggests 
that the carbon chain is more difficult to be broken. The relationship between the discharge 
quantity and the total dose of irradiation before tracking failure for 600 discharges under 
100 kPa and 1 kPa are shown in Figs 15, 16 and 17. The discharge quantity decreases with 
PBN and PET, but increases with PBT with increasing the total dose of irradiation. From 
Figs. 15 to 17, with the decrease of the atmospheric pressure, the discharge quantity of PBN 
and PET increase, but decrease with PBT. 
 
 
(a) Pulse interval with 10 ms   (b) Pulse interval with 5 ms 
Fig. 15. Relation between the discharge quantity and the total dose of irradiation for PBN. 
The discharge quantity of PBN and PET decrease with the increase of the total dose, which 
suggests that the thermal properties of tracking resistance are improved and the tracking 
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failure becomes more difficult. This fact is due to the occurrence of the cross-linking 
reaction. With the increase of the total dose of irradiation, the discharge quantity increase 
with PBT, which suggests that the thermal properties are worsened and the tracking failure 
becomes easier. The reason for this is due to the degradation reaction by irradiation. 
 
 
(a) Pulse interval with 10 ms    (b) Pulse interval with 5 ms 
Fig. 16. Relation between the discharge quantity and the total dose of irradiation for PET 
The discharge quantity of PBN and PET increase with decreasing the atmospheric pressure. 
Under the reduced atmospheric pressure, the density of the gases is decreased, the speed of 
electron becomes fast, and the surface more readily causes the discharging. As a result, the 
discharge quantity increases with the decrease of the atmospheric pressure. The discharge 
quantity decreases with decreasing the atmospheric pressure for PBT. It is because under the 
reduced atmospheric pressure, the probability of the oxidation reaction of PBT surface and 
the cracked gas decrease with the decrease in the oxygen content. The carbon deposition of 
PBT by the ignition to the surface increases, and the discharges can not completely take 
place due to the decomposed carbon, so the total discharge quantity of PBT under the 
reduced atmospheric pressure is smaller. 
 
 
(a) Pulse interval with 10 ms    (b) Pulse interval with 5 ms 
Fig. 17. Relation between the discharge quantity and the total dose of irradiation for PBT 
From Figs. 15 to 17, discharge quantity of PBN and PET increased with the decreasing the 
pulse interval, but the tendency is opposite for PBT. The discharge quantity is bigger in 
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shorter pulse interval because the higher accumulative heat quantity of consecutive 
discharge is, the more quickly tracking failure occurred. For PBN and PET, tracking failure 
is more difficult due to the inherent carbonization property and the discharge is continuous. 
The formation of carbon conductive path is gradual, and the discharge quantity is bigger at 
the shorter pulse interval. For PBT, the formation of carbonization and tracking failure are 
easier. It is observed that short-circuit forms in a very short time, and the discharge is 
discontinuous. At the shorter pulse interval, the carbonization forms more quickly and the 
brief short-circuit occurs more frequently, which causes the discharges cannot completely 
take place, so the total discharge quantity is smaller. 
The photographs of sample surface after the discharge for 20 s with the pulse interval of 
10 ms under 100 kPa and 1 kPa are shown Tables 1, 2 and 3. The color of sample surfaces 
is gradually dark according to the total dose of gamma-ray irradiation. The noticeable 
changes of sample surface in the tracking failure process are observed. The repetitive 
discharge occurs before tracking failure and the quantity of decomposition carbon 
increases in the area close to the electrodes. The features of tracking failure phenomenon 
are different between PBN, PET and PBT. The carbonized area decreases with PBN and 
PET, but increases with PBT with increasing the total dose of irradiation. The difference 
indicates that the thermal properties of tracking resistance are improved with PBN and 
PET, but worsened with PBT.  
 
Total dose 100 kPa 1 kPa 
0 kGy 
100 kGy 
1000 kGy 
Table 1. Sample surface after the carbonization with PBN 
By comparison with the case of 1 kPa, the features of tracking failure phenomenon are 
different in the case of 100 kPa. The oxidation reaction, which took place on the electrodes, is 
an exothermic reaction initiated by scintillation discharge and increases the intensity of the 
discharge. In the case of 100 kPa, there is enough aerial oxygen for the samples to be 
oxidized completely, which shows more carbonization area in the second columns of Tables 
1, 2 and 3. In the case of 1 kPa, there is not enough aerial oxygen for the samples to be 
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oxidized completely and the oxidation product is largely decreased, which shows less 
carbonization points in the third columns of Tables 1, 2 and 3. The differences of shape and 
area of carbonized resultants are independent of the carbonization process with reducing 
the atmospheric pressure. 
 
Total dose 100 kPa 1 kPa 
0 kGy 
100 kGy 
 
1000 kGy 
 
Table 2. Sample surface after the carbonization with PET 
 
Total dose 100 kPa 1 kPa 
0 kGy 
100 kGy 
1000 kGy 
Table 3. Sample surface after the carbonization with PBT 
The tracking failure properties are improved for PBN and PET but worsened for PBT by 
gamma-ray irradiation. This difference is attributed to the radiation-induced cross-linking 
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and degradation. The effect of the total dose on electrical properties is markedly different, 
depending on the chemical structure of the base polymer. The radiation adds a particular 
dimension to the aging problem, because it interacts strongly with materials in general and 
brings about structural changes that alter their properties. This is because that it can alter the 
macroscopic properties of polymeric materials through mechanisms like chain scission, 
cross-linking and oxidation. By the comparison of the molecule formulas of PBN and PBT, 
there are two phenyls in the main chain of PBN but one for PBT. The amount of phenyl in 
the main chain plays a main role in the result of the radiation reaction. In another word, the 
resistance to the tracking failure of polybutylene polymers is improved for PBN which 
contains more combined phenyls in the main chain. Comparing the molecular structures of 
PET and PBT, there are four methylene groups in the chain of PBT but two for PET. The four 
methylenes increase the length of the thinner, less bulky, portion of the molecular chain, 
resulting in easier bending. 
6. Effects of gamma-ray irradiation on tracking failure under magnetic filed 
Figs. 18, 19 and 20 show the relation between the time to tracking failure and the total dose 
of irradiation with and without magnetic field. The time to tracking failure increases with 
increasing the total dose with PBN and PET, but decreases with PBT. Under the magnetic 
field, the time to tracking failure of all the samples increases with the relative angles of 0 and 
90 degrees, but decreases with the relative angle of 270 degrees. 
 
 
(a) Pulse interval with 10 ms   (b) Pulse interval with 5 ms 
Fig. 18. Relation between the time to tracking failure and the irradiation with PBN 
With increasing the total dose, the time to tracking failure of PBN and PET increases, which 
indicates the properties of tracking resistance are improved. However, the time to tracking 
failure of PBT decreases with increasing the total dose, which indicates that the properties of 
tracking resistance are worsened. 
Under the magnetic field, the time to tracking failure of the three samples are delayed with the 
relative angles of 0 and 90 degrees, but shortened with the relative angle of 270 degrees. The 
tracking failure is caused by the decomposed carbon on the sample surface, which is 
precipitated due to heat generated by the discharge between the electrodes. Free electrons 
which are emitted from electrode dissociate polymer molecules by the rupture of C-H bond. 
When magnetic field is applied, an electromagnetic force, the direction of which is decided by 
the direction of E×B, will affect the frequency of electron collision and the formation of 
  
Nuclear Power – Operation, Safety and Environment 
 
358 
decomposed carbon. As a result, the dielectric performance is changed by the magnetic field. 
With the relative angles of 0 and 90 degrees, the charge carriers are deflected to one side and 
upward away from the surface, respectively. As a result, there is a decrease in collision 
frequency and the time to tracking failure increases. When the relative angle is 270 degrees, the 
electrons are deflected towards the sample surface because of the electromagnetic force. The C-
H bonds are ruptured and the carbon is separated more readily. Therefore, the time to tracking 
failure is shortened with the relative angle of 270 degrees. 
 
 
(a) Pulse interval with 10 ms    (b) Pulse interval with 5 ms 
Fig. 19. Relation between the time to tracking failure and the irradiation with PBT 
 
 
(a)Pulse interval with 10 ms   (b) Pulse interval with 5 ms 
Fig. 20. Relation between the time to tracking failure and the irradiation with PET 
Figs. 21, 22 and 23 show the relation between the discharge quantity and the total dose of 
irradiation. With the increase of the total dose of irradiation, the discharge quantity 
decreases with PBN and PET, but increases with PBT. Under magnetic field, the discharge 
quantity of the samples increases with the relative angles of 90 and 270 degrees, but 
decreases with the relative angle of 0 degree. The discharge quantity increases with the 
relative angles of 90 and 270 degrees, but decreases with the relative angle of 0 degree. In 
addition, it decreases with the relative angle of 90 degrees for PBT. When the relative angle 
is 0 degree, the electromagnetic force is parallel to the sample surface, which makes the 
electrons deviate to the surface. The tracking failure is suppressed, since the probability of 
the electron collision is decreased. Therefore, the discharge quantity is smaller. 
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(a) Pulse interval with 10 ms   (b) Pulse interval with 5 ms 
Fig. 21. Relation between the discharge quantity and the total dose of irradiation with PBN 
 
 
(a) Pulse interval with 10 ms   (b) Pulse interval with 5 ms 
Fig. 22. Relation between the discharge quantity and the total dose of irradiation with PBT 
 
 
(a) Pulse interval with 10 ms    (b) Pulse interval with 5 ms 
Fig. 23. Relation between the discharge quantity and the total dose of irradiation with PET 
Conversely, with the relative angle of 270 degrees, the electromagnetic force is downward to 
the sample surface, the electron collision is increased on the sample surface and the 
discharge quantity increases. The electromagnetic force is upward to the sample surface 
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with the relative angle of 90 degrees, which makes the electrons pass the sample surface 
more easily. As a result, the electromagnetic force is upward to the sample surface and the 
discharge quantity is larger for PBN and PET. For PBT, the tacking failure is mostly decided 
by the carbonization. The electrons upward to the sample surface inhibit the carbonization 
process, and the discharge quantity decreases. 
The photographs of sample surface after tracking failure with the pulse interval of 10 ms at the 
relative angles of 0, 90 and 270 degrees are shown in Tables 4, 5 and 6. The color of sample 
surface is gradually dark according to the total dose of gamma-ray irradiation. The repetitive 
discharge occurs before tracking failure and the quantity of decomposition carbon increases in 
the area close to the electrodes. As shown in the Tables, the surface is carbonized by the heat 
energy from the discharge. With the high repetition rate of discharges, there is a high increase 
of discharge quantity that affects the carbonization progress and the situation of carbon 
deposition. When the intensive discharge lasts for a period of time, the surface is carbonized 
first to the area close to the electrodes. Due to the conductive nature of carbonization products, 
they act as the extension of the electrodes. After a sufficiently long time, the carbonized 
conduction path is finally formed over the short-circuited path. 
 
Dosage 0 90 270 
0kGy 
 
 
 
100kGy 
  
1000kGy 
 
Table 4. Sample surface after the carbonization with PBN 
The features of tracking failure phenomenon are different among PBN, PET and PBT. The 
carbonized area decreases with PBN and PET, but increases with PBT with increasing the 
total dose of irradiation. By comparing the cases of 0, 90 and 270 degrees, the features of 
tracking failure phenomenon are different. The carbonization path is downside to the 
sample surface with the relative angle of 0 degree. The carbonization path of 90 degrees is 
narrow and the carbonization path of 270 degrees was almost circular. 
The oxidation reaction, which takes place on the electrodes, is an exothermic reaction 
initiated by scintillation discharge and enhanced the intensity of the discharge. When the 
relative angle is 0 degree, the electromagnetic force is parallel to the sample surface, which 
makes the electrons deviate to the surface of the samples. The decomposition carbon 
separates out by the energy of electrons. As a result, the carbonization path is downside to 
the sample surface. When the relative angle is 90 degrees, the electromagnetic force is 
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upward to the sample surface. There is a decrease in collision frequency of the electrons and 
the sample surface. The discharge energy is smaller and the carbonization progress is 
difficult. As a result, the growth of carbonization path is inhibited. The shape is narrow and 
the carbonized area decreases. When the relative angle is 270 degrees, the electromagnetic 
force is downward to the sample surface. The electron collision is increased on the sample 
surface and the discharge energy increases. The carbonization growth is easier and the 
carbonization paths extend more easily. Accordingly, the carbonization path of 90 degrees is 
almost circular and the carbonized area increases. The carbonized area of 0 degree is biggest 
and that of 90 degrees is smallest for PBT and PET, but that of 270 degrees is biggest for 
PBN. For PBN, the development of carbonization is not complete. 
 
Dosage 0 90 270 
0kGy 
 
100kGy 
  
1000kGy 
  
Table 5. Sample surface after the carbonization with PBT 
 
Dosage 0 90 270 
0kGy 
100kGy 
1000kGy 
Table 6. Sample surface after the carbonization with PET 
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7. Recurrence plots of discharge current in tracking test 
Fig. 24 shows the variation of RP topological structure at different states of discharge 
process for PBT with 100 kGy dosage at 350 V. Fig. 24a shows the initial state of the test. 
The sparse recurrence point density indicates a low correlation between embedding 
vectors X(i) and X(j) in m-dimension space. It also shows that the beginning of the 
tracking test is an unstable state due to incomplete evolution of the solution on the sample 
surface, which results in leakage currents and the occurrence of discharge between tiny 
droplets. Fig. 24b shows the middle state of discharge process. It shows a stationary state 
which is manifested in a comparatively regular and dense recurrence point distribution. 
This indicates that some embedding vectors are the same or very similar to other 
embedding vectors in m-dimension phase space. It can also be considered to correspond 
to the state of the discharge process when the discharge mainly occurs between the 
deposited carbon patches and the process is in a comparatively stationary state. Fig. 24c 
shows the state of the discharge process just before tracking failure. The topological 
structure is completely different from that shown in Fig. 24a or Fig.24b. From vector X (0) 
to X (4500), the main segments of the map indicates a stationary state with an exception of 
a short unstable one that produced the white cross blank area between vector X (4500) to 
X (5000). This also indicates that the discharge state will switch to the next state which 
indicates the imminence of the breakdown. 
 
     
(a) At the initial stage  (b) In the middle stage  (c) Just before tracking failure 
Fig. 24. Recurrence plots for three different stages in the discharge 
The variations of topological structures for PBT at 375 V and for PET at 450 V with the 
increase of irradiation dosage are shown in Fig. 25. In Fig. 25a, the point density of PBT 
decreases with the increase of the irradiation dosage. By contrast, in Fig. 25b, the point 
density of PET increases with the increase of irradiation dosage. The two opposite 
tendencies of recurrence point density indicate that gamma-ray irradiation has completely 
different effects on the resistance to tracking for PBT and PET. 
In order to understand the underlying mechanism of the confusing discharge process, the 
RP has been made to evaluate the tracking resistance. Fig. 26 shows the RPs of the discharge 
resulting from the application of 400V with M-PC. The structures of the irradiated samples 
are different from that of the unirradiated ones and there are bigger white space segments in 
the plot of the unirradiated sample. The white space segments stand for inflation processes 
due to the high amplitude transients, which indicate that there are high amplitude changes 
in the discharge currents of unirradiated sample and the fluctuation is more strenuous than 
that of the total dose at 100 kGy and 1000 kGy. The discharge processes change due to the 
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increase of the irradiation. There is almost no obvious difference in the white space, but the 
point density increases with the irradiation dosage from 100 kGy to 1000 kGy, which 
indicates that the embedding vectors are very similar to the neighbor vectors. It is suggested 
that the discharge process at 1000 kGy is more intensive than that at 100 kGy. This results of 
is related to the phenomenon in which as total dose increases, the tracking resistance of M-
PC is improved compared with unirradiated samples and the tracking resistance decreases 
with the total dose from 100 kGy to 1000 kGy. 
 
     
(i) 0 kGy   (ii) 100 kGy    (iii) 1 MGy 
(a) PBT, the applied voltage was 375 V 
   
(i) 0 kGy   (ii) 100 kGy   (iii) 1 MGy 
(b) PET, the applied voltage was 450 V 
Fig. 25. Relation between the RP and the dosage of gamma-ray irradiation 
 
 
(a) Unirradiation    (b) 100 kGy    (c) 1000 kGy 
Fig. 26. RPs of discharge currents with M-PC 
Fig. 27 shows the recurrence plots of the discharge currents with PE at 400V. The point 
density and the white spaces all decrease with the increase of the irradiation dosage, which 
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indicates the intensity and the high amplitude transients of the discharge currents decrease. 
These results are related to the phenomenon where as total dose increases the tracking 
resistance of PE is improved. It is also confirmed that the point density and the white space 
are directly related to the features of the discharge process. 
Fig. 28 shows the relationship between the quantitative indicators and the gamma-ray 
radiation. The RR increases for M-PC but decreases for PE with the increase of the radiation 
dosage, while the DET of PE increases. The DET of M-PC increases with the total dose from 
0 kGy to 100 kGy and decreases from 100 kGy to 1000 kGy. For M-PC, the increasing of RR 
indicates that the intensity of the discharge currents increases. The DET increases first and 
then decreases indicate that the deterministic ingredients of the discharge currents increases 
first and then decreases with increasing the radiation dosage. For PE, the decreasing of RR 
and the decreasing of DET indicate that the discharge is more stable and regular. 
 
 
(a) Unirradiation    (b) 100 kGy   (c) 1000 kGy 
Fig. 27. RPs of discharge currents with PE 
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Fig. 28. Relationship between the quantitative indicators and the gamma-ray radiation 
8. Conclusions 
The effects of gamma-ray irradiation on dielectric breakdown have been studied by 
applying a dc pulse voltage. The experiments reveal that the dielectric properties of 
polybutylene polymers are obviously changed by the gamma-ray irradiation. With the 
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increase of the total dose of irradiation, the time to dielectric breakdown increases with 
PBN, but decreases with PBT, the discharge quantity decreases with PBN, but increases with 
PBT. It indicates that the total dose of irradiation has a converse effect on the discharge 
quantities. The discharge quantity increases with the decrease of the discharge interval with 
PBN, but the tendency is opposite with PBT. Time to dielectric breakdown for both PBN and 
PBT all decreases with the decrease of the discharge interval. The dielectric properties of 
PBN are improved, but worsened for PBT by gamma-ray irradiation. Dielectric properties 
are improved by irradiation for polybutylene polymers which contain more combined 
phenyls in the main chain. 
The tracking resistance of gamma-ray irradiated polycarbonate mixed with polyethylene by 
use of IEC 60112 is studied. With the increase of the total dose of Gamma-ray irradiation, 
both the erosion depth and weight loss are smaller than that of unirradiated samples, which 
show the tracking resistance is improved. Both the erosion depth and weight loss decrease 
with the total dose increasing from 0 kGy to 100 kGy, but increase from 100 kGy to 1000 
kGy. There is a threshold value for the tracking resistance near 100 kGy. When the total dose 
exceeds the threshold value, the tracking resistance begins to decrease. 
The effect of gamma-ray irradiation on tracking failure of PBN, PBT and PET by applying a 
dc pulse voltage under reduce atmospheric pressure is studied. With the decrease of the 
atmospheric pressure, the time to tracking failure and the discharge quantity all increase 
with PBN and PET. The time to tracking failure is delayed with PBT, and the discharge 
quantity decreases with decreasing the atmospheric pressure. It is found that the irradiation 
and reduced pressure stress response of PBN, PET and PBT are variable: the resistance to 
tracking failure of PBN and PET are improved, but worsened for PBT by gamma-ray 
irradiation and the resistance to tracking failure of all them are influenced obviously by the 
reduced atmospheric pressure. 
The effects of gamma-ray irradiation and magnetic field on tracking failure of PBN, PBT and 
PET by applying a HV pulse voltage are studied. Under the magnetic field, the time to 
tracking failure of all the samples are delayed with the relative angles of 0 and 90 degrees, 
but decrease with the relative angle of 270 degrees, the discharge quantity of the samples 
increase with the relative angles of 90 and 270 degrees, but decrease with the relative angle 
of 0 degree. In addition, it decreases with the relative angle of 90 degrees for PBT. The 
carbonization path is downside to the sample surface with the relative angle of 0 degree. 
The carbonization path of 90 degrees is narrow and the carbonization path of 270 degrees is 
almost circular. The carbonized area decreases from 0 to 90 degrees and then increases from 
90 to 270 degrees for all the samples. The carbonized area of 0 degree is biggest and that of 
90 degrees is smallest for PBT and PET, but that of 270 degrees is biggest for PBN. 
Recurrence plots are employed to evaluate the resistance to tracking of polymer samples 
with gamma-ray irradiation. The results obtained show that it is useful to visualize the state 
of discharge process. The recurrence plots confirmed by the CTI can successfully indicate 
the resistance to tracking of polymer material with gamma-ray irradiation. Recurrence plots 
can serve as a visual method to identify different dynamic systems and reveal time-domain 
features of the discharge. The recurrence point density decreases with the increase of the 
dosage of irradiation for PBT. This can be explained by the resistance to tracking of PBT 
decreasing by increasing the dosage of gamma-ray irradiation. On the other hand, with the 
increase of the dosage of gamma-ray irradiation, the recurrence point density increases for 
PET, indicating less complex discharge process. This can be explained due to cross-linking 
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being the predominant process through irradiation. The improvement in mechanical and 
thermal performance through irradiation leads to less easy carbonization. In the dc tracking 
test of gamma-ray irradiated polycarbonate, the topological structures of the recurrence 
plots with the irradiated samples are different from that of the unirradiated sample. There 
are bigger white space segments, which indicate that there are high amplitude transients in 
the discharge currents of unirradiated sample. The recurrence point density increases from 
100 kGy to 1000 kGy, which suggests that the discharge processes of the total dose at 1000 
kGy irradiated samples is more intensive than that at 100 kGy. 
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